ill 


WAR  AND  REVOLUTION 
IN  RUSSIA  1914—1917 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  VORK   •    BOSTON   •    CHICAGO  •    DALLAS 
ATLANTA   •    SAN   FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


■"H 


GENERAL  GOLRKO 
From   a  painting  by   Mrs.   Lessly-Cotton 


WAR  AND  REVOLUTION 
IN  RUSSIA  1914-1917/ 


BY 

GENERAL   BASIL   GOURKO 

Chief  of  Russian   Imperial  General  Staff,  November  1916 — March 

1917;  Commander-in-Chief  of  Western  Armies, 

March  1917— June  1917 


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Copyright,  1919 
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Sul  up  and  electr(ftvpe(l.'^Pfift?isbed.  January,  1919 


•   •        ••  •      • 


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•  *    • 

•  •  • 


TO 

MY  WIFE 

These  Pages  'were  ivr'itten  ivhen  my  ivife  ivas  ivorking  in  the  capacity  of 
'voluntary  Sister  of  Charity  in  a  divisional  bandaging  detachment  in  the 
French  Army. 

Having  arrived  in  France  ivith  me,  my  ivife,  after  three  years  of  ivar  at  the 
Front,  in  spite  of  the  anxious  days  through  ivhich  she  had  lived  during  the 
time  of  my  imprisonment  in  the  Fortress  of  Peter  and  Paul,  did  not  care  about 
entertaining  the  idea  of  limiting  herself  to  the  life  of  an  ordinary  tvoman,  ivith 
all  the  unavoidable  results  ivhich  so  little  harmonise  with  the  events  through 
luhich  ive  are  living. 

As  at  this  time  we  ivere  taking  advantage  of  the  hospitality  of  France,  quite 
naturally,  she  wished  to  devote  herself  to  the  French  wounded  soldiers.  She 
made  only  one  condition;  that  she  should  work  in  a  medical  institution  where 
there  were  no  other  sisters  and  where  the  first  surgical  aid  is  given  to  the 
wounded.  By  the  decision  of  the  French  high  authorities,  she  was  taken,  with 
regard  to  her  experience,  into  a  surgical  bandaging  detachment,  in  order  to 
show  if  a  woman  can  meet  the  difficulties  which  are  inseparable  from  the  work 
in  a  divisional  detachment. 

On  December  i^th,  1917,  she  entered  the  221st  Bandaging  Detachment.  In 
three  months  the  medical  authorities  of  the  place  were  to  give  their  report. 
But  on  March  2ird,  1918,  a  German  lo-inch  shell  fell  into  the  half-ruined  cot- 
tage which  served  as  the  mess  of  the  medical  staff,  during  their  lunch  hour. 
Four  doctors,  two  officer  administrators,  and  my  wife  were  struck  by  the  broken 
shell.  Not  long  before  a  munition  store  was  placed  near  the  bandaging  de- 
tachment, and  this  was  subjected  to  the  German  fire.  After  the  catastrophe 
the  detachment  was  sent  to  another  village.  The  German  shell  shortened  my 
wife's  earthly  existence  and  her  self-denying  work.  But  it  is  not  for  me,  the 
man  who  was  so  near  to  her,  to  give  the  characteristics  of  such  a  remarkable 
woman.  Perhaps  some  time  she  will  find  a  just  and  merited  reward.  But 
one  can  already  express  the  hope  that  her  four  years'  work  at  the  Front,  and 
even  more  by  her  death  on  the  field  of  honour,  she  helped  to  ensure  the  hope 
of  a  better  future  for  the  country  where  there  are  women  of  such  remarkable 
energy,  of  so  developed  a  feeling  of  duty,  women  able  to  work  and  to  sacri- 
fice their  lives  in  the  name  of  self-denial  and  love  to  suffering  humanity. 


PREFACE 

In  the  midst  of  profound  peace,  in  the  active  work  of 
economical  and  social  reform,  Russia,  as  by  thunderbolt, 
was  struck  by  the  news  of  approaching  mobilisation,  and 
by  the  urgent  necessity  of  having  recourse  to  the  sword  to 
protect  her  interests  and  those  of  the  other  Slav  nations. 

To  define  exactly  the  position  in  which  the  beginning  of 
the  war  found  Russia,  it  is  necessary  briefly  to  survey  her 
political  condition  at  the  moment.  The  country  was  still 
feeling  the  disturbing  effects  of  the  Revolution  of  1905-6. 
The  intellectual  classes  which  had  now  received  access  to 
and  obtained  a  share  in  political  life  and  legislation,  were 
engrossed  by  the  struggle  with  the  Government.  This  tur- 
moil centred  specially  in  the  Imperial  Duma.  With  the 
opening  of  military  action  this  internal  strife  of  the  parties, 
as  in  other  European  countries,  and  the  striving  for  suprem- 
acy between  the  Imperial  Duma  and  the  Government,  died 
down  at  first,  but  later  became  gradually  acute  again. 

This,  we  observe,  was  the  case  with  all  our  Allies  and  in 
a  certain  degree  with  our  enemies.  After  three  years  of 
war,  this  struggle,  becoming  still  more  acute,  brought  about 
a  crisis  which  ended  in  the  Revolution  of  March  19 17. 

As  to  Russia's  military  strength  and  her  readiness  to 
enter  the  war,  it  is  necessary  to  remember  that  the  wounds 
sustained  by  the  Army  in  unsuccessful  war  with  Japan  in 
the  Far  East  were  not  yet  healed.  The  imperial  Duma, 
whose  representatives  were  mainly  concerned  with  military 
affairs,  by  all  its  measures  incited  the  Government,  with- 
out considering  the  cost,  to  prepare  the  Army  as  quickly  as 

vii 


viii  PREFACE 

possible  for  war,  and  to  take  such  steps  as  would  save  the 
Russian  Army  and  the  Russian  military  establishment  from 
dependence  upon  foreign  supplies.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Government,  basing  its  policy  on  the  fact  that  it  had  never 
adopted  aggressive  politics,  considered  it  imperative  to  ob- 
serve severe  economy  in  all  expenditure  and  consequently 
postponed  for  many  years  the  necessary  outlay  for  the  de- 
fence of  the  country.  The  result  was  that,  in  taking  mili- 
tary measures,  we  were  far  behind  our  Western  neighbours. 
Finally,  the  third  influence  which  must  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration was  the  realisation  of  that  economic  reform 
which  brought  about  the  transition  of  the  peasantry  from 
common  to  single  ownership  and  its  effect  on  the  great  mass 
of  the  Russian  population.  It  is  sufl'icient  to  mention  that 
it  made  it  necessary  for  every  peasant  landowner  to  fix  new 
boundaries  to  his  possessions;  in  most  cases,  the  exchange  of 
one  land  for  another,  and  finally,  for  the  greater  part  of 
the  peasantry,  the  transfer  of  their  farm-buildings  from  one 
place  to  another.  This  far-reaching  reform,  though  hardly 
apparent  to  the  stranger,  profoundly  affected  the  interests 
of  the  great  Russian  peasant  population,  which  forms  more 
than  90  per  cent,  of  the  Army's  recruits. 

The  moral  of  the  Russian  Army  during  the  whole  three 
years  of  the  war  was  deeply  affected  by  these  circumstances. 
Only  strict  discipline,  the  habit  of  obeying  his  chiefs,  and 
the  inborn  respect  for  fate  of  the  Russian  peasant,  made  him 
conscientiously  do  his  duty,  though  his  thoughts  were  all  at 
home.  Imagine,  then,  the  sensation  aroused  in  him  by  the 
spreading  Revolution,  when  at  last  he  understood  that  all 
the  elements  hitherto  sustaining  him  had  failed.  Dominant 
in  his  being  was  the  irresistible  desire  to  return  home  and 
to  take  part  in  the  organisation  of  his  future  economical 
life.     And  if  one  adds  to  this  the  principle,  proclaimed  by 


PREFACE  ix 

the  Revolution,  of  the  transfer  of  the  country  squires'  estates 
to  the  peasantry,  it  will  be  clear  why  all  the  thoughts  of  the 
peasant  soldier  turned  towards  material  questions  to  the 
detriment  of  everything  which,  till  now,  had  incited  him  to 
perform  honestly  his  duties  as  a  soldier.  When  the  Russian 
soldiers'  hostility  to  the  continuation  of  the  war  became 
known  to  our  Allies  it  excited  the  most  intense  astonishment. 
A  comparison  was  made  between  the  successes  won  by  the 
young  army  of  France  after  the  great  Revolution  of  the 
eighteenth  century  and  the  debacle  of  the  mighty  Russian 
military  machine. 

The  comparison  was,  of  course,  against  us.  But  to  what 
was  this  due?  To  forgetfulness,  simple  ignorance,  or  in- 
tentional perversion  of  history?  If  the  crowd  judges  by 
external  signs  and  superficial  knowledge,  it  is  unpardonable 
that  the  Press  and  leaders  of  thought  and  policy  should  form 
their  conclusions  on  the  same  meagre  premises.  Do  they 
forget  that  the  wars  of  France  were  the  effect  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, that  on  the  fields  of  Valmy  and  Jemappes  France  was 
protecting  her  sacred  Revolt?  In  Russia,  on  the  contrary, 
the  war  (especially  to  a  superficial  observer),  was  the  prin- 
cipal cause  of  the  Russian  Revolution,  as  the  revolutionary 
movement  of  1905-6  was  the  result  of  our  failure  in  Man- 
churia. In  the  opinion  of  the  nation,  the  war  had  made 
the  Russian  Revolution.  Therefore  it  had  done  its  work; 
it  was  not  necessary  to  continue  the  war.  This  was  the 
principal  formula  of  agitators  "  who  were  deepening  the 
Revolution,"  and  whose  preaching  drowned  the  voices  of 
those  who  called  upon  the  Russian  soldier  to  fight  for  the 
"  safety  of  the  Revolution." 

But  there  is  another  circumstance  which  entirely  pre- 
cludes the  comparison  between  France's  position  after  the 
Revolution  with  that  of  Russia  in  19 17.     The  French  Army, 


X  PREFACE 

in  order  to  win  Valmy  and  Jemappes,  had  more  than  two 
years  of  quiet  preparation.  The  whole  French  Army  was 
recruited  from  fresh  young  elements  uncorrupted  by  close 
association  with  the  effervescence  of  the  Revolution.  Why 
France  had  an  opportunity  of  two  years'  preparation  for 
the  determined  conflict  is  quite  another  question,  and  I  shall 
not  touch  upon  it;  its  decision  did  not  depend  upon  France. 
The  conduct  of  the  remainder  of  the  royal  troops  in  France 
was  disgraceful,  for  these  troops,  directly  after  the  Revolu- 
tion, though  in  another  degree,  brought  about  the  same 
scenes  of  disorganisation  which  were  observed  in  our  coun- 
try. They  also  ran  shamefully  from  the  weak  attack  of 
German  and  Austrian  troops,  as  our  "  comrades  "  ran. 

Such  were,  as  was  said  above,  the  principal  traits  which 
characterised  the  internal  political  life  in  Russia.  In  Rus- 
sian external  politics  the  principal  attention  was  directed 
to  the  Near  East.  This  attention  was  especially  acute  after 
the  so-called  Balkan  War,  1911-12,  which  was  ended  by 
the  disruption  of  the  small  Balkan  nations,  hitherto  allied 
against  Turkey.  In  this  unexpected  rupture  was  clearly 
seen  the  hand  of  the  diplomacy  of  the  Central  Powers.  In 
this  case  German  politics  followed  the  familiar  road.  This 
same  German  policy,  after  the  Japan-China  War,  awoke 
the  dissension  between  Russia  and  Japan.  The  principal 
cause  of  that  dissension  was  the  occupation  by  Russia  of 
the  Liaoyang  Peninsula,  with  Port  Arthur,  accomplished 
by  agreement  and  in  opposition  to  the  plans  of  Germany 
who  occupied  Kiatchao  in  the  Gulf  of  Pe-Tchi-li.  Conse- 
quently, in  her  wish  to  weaken  her  probable  adversaries, 
Germany,  with  the  support  of  the  South  African  Republics, 
encouraged  the  outbreak  of  the  Anglo-Boer  War.  With  the 
glad  consent  of  Germany,  Italy  undertook  the  colonial  war 
with  Tripoli. 


PREFACE  xi 

During  the  last  few  years,  all  the  wars  of  civilised  na- 
tions were  prepared  in  one  way  or  another  by  German 
diplomacy,  guided  by  the  War  Lord,  William.  It  is  enough 
here  to  recall  his  telegram  to  the  President  of  the  Transvaal 
Republic,  Kriiger,  at  the  moment  when  this  small  State  had 
to  decide  for  war  or  peace  with  England. 

Germany,  by  instigating  these  wars,  counted  upon  weaken- 
ing her  future  adversaries  and  undermining  them  economic- 
ally. 

Not  without  the  influence  of  German  diplomacy,  then, 
occurred  the  dissension  among  the  allied  Balkan  nations. 
To  encourage  this  dissension  was  not  difficult;  the  inter- 
ests of  the  nations  involved  were  complex  in  the  extreme, 
and  the  division  of  conquered  Turkey  was  a  veritable  apple 
of  discord  among  the  Balkan  States.  But  it  would  be  a 
mistake  to  say  that  the  Balkan  question,  and  the  closely  asso- 
ciated Slav  question,  had  in  19 14  for  Germany  any  essen- 
tial importance.  We  see  now,  when  these  events  are  part 
of  the  past,  that  the  question  most  troubling  Germany  was 
her  rivalry  with  England.  The  fact  that  Germany  hoped 
not  to  see  England  among  the  number  of  her  enemies  in  the 
present  war  confirms  that  idea.  In  this  case  Germany  only 
followed  her  usual  tactics  by  attacking  and  endeavouring  to 
dispose  of  the  weakest,  in  order  to  make  the  struggle  with 
her  principal  enemy  easier.  The  Governments  of  the  Eu- 
ropean countries  concerned  understood,  of  course,  the  tend- 
ency of  Germany,  and  intended  to  begin  the  war  at  the 
same  time,  to  deprive  her  of  opportunity  of  beating  her 
adversaries  separately. 

Germany  found  herself  within  a  ring  of  foes.  But  this 
discovery,  painful  as  it  must  have  been  to  Teuton  diplomacy, 
did  not  change   the  Teuton   tactics.     Germany   invariably 


xii  PREFACE 

takes  adv-antage  of  every  chance  to  attack  her  weak  ad- 
versaries and  finish  with  them  so  as  to  deal  with  her  more 
formidable  opponents  in  turn.  The  only  means  of  meeting 
such  strategy  would  be  the  co-ordination  of  the  forces  of  all 
the  Allies;  but  to  this,  unfortunately,  there  were  so  many 
obstacles  that  the  Allies  found  themselves  unable  to  carry 
it  out.  Will  they  succeed  in  the  future?  It  will  depend 
upon  the  wisdom  of  their  rulers,  and  in  what  degree  they 
learn  to  subordinate  personal  interest  to  the  general  inter- 
est of  the  Alliance. 

Paris, 
March,  1918. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I  The  Mobilisation  of  the  Russian  Army     .      .  i 

II  The  Strategical  Development 15 

III  First  Fighting  Operations 25 

IV  The  Occupation  of  East  Prussia     ....  38 

V     Cavalry  Operations  and  Some  Characteristic 

Incidents 47 

VI     Our  Dash  Through  the  German  Lines     .      .     59 

VII     The  Battle  of  Tannenberg 71 

VIII     Fighting  in  Poland  and  Galicia 84 

IX     Beginning  of  Trench  Warfare  —  Retreat  of 

the  Russian  Armies 100 

X     Munitions  of  War 118 

XI     The  Summer  Campaign  of  1915 129 

XII     Flight  of  the  Russian  Population  —  Care  of 

THE  Wounded 144 

XIII  The  Crucial  Winter  of  1915-16     ....   158 

XIV  Summer  Fighting  of  1916 170 

XV    At    General    Headquarters    in    Mohileff  — 

Entry  of  Roumania 183 

XVI     General     Korniloff  —  My    Appointment    as 

Chief  of  Staff 198 

XVII  First  Days  at  General  Headquarters  .      .      .  210 

XVIII  The  Political  Situation  in  1916     ....  218 

XIX  The  Fighting  in  Roumania 232 

XX  Free  Poland  —  The  Railway  Problem  .      .      .  245 

XXI     Preparations    for   the    Offensive    in    1917  — 

THE  Murder  of  Rasputin 262 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XXII     Political  Changes  in  Petrograd      ....  274 

XXIII  The  Inter-Ally  Conference 291 

XXIV  The  Polish  Question  and  First  Signs  of  Revo- 

lution     308 

XXV    The    Revolution  —  Abdication    of    the    Em- 
peror        322 

XXVI     The  First  Effects  of  the  Revolution  .      .      .   338 

XXVII     The  Attempted  Reorganisation  of  the  Army  354 

XXVIII  Kerensky,  Minister  of  War^ — The  Confer- 
ence of  the  Commanders-in-Chief  in  Petro- 
grad —  My  Conflict  with  the  Government  368 

XXIX  The  Election  of  the  Cossack's  Ataman  —  My 
Arrest  and  Confinement  in  the  Fortress  of 
Peter  and   Paul  —  Departure  to  England  381 

APPENDIX  I 
The  Tsar's  Order  of  the  Day 399 

APPENDIX  II 

General  Gourko's  Letter  to  the  Tsar,  Written  Four 

Days  After  His  Abdication 402 

APPENDIX  III 

Order    of    the    Commander-in-Chief   of   the    Western 

Front,  June  8th,  1917 402 

Index 411 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


General   Gourko Frontispiece 

From  a  painting  by   Mrs.   Lessly-Cotton. 

PAGE 

His  Majesty  Nicolai  II 36 

General  Aide-de-Camp   Samsonoff  and  General  Aide-de-Camp 

Rennenkampf     ,      .  67 

General  Gourko  and  General  Tcherbatcheff :  a  halt  by  the  way- 
side         136 

Most     convenient     and     comfortable     means     of     transferring 

wounded  on  bad  roads 154 

Mohileff:  house  occupied  by  His  Majesty  (on  the  right)  and  by 

headquarters   (on  the  left)  at  the  Stafka 184 

General  Gourko  as  Chief  of  the  Staff,  1916-1917     ....    220 

Bedroom  of  His  Majesty  and  the  Tsarevitch  at  headquarters  in 

Mohileff 236 

The  conference  at  Mohileff,  19 15,  which  decided  the  campaign 

for  1916 270 

Heads  of  the  Allied  Military  Missions 298 

General  Gourko  and  General  Russky  at  Kislovodsk  ....  386 

Madame  Gourko  as  a  Sister  of  Charity 398 

General  Gourko  in  the  fortress  of  St.  Peter  and  St.  Paul     .      .  398 


WAR  AND  REVOLUTION  IN 
RUSSIA  1914-1917 

CHAPTER  I 

THE    MOBILISATION    OF    THE    RUSSIAN    ARMY 

Peace-loving  Russia  was  in  the  midst  of  the  summer  holi- 
days when  the  storm-clouds,  which  had  hovered  over  Europe 
for  a  month,  finally  burst. 

Petrograd  and  Moscow  were  practically  deserted;  only 
those  people  whose  duties  confined  them  to  the  cities  were 
in  residence.  Dark  as  the  political  horizon  was  after  the 
assassination  of  the  Austrian  heir  at  Serajevo,  few  imagined 
that  the  differences  between  Austria  on  the  one  hand,  and 
Serbia  and  Russia  on  the  other,  were  so  grave  that  they  could 
not  be  settled  by  ordinary  diplomatic  procedure. 

When  it  became  clear  that  Austria  intended  to  make  a 
casus  belli  of  the  incident  and  to  prosecute  the  conflict  with 
Serbia  with  all  her  might,  the  Russian  Government  decided 
to  declare  a  mobilisation  of  the  troops  stationed  on  the 
Russo-Austrian  frontier. 

On  July  24th  it  became  generally  known  that  a  conflict 
was  inevitable.  The  troops  had  already  left  for  their 
summer  training  camps.  Two  days  later  they  were  directed 
to  return  to  their  winter  quarters;  orders  had  been  re- 
ceived by  the  commanders  of  the  military  districts  that  their 
forces  were  to  undergo  preparatory  mobilisation. 

The  first  order  affected  only  the  districts  of  Odessa,  Kieff, 

I 


2         MOBILISATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMY     [ch.  i 

Petrograd,  and  Kazan;  the  hour  of  mobilisation  was  to  be 
midnight  July  29th-30th.  The  commanders  of  these  dis- 
tricts had  barely  time  to  commence  obeying  their  instruc- 
tions when  fresh  orders  were  received  stating  that  the 
mobilisation  was  to  be  general.  This,  of  course,  brought 
in  all  the  other  military  districts,  and  to  avoid  confusion 
the  mobilisation  was  fixed  to  date  from  midnight  July 
30th-3ist.  The  following  day,  at  7.10  p.m.,  the  Kaiser 
signed  Germany's  declaration  of  war  on  Russia. 

The  cancellation  of  the  order  for  the  mobilisation  of  the 
Southern  armies  against  Austria  and  the  substitution  of  a 
general  mobilisation  was  the  pretext  on  which  the  German 
Emperor  declared  war  against  Russia.  The  German  Gov- 
ernment alleged  that  this  furnished  undoubted  proof  that 
Russia  was  preparing  herself  to  fight  not  only  with  Austria- 
Hungary  in  case  she  attacked  defenceless  Serbia,  but  also 
with  Germany.  Thus,  among  other  things,  the  German 
Emperor,  in  his  autograph  note  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  transmitted  by  the  American  Ambassador, 
Mr.  J.  W.  Gerard,  said  that  the  Tsar's  order  for  the  general 
mobilisation  was  also  directed  against  Germany. 

In  the  project  of  the  agreement,  signed  by  the  Emperors 
Nicolas  II  and  William  II  in  Bjorko  in  July  1905,  which 
originated  exclusively  with  William  II,  it  was  stated: 

"  If  any  European  Empire  attacks  another,  then  the  Em- 
pire which  was  allied  with  the  other,  bound  by  this  covenant, 
engages  itself  to  help  it  with  its  land  and  naval  forces." 

This  meant  that,  to  help  her  future  Ally,  Germany  wished 
to  put  into  the  field  all  the  Russian  military  forces.  Is  it 
possible  the  German  Emperor  could  suppose  that  Russia, 
forced  into  the  necessity  of  leading  the  attack  against  Aus- 
tria, would  not  at  once  put  into  the  field  all  her  military 
strength?     Are  we  to  regard  the  Emperor  William,  who 


1914]     MOBILISATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMY  3 

considers  himself  proficient  In  military  art,  as  Intentionally  or 
unwittingly  forgetful  of  the  elementary  and  fundamental 
principles  of  warfare,  "  to  put  at  once  Into  the  field  not  only 
all  the  forces,  but  at  once  superiority  of  weight  over  the 
enemy,  and  not  to  risk  being  partially  broken  "?  But  then 
the  question  really  arises:  If  the  German  mobilisation  was 
directed  only  against  Russia,  why  then  in  this  case  did  Ger- 
many not  maintain  this  principle  and  declare  war  only  with 
Russia?  Immediately  prior  to  the  declaration  of  war  Ger- 
many was  making  advantageous  proposals  to  France,  hop- 
ing to  keep  her  neutral,  and  was  mobilising  all  her  Army 
and  all  her  Fleet. 

The  order  for  partial  mobilisation  was  Russia's  reply  to 
the  mobilisation  of  eight  Austrian  army  corps  disposed  near 
the  Serbian  frontier.  Austria  counter-moved  by  mobilising 
all  her  armies.  When  this  became  known  in  Russia  the 
order  was  given  to  mobilise  the  entire  Russian  Army. 

As  evidence  how  little  the  outbreak  of  war  was  expected 
In  Russia  may  be  mentioned  the  fact  that  people  were 
pouring  out  of  the  big  towns  for  their  summer  holidays, 
while  at  the  same  time  the  Russian  soldiery  were  being  con- 
veyed to  their  summer  training  camps,  which  in  some  cases 
were  a  hundred  versts  from  the  regimental  headquarters 
where  all  the  equipment  necessary  for  a  campaign  was  stored. 
This  meant  that  before  they  could  join  In  the  mobilisation 
they  would  have  to  be  brought  back.  Improvisation  In  such 
difficult  problems  as  mobilisation  is  out  of  the  question;  the 
gain  of  a  day,  or  even  an  hour,  during  the  first  movements 
may  prove  of  incalculable  Importance,  and  for  that  reason 
it  was  decided  by  the  Tsar  that  there  should  be  a  general 
mobilisation  of  all  Russia's  fighting  forces. 

The  order  for  the  preparatory  mobilisation  inevitably 
became  known  to  millions  of  army  men  and  civilians  and 


4         MOBILISATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMY     [ch.  i 

drifted  through  to  the  ears  of  our  enemies.  Had  Germany 
regarded  this  action,  not  only  as  a  menace  to  Austria,  but 
as  a  desire  to  enter  into  hostilities,  then  surely  from  that 
day  protestations  would  have  been  made  to  the  Russian 
Government.  Instead  of  protesting  the  Central  European 
Powers  commenced  preparing  for  war,  especially  as  regards 
their  mercantile  marine  trading  in  distant  waters.  Indisput- 
able evidence  to  this  effect  afterwards  fell  into  our  hands  in 
the  form  of  documents  captured  by  us  in  East  Prussia. 

On  the  evening  of  July  29th  it  became  known  that  the 
Tsar  had  signed  the  order  for  the  general  mobilisation. 
All  Russia,  both  civil  and  military,  settled  down  to  work. 
Justice  must  be  done  to  the  millions  of  people,  both  high  and 
low,  who  came  forward  to  work  with  such  good-will  and 
energy  that  the  results  exceeded  our  most  sanguine  hopes  and 
expectations,  to  say  nothing  of  the  calculations  of  the  enemy. 
In  keeping  with  this  speed  was  the  efficiency  of  accomplish- 
ment. To  enable  the  complications  and  difficulties  of  a  gen- 
eral mobilisation  within  the  Russian  Empire  to  be  properly 
appreciated,  it  is  necessary  to  show  the  difference  between 
Russia  and  the  Western  Em.pires,  in  those  elements  which 
have  the  greatest  influence  in  the  rapidity  of  such  operations. 
For  100  square  kilometres  in  European  Russia,  without  the 
Provinces  of  Poland,  Russia,  for  every  10,000  inhabitants, 
had  0.96  kilometres  of  railways.  Germany,  in  the  same 
proportion,  possessed  11.5  kilometres. 

Consequently  Germany  had  twelve  times  more  devel- 
oped railways  than  European  Russia  —  which  was  obliged 
to  serve  a  population  2^  times  greater.  In  addition,  in 
Russia  everything  had  to  be  transported,  during  the  mobi- 
lisation, on  an  average,  live  times  farther,  taking  into  con- 
sideration only  European  Russia  and  also  the  fact  that 
all  the  troops  went  in  the  same  direction.     The  number  of 


I9I4]     MOBILISATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMY  5 

troops  conveyed  enormous  distances  would  sufficiently  illus- 
trate these  difficulties.  It  is  necessary  to  remember  how 
comparatively  small  is  the  number  of  what  are  known  as 
strategical  railways  which  were  free  to  carry  troops  to  our 
frontier  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Rumanian  borders,  where  an 
immediate  disposition  of  an  army  was  necessary.  Up  till 
then,  however,  it  was  by  no  means  clear  to  those  in  com- 
mand whether  Russia  would  have  to  face  Austria  as  a  single 
adversary  or  whether  there  would  be  a  coalition  of  the  Cen- 
tral Powers. 

Historical  events  moved  very  quickly,  however,  and  within 
two  days  of  the  order  for  the  general  mobilisation  it  was 
clear  that  Russia  was  threatened  with  warfare  on  the  whole 
of  her  western  frontier.  Then  arose  the  question  in  the 
minds  of  every  one  —  to  whom  would  Italy  and  Rumania 
ally  themselves? 

There  were  a  few  secondary  causes  which  threatened  to 
impede  the  successful  and  rapid  carrying  out  of  the  mobilisa- 
tion. Quite  recently  there  had  been  undertaken,  but  not 
altogether  finished,  the  withdrawal  of  several  corps  of  in- 
fantry and  some  divisions  of  cavalry  from  parts  of  the 
frontier  to  the  Central  and  other  Governments  close  to  the 
Volga.  This  measure  had  been  taken  on  economic,  not  on 
military  grounds,  which  proves  beyond  doubt  that  Russia 
was  far  removed  from  any  idea  of  aggression  towards  her 
neighbours.  The  fact  is  that  a  large  concentration  of  troops 
on  the  border  provided  an  undoubted  economic  gain  to  the 
inhabitants  of  the  district,  but  was  detrimental  to  the  inter- 
ests of  the  interior  provinces,  who  contributed  their  share  to 
the  upkeep  of  the  army  without  getting  any  benefit  from 
their  presence  within  their  boundaries. 

Another  reform  which  impeded  the  mobilisation  was  the 
system    known    as    the    "  hidden    reserves."     All    fighting 


6        MOBILISATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMY     [ch.  i 

branches  of  the  Army  have  formations  within  their  own 
formations  composed  of  comparatively  small  numbers  of 
officers  and  men  who  have  to  form  the  nucleus  of  the  second 
line  of  offence;  these  were  the  hidden  reserves.  At  the 
same  time  all  the  staffs  of  the  higher  military  commands  had 
to  be  formed;  this  last  requirement,  with  the  others,  indicates 
the  defects  of  the  system,  for  naturally  the  new  staff  could 
not  at  once  become  familiar  with  their  duties  under  the  new 
conditions.  This  affected  the  training  of  the  staffs  for  the 
higher  commands,  beginning  with  the  army  staff  and  finish- 
ing with  the  staff  of  the  generalissimo.  It  was  necessary  at 
the  outset  of  military  operations  to  form  one  staff  of  the 
generalissimo  for  the  whole  Russian  Army,  three  chief  com- 
mands, including  the  command  for  the  Caucasus,  and  eleven 
army  commands,  including  the  Caucasian  Army,  which  made 
in  all  fourteen  head  commands.  Officers  for  the  formation 
of  these  commands  should  have  served  in  -the  Ministry  of 
War  in  Petrograd,  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  and  the  war 
staffs  of  the  different  military  districts.  All  these  staffs, 
however,  could  only  spare  a  few  of  their  highly  placed  offi- 
cers for  the  formation  of  the  new  staffs  of  the  chief  army 
commands;  their  time  was  already  fully  occupied  with  the 
mobilisation  of  the  second  portion  of  the  Army,  together 
with  that  already  called  out. 

Naturally  the  number  of  officers  on  these  staffs  was  alto- 
gether insufficient  for  the  increased  duties  and  formation  of 
new  staffs.  This  led  to  the  detachment  of  officers  from 
the  front  line  units  to  the  staffs.  At  the  most  critical  time, 
when  the  work  of  the  staffs  was  most  responsible,  when  any 
mistake  might  cause  injury  beyond  repair,  on  the  activity 
of  the  troops  at  that  same  moment  these  staffs  were  being 
formed.  In  these  cases  the  responsibility  lay  with  the  com- 
manders who  retained  their  previous  positions  or  who  were 


1914]     MOBILISATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMY  7 

appointed  to  the  head  of  the  newly  formed  fighting  units  or 
staffs.  Nevertheless,  as  I  have  already  stated,  the  mobili- 
sation was  carried  out  very  successfully  and  so  quickly  that  it 
was  impossible  to  bestow  sufiicient  praise  on  the  army  staffs 
and  civil  administrations  who  took  part  in  it,  especially  in 
the  case  of  those  on  whom  fell  the  hardest  work  before  the 
completion  of  the  complicated  and  uninterrupted  transport 
arrangements.  It  was  quite  a  usual  occurrence  for  rail- 
way servants,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  actuated  only 
by  feelings  of  national  necessity  and  patriotism,  to  work 
twenty-four  hours  on  end  for  days  running  without  once 
closing  their  eyes. 

So  far  as  the  higher  commands  were  concerned,  men  had 
already  been  notified  in  peace-time  as  to  what  appointments 
they  would  hold.  However,  when  war  was  declared  these 
men  had  little  or  no  opportunity  of  becoming  acquainted  with 
the  troops  who  were  to  serve  under  them,  or  even  to  know 
their  immediate  subordinates. 

Naturally  this  did  not  enhance  the  commanders'  authority 
with  the  men,  nor  did  it  make  their  relations  with  their  assist- 
ants any  easier.  Although  the  great  personages  at  the 
head  of  the  higher  commands  are,  without  doubt,  of  great 
public  interest  owing  to  the  part  they  played  in  recent  his- 
torical events,  the  fact  that  most  of  these  people  are  still 
living,  and,  in  course  of  time,  let  us  hope,  will  again  figure 
prominently  in  the  government  of  the  country,  compels  me 
to  confine  myself  to  the  barest  outlines  of  their  curricidinn 
vita. 

At  the  head  of  the  Army  was  appointed  the  Grand  Ehike 
Nicolai  Nicolaievitch,  the  uncle  of  the  Tsar,  a  man  who, 
though  not  young,  was  still  full  of  vigour,  indeed  one  might 
almost  say,  of  youthful  energy.  Possessing  a  very  close 
knowledge  of  the  ways  of  troops,  the  Grand  Duke  had  re- 


8         MOBILISATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMY     [ch.  i 

ceived  his  military  education  at  the  NIcolaieffsky  Academy 
of  the  General  Staff  in  Petrograd.  Later  he  underwent  an 
extensive  experience  in  cavalry  commands;  a  little  less  than 
ten  years  ago  he  held  the  post  of  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  Guards  and  the  Petrograd  Military  District.  Although 
having  the  reputation  of  being  severe  and  fiery,  and  at  times 
lacking  self-control,  the  Grand  Duke  had  the  sympathies  of 
the  troops  he  was  to  command.  As  the  late  Inspector-Gen- 
eral of  Russian  Cavalry  he  knew  more  or  less  all  the  cavalry 
leaders  and  practically  all  the  other  prominent  officers,  as  all 
of  them,  on  taking  up  a  new  post,  came  to  Petrograd,  and 
there  had  to  report  themselves  to  the  Grand  Duke  as  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  District. 

His  appointment  as  Commander-in-Chief  on  the  Russian 
Army  was  greeted  with  pleasure  by  the  entire  Russian  Press 
without  any  dissentient  expression  of  opinion.  The  Grand 
Duke  was  not  afforded  the  opportunity  of  selecting  his  near- 
est assistants;  this  had  been  done  for  him  by  the  Ministry  of 
War. 

Although  the  Grand  Duke  had  had  no  opportunity  of 
endorsing  it,  a  list  of  these  officers  was  submitted  to  the 
Imperial  authority  and  duly  confirmed  by  the  Emperor. 

From  a  war  administrative  post,  General  Yanushkevitch 
was  not  long  before  appointed  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  in 
Petrograd,  and  when  war  broke  out  he  was  the  Grand 
Duke's  nearest  assistant. 

Yanushkevitch's  activities  in  this  post  inspired  the  observa- 
tion, "  Our  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  is  still  a  child,"  ad- 
dressed by  General  Soukhomlinoff,  to  a  close  friend  of  his, 
a  General  whose  initial  is  D-n. 

He  had  had  no  war  experience,  and,  as  was  natural  as 
far  as  strategical  combinations  were  concerned,  came  com- 
pletely under  the  influence  of  his  most  intimate  official  asso- 


I9I4]     MOBILISATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMY  g 

date,  the  Quartermaster-General  of  the  General  Staff  in 
Petrograd,  General  Daniloff.  For  several  years  Daniloff 
had  held  the  post  of  Quartermaster-General  of  the  General 
Staff  Administration.  Later  in  the  war  he  was  given  serv- 
ice posts,  and  became  commander  of  an  army  corps  and 
then  of  an  army.  During  the  Revolution  he  was  Chief  of 
Staff  on  the  Northern  Front  under  General  Russky,  and 
held  this  post  for  about  six  months. 

General  Ivanoff  was  appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  South-western  Front  Army  group.  His  staff  was 
formed  in  Kieff  from  the  staff  of  that  district,  and  General 
Ivanoff  was  to  command  the  armies  on  the  South-west  Front 
which  were  to  operate  against  Austria.  Ivanoff's  Chief  of 
Staff  was  General  Alexeieff,  later  to  be  famous  throughout 
the  world  as  Chief  of  Staff  to  the  Emperor.  General  Ivan- 
off's characteristics  were  typical  of  the  man  who,  from  very 
modest  ancestry,  had  worked  himself  up  to  the  position  of 
the  highest  importance.  His  special  qualities  of  character 
and  mind  were  good  nature,  kindness,  accessibility  to  juniors, 
evenness  of  temper,  and  great  modesty  combined  with 
punctilious  study  of  military  affairs.  Most  of  his  life  had 
been  spent  with  the  artillery,  including  garrison  armament. 
He  had  his  baptism  of  fire  in  the  Manchurian  campaign, 
while  holding  the  post  of  Commander  of  the  3rd  Siberian 
Army  Corps.  In  this  campaign,  amongst  other  honours, 
he  won  the  greatly  coveted  Order  of  St.  George  of  the 
Fourth  and  Third  Degrees,  highly  prized  in  all  European 
armies.  Although  his  fighting  activities  in  Manchuria  were 
neither  very  varied  nor  extensive,  they  gave  him  wide 
experience.  In  Manchuria  he  was  reproached  with  being 
completely  under  the  influence  of  his  Chief  of  Staff;  but,  if 
this  was  the  case,  it  could  only  have  been  of  service  to  the 
nation,  for  it  revealed  the  high  talents  of  General  Alexeieff. 


10       MOBILISATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMY     [ch.  i 

Alexeieff,  appreciating  his  influence  on  General  Ivanoff, 
was  able  to  work  out  strategical  plans,  knowing  that  he 
would  be  compelled  to  bear  the  full  responsibility  for  these 
decisions  on  his  own  shoulders.  Here,  then,  did  Alexeieff 
receive  that  preparatory  training  which  fitted  him  for  the 
high  duties  he  was  to  undertake  later  on. 

General  Alexeieff  spent  the  first  ten  years  of  his  military 
service  as  junior  officer  of  one  of  the  less  important  in- 
fantry regiments  quartered  in  Mohileff.  In  this  position 
he  received  his  baptism  of  fire  during  the  campaign  on  the 
Danube  of  1877-8,  his  first,  although  very  limited,  experi- 
ence of  fighting.  Only  in  the  tenth  year  of  his  service  did 
he  decide  to  take  his  examination  at  the  Nicolaieffsky  Mili- 
tary Academy,  and  when  he  did  so  he  finished  brilliantly. 
The  Manchurian  campaign  found  him  Quartermaster-Gen- 
eral; after  the  battle  of  Mukden,  during  a  period  of  com- 
parative calm,  he  became  Chief  of  Staff  to  the  3rd  Army. 
This  work  gave  him  extensive  war  experience,  especially  in 
staff  duties;  this  experience  he  turned  to  very  useful  pur- 
pose in  the  European  War. 

His  character  may  be  described  without  reserve,  for  it 
is  of  the  first  order.  Even  in  the  highest  position  he  re- 
tained an  unusual  modesty,  accessibility,  and  simplicity  which 
warmly  commended  him  to  all  who  had  to  deal  with  him 
directly.  He  could  not  be  reproached  with  exceptional 
softness,  for  he  took  measures  of  necessary  severity  to 
bring  into  effect  a  decision  once  made.  If  there  was  any 
shortcoming  in  his  character  it  was  only  in  dealing  with  his 
nearest  assistants  and  colleagues,  on  whose  failings  he  was 
wont  to  look  much  too  tolerantly.  However,  even  the 
sun  has  its  spots,  and  what  General  Alexeieff  is  mainly  re- 
proached with  is  that  he  took  too  much  work  on  himself. 
He  worked  out  many  questions  and  undertook  much  prepara- 


1914]     MOBILISATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMY        11 

tory  labour,  even  down  to  the  minutest  detail,  instead  of 
devolving  these  tasks  on  subordinates  and  putting  upon  them 
the  responsibility  for  their  conscientious  and  thoughtful  ful- 
filment. Naturally  such  methods  gave  him  a  great  deal 
of  trouble,  and  possibly  overtaxed  his  strength,  causing  the 
illness  which  unnoticed  crept  upon  him  in  October  19 16, 
and  nearly  killed  him  during  the  days  following.  Only 
after  four  months'  rest  in  the  sunny  Crimea  was  he  suffi- 
ciently recovered  to  resume  his  duties  of  Chief  of  the  Im- 
perial General  Staff.  This  took  place  only  a  week  before 
the  Revolution.  Later,  although  for  a  very  short  time, 
he  became  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Russian  armies. 
In  this  latter  capacity  his  work  was  but  little  changed,  for 
as  Chief  of  the  Staff  he  practically  fulfilled  the  role  of  Com- 
mander-in-Chief when  the  Emperor  Nicolai  II  was  called 
to  the  direction  of  other  state  affairs. 

One  must  think  and  hope  that  the  Russian  people  will 
again  receive  this  gifted,  high-minded  soldier,  and  will  again 
afford  him  the  opportunity  of  service  to  the  fatherland  he 
so  passionately  loves,  to  which  he  has  already  given  forty 
years  and  more  of  his  life's  most  irreproachable  and  earnest 
work. 

General  Gilinsky  was  appointed  Commander-in-Chief  on 
the  North-western  Front  or  Army  Group.  In  regard  to 
the  personality  of  this  General  I  can  say  but  little.  In 
the  Manchurian  campaign  he  held  the  post  of  Chief  of 
Staff  to  the  Viceroy  and  also  to  the  Commander-in-Chief. 
He  left  behind  him  no  specially  valuable  record,  and  his 
influence  on  the  war  can  hardly  be  called  successful.  Not- 
withstanding this,  a  short  time  prior  to  the  present  war  he 
held  the  post  of  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  having  been 
chosen  by  the  Minister  of  War,  General  Soukhomlinoff. 
When  the  post  of  Commander  of  the  Forces  and  Governor- 


12       MOBILISATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMY     [ch.  i 

General  of  Warsaw  fell  vacant,  Gilinsky  exerted  all  his  in- 
fluence towards  obtaining  it  and  succeeded.  This  appoint- 
ment only  proved,  I  am  sorry  to  say,  that  at  this  time  ap- 
pointments were  made  to  the  most  responsible  and  important 
posts  for  various  reasons,  least  of  which  was  the  suitability 
of  the  person  appointed.  Becoming  Commander  of  the 
Warsaw  Military  District  he  was  then  appointed  Com- 
mander-in-Chief on  that  point  in  the  event  of  war  with 
Germany,  though  his  fighting  qualities,  as  shown  in  the 
Japanese  War,  were  not  such  as  fitted  him  for  such  an  office. 
Later  events  only  confirmed  the  impression  of  his  unfitted- 
ness  for  his  responsibilities  as  Commander-in-Chief.  At 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  when  he  should  have  been  work- 
ing for  the  co-ordination  of  the  operations  of  Generals 
Samsonoiif  and  Rennenkampf,  he  failed  utterly  to  fulfil  this 
necessity. 

Among  the  men  who  received  appointments  to  the  com- 
mand of  armies  I  must  mention  Generals  Samsonoff,  Brus- 
siloff,  and  Rennenkampf,  the  first  two  as  having  played  an 
extraordinarily  prominent  part  in  the  early  days  of  the  war, 
and  the  latter  as  having  acquired  in  the  Japanese  War,  as  in 
the  Manchurian  campaign  of  1900,  the  reputation  of  a 
soldier  of  exceptional  energy,  determination,  courage,  and 
military  capability.  I  am  sorry  to  say  at  the  same  time 
that  his  moral  reputation  was  considerably  damaged.  Not- 
withstanding this  last  condition,  he  was,  just  prior  to  the 
war,  appointed  commander  of  the  East  Prussian  frontier 
forces  in  the  Vilna  Military  District,  where  earlier  he  had 
commanded  the  3rd  Army  Corps.  This  appointment  was 
criticised  by  many  on  account  of  his  moral  reputation,  but 
at  the  same  time  applauded  as  the  appointment  of  a  man 
who  would  give  his  country  good  service  in  time  of  war. 
Consequently,  when  his  military  fortune  changed,  the  pub- 


1914]     MOBILISATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMY        13 

lie  remembered  his  German  descent.  It  was  even  reported 
that  his  own  brother  was  serving  in  the  German  Army. 
In  any  case,  he  suffered  in  the  same  manner  as  did  many 
whose  mihtary  fortune  had  deserted  them.  The  public 
"  mouth,"  searching  for  reasons  and  excuses  for  a  military 
defeat,  invariably  expresses  itself  in  the  word  "  traitor  " 
and  searches  for  substantiation  where  there  can  be  no  possi- 
ble foundation.  In  any  case,  General  Rennenkampf's  Ger- 
man ancestry  was  an  undoubted  fact;  but  against  this  it 
must  be  remembered  that  every  one  who  came  into  touch 
with  him  was  invariably  imbued  with  the  certainty  that 
all  his  sympathies  were  for  Russia,  and  especially  for  her 
Army,  in  which  he  had  served  for  forty  years,  and  had 
earned  a  brilliant  military  reputation.  More  will  be  said  of 
Rennenkampf  in  the  account  of  later  events.  I  can  state 
here,  however,  that  his  characteristics  were  great  boldness, 
decisiveness,  and  resolution  in  working  out  a  plan.  France, 
of  course,  had  to  be  thankful  to  him  for  her  victory  on 
the  Marne  and  consequently  the  saving  of  Paris  from  in- 
vasion by  the  Germans. 

General  Samsonoff's  personality  is  slightly  less  remark- 
able. Like  General  Rennenkampf,  he  was  trained  at  the 
Nicolaieffsky  Military  Academy,  and  in  the  Manchurian 
War,  where  he  generally  commanded  cavalry  units,  he 
gained  a  very  fair  reputation.  Morally,  Samsonoff  was  ir- 
reproachable. This  inspired  the  love  and  respect  of  his 
troops.  Though  possessed  of  a  brilliant  mind,  reinforced 
by  a  good  military  education,  he  had  never  had  the  oppor- 
tunity to  reveal  any  greatness  of  character  or  decision. 

General  Brussiloff's  character  is  less  capable  of  analysis. 
His  military  career  had  given  him  no  opportunity  to  test  his 
abilities.  Most  of  his  service  had  been  passed  in  the  School 
for  Cavalry  Officers,  where  he  had  more  to  do  with  the 


14       MOBILISATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMY     [ch.  i 

technicalities  of  troops  than  with  their  fighting  uses.  This 
service  at  least  enabled  him  to  perfect  his  theoretical  knowl- 
edge, and  to  study  military  affairs,  which  was  more  than 
necessary  to  him  as  he  had  not  received  the  higher  educa- 
tion of  the  Nicolaieffsky  Academy.  Nevertheless,  his  activi- 
ties in  this  war  show  that  without  doubt  he  possesses  a  cer- 
tain military  ability.  He  is  not  without  a  certain  amount 
of  impressiveness,  which  more  than  once  showed  itself  when 
the  troops  under  him  were  in  a  difficult  position.  His  name 
was  scarcely  known  amongst  the  Russian  troops  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war,  but  his  victorious  career  in  his  first 
fighting  duties  quickly  brought  him  to  the  front  among 
the  most  popular  personalities.  But,  of  course,  what  at- 
tracted most  attention  was  his  victorious  advance  in  the 
spring  of  19 1 6  to  the  aid  of  Italy  when  the  latter  country 
was  so  hard  pressed  by  the  Austrians.  This  was  the  zenith 
of  his  rising  star.  Later,  he  gradually  lost  his  hold  on 
public  opinion.  What  led  to  his  fall  was  his  extreme  op- 
portunism after  the  Revolution  of  19 17.  This  opportun- 
ism was  taken  advantage  of  to  the  full  by  the  Temporary 
Government  of  which  Prince  Lvoff  was  President  and  he 
was  given  the  post  of  Commander-in-Chief  at  Headquarters, 
but  this  only  finally  ruined  him  in  the  eyes  of  the  intelligent 
classes  of  the  Russian  public  and  especially  in  the  eyes  of 
all  the  Russian  officers.  Therefore  his  resignation  of  the 
post  of  Commander-in-Chief  astonished  nobody,  and  no- 
body felt  any  special  regret  about  It.  All  the  same,  one 
must  say  there  were  more  positive  than  negative  sides  to 
his  character. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    STRATEGICAL    DEVELOPMENT 

Before  speaking  of  the  strategical  development  of  the 
Russian  armies  from  the  Baltic  Sea  to  the  Rumanian  fron- 
tiers, a  cursory  glance  should  be  given  at  the  map  of  our 
western  frontier  zones.  Here  what  catches  the  eye  is  the 
exceptional  position  taken  up  by  part  of  the  late  Polish  King- 
dom under  the  sovereignty  of  Russia. 

Russian  Poland,  extending  deep  into  the  territory  of  our 
opponents,  on  one  side  brings  us  near  to  the  most  important 
and  most  populous  of  their  centres,  but  on  the  other  side 
represents  a  terrain  which  could  easily  be  taken  in  the  pincers 
of  their  armies.  Only  our  enormous  superiority  in  forces 
might  have  made  it  possible  to  take  advantage  of  the  ad- 
vanced position  of  Poland  as  a  starting-point  salient  for  mak- 
ing an  invasion  of  Germany  and  Austria.  If  we  did  not 
bring  this  superiority  to  bear  in  regard  to  simultaneous 
fighting,  the  Western  neighbours  to  Russian  Poland  would 
be  able  to  weaken  our  strategical  position,  especially  at  that 
stage  of  the  war  when  our  opponents  could  place  superior 
forces  in  the  field  earlier  than  we  could. 

For  this  reason,  our  strategical  plans  never  included 
the  defence  of  that  part  of  Poland  which  lies  on  the  left 
or  west  bank  of  the  Vistula,  and  why,  during  the  course 
of  many  years,  we  did  not  fortify  our  actual  frontiers, 
but  a  line  on  the  River  Vistula.  But  after  the  Manchurian 
Campaign,  when  the  Russian  Government  utilised  every  op- 
portunity to  reduce  military  expenditure,  the  idea  arose  of 

IS 


i6  THE  STRATEGICAL  DEVELOPMENT       [ch.  ii 

carrying  our  defensive  lines  even  farther  eastward  to  the 
lines  of  Brest-Litovsk.  Sad  to  say,  this  idea  received  con- 
firmation and,  not  long  before  the  beginning  of  war  opera- 
tions, all  the  old  fortified  outworks  around  Warsaw  and 
near  the  fortress  of  Zegrje,  at  the  junction  of  the  rivers 
Bug  and  Narev,  had  been  destroyed  by  explosives.  This 
plan,  however,  had  a  great  many  opponents,  and  met  with 
much  well-founded  criticism.  The  war  censorship  condi- 
tions did  not  admit  of  ventilation  of  this  question  in  the 
Press  for  the  public  enlightenment,  and  therefore  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  judge  what  motives  had  impelled  the  Minister  of 
War,  General  Soukhomlinoff,  to  take  this  serious  measure. 

Although  at  that  time  I  was  in  no  way  connected  with 
the  central  war  administration,  I  nevertheless  took  advan- 
tage of  the  first  interview  I  had  with  the  Minister  of  War 
to  bring  up  this  question. 

Without  going  into  details,  I  will  only  say  that  the  Min- 
ister gave  me  the  following  explanation.  (This  was  in 
19 1  o,  two  years  before  the  work  of  destroying  the  Warsaw 
forts  was  taken  in  hand)  :  — 

The  fortresses  of  Warsaw,  Novogeorgievsk  and  Zegrje, 
composing  the  so-called  fortified  triangle,  were,  according 
to  the  opinions  of  the  engineers  and  especially  of  the 
artillery  experts,  completely  out  of  date  at  this  time.  To 
bring  them  up  to  modern  requirements  demanded  the  con- 
struction of  a  completely  new  belt  of  separate  forts,  and, 
so  to  speak,  the  creation  of  a  completely  fortified  province; 
but  this,  in  the  first  place,  would  require  enormous  expendi- 
ture, and  in  the  second  place  would  entail  the  inconvenience 
of  including  in  this  province  a  town  with  a  million  inhabi- 
tants. The  solution  of  this  difficulty,  according  to  General 
Soukhomlinoff,  was  to  embrace  Novogeorgievsk  in  a  new 
belt  of  completely  modern  forts  including  within  it  the  fort 


1914]        THE  STRATEGICAL  DEVELOPMENT  17 

of  Zegrje  and  the  external  fortified  outworks  of  the  fortress 
of  Warsaw,  and  bringing  the  latter  to  a  modern  condi- 
tion. 

This  would  have  given  them  the  advantage,  at  less  cost, 
of  possessing  fully  modern  fortresses,  excluded  from  the 
surroundings  of  the  fortresses  of  the  town  of  Warsaw, 
and  further  the  town  itself  and  the  roads  leading  through 
the  town  would  have  been  dominated  by  the  fortress  camp 
of  Novogeorgievsk.  This  would  have  taken  away  any  ad- 
vantage from  an  opponent  who  wished  to  capture  Warsaw 
before  he  had  taken  the  Novogeorgievsk  fortresses. 

It  was  impossible  not  to  allow  that  these  arguments 
were  sound  and  practical  under  the  conditions  of  that  day. 

But  why,  instead  of  bringing  this  plan  into  effect,  they 
commenced  by  destroying  the  Warsaw  fortress,  even  be- 
fore confirming  the  line  of  the  new  belt  of  forts  round 
Novogeorgievsk,  and,  worse  still,  afterwards  destroyed 
the  forts  near  Zegrje,  I  never  have  been  and  never  shall 
be  able  to  explain.  I  never  got  another  opportunity  of 
speaking  to  General  Soukhomlinoff  about  this. 

In  working  out  our  strategical  plan,  there  was  invariably 
the  clash  of  two  opinions.  Having  in  view  the  necessity  of 
fighting  with  two  opponents,  one  side  advocated  the  concen- 
tration of  the  main  force  against  the  strongest  opponent, 
Germany,  while  opposing  the  weaker  opponent,  Austria, 
with  comparatively  negligible  forces. 

Others  dwelt  on  the  wisdom  of  at  first  delivering  the 
main  blow  against  Austria,  and  finishing  with  her  first  and 
then  striking  with  all  our  available  forces  against  Germany. 
Each  side  advanced  very  weighty  theoretical  and  practical 
arguments  in  favour  of  this  or  that  plan.  To  discuss  them 
all  would  take  too  long  and  necessitate  too  much  specialis- 
ing.    The  plan  of  strategical  development  that  began  to 


1 8  THE  STRATEGICAL  DEVELOPMENT      [ch.  ii 

be  realised  at  the  beginning  of  the  mobilisation  in  19 14, 
was  founded  on  the  second  idea,  namely,  that  of  directing 
the  main  blow  against  Austria,  and  advancing  against  Ger- 
many afterwards. 

It  is  very  difficult  to  ascertain  how  far  the  Germans  were 
informed  of  our  plan  of  operations.  But  doubtless  they 
were  able  to  judge  theoretically  that  the  Russian  Army  could 
not  strike  simultaneous  blows  against  Austria  and  Germany. 
Actually  Germany  was  in  the  same  position  as  ourselves; 
she  had  to  decide  against  whom  to  direct  the  main  blow, 
against  France  or  against  Russia. 

She  decided  to  deliver  the  main  blow  against  France, 
as  an  opponent  who  would  be  earlier  prepared  to  deliver 
a  decisive  blow.  But  it  can  hardly.be  doubted  that  Germany 
knew  the  fundamental  outlines  of  our  plan  of  strategic 
development  by  studying  various  signs  of  our  fighting  prepa- 
rations, not  to  mention  the  help  received  through  brib- 
ery and  by  traitors,  and  even  spies.  These  'conditions 
made  the  operations  of  Germany  easier,  and  gave  her  a 
large  scope  of  freedom  in  directing  the  main  body  of  her 
forces  against  France,  whilst  keeping  a  comparatively  weak 
body  on  her  frontiers  in  East  Prussia  and  almost  entirely 
ignoring  her  frontiers  to  the  west  of  the  River  Vistula. 
Germany  also  reckoned  on  the  slowness  of  our  mobilisa- 
tion, therefore  stirred  up  Austria  to  commence  as  early  as 
possible  her  advance  into  Podolia  and  Volhynia,  and  along 
the  right  banks  of  the  Vistula  for  the  capture  of  Warsaw 
from  the  east.  This  plan  very  probably  would  have  re- 
ceived full  realisation  if  our  advance,  which  took  place 
earlier  than  the  Germans  had  expected,  had  not  interfered 
with  it.  The  result  was  that  we  and  the  Austrians  came 
face  to  face  while  we  were  advancing  to  make  our  main 
blow.     In  East  Prussia,  our   advance  was  due  to  a  con- 


1914]        THE  STRATEGICAL  DEVELOPMENT  19 

siderable  extent  to  the  break  through  which  General  Ren- 
nenkampf  organised  with  all  the  means  at  his  disposal,  not- 
withstanding the  restraining  instructions  he  constantly  re- 
ceived from  General  Gilinsky. 

•  «  ■  •  • 

The  great  European  War  in  19 14  found  me  at  the 
head  of  the  ist  Army  Cavalry  Division,  which  in  peace 
time  had  its  quarters  in  Moscow,  and  her  neighbouring 
towns.  I  had  commanded  this  division  already  for  three 
years  and  a  little  over,  and  was  intimately  acquainted 
with  all  its  officers  from  the  oldest  of  the  seniors  to  the 
last  joined  junior.  Entering  the  war  at  the  head  of  this 
division  was  specially  to  my  liking,  as  I  felt  sure  that, 
amongst  those  under  me,  I  should  find  trustworthy  co- 
workers in  fulfilling  the  most  intricate  and  risky  fighting 
problems  which  might  fall  to  the  cavalry.  We  were  given 
two  days  for  our  mobilisation  and  collection,  not  counting 
two  days  for  what  is  called  "  preparation  for  mobilisation." 
Actually  we  were  able  to  move  and  entrain  in  twenty-four 
hours,  the  time  we  took  to  prepare  our  frontier  cavalry  in 
peace  times. 

By  the  regiments  of  my  division  the  news  of  the  coming 
campaign  was  received  with  great  enthusiasm  and  an  ardent 
desire  to  put  into  practice  all  that  knowledge  which  the 
troops  accumulate  by  long  years  of  hard,  peaceful  work. 
During  all  the  time  taken  in  mobilising  and  moving  from 
our  quarters  in  Moscow  and  its  neighbourhood  to  the  town 
of  Suwalki  where  we  detrained  there  was  not  a  single  in- 
dividual instance  of  trouble  amongst  the  soldiers  which  could 
be  regarded  seriously,  so  well  did  each  one  understand  his 
duty. 

Among  the  population  after  the  mobilisation,  as  far  as 
we   could   gather,    the    distinguishing   characteristic   was   a 


20  THE  STRATEGICAL  DEVELOPMENT       [ch.  ii 

calm  and  general  desire  to  fulfil  their  duty  and  to  bring  as 
much  help  as  possible  to  the  affairs  of  the  nation.  There- 
fore there  were  no  specially  noisy  demonstrations  in  the 
streets  or  in  public  gatherings,  but  everywhere  could  be  felt 
the  heightened  spirit  and  mind  and  the  understanding  that 
Russia  and  her  Allies  had  taken  up  arms  in  a  just  cause. 
There  was  no  appearance  of  any  kind  of  chauvinism  or 
aggressiveness,  or  any  kind  of  hatred  to  the  enemy;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  everybody  spoke  out  their  firm  convic- 
tion that  in  this  just  cause  victory  must  be  on  our  side. 

The  same  spirit  was  noticeable  right  along  our  route  to 
the  front.  The  journey  was  performed  without  a  hitch, 
and  on  the  given  day  (August  6th)  towards  nightfall  we 
arrived  in  Suwalki.  By  the  end  of  the  next  day  all  my  divi- 
sion had  bivouacked  in  the  neighbourhood  and  in  the 
dragoon  barracks  near  the  town.  We  were  now  included  as 
one  of  the  units  of  the  ist  Army,  then  under  General  Ren- 
nenkampf.  At  this  time  the  Staff  of  the  5th  Rifle  Division 
was  in  Suwalki.  Regiments  of  this  division  had  already 
been  moved  forward  to  our  frontiers,  and  were  holding  it 
from  the  well-known  Rominten  Forests  and  for  sixty  kilo- 
metres to  the  south.  These  were  the  Rominten  Forests  to 
which  the  Emperor  William  used  to  come  every  year,  ac- 
companied by  his  most  intimate  friends  and  members  of  his 
family  to  hunt  deer.  He  used  to  invite  the  Russian  authori- 
ties, amongst  whom  very  often  was  the  Governor  of  Su- 
walki. Amongst  the  visitors  used  to  be  the  well-known 
Colonel  Miassoiedoff,  who  at  that  time  was  Chief  of  the 
Gendarmerie  Administration  in  the  frontier  town  of  Verj- 
bolovo  opposite  to  Eidkuhnen,  about  100  kilometres  north 
of  Rominten.  Miassoiedoff  was  executed  in  19 15,  hav- 
ing been  found  to  be  a  spy. 

Having  arrived  in  Suwalki,  as  senior,  I  immediately  placed 


I9I4]        THE  STRATEGICAL  DEVELOPMENT  21 

myself  over  the  Rifle  Division,  and  took  upon  myself  the 
duties  of  temporary  Governor-General,  as  the  Governor 
had  left  with  his  administration,  as  far  as  I  can  remember, 
for  Kovno. 

Reporting  all  this  to  General  Rennenkampf,  I  set  to  work 
to  inspect  the  frontiers  and  the  Sharpshooters  units  which 
had  already  had  passages  at  arms  with  small  German  units 
quartered  some  20  kilometres  beyond  the  frontiers.  At 
the  same  time  I  commenced  giving  small  problems  to  single 
units  of  my  division,  whose  main  forces  were  still  in  the 
town  of  Suwalki. 

Three  years'  service  with  the  regiments  of  my  division 
had,  of  course,  made  me  very  intimate  with  all  their  per- 
sonal qualities,  but  I  could  not  help  feeling  anxious  as  to 
what  extent  they  would  prove  trustworthy  weapons  in  my 
hands  when  responsible  fighting  problems  had  to  be  solved. 
Every  military  man,  of  course,  understands  what  a  tre- 
mendous part  the  personality  of  a  chief  plays,  either  in 
small  or  large  army  combinations.  He  knows,  too,  what 
a  chief's  example  means;  but  I  am  sorry  to  say  that  the  ma- 
jority understand  "  personal  example  "  to  mean,  for  the 
chief,  first  of  all  that  he  must  show  an  example  of  courage 
in  battle,  whereas  actually  this  is  of  no  more  consequence 
than  a  personal  example  from  the  chief  in  all  the  routine 
of  the  troops,  which  must  be  shown  in  his  daily  service  life. 
In  taking  part  in  battle,  one  must  learn,  first  of  all,  that  every 
man  going  into  action  cannot  but  understand  that  he  risks 
his  life,  and  that  only  at  that  risk  can  he  obtain  the  results 
demanded  of  him.  Consequently  a  man  must  be  fired  by 
some  feeling  which  would  dominate  the  fear,  which,  more 
or  less,  almost  every  man  undergoes  in  the  moment  of  serious 
danger.  Such  a  feeling  may  be  the  consciousness  of  duty 
understood  in  its  widest  sense,  or  fear  which  is  more  pres- 


22  THE  STRATEGICAL  DEVELOPMENT      [ch.  ii 

ent  than  the  danger  of  the  enemy  bullet  or  sword.  Per- 
haps this  Is  not  altogether  flattering  to  humanity,  but  only 
in  this  way  can  one  justify  a  sentence  of  death  on  a  traitor 
to  his  duty,  who,  for  example,  leaves  the  field  of  battle. 
However,  this  is  an  extreme  measure,  and  a  Chief's  duty 
is  to  exhaust  all  means  to  prevent  a  situation  demanding 
recourse  to  the  death  sentence.  Neglect  of  these  rules  may 
have  the  most  grievous  consequences,  and  the  unnecessary 
spilling  of  blood  that  it  may  cause  doubtless  lies  heavily  on 
the  conscience  of  the  Chief  who  allows  it  to  occur.  There- 
fore, one  of  the  means  for  successfully  carrying  out  military 
operations  is  the  use  by  the  Chief  of  extraordinary  severity 
with  his  subordinates;  at  the  same  time  every  Chief  should 
remember  that  this  rigour  will  not  be  a  reproach  to  him, 
but  will  tend  to  increase  the  respect  he  is  held  in  if  he  him- 
self is  subject  to  the  harsh  conditions  he  has  imposed. 

During  my  three  years  of  service  in  Moscow  I  had 
never  any  occasion  to  show  any  special  severity  to  my  sub- 
ordinates. The  reason  of  this  was  that  not  one  of  them  at 
any  time  seriously  refused  to  do  his  service  duties. 

I  never  doubted  that  they  would  show  the  same  loyalty 
under  fighting  conditions.  However,  the  difference  between 
peace  work  and  war  is  so  great  that  a  reputation  earned  in 
peace  is  not  always  to  be  maintained  in  war. 

On  this  account  I  felt  afraid  that  my  subordinates  might 
conclude  that  I  should  not  be  able  on  necessity  to  use  ex- 
treme severities  in  war  time.  In  view  of  this  I  wished  that 
fate  would  give  me  the  opportunity,  at  the  outset  of  the 
fighting  activities  of  my  division,  to  exhibit  a  concrete  ex- 
ample of  severity,  feeling  perfectly  sure  that  then  I  should 
be  freed  from  further  necessity  of  resorting  to  extreme 
measures.      Such  an  opportunity  was  given  me. 

One  of  the  first  operations,  which  I  had  to  entrust  to 


1914]        THE  STRATEGICAL  DEVELOPMENT  23 

my  units  under  fighting  conditions,  consisted  of  sending  three 
separate  squadrons  one  from  each  regiment  in  the  division, 
and  the  sotnia  ( 100)  of  Cossaclcs  in  different  directions  into 
German  territory  to  find  out  the  strength  and  positions  of 
the  enemy  lying  in  front  of  the  regiments  of  the  5th  Rifle 
Division.  Each  squadron  and  sotnia  commander  was  in- 
structed as  to  the  route  to  be  followed,  and  the  zone  to 
be  reported  on;  they  were  to  do  this  by  small  parties  of 
scouts. 

Actually,  the  three  squadron  commanders  decided  to  unite 
their  forces,  and  move  on  one  and  the  same  route.  Having 
carried  out  the  operation  they  returned  the  following  day 
with  their  reports,  and  at  the  same  time  did  not  hide  the 
fact  that  they  had  not  travelled  by  the  routes  that  I  had 
instructed  them  to  use  and  giving  me  different  good  reasons 
for  this.  I  determined  to  punish  them.  Calling  together 
all  the  officers,  I  placed  before  them  my  verdict  that  the 
two  squadron  commanders,  hav^ing  joined  up  to  the  third 
commander,  and  therefore  followed  a  route  other  than  the 
one  I  had  indicated,  were  to  be  degraded  from  their  squad- 
rons until  such  time  as  their  service  in  the  field  justified  my 
restoring  them  to  their  commands.  Besides  this,  I  took 
advantage  of  this  chance  to  show  my  subordinates  how  I 
understood  the  execution  of  a  given  order,  and  what  dis- 
asters might  result  from  disobeying  an  order.  I  explained 
to  them  that  in  war  time  no  fighting  result  is  gained  other- 
wise than  at  the  price  of  blood,  but  that  neglect  of  an 
order  very  often  results  in  unnecessary  shedding  of  blood. 
I  told  them  that  I  was  ready  to  accept  the  responsibility  of 
bloodshed,  but  only  under  the  condition  that  they  would 
allow  nothing  to  stand  in  the  way  of  my  orders  being  ful- 
filled to  the  utmost.  On  the  other  hand,  I  indicated  that  if 
my  orders  were  not  fulfilled,  then  all  the  responsibility  for 


24  THE  STRATEGICAL  DEVELOPMENT      [ch.  ii 

needless  slaughter  would  lie  on  those  who  had  not  followed 
the  orders  given.  I  never  had  occasion  to  test  the  effect 
of  my  words,  but  I  must  say  that  during  the  three  and  a 
half  months  in  which  I  was  commanding  this  division  I 
never  again  had  to  use  severe  or  violent  measures.  And 
here  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  during  this  stage  of 
the  campaign  cavalry  officers  had  constantly  to  carry  out 
orders  singly  and  without  any  kind  of  control  by  their 
seniors.  I  will  mention  one  characteristic  episode.  Work- 
ing nearly  all  the  time  on  the  left  flank  of  our  First  Army, 
I  had  constantly  to  send  separate  squadrons  and  sotnias  to 
observe  our  direction  or  locality.  Usually  these  squadrons 
and  sotnias  were  exchanged  for  fresh  ones  every  three  days. 
In  consequence  of  some  movement  affecting  the  whole  di- 
vision, I  could  not  send  a  sotnia  of  Cossacks  for  the  relief 
of  those  observing  the  neighbourhood  of  the  small  German 
fortress  of  Lotzen.  The  commander  of  the  sotnia  having 
been  on  duty  there  three  days,  decided  that  his  period  of 
duty  was  over,  without  waiting  for  the  relief,  rejoined  the 
division,  and  covering  more  than  sixty  versts  came  to  me 
with  his  report.  Having  listened  to  him,  I  merely  told  him 
that  he  had  violated  the  instructions  given  him,  and  that 
therefore  he  must  immediately  resaddle  and  with  his  Cos- 
sacks return  to  the  place.  The  result  was  that  when  our 
troops  commenced  a  general  retreat  out  of  East  Prussia 
several  days  later,  I  had  great  difficulty  in  getting  this  sotnia 
back  to  me,  because  notwithstanding  that  the  Germans  at- 
tacked them  from  all  sides,  and  threatened  completely  to 
surround  them,  the  commander  remained  on  the  spot  until 
he  received  the  order  to  retire  from  a  Cossack  who  was 
lucky  enough  to  get  through  to  him. 


CHAPTER  III 

FIRST    FIGHTING    OPERATIO.NS 

Information  coming  in  at  that  time  from  our  reconnoitring 
patrols  showed  that  some  kind  of  concentration  of  German 
troops  was  taking  place  near  the  town  of  Marggrabowa, 
sixteen  kilometres  from  our  positions.  Evidently  similar 
news  had  been  received  by  General  Rennenkampf's  staff. 
In  consequence  I  received  an  order  from  General  Rennen- 
kampf  to  use  all  means  by  scouting,  or  even  fighting,  to  ascer- 
tain the  size  of  this  concentration. 

Having  the  5th  Rifle  Division  as  well  as  my  Cavalry 
Division  at  my  disposal,  I  decided  to  make  a  demonstra- 
tive advance  in  force,  that  same  night,  on  a  front  of  about 
twenty-five  to  thirty  kilometres,  with  cavalry  columns  and 
an  Infantry  column.  The  plan  was  to  send  the  cavalry 
columns  south  and  north  of  Marggrabowa,  and  the  Infantry 
column  direct  on  the  town  itself,  with  the  calculation  that 
the  cavalry  columns  must  get  Into  touch  with  the  enemy 
several  hours  earlier  than  the  infantry.  Such  an  appearance 
of  cavalry  on  the  railway  line,  Marggrabowa-Gumbinnen, 
would,  without  fail.  Induce  the  Germans  to  send  reinforce- 
ments out  of  Marggrabowa  to  the  railroad  where  the  cavalry 
were.  Our  scouts  would  find  out  the  strength  of  the  rein- 
forcements sent  out  in  this  way  and  the  Marggrabowa  gar- 
rison would  be  weakened  and  thus  make  it  easier  for  the 
Infantry  column  to  capture  the  town.  Marggrabowa  was 
defended  from  the  east  by  lakes,  part  of  the  system  of  the 

25 


26  FIRST  FIGHTING  OPERATIONS  [ch.  hi 

Masurian  Lakes,  and  an  approach  to  the  town  was  only 
possible  across  two  narrow  isthmuses  easily  defended  by 
comparatively  negligible  forces.  The  outside  cavalry 
columns  had  their  artillery  with  them,  the  firing  of  which 
must  reveal  their  presence.  My  calculations  were  also 
founded  on  the  fact  that  the  Germans  would  use  every 
effort  to  be  superior  in  strength  so  as  not  to  risk  even  a 
partial  defeat  in  the  first  engagement  on  this  part  of  the 
front. 

The  infantry  column  was  composed  of  one  rifle  regiment 
with  a  field  battery,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Tara- 
novsky,  who  subsequently  commanded  the  Russian  division 
in  Salonika.  As  this  column's  operation  was  a  most  diffi- 
cult one,  and  as  this  was  the  first  engagement  for  the  Rifle 
regiments  I  decided  to  be  with  this  part  of  the  force.  The 
whole  of  the  cavalry  division  left  Suwalki  on  the  eve  of 
August  iith  for  the  purpose  of  crossing  the  frontiers  be- 
fore daylight.  The  infantry  column  which  I  joined  just 
before  dawn  was  to  cross  the  frontiers  an  hour  later,  when 
the  cavalry  patrols  had  got  into  touch  with  the  enemy  in- 
fantry defending  the  Marggrabowa-Gumbinnen  railroad. 

•  •  •  •  • 

With  the  Rifle  column  I  crossed  the  Prussian  frontier 
at  dawn.  At  daybreak,  to  our  great  astonishment,  we 
saw  a  large  number  of  fires  ahead,  the  heavy  smoke  from 
which,  in  the  calm  morning  air,  rose  in  thick  black  columns. 
By  the  positions  of  the  smoke  columns  I  could  tell  that  they 
agreed  with  the  movements  of  the  three  cavalry  columns  I 
had  sent  out.  Naturally,  the  first  thought  was,  that  my 
cavalry  units  were  burning  the  farms  in  their  locality,  de- 
stroying the  forage  and  unthrashed  grain.  As  this  did  not 
fall  in  with  my  plans,  I  immediately  sent  them  orders  to 
stop   this   incendiarism.      But  before   I   received  the   reply 


1914]  FIRST  FIGHTING  OPERATIONS  27 

from  the  commanders  of  these  columns  I  was  able  to  sat- 
isfy myself  that  it  was  not  any  of  their  work.  What  the 
actual  cause  of  these  fires  was  we  never  found  out,  but  as 
we  advanced  farther  into  East  Prussia  we  nearly  always 
saw  the  same  picture.  In  conjunction  with  the  approach  of 
any  considerable  body  of  Russian  troops,  thick  columns  of 
smoke  started  from  some  store  filled  with  forage  or  straw, 
usually  from  the  farms  nearest  to  the  head  of  the  column. 
In  this  the  very  line  of  direction  and  speed  of  our  columns 
was  seen  from  a  great  distance  off.  Naturally  the  only 
thing  to  do  was  to  adopt  some  kind  of  repressive  measures, 
although  this  caused  us  a  great  deal  of  trouble.  With  the 
slightest  sign  of  an  advance  by  us,  the  local  population  fled 
towards  the  west,  carting  away  their  most  valued  posses- 
sions. This  appearance  was  so  general,  that  it  could  only 
have  been  due  to  arrangement  by  the  German  authorities. 
The  only  human  beings  we  at  any  time  saw  in  these  de- 
serted villages  were  very  old  women  and  men  who  could 
barely  drag  one  foot  after  the  other.  Very  often  we  met, 
but  oftener  observed  disappearing  in  the  distance,  cyclists 
who  were  without  exception  boys  from  twelve  to  fourteen 
years  of  age. 

So  hurried  was  the  flight  of  the  inhabitants  that  often 
our  advanced  units  found  in  the  houses  prepared  food  still 
warm;  more  than  once  the  meal  had  not  been  finished,  and 
the  cattle  still  were  chained  to  their  stalls  in  the  stables. 
There  were  cases  where  the  cattle  remained  without  food  and 
drink  for  several  days  in  these  farms.  If  our  troops  hap- 
pened to  pass  them  by  the  poor  beasts  drowned  all  the 
noises  in  the  neighbourhood  with  their  constant  lowing. 
Naturally,  our  men  let  them  straight  out  into  the  fields, 
with  the  idea  that  sometimes  they  might  prove  useful  for 
our  troops,  following  on.      But  if  these  fires  were  to  direct 


28  FIRST  FIGHTING  OPERATIONS  [ch.  iii 

the  Germans,  they  also  served  us  to  a  certain  degree  by 
showing  where  our  columns  were  much  more  quickly  than 
reports  could  have  reached  us.  In  this  way,  I  clearly  saw 
that  my  cavalry  columns  had  reached  the  railway,  some 
fifteen  to  twenty  kilometres  away,  some  two  hours  from 
the  time  they  crossed  the  frontiers.  Evidently  they  were 
fighting,  for  we  could  hear  the  artillery.  After  a  couple 
of  hours,  the  cannonading  became  more  intense,  which 
showed  me  that  the  Germans  had  sent  artillery  units  as 
reinforcements.  We  were  most  scantily  supplied  with  tele- 
graph and  telephone  equipment  and  personnel.  In  actual 
fact  there  was  only  one  unit  of  sixty  men  per  divisional  staff. 
There  were  trained  men  in  the  regiments,  but  they  had  no 
telegraphic  material.  These  men  had  not  yet  become  ac- 
customed to  lay  lines  as  quickly  as  would  be  required  by  a 
moving  cavalry  column. 

In  the  middle  of  August,  when  cavalry  units  constantly 
moved  over  fifty  and  more  kilometres  per  day,  this  organ- 
isation had  so  far  been  put  in  order,  that,  taking  advantage 
of  the  German  telegraph  posts  and  wires,  they  added  to 
and  cut  away  from  them,  so  that  our  columns  and  staffs  were 
connected  up  to  their  rear  with  telephone  wires  not  later 
than  an  hour  after  their  arrival  at  the  place  where  they  in- 
tended spending  the  night. 

I  am  sorry  to  say  that  at  this  time  the  intimate  connec- 
tions between  the  staffs  of  large  units  was  insufficiently  as- 
sured. I  was  always  followed  by  a  section  of  wireless 
telegraphy,  but  I  could  only  take  advantage  of  these  installa- 
tions at  our  night  stopping-places  and  then  only  to  com- 
municate with  the  army  staff,  because  the  infantry  army 
corps  had  not  as  yet  been  allotted  stations  of  wireless 
telegraphy.  Knowing  their  direction  from  the  fires  that 
had  broken  out,  the  infantry  column  with  which  I  was  slowly 


1914]  FIRST  FIGHTING  OPERATIONS  29 

advancing,  with  only  weak  opposition  from  small  German 
infantry  patrols,  moved  forward  toward  the  lake  Isthmuses, 
over  which  were  macadamised  roads  leading  to  Marggra- 
bowa.  I  had  to  quicken  the  advance  of  the  infantry,  as  I 
feared  that  the  weak  cavalry  columns,  from  each  of  which 
only  some  500  rifles  could  be  used,  would  not  be  able  to 
continue  fighting  long  with  the  German  Infantry  which  had 
been  sent  out  from  Marggrabowa.  There  was  also  the 
danger  that  at  the  close  of  the  fight  these  infantry  units 
would  return  to  Marggrabowa  and  take  up  a  position  on 
the  isthmus  or  reinforce  those  that  were  there  already,  and 
in  this  way,  or  at  any  rate  make  more  difficult,  my  entry  Into 
the  town.  My  chief  aim  was  to  capture  the  telegraph  and 
post  offices  in  Marggrabowa  with  all  the  correspondence, 
from  which  we  could  get  most  valuable  Information  about 
the  enemy. 

My  plans  were  partly  right;  the  return  of  the  German  in- 
fantry and  artillery,  sent,  as  I  had  supposed,  out  of  Marg- 
grabowa, was  Interfered  with  owing  to  the  destruction  of 
the  railway  lines  and  small  defensive  posts  by  some  of  our 
cavalry.  This  delayed  the  movement  for  some  hours,  at 
places  for  possibly  a  day. 

When  our  infantry  neared  the  isthmuses  they  found  them 
held  by  small  units  of  infantry  and  cyclists  (as  we  found  out 
later).  What  strength  they  were  In  we  did  not  ascertain 
because  the  majority  of  the  cyclists  retreated  to  the  west 
and  south-west  of  the  town,  only  leaving  about  sixty  cycles 
on  the  road.  They  were  immediately  taken  possession  of 
by  our  Infantry,  and  even  by  part  of  our  cavalry.  While 
the  battle  for  the  isthmuses  was  going  on  I  gave  orders  for 
the  nearest  cavalry  column  to  join  me;  this  was  composed  of 
lancer  and  dragoon  regiments,  so  that,  when  the  Infantry 
had  taken  the  isthmus  and  secured  their  retreat,  two  cav- 


30  FIRST  FIGHTING  OPERATIONS  [ch.  hi 

airy  regiments  and  a  battery  of  artillery  were  to  move  for- 
ward to  capture  Marggrabowa,  to  take  the  railroad,  tele- 
graph, post,  and  telephone  stations,  and  to  destroy  them 
completely.  I  remember  that  one  of  the  same  officers  of 
the  dragoons,  who  two  days  earlier  had  been  degraded  from 
his  command  of  a  squadron,  was  ordered  to  seize  the  rail- 
way station.  This  he  did  at  the  head  of  half  a  squadron 
most  successfully,  quickly,  and  cleverly.  Less  fortunate  was 
the  other  whom  I  had  degraded,  the  one  who  commanded 
the  hussar  squadron.  Taking  part  in  the  fight  in  the  next 
cavalry  column,  he  advanced  at  the  head  of  his  unit  and  was 
killed.  This  was  the  first  officer  the  division  had  lost. 
After  half  an  hour's  fight,  the  impetuous  movement  of  the 
riflemen  dislodged  the  Germans  from  the  isthmus  and  gave 
us  access  to  the  outskirts  of  the  town.  By  this  time  our 
lancers  were  coming  up.  As  they  approached  the  isthmus 
already  occupied  by  the  infantry,  I  dismounted  the  squadrons 
and  ordered  them  to  seize  the  small  approach  to  Marggra- 
bowa in  extended  order.  When  I  came  up,  I  dismounted, 
and  Captain  Makedonsky,  the  commander  of  the  lancer 
squadron,  informed  me  that  only  a  few  minutes  before,  a 
German  motor-car  had  reached  him  from  Marggrabowa, 
showing  the  signs  of  the  Red  Cross,  and  offering  their  serv- 
ices if  we  had  any  wounded.  But  before  Makedonsky 
could  answer  if  wounded  were  requiring  attention,  the  driver 
of  the  motor-car,  taking  advantage  of  the  fact  that  the 
road  there  was  wider,  turned  the  car  round  and  quickly 
disappeared  into  the  town.  I  explained  to  Makedonsky 
that  this  was  "  a  hospital  motor-car  "  which  did  not  wish 
to  give  us  medical  assistance  so  much  as  to  help  the  Ger- 
man scouting  troops  that  had  been  defending  the  Marggra- 
bowa approaches,  and  I  advised  him  in  future  to  stop  such 
motor-cars  and  send  them  on  to  my  staff  under  escort.     By 


I9I4]  FIRST  FIGHTING  OPERATIONS  31 

this  time  the  whole  of  Marggrabowa,  lying  on  a  slope  to- 
wards Lake  Oletzko,  was  before  my  eyes. 

One  could  see  without  field  glasses  that  white  flags  with 
red  crosses  were  over  all  the  large  buildings.  We  found 
out  later  that  several  of  these  really  were  fitted  up  as 
hospitals;  the  others,  as  the  inhabitants  said,  were  pre- 
destined for  this  purpose,  all  the  schools  being  also  so 
used.  As  this  was  the  first  time  that  my  regiment  had  been 
engaged  in  my  presence,  I  thought  it  right,  having  given 
all  instructions,  to  join  the  first  lancer  squadron;  and  so, 
along  with  Captain  Makedonsky  and  the  front  chain  of 
dismounted  lancers,  I  made  my  way  towards  the  Marggra- 
bowa approaches,  where  rifle  shots  at  occasional  intervals 
could  be  heard  from  the  gardens  and  windows  of  buildings 
surmounted  by  the  Red  Cross.  Somewhere  on  one  side 
we  could  hear  a  machine  gun,  and  two  of  ours  commenced 
answering  it.  The  German  machine  gun,  which  was  evi- 
dently being  fired  from  the  window  of  some  high  building, 
stopped.  Our  line  of  lancers  moved  steadily  on  to  the 
gardens  which  surround  the  pretty  town,  shooting  now  and 
again.  I  am  well  aware  that  I  had  no  business  to  be  in 
the  front  attacking  lines,  but  there  were  many  reasons  which 
made  me  go,  contrary  to  the  letter  of  the  rule  which  says 
that  the  chief  must  not  devote  himself  in  any  one  small  part, 
as  It  Is  invariably  harmful  to  the  course  of  the  whole  battle. 
These  fundamental  laws,  of  course,  are  not  known  by  every 
soldier,  but  soldiers  are  strongly  influenced  by  the  presence 
of  their  chief  in  their  immediate  vicinity.  Or  that  in  case  of 
necessity  the  chief  could  show  himself  amongst  them  in 
the  very  foremost  lines.  I  did  not  doubt  that  my  presence 
in  the  firing  line  would  be  known  throughout  all  the  regi- 
ments of  my  division,  and  would  afterwards  enable  me 
to  avoid  actually  appearing  in  the  front  lines,  and  risk  los- 


32  FIRST  FIGHTING  OPERATIONS  [ch.  hi 

ing  the  total  direction  of  the  battle.  One  must  not  forget 
that  in  field  fighting,  much  more  than  in  position  fighting 
or  so-called  trench  warfare,  every  kind  of  unforeseen  thing 
and  surprise  occurs.  Therefore  it  is  imperative  that  the 
chief  must  issue  commands  more  quickly  and  take  timely 
measures  to  parry  such  occasions. 

By  this  time,  the  lancers,  to  whom  had  been  added  the 
dismounted  dragoon  squadrons,  had  gradually  penetrated 
the  approach  to  the  town,  and  as  they  advanced  the  intensity 
of  the  German  fire  decreased.  It  was  apparent  by  this  time 
that  the  Germans  had  no  intentions  of  seriously  defending 
the  town,  but  preferred  to  evacuate  it. 

By  the  time  the  dismounted  cavalry  units  entered  the  town 
the  firing  had  completely  died  down.  The  town  presented 
an  absolutely  peaceful  picture.  Almost  all  the  shops  were 
closed,  but  they  were  not  barricaded,  and  evidently  had 
only  just  stopped  trading.  Many  people  were  looking  out 
of  the  windows  with  interest;  they  were  mostly  women.  To 
questions  as  to  where  the  telegraph,  post,  and  telephone  sta- 
tions were,  they  readily  gave  reply.  We  found  these  build- 
ings in  the  only  town  square.  My  staff  immediately  ar- 
ranged parties  to  seize  all  the  correspondence,  and  to  de- 
stroy the  telegraph  and  telephone  instruments.  To  de- 
stroy the  telephone  installations  on  the  roofs.  Lieutenant 
Shataloff,  an  oflicer  of  the  field  artillery  acting  as  adjutant 
to  the  chief  of  my  field  artillery  division,  was  given  this 
work  at  his  own  request.  Having  climbed  to  the  roofs 
at  first  he  gave  himself  up  to  fulfilling  his  task  completely 
and  whole-heartedly,  and  not  satisfied  with  breaking  up 
insulators  and  cutting  wires,  handed  over  this  work  to  his 
men  and  commenced  scanning  the  neighbourhood  and  espe- 
cially the  neighbouring  country  roads,  all  the  time  report- 
ing to  the  staff  officer,  standing  in  the  square,  what  he  saw. 


1914]  FIRST  FIGHTING  OPERATIONS  33 

Some  time  later  on  a  report  was  brought  from  him  that  on 
one  side  small  bodies  of  enemy  cyclists  could  be  seen  rapidly 
retreating  in  various  directions,  and  that  on  the  other  side 
the  movement  of  some  kind  of  column  was  observed  to- 
wards the  southern  outskirts  of  Marggrabowa  held  by  only 
very  weak  units  of  my  dismounted  cavalry. 

The  movement  did  not  threaten  to  cut  me  off  from  the 
isthmuses  held  by  my  infantry;  but  as  I  had  no  intention  of 
holding  the  town,  and  as  my  main  object  of  finding  out 
what  forces  the  Germans  were  concentrating  in  Marggra- 
bowa had  been  already  fulfilled  and  the  extensive  post  and 
telegraph  correspondence,  amongst  which  were  a  considera- 
ble number  of  letters  addressed  to  units  intended  to  take  up 
their  quarters  round  about  Marggrabowa,  had  been  seized,  I 
considered  that  my  business  in  the  town  was  completed. 
When  I  came  out  of  the  buildings  where  I  had  been  watch- 
ing the  sorting  of  the  postal  correspondence,  to  my  aston- 
ishment I  found  the  square  filled  up  with  dismounted  men 
leading  the  horses  which  it  is  their  duty  to  hold  whilst  a 
fight  is  in  progress.  They,  when  the  firing  ceased,  had 
brought  the  horses  up,  probably  calculating  that  the  dis- 
mounted troopers  would  be  remounted  and  sent  in  pursuit 
of  the  retreating  enemy.  What,  however,  was  completely 
out  of  place  was  the  presence  in  the  square  of  a  whole  horse 
battery  complete  with  ammunition  carts.  This  can  only  be 
explained  by  the  inexperience  of  the  battery  commander 
and  his  intense  desire  to  move  forward.  The  approaching 
German  column  might  at  any  minute  have  deployed  and 
opened  fire  on  the  town  if  they  had  received  information 
from  their  cyclists  that  the  Russian  troops  had  filled  up 
the  streets  and  square  of  the  town.  I  do  not  think  that 
the  presence  of  the  Red  Cross  on  the  buildings,  generally 
speaking  with  somewhere  about  a  hundred  or  so  sick  and 


34  FIRST  FIGHTING  OPERATIONS  [ch.  hi 

wounded,  or  solicitude  for  the  inhabitants,  would  have  de- 
terred the  Germans  from  opening  fire  on  the  town.  They 
understood  very  well  that  troops  that  had  never  been  fired 
on  might  become  very  nervous  when  shells  exploded  in  the 
narrow  streets. 

I  sent  a  strong  scouting  party  to  watch  the  direction  the 
German  columns  were  taking,  and  to  hold  up  their  front 
patrols.  I  gave  orders  for  the  town  to  be  evacuated  and 
for  the  troops  to  go  toward  the  nearest  northern  isthmus 
which  was  held  by  our  men.  The  evacuation  of  the  town 
commenced  soon  after  noon.  The  retirement  was  carried 
out  without  any  special  incident,  and  without  pressure  from 
the  enemy.  Our  expectation  of  valuable  information  from 
the  seized  correspondence  from  the  post  ofl'ice  was  realised. 

It  was  in  these  days  that  German  aeroplanes  first  made 
their  appearance,  Taubes  flying  over  the  camp  continually. 
The  first  impression  they  made  on  the  Russian  troops,  very 
few  of  whom  had  seen  an  aeroplane  before,  was  remark- 
able; immediately  an  aeroplane  hove  in  view  the  men  would 
rush  for  their  rifles  and  blaze  aimlessly  away  until  their 
officers  succeeded  in  convincing  them  it  was  quite  useless. 
After  a  time,  the  majority  of  the  men  regarded  the  coming 
of  enemy  aeroplanes  with  equanimity,  although  there  were 
cases  of  individual  firing  which  in  the  beginning  could  never 
be  stopped.  Sometimes  this  bad  example  became  so  contagi- 
ous that  men  would  fire  round  after  round  at  an  aeroplane 
thousands  of  yards  high;  on  one  occasion  an  orderly  room 
clerk  emptied  all  the  barrels  of  his  revolver  at  a  machine 
well  out  of  rifle  range.  As  it  was  impossible  to  distinguish 
with  the  naked  eye  between  the  black  cross  of  the  German 
machines  and  the  red,  white,  and  blue  circle  of  our  own,  some 
of  our  own  machines  were  shot  down  by  rifle  fire  while 
descending  to  their  aerodrome.     This  was  the  reason  for  an 


1914]  FIRST  FIGHTING  OPERATIONS  35 

order  that  all  our  aeroplanes  should  fly  low  over  our  lines 
so  that  they  could  be  recognised,  but  even  this  arrangement 
hardly  met  the  situation,  because  reinforcements  were  al- 
ways arriving,  mostly  men  from  the  older  classes,  who  had 
never  seen  an  aeroplane,  and  merely  regarded  it  as  some- 
thing to  be  shot  at.  They  seriously  thought  that  such  a  cun- 
ning idea  as  an  aeroplane  could  only  emanate  from  and  be 
used  by  a  German.  Of  course  these  newly  arrived  units 
soon  became  accustomed  to  aeroplanes. 

The  Germans  did  not  yet  possess  successful  bomb-drop- 
ping machines,  and  their  flights  over  the  troops  did  no  harm. 
Neither  were  they  armed  with  machine  guns,  and  air  fighting 
had  not  started.  Any  aerial  combats  that  took  place  were 
fought  out,  as  one  might  say,  with  cold  steel,  by  charging 
the  enemy  aeroplane  direct.  Naturally  such  events  were 
very  few,  and  I  only  know  of  one  airman,  Lieutenant 
Nesteroff,  who  met  his  death  by  charging  the  enemy  in  this 
way.  He  destroyed  his  foe,  but  fell  a  victim  to  his  im- 
prudently valiant  act.  This  was  the  Lieutenant  Nesteroff 
who  was  the  first  airman  in  the  world  to  "  loop  the  loop  " 
in  the  air.  He  did  this  feat  on  his  unstable  machine  at  the 
Kieff  Aerodrome.  I  must  add  that  he  was  forbidden  to 
make  any  further  such  experiments  by  his  seniors,  who  said 
that  if  he  had  a  strong  desire  to  break  his  neck,  it  did 
not  give  him  the  right  to  destroy  Government  property,  es- 
pecially aeroplanes,  in  which  at  that  time  there  was  a  great 
shortage.  Following  his  initiative  in  making  this  "  loop 
in  the  air,"  the  performance  was  popularised  by  the  French 
aviator  Pegoud  and  others. 

•  •  •  •  • 

The  correspondence  seized  by  my  troops  at  the  post  office 
in  Marggrabowa  gave  some  extremely  useful  information 
to  General  Rennenkampf's  staff.     We  learnt  from  it  de- 


36  FIRST  FIGHTING  OPERATIONS  [ch.  m 

tails  as  to  how  the  enemy  forces  were  grouped  in  East  Prus- 
sia and  a  good  many  of  their  preliminary  intentions,  which 
knowledge  proved  of  inestimable  value  in  the  early  days  of 
the  fighting. 

A  vast  difference  was  now  noticed  in  the  methods  of  get- 
ting news  used  both  by  ourselves  and  by  the  Germans. 
From  the  first  days  of  the  campaign  it  was  clear  to  us  that 
the  Germans  were  employing  every  conceivable  method  of 
obtaining  information.  In  our  territory  we  discovered  peo- 
ple who  were  giving  the  Germans  news  of  what  was  tak- 
ing place  on  our  front  and  in  our  rear.  When  we  invaded 
German  territory,  we  soon  found  that  the  enemy  was  em- 
ploying the  local  inhabitants,  especially  boys  of  school  age, 
who,  using  cycles,  appeared  in  front  and  to  the  sides  of  our 
moving  units.  At  first  we  paid  no  attention  to  them,  until 
circumstances  clearly  showed  the  reasons  for  such  cycle 
rides.  We  had  to  order  these  young  cyclists  to  be  fired  on. 
Thereafter  they  showed  themselves  much  less  frequently. 
Their  method  of  transmitting  information  by  fires  I  have 
already  mentioned.  Several  times  we  caught  German  sol- 
diers dressed  as  peasants,  and  even  as  women.  Discovered 
by  the  Government  underclothing  they  wore,  they  readily 
confessed  the  reason  for  their  using  peasants'  clothes. 
However,  many  of  these  disguised  soldiers  probably  were 
never  caught.  The  Germans  obtained  more  help  from  the 
women,  to  whom,  of  course,  we  had  to  behave  with  greater 
deference,  because  a  clear  proof  of  their  implication  in 
espionage  was  much  more  difl'icult  to  find.  Evidently  all  the 
frontier  districts  of  the  East  of  Prussia  were  covered  by 
a  close  net  of  what  one  may  call  watch  towers.  These  tow- 
ers were  triangular  wooden  buildings,  similar  to  miniature 
Eiffel  towers.  They  were  generally  situated  on  hills,  giv- 
ing a  splendid  view  of  surrounding  country.      Many  were 


Jtr'"'-; 


HIS   MAJKSTV   NICOLAI   II 


I9I4]  FIRST  FIGHTING  OPERATIONS  37 

built  in  the  woods,  where  without  them  observation  was  im- 
possible. Of  course  they  did  us  a  good  deal  of  service  also, 
but  they  were  of  more  advantage  to  the  enemy.  Whenever 
we  could  find  no  use  for  them,  we  destroyed  them.  What 
gave  us  a  great  deal  of  trouble  in  finding  out  our  position  in 
unknown  places  was  the  complete  absence  of  the  local  in- 
habitants. Scouting  inquiries  through  persons  knowing  the 
country  could  not  therefore  be  made.  Our  position  would 
have  been  much  more  difficult  if  we  had  not  found  a  large 
number  of  road  signposts  at  cross  roads  and  near  inhabited 
points,  showing  the  directions  and  distances  of  towns  and 
villages  in  kilometres.  Eventually  as  time  went  on,  the 
Germans  realised  how  great  a  help  these  signposts  gave  us, 
and  when  we  invaded  East  Prussia  the  second  time  they 
were  either  entirely  removed  or,  what  was  worse,  were 
turned  round,  thus  giving  false  directions.  Our  maps  of 
East  Prussia  were  exact  copies  from  the  German  maps  and 
therefore  all  the  names  were  in  Latin  letters.  But  it  was 
astonishing  to  find  how  intelligently  our  reconnoitring  parties 
used  the  maps  when  scouting  without  ofl'icers. 

In  general,  our  first  move  into  East  Prussia  convinced  us 
how  thoroughly  the  Germans  had  prepared  for  war;  they 
had  thought  everything  out,  had  foreseen  everything,  and 
had  made  a  large  expenditure  on  the  preparations. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   OCCUPATION   OF    EAST    PRUSSIA 

Soon  after  we  returned  from  the  attack  on  Marggrabowa 
we  received  at  headquarters  particulars  of  the  general  at- 
tack Rennenkampf  was  about  to  undertake  in  East  Prussia. 

I  was  instructed  to  remain  with  my  cavalry  division  and 
with  the  5th  Rifle  Division  on  the  flank  of  the  attack,  which 
was  to  be  delivered  by  the  ist  Army,  and  to  cover  the  left 
flank.  Though  we  were  aware  that  the  2nd  Army  under 
the  command  of  General  Samsonoff  was  concentrated  some- 
where in  the  neighbourhood  of  Lomja,  there  had  not  yet 
been  established  any  proper  liaison  with  this  army.  I  re- 
peatedly sent  out  patrols  under  the  command  of  officers  to 
get  into  touch  with  Samsonoff's  Army,  but  without  success. 
General  Rennenkampf  had  at  his  disposal  four  corps  of 
infantry,  and  not  less  than  five  cavalry  divisions,  including 
two  divisions  of  the  Guards  which  had  not  long  arrived 
from  Petrograd,  but  had  already  been  in  action  at  Stallou- 
penen  near  the  renowned  frontier  station  of  Eydkuhnen- 
Verjbolovo.  In  this  action,  which  was  a  very  sanguinary 
affair,  the  Guards  had  lost  many  of  their  officers. 

Considering  the  far-reaching  operations  he  was  about  to 
undertake  General  Rennenkampf  was  at  a  great  disad- 
vantage owing  to  the  incompleted  organisation  in  his  rear. 
While  his  troops  were  stationary  these  things  were  not  so 
noticeable,  but  when  he  came  to  move  across  hostile  country 
it  was  painfully  evident  that  very  little  provision  had  been 
made  for  such  an  advance.     Such  shortcomings  did  not  deter 

38 


1914]       THE  OCCUPATION  OF  EAST  PRUSSIA  39 

a  man  of  Rennenkampf's  dashing  character.  He  was  anxi- 
ous to  take  advantage  of  the  evident  unpreparedness  of  the 
Germans,  who  appeared  to  have  little  inclination  to  enter 
into  battle.  Against  the  wishes  of  his  immediate  superior, 
General  Rennenkampf  decided  to  take  the  offensive,  ex- 
pecting that  his  action  would  move  Samsonoff  to  do  likewise. 
Such  a  concentric  advance  would  undoubtedly  have  made  it 
possible  for  the  Russian  troops  to  occupy  the  strong  defen- 
sive line  of  the  Masurian  Lakes  without  any  great  sacrifice. 
Moreover,  at  that  time  there  was  no  reason  for  believing 
that  the  isthmuses  of  the  lakes  were  very  strongly  held  and 
fortified  by  the  enemy. 

In  the  first  months  of  the  war  field  fortification  was  prac- 
tically non-existent;  trenches  were  only  resorted  to  on  ex- 
ceptional occasions,  and  even  then  were  of  a  very  improvised 
type.  Throughout  East  Prussia  we  came  across  plenty  of 
barbed  wire,  but  it  was  still  in  the  coil  piled  up  awaiting  the 
time  when  trench  warfare  should  begin.  We  came  across 
a  great  many  trenches,  but  the  Germans  had  done  little  to 
strengthen  them.  At  that  time  the  rapid  advance  of  our 
troops  prevented  them  digging  trenches,  which  in  the  future 
hemmed  in  all  the  European  armies.  The  attack  planned 
by  General  Rennenkampf  was  to  be  on  a  front  of  not  less 
than  100  kilometres  and  undertaken  by  several  columns. 
On  the  front  to  be  attacked  lay  the  forest  of  Rominten  which 
Rennenkampf  intended  to  skirt  by  advancing  to  the  north 
and  south,  avoiding  any  wood  fighting,  as  the  German  troops 
in  that  neighbourhood  had  the  advantage  of  utilising  the 
rangers  employed  by  the  Emperor  in  the  forest. 

Rennenkampf's  belief  that  we  would  only  meet  with 
weak  resistance  at  the  start  was  only  partially  borne  out, 
every  column,  the  same  as  the  5th  Rifle  Division,  having  to 
take  part  in  strenuous  fighting.     When  the  attack  was  over. 


40  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  EAST  PRUSSIA     [ch.  iv 

I  endeavoured  to  ascertain  what  the  different  commanders 
thought  of  it  all.  The  general  impression  was  that  the 
Germans  were  doing  everything  in  their  power  to  retain 
the  initiative  and  were  aiming  at  offensive  tactics.  They 
showed  a  certain  impetuosity,  and  one  could  notice  the  per- 
sonal initiative,  not  only  of  the  smaller  units,  but  even  of 
small  bodies  of  infantry,  even  when  they  were  without  offi- 
cers. On  the  other  hand,  in  defensive  open  fighting  they 
did  not  distinguish  themselves  by  any  extraordinary  tenacity 
of  purpose,  and  when  they  began  to  retire  after  a  battle  their 
power  of  resistance  dwindled  to  vanishing  point.  At  that 
period  of  the  war  we  did  not  feel  our  lack  of  artillery  to 
any  appreciable  extent,  although  it  was  obvious  that  the 
Germans  possessed  great  superiority  in  guns  of  all  descrip- 
tions, particularly  in  howitzers  and  heavy  guns.  Our  artil- 
lery of  these  classes  was  almost  non-existent.  The  Germans 
were  able  to  furnish  even  their  cavalry  units  with  heavy 
artillery  of  some  kind  and  used  their  ammunition  with- 
out regard  for  the  future.  In  the  course  of  events  this 
lavish  expenditure  of  shells  caused  a  shortage;  during  19 14 
we  found  instructions  from  their  High  Command  ordering 
them  to  be  sparing  in  the  use  of  all  artillery  ammunition. 

Notwithstanding  strong  resistance  by  the  enemy,  our 
troops,  fighting  nearly  every  day,  continued  to  advance  and 
shortly  afterwards  occupied  the  town  of  Insterburg,  to  which 
General  Rennenkampf  transferred  his  Army  Headquarters. 
Here  Rennenkampf's  army  began  to  feel  the  lack  of  organ- 
isation in  the  rear;  the  provisioning  of  the  men  became  a 
great  difficulty.  In  this  respect,  however,  our  plight  was 
In  no  way  comparable  to  the  Germans'.  Still,  the  enemy 
was  able  to  utilise  the  vast  network  of  normal  and  narrow- 
gauge  railways  for  the  defence  of  the  country,  as  well  as 
for  the  invasion  of  our  territory.     Moreover,  he  was  able 


1914]      THE  OCCUPATION  OF  EAST  PRUSSIA  41 

to  use  the  country  roads  for  his  mechanical  transport.  At 
this  stage  we  had  practically  no  transport  of  this  character. 
When  my  cavalry  came  into  contact  with  the  Germans 
they  could  always  see  following  the  enemy  long  columns  of 
motor-transport  of  all  types  filled  with  troops.  Another 
great  advantage  the  enemy  had  lay  in  the  telegraph  and 
telephone  systems;  those  in  East  Prussia  had  been  destroyed 
during  the  retreat,  and  it  was  only  after  careful  repair  that 
we  could  make  use  of  them.  Of  still  less  advantage  to 
us  were  the  paved  roads,  for  we  possessed  neither  light  nor 
heavy  motor  transport.  When  the  transport  officer  of  my 
division  succeeded  in  obtaining  three  heavy  motor-waggons, 
the  neighbouring  infantry  staffs  became  very  jealous  of  me. 
Without  this  transport  I  should  never  have  been  able  to 
cover  the  fifty  kilometres  I  travelled  nearly  every  day  dur- 
ing the  time  I  was  charged  with  the  protection  of  the  flank 
of  the  1st  Army.  Luckily,  there  was  no  shortage  of  food 
and  fodder  in  the  country,  an  astonishing  amount  of  rural 
wealth  being  revealed  as  we  passed  through.  There  were 
localities  where  German  troops,  and  our  own,  passed  five  or 
six  times,  taking  toll  of  the  country  on  each  occasion,  and  yet 
during  our  second  campaign  in  East  Prussia  in  the  late 
autumn  of  19 14  we  found  remaining  enormous  reserves  of 
food  for  both  horses  and  men,  although  all  the  armies  who 
passed  used  the  food  with  a  total  disregard  of  the  future. 
I  was  greatly  impressed  by  the  extremely  high  standard  of 
scientific  agriculture  throughout  the  whole  of  East  Prussia. 
Not  only  were  the  people  most  solicitous  as  to  the  cultiva- 
tion of  their  farms,  but  their  Government  undoubtedly  af- 
forded them  every  assistance. 

Evidently  only  these  radical  Government  measures  could 
explain  the  fact  that  in  all  the  provinces  of  East  Prussia 
through  which  we  passed  all  the  horned  cattle  was  of  a 


42  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  EAST  PRUSSIA      [ch.  iv 

Dutch  breed,  a  black-and-white  beast  which  the  Germans 
had  probably  decided  was  the  best  for  that  country.  An- 
other point  which  impressed  us  all  greatly  was  the  richness 
of  the  farms  and  their  strange  similarity  of  build.  All  the 
farmhouses  consisted  of  several  stone  buildings,  one  of 
which  would  be  occupied  and  the  others  for  rural  economy 
purposes;  all  were  surrounded  by  high  stone  walls.  Those 
farms  appeared  like  small  fortifications  and  they  often 
played  an  extremely  important  part  during  our  fighting  with 
the  Germans.  Unfortunately  it  was  the  Germans  who 
found  them  the  most  profitable.  Our  field  artillery  was 
comparatively  innocuous  against  the  thick  walls,  whilst 
when  we  were  in  occupation  of  one  of  these  temporary 
blockhouses  the  heavy  howitzer  shells  of  the  enemy,  which 
our  troops  christened  "  Trunks,"  played  havoc  with  us,  a 
number  of  our  men  receiving  wounds  from  splinters  of 
stones. 

I  have  already  mentioned  that  during  the  time  we  were 
advancing  through  East  Prussia  practically  all  the  German 
inhabitants  had  fled  to  the  interior  of  the  country.  The 
country  people  carried  away  most  of  their  belongings  on 
their  farm  vehicles  and  only  left  behind  their  cattle  and 
poultry.  The  people  in  the  towns  were,  of  course,  able  to 
use  the  railways  and  fled  in  thousands  to  the  interior.  At 
the  beginning  of  our  first  campaign  in  East  Prussia  we  wit- 
nessed the  departure  of  the  country  folk,  whereas  on  the 
frontier,  towns  retained  all  their  inhabitants.  This  proved 
that  our  advance  was  quite  unexpected  by  the  Germans,  but 
towards  the  end  of  the  first  invasion  and  more  especially  at 
the  commencement  of  the  second,  Eastern  Prussia  was 
deserted.  People  had  fled  from  the  towns.  All  the  able- 
bodied  inhabitants  had  gone  westward  and  we  were  able 
to  wander   at  will   amongst  their  villages.      In   the   towns 


1914]       THE  OCCUPATION  OF  EAST  PRUSSIA  43 

a  few  of  the  more  courageous  people  remained;  perhaps 
they  did  not  altogether  believe  the  fearsome  tales  which 
were  running  like  wildfire  throughout  Germany  as  to  the 
havoc  our  troops  were  making. 

A  characteristic  episode  happened  in  the  town  of  Anger- 
burg,  which  we  had  reached  after  a  fifty-kilometre  march  in 
the  days  when  motor-lorries  had  not  been  provided  to  bring 
up  the  supply  of  rations  for  the  men.  We  arrived  at 
Angerburg  at  nightfall,  the  town  having  been  evacuated 
by  the  Germans  only  a  few  hours  before.  My  ofl^cers  re- 
ported to  me  that  they  had  no  bread  for  their  men,  and 
that  the  supply  of  sugar,  tea,  and  salt  had  dwindled  to  van- 
ishing point.  I  issued  an  order  to  investigate  matters  in 
the  local  bakers'  shops,  but  these  proved  to  be  closed  and 
deserted  by  their  owners.  There  were  no  municipal  author- 
ities in  the  town.  In  the  streets  solitary  citizens  strolled 
about  watching  with  curious  eyes  the  Russian  troops  who 
were  resting.  I  gave  an  order  to  ring  the  alarm  bell  at  the 
steeple  and  to  make  it  known  to  the  citizens  that  they  had 
all  to  meet  in  the  market  square.  Little  by  little  a  small 
number  of  people  collected,  mostly  old  men  and  women, 
some  300  altogether.  Addressing  them  I  asked  them  to 
point  out  to  me  someone  who  could  assume  the  functions  of 
mayor  and  act  as  an  intermediary  between  myself  and  the 
citizens.  Amidst  a  babel  of  voices  a  name  was  called  out 
and  a  man  came,  or  was  rather  pushed,  through  the  crowd. 
He  was,  I  afterwards  learnt,  the  owner  of  a  provision 
shop.  Then,  in  the  presence  of  the  crowd,  I  told  him  what 
my  requirements  were  —  namely,  that  the  citizens  should 
set  to  work  immediately  in  all  the  bakers'  shops  of  the  town, 
appointing  to  each  shop  sufficient  women  to  bake  the  bread. 
It  had  already  been  reported  to  me  that  there  was  plenty 
of   flour   in    the    shops.     On   the    following   morning   this 


44  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  EAST  PRUSSIA     [ch.  iv 

bread,  sufficient  for  two  days'  supply,  had  to  be  furnished 
for  my  cavalry  division,  which  was  then  about  4,000  strong, 
together  with  a  quantity  of  sugar,  tea,  salt,  and  tobacco. 
While  I  was  explaining  this  to  the  newly  elected  Burgo- 
master it  was  pretty  evident  that  he  was  not  at  all  anxious 
to  assist,  every  possible  excuse  being  urged  against  supply- 
ing us. 

Our  next  trouble  was  with  motor-cars.  Remembering 
an  incident  at  Marggrabowa  when  a  German  car  with  the 
Red  Cross  made  a  pretence  of  wishing  to  pick  up  the 
wounded  and  then,  when  the  roads  suddenly  became  clear, 
dashed  off  to  the  west,  I  decided  to  take  no  risks  at  Anger- 
burg,  my  staff  having  reported  to  me  that  they  had  seen  a 
car  in  the  town  which  might  be  utilised.  So,  again  ad- 
dressing the  crowd,  I  said  that  as  motor-cars  were  used  for 
military  purposes  I  required  the  citizens  present  to  inform 
me  at  once  where  all  the  motor-cars  were  situated,  because, 
doubtless,  they  would  know  where  they  were  kept.  I 
added,  moreover,  that  it  was  not  a  joke,  and  if  the  informa- 
tion was  not  given  conscientiously  I  would  issue  an  order  to 
shoot  the  inhabitants  of  a  house  where  a  car  was  found,  or, 
in  the  absence  of  them,  would  shoot  the  inhabitants  of  the 
neighbouring  houses.  I  gave  the  order  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  show  it  was  not  to  be  disregarded,  and  I  realised  that 
if  the  inhabitants  should  understand  that  it  was  not  a  mere 
threat  I  should  never  have  to  fulfil  it.  The  impression  it 
made  surpassed  my  fondest  hopes.  First  of  all  there  were 
a  few  voices  from  the  crowd  from  people  offering  to  guide 
us  to  where  there  were  cars,  information  which  on  verifica- 
tion proved  to  be  perfectly  accurate,  although,  unfortunately, 
none  of  these  cars  could  be  used,  all  that  was  useful  being 
a  number  of  spare  parts.  But  my  threat  of  shooting  made 
the  new  Burgomaster  suddenly  come  to  the  conclusion  that 


1914]       THE  OCCUPATION  OF  EAST  PRUSSIA  45 

ail  of  my  requests  could  now  be  fulfilled.  Volunteers  came 
forward  to  commence  the  baking,  and  by  the  following 
morning  all  my  requisitions  had  been  carried  out  to  the  let- 
ter, the  supplies  being  sufficient  to  carry  us  over  a  few  days. 
If  the  evacuation  of  Eastern  Prussia  gave  us  a  good  deal 
of  trouble,  one  could  only  say  that  for  Germany  the  con- 
sequences were  infinitely  more  serious.  Fugitives  left  for 
the  inland  towns  by  the  thousand,  spreading  as  they  went 
exaggerated  statements  as  to  the  cruelties  alleged  to  have 
been  practised  by  our  troops.  Our  Cossacks  in  particular 
were  the  cause  of  many  a  wild  rumour  of  alleged  atrocities 
on  the  people,  rumours,  I  need  hardly  say,  which  lost  noth- 
ing in  the  telling,  and  created  panic  in  the  German  towns. 
Although  it  is  difficult  to  say  to  what  extent,  these  stories, 
which  were  current  all  over  Germany,  could  not  but  exert 
an  influence  on  the  German  military  authorities,  who  were 
being  pressed  on  all  sides  to  try  to  check  our  invasion  of 
Eastern  Prussia.  At  that  time  this  could  only  have  been 
accomplished  by  a  large  transfer  of  troops  from  the  West- 
ern Front,  and  this  the  Germans  were  possibly  reluctant  to 
do.  When,  however.  General  Samsonoff's  army  com- 
menced serious  military  operations,  the  German  High  Com- 
mand realised  that  all  Eastern  Prussia  and  the  defensive 
lines  of  the  Masurian  Lakes  were  likely  to  pass  into  our 
possession.  Such  an  event,  in  the  eyes  of  the  Germans, 
could  hardly  fail  to  be  regarded  as  one  of  great  importance 
and  likely  to  have  a  great  effect  on  the  ultimate  issue  of 
the  campaign,  for  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  at  this 
time  they  were  still  of  the  opinion  that  the  war  would  last 
but  a  few  months.  Had  this  not  been  the  case,  they  would 
doubtless  have  preferred  first  of  all  to  achieve  a  substantial 
success  on  the  French  front,  even  at  the  cost  of  a  temporary 
failure  in  Eastern  Prussia.     However,  the  Germans  finally 


46  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  EAST  PRUSSIA     [ch.  iv 

decided  to  strengthen  their  Eastern  front  at  the  cost  of  the 
other,  a  decision  which  had  an  enormous  influence  on  the 
future  of  the  whole  war.  This  shows  once  more  that  in 
every  affair,  and  especially  in  military  operations,  it  is  dan- 
gerous to  abandon  a  decision  already  taken,  even  if  chang- 
ing the  plan  promises  a  temporary  success. 


CHAPTER  V 

CAVALRY    OPERATIONS    AND    SOME    CHARACTERISTIC 

INCIDENTS 

While  General  Rennenkampf,  prompted  no  doubt  by  his 
natural  boldness,  was  energetically  advancing  towards  the 
west  and  menacing  the  German  fortress  of  Konigsberg 
without  waiting  for  his  rear  lines  to  be  organised,  the  forma- 
tion of  General  Samsonoff's  army  was  being  completed  and 
disposed  near  the  northern  frontier  of  the  Polish  kingdom, 
with  its  front  directed  towards  the  north.  The  country 
between  these  two  army  groups  had  to  be  filled  in  later  on 
by  the  loth  Army  which  now  was  just  beginning  formation. 
During  the  interval  the  lOO  intervening  kilometres  were  oc- 
cupied by  weak  and  widely  extended  cavalry  units. 

Before  describing  the  development  of  military  activities, 
it  is  interesting  to  review  briefly  the  part  played  by  our 
cavalry  in  the  first  days  of  the  campaign.  During  this 
period  they  had  been  obliged  to  carry  out  every  method  of 
fighting  assigned  to  them  by  textbooks  on  tactics  and  strategy, 
most  onerous  of  these  duties  being  endless  work  of  recon- 
naissance which  entailed  very  heavy  responsibility  on  the 
mounted  arms.  Every  day  our  cavalry  had  to  throw  out 
a  network  of  patrols,  varying  in  strength  from  ten  men  to 
an  entire  squadron.  Of  no  less  importance  was  the  work 
of  protecting  the  flanks  of  the  army.  At  this  stage  our 
armies  were,  with  few  exceptions,  grouped  separately,  so 
that  their  flanks  were  never  safe  from  a  turning  movement 
by  the  enemy's  infantry  and  cavalry,  and  it  was  only  the 

47 


48  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS  [ch.  v 

timely  intervention  of  our  own  cavalry  which  could  guard 
against  such  a  contingency.  It  was  the  cavalry  also  which 
had  to  maintain  contact  between  the  different  armies  and 
at  the  same  time  keep  a  constant  watch  over  the  intervening 
country.  And  independently  the  cavalry  had  to  fight  off 
the  numerous  surprise  attacks  which  the  Germans  were 
fond  of  making  on  our  rear,  some  of  these  being  on  quite  a 
large  scale.  In  moving  through  the  country  we  were  oc- 
cupying, we  naturally  destroyed  all  railway  lines  and  build- 
ings. We  found  that  most  of  the  substantial  buildings  and 
bridges  were  strongly  held  by  the  Germans  and  to  attack 
them  required  a  considerably  larger  force  than  we  had  avail- 
able for  this  purpose.  The  Germans,  on  the  other  hand, 
with  their  splendid  railway  system  were  able  at  any  time 
to  bring  up  train  loads  of  reinforcements  to  meet  strategic 
contingencies. 

To  people  not  intimately  acquainted  with  military  opera- 
tions and  the  conditions  under  which  modern  war  is  waged, 
it  may  possibly  appear  incomprehensible  that  the  so-called 
"  line  strategy  "  is  again  being  used  in  the  twentieth  cen- 
tury, a  strategy  that  has  been  so  severely  criticised  by  all  the 
great  mihtary  leaders.  There  is  but  one  answer  to  such  a 
question  —  namely,  the  influence  railways  have  on  strategical 
operations.  Until  railways  were  widely  used,  armies  were 
tied  down  very  closely  to  their  lines  of  communication. 
The  transference  or  institution  of  new  lines  of  communica- 
tion in  those  times  was  a  process  as  complicated  as  It  was 
slow,  and  had  to  precede  to  a  certain  degree  the  concentra- 
tion of  troops  In  any  given  direction.  Therefore  it  was  Im- 
possible to  conceal  such  an  operation  from  either  secret  or 
open  agents  of  the  enemy.  It  Is  another  matter  nowadays. 
Let  us  suppose  that  one  of  the  belligerents  has  collected  Its 
armed  forces  into  several  groups  and  left  the  spaces  between 


1914]  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS  49 

these  groups  without  observation  or  occupation  by  cavalry, 
or  territorial  units,  and  further  that  these  spaces  may  be  of 
100  versts  or  more  in  extent.  Naturally,  an  enterprising 
opponent  would  take  advantage  of  these  spaces  to  penetrate, 
not  only  within  his  enemy's  lines,  but  also  to  establish  a 
profitable  base  for  making  a  blow  on  the  flanks  of  one  of 
the  enemy  groups.  A  quick  concentration  of,  say,  an  army 
corps,  could  be  effected  by  railroads  leading  to  these  un- 
occupied areas.  If  it  is  taken  into  consideration  that  an 
area  on  the  European  frontiers  of  100  kilometres  or  more 
is  fed  generally  by  several  railroads,  then  it  is  quite  clear 
that  the  enterprising  enemy  can  quickly  concentrate  against 
such  a  point  a  whole  army. 

If,  however,  in  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  neither 
side  can  at  once  place  its  entire  strength  in  the  field,  the 
task  of  occupying  or  covering  these  unoccupied  areas  must 
fall  upon  the  cavalry  as  the  most  mobile  branch  of  an  army. 
Their  duty  would  be  to  prevent  the  concentration  of  the 
enemy  until  such  time  as  their  own  infantry  was  prepared 
to  attack  in  force. 

On  this  account  the  cavalry  was  indispensable  to  the 
Russian  Army,  which  had  to  deploy  on  a  front  of  nearly 
1,300  kilometres.  One  can  only  regret  that  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  campaign  the  considerable  forces  of  Russian 
horsemen,  which  were  formed  from  the  second  and  third 
mobilisations  of  Cossacks,  could  not  be  brought  up  to  our 
frontiers  because  the  comparatively  poor  railroad  system 
was  entirely  occupied  in  transferring  troops  and  war  ma- 
terials to  our  western  frontier,  and  at  the  same  time  bring- 
ing up  mobilised  reserves  and  new  rear-guard  formations. 
Therefore,  It  can  probably  be  supposed  that  future  wars, 
at  the  beginning,  will  develop  on  the  principles  and  laws  of 
wide  field  tactics,  but  with  the  time  when  all  the  fighting 


50  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS  [ch.  v 

forces  shall  be  brought  into  the  field  both  belligerents  will 
use  position,  trench,  and  line  tactics  where  the  flanks  of  the 
opponents  are  secured  by  the  seas  or  a  neutral  territory. 

During  the  war  of  movement  in  East  Prussia  our  cavalry 
did  some  magnificent  work,  their  reconnoitring  and  patrol 
activities  on  the  flanks  of  the  armies  keeping  the  Germans 
in  a  state  of  constant  perturbation  which  must  have  been  far 
from  pleasant. 

When  my  division  captured  the  railways  which  sur- 
rounded Korschen  I  sent  Cornet  Bolderoff  of  the  first  regi- 
ment of  Don  Cossacks  on  a  reconnoitring  patrol  in  some  of 
the  lonelier  districts  where  I  suspected  the  presence  of  the 
enemy.  This  suspicion  proved  to  be  well  founded.  One 
day  Cornet  Bolderoff  came  across  a  German  columm  moving 
forward  in  a  direction  which  would  directly  menace  my 
rear  and  might  have  proved  a  grave  danger  to  the  infantry 
on  the  flanks  of  the  ist  Army. 

Leaving  his  patrol  hidden  in  the  woods,  Bolderoff,  ac- 
companied by  a  few  dismounted  Cossacks,  waded  through 
the  marshy  woods  which  surrounded  the  macadamised  roads 
along  which  the  German  troops  could  be  seen  marching. 
There  he  remained  for  hours,  crouching  low  behind  the 
bushes,  hardly  daring  to  breathe,  while  he  took  careful 
count  of  the  infantry,  artillery,  and  heavy  transport,  which 
took  hours  to  go  by.  These  numbers  he  communicated  to 
his  men  lying  a  short  distance  behind,  who  sent  them  on  to 
us,  and  when  twilight  had  gone  and  the  German  column  had 
disappeared,  rejoined  his  patrol  and  galloped  to  my  staff 
headquarters  with  the  news.  For  this  gallant  exploit  Bol- 
deroff was  decorated  with  the  Cross  of  St.  George;  he  was 
the  first  officer  in  the  division  to  be  so  honoured;  apart 
from  those  who  had  been  killed,  or  had  died  from  wounds. 


1914]  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS  51 

Another  exploit,  If  anything  still  more  brilliant,  took, 
place  close  to  the  Augustoff  Canal  in  September  19 14,  and 
had  the  effect  of  nullifying  a  German  project  to  force  our 
lines  near  the  River  Nieman,  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Druskeniki.  I  had  sent  out  Cornet  Ivanoff  in  command  of 
a  patrol  of  Soumsky  Hussars  to  ascertain  the  strength  of 
the  Germans  who  would  have  to  cross  a  thickly  wooded 
country  before  they  could  attack  the  left  bank  of  the  Nie- 
man. In  moving  through  the  forest  Ivanoff's  patrols  dis- 
covered a  German  column  and  informed  their  commander, 
who,  before  taking  cover  in  the  thick  undergrowth,  sent  off 
two  men  to  divisional  headquarters  with  the  news  and  then 
lay  flat  for  hours  watching  the  Germans,  listening  to  their 
talk  and  taking  careful  note  of  the  numbers.  While  on  the 
way  to  headquarters,  however,  the  two  messengers  came 
across  another  German  column  marching  along  a  road  be- 
tween the  first  body  and  the  Augustoff  Canal.  The  presence 
of  this  second  column  at  this  point  made  it  impossible  for 
our  two  messengers  to  get  through.  Accordingly  one  of 
the  hussars  remained  to  watch  the  enemy  force  while  the 
other  returned  to  Inform  Cornet  Ivanoff  of  the  position. 
Ivanoff  detailed  an  intelligent  non-commissioned  officer  to 
watch  the  second  German  column,  with  Instructions  to  go 
straight  to  headquarters  when  the  opportunity  presented 
itself. 

During  the  evening  I  received  both  reports,  and  as  they 
indicated  a  graver  menace  to  the  First  than  to  the  Tenth 
Army,  to  which  I  then  belonged,  I  sent  full  details  on  to 
General  Rennenkampf  and  also  communicated  with  the  staffs 
of  both  armies  by  wireless.  Especially  Important  was  Ivan- 
off's information  that  a  certain  number  of  platoons  were 
carrying  their  banners,  showing  that  the  main  body  of  the 
regiment  had  gone  on  ahead.     Ivanoff  also  gave  particu- 


52  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS  [ch.  v 

lars  of  the  light  and  heavy  artillery  with  the  Germans.  I 
had  no  opportunity  of  ascertaining  to  what  extent  this  valu- 
able information  was  utilised,  but,  at  any  rate,  General 
Rennenkampf  took  such  measures  that  the  Germans  failed 
to  force  the  Nieman,  and  two  days  later  made  a  precipitate 
retirement. 

As  an  example  of  the  lucky  capture  of  an  important  rail- 
way junction  with  comparatively  little  fighting,  the  taking 
of  Korschen,  described  in  military  geographical  handbooks 
as  one  of  the  most  vital  railway  junctions  in  East  Prussia, 
is  worth  mentioning.  Apparently  the  appearance  of  Rus- 
sian cavalry  in  the  neighbourhood  was  quite  unexpected,  for 
the  junction  was  held  only  by  a  weak  body  of  the  Land- 
sturm.  Our  capture  of  this  junction  did  not  enter  into  the 
enemy's  calculations,  for  shortly  afterwards  he  brought  up 
strong  reinforcements  of  cavalry  and  infantry,  together 
with  companies  of  cyclists  and  heavy  motor  transport. 
Korschen  changed  hands  a  good  deal  subsequently,  although 
the  Germans  were  not  able  to  use  the  railways  again.  We 
had  destroyed  all  the  station  buildings  and  permanent  way 
in  the  vicinity,  and  when,  in  the  early  days  of  September 
19 14,  General  Rennenkampf  was  obliged  to  begin  a  retiring 
movement  to  our  frontier,  my  retreating  horse-patrols  set 
fire  to  the  important  stocks  of  coal  which  had  been  col- 
lected at  the  junction;  the  Germans  were  unable  to  subdue 
the  outbreak  owing  to  the  destruction  of  the  water-pipes. 
The  capture  of  Korschen  cost  the  Petrograd  Lancers  sev- 
eral of  their  officers,  including  Captain  Makedonsky,  who 
fought  in  the  Japanese  War  and  greatly  distinguished  him- 
self at  the  taking  of  Marggrabowa. 

The  work  of  securing  the  flanks  of  the  army,  not  only 
by  reconnaissance,  but  by  fighting,  was  characteristically 
used  in  the  first  days  of  the  retreat  of  General  Rennen- 


1914]  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS  53 

kampf's  army  from  East  Prussia.  Soon  after  the  return  of 
my  division,  after  an  attack  on  the  town  of  AUenstein,  which 
I  will  describe  later  in  more  detail,  an  order  was  issued  to 
detach  my  division  from  the  First  Army  and  to  include  it  in 
the  newly  formed  Tenth  Army.  This  army  had  to  occupy 
the  country  between  the  army  of  Rennenkampf  and  the 
former  army  of  Samsonoff,  and  partly  to  replace  the  army 
which  after  the  unlucky  battle  of  Tannenberg  Woods  lost 
nearly  half  its  strength. 

In  obedience  to  Rennenkampf's  orders  and  having  re- 
ceived my  instructions  from  General  Ratkewitch,  who  tem- 
porarily commanded  the  loth  Army,  which  orders  were  later 
confirmed  by  General  Pflug,  I  moved  in  the  rear  of  our  in- 
fantry in  the  direction  of  Marggrabowa,  which  lay  outside 
the  sphere  of  the  attack  of  Rennenkampf  and  Samsonoff. 
From  that  point  I  intended  to  move  on  to  the  left  flank  of 
the  loth  Army,  which  then  did  not  possess  sufficient  cavalry 
for  conducting  reconnaissances  on  its  left.  The  town  of 
Graevo  was  fixed  as  my  point  of  concentration,  and  to  reach 
it  I  had  to  conduct  a  series  of  forced  marches.  When  I 
arrived  on  the  left  flank  of  the  2nd  Corps  of  the  ist  Army 
I  ascertained  from  the  Corps  Commander  that  the  Germans 
were  moving  and  that  no  forces  were  available  to  intercept 
the  movement.  General  Rennenkampf  had  promised  a  di- 
vision of  infantry,  which,  however,  could  not  arrive  for  at 
least  two  days,  and  would,  on  arrival,  be  posted  behind  the 
left  flank  of  a  place  called  the  "  Rothe  Bude."  Night  had 
fallen,  and  the  last  information  brought  to  us  revealed  the 
fact  that  considerable  German  forces  had  occupied  the  small 
German  town  of  Widmennen  to  the  east  of  Lotzen,  which 
had  already  played  an  important  part  in  the  defence  of  the 
gates  to  the  Masurian  Lakes.  Out  of  these  gates  there  had 
now  appeared  a  German  column  apparently  with  the  inten- 


54  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS  [ch.  v 

tion  of  turning  Rennenkampf's  left  flank.  I  was  thus  be- 
tween two  fires;  I  had  either  to  follow  exactly  the  orders 
I  had  been  given  by  the  commanders  of  both  armies,  or, 
on  my  own  initiative,  and  despite  orders,  to  move  forward 
on  the  flanks  of  the  2nd  Corps  and  sustain  the  first  blow 
of  the  German  column  until  the  promised  assistance  ar- 
rived. When  this  infantry  did  arrive  I  should  have  at 
once  retired,  for  in  fighting  strength  my  cavalry  could  not 
compare  with  an  infantry  division. 

I  did  not  hesitate  as  to  the  course  I  should  take.  Strong 
bodies  of  cavalry  were  sent  to  capture  the  necks  between 
the  lakes  to  the  east  of  Widmennen,  so  far  occupied  only 
by  weak  German  patrols.  Simultaneously  I  rode  off  to 
choose  a  position,  close  to  the  isthmuses,  near  the  Lake  of 
Kruglanken,  which  was  comparatively  easy  to  defend  with 
small  bodies  of  troops.  My  division  at  this  time  consisted 
of  four  regiments,  the  Moscow  Lancers  having  returned  to 
me  from  the  4th  Corps. 

I  informed  the  commander  of  the  two  armies  of  my 
Intention  to  disregard  my  orders  to  advance  on  Graevo. 
Next  morning,  while  the  battle  for  the  possession  of  the 
aforementioned  necks  was  In  progress,  I  received  a  second 
order  from  the  commander  of  the  loth  Army  to  make  all 
haste  with  my  arrival  to  enable  him  to  complete  his  forma- 
tion. I  could  not  understand,  however,  whether  this  was 
in  answer  to  my  communication  about  having  been  delayed 
for  more  than  twenty-four  hours  to  protect  the  flank  of  the 
1st  Army  or  whether  my  dispatch  and  his  order  had  crossed 
each  other.  In  any  case  it  was  too  late;  even  had  I  wished 
it  I  could  not  have  withdrawn  my  troops  before  nightfall  and 
after  that  it  was  imperative  that  they  should  have  a  night's 
rest.  During  the  night  the  promised  Infantry  reinforce- 
ments were  due  and  there  was  every  possibility  that  they 


1914]  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS  55 

could  be  disposed  so  as  to  protect  the  left  flank  of  the  2nd 
Corps.  The  belief,  which  I  shared  with  the  commander 
of  this  corps,  that  the  Germans  had  the  intention  of  turning 
his  left  flank,  turned  out  to  be  well  founded. 

Early  the  following  day  the  Germans  bombarded  the 
necks  occupied  by  my  dismounted  dragoons.  My  two 
horse  batteries,  which  had  just  taken  up  position,  immedi- 
ately answered  the  fire,  and  so  attracted  most  of  the  enemy's 
heavy  artillery.  The  Germans  were  under  the  delusion 
that  their  batteries  were  on  the  slope  of  a  small  hill  covered 
with  bushes,  and  they  literally  ploughed  up  the  ground  for 
some  distance  around  until  the  green  field  became  black. 

Shortly  after  noon,  German  infantry  appeared  before  the 
dragoons  and  began  to  attack  in  long  waves.  They  did  not 
appear  to  relish  their  task  and  made  but  little  headway 
against  our  artillery  fire  and  the  rifle  fire  of  the  dismounted 
dragoons.  It  was  diflicult  to  explain  this  hesitation  of  the 
Germans,  as  the  total  force  did  not  amount  to  more  than 
two  and  a  half  battalions  of  infantry.  Probably  the  Ger- 
mans thought  we  were  occupying  the  necks  in  force.  Until 
the  evening  I  was  not  obliged  to  strengthen  my  front  line. 
I  had  to  be  particularly  economical  in  the  use  of  my  reserves, 
for  I  had  received  information  that  while  the  enemy  was 
attacking  on  my  front  his  cavalry  had  been  noticed  moving 
in  a  southern  direction  with  the  intention  of  either  turning 
my  flank  or  taking  me  in  the  rear.  Luckily  this  cavalry 
could  move  no  faster  than  an  infantry  column  as  the  Ger- 
man cavalry  had  attached  to  it  a  Jaeger  battalion  which  ham- 
pered mobility.  In  some  cases  the  Germans  tried  to  coun- 
terbalance this  defect  by  the  presence  of  cyclist  companies 
or  by  putting  their  infantry  in  heavy  motor-waggons.  The 
slowness  of  the  enemy's  movements  naturally  assisted  me 
greatly,  for  it  would  have  been  impossible  with  my  weak- 


56  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS  [ch.  v 

ened  forces  to  have  fought  an  engagement  with  the  German 
infantry  advancing  on  my  front  and  at  the  same  time  to  have 
repelled  an  attack  in  the  rear.  In  the  rear  the  sparseness 
of  my  force  would  soon  have  become  apparent,  with  results 
that  could  only  have  proved  disastrous.  In  any  case,  the 
German  infantry  were  very  slow  to  attack,  probably  because 
they  were  expecting  something  from  their  cavalry  in  the 
rear.  For  some  time  I  managed  to  detain  this  cavalry 
column  on  the  neck  of  a  lake  by  a  squadron  which  I  sent 
there  for  the  purpose.  In  this  engagement,  when  our 
dragoons  were  mounting  their  horses  preparatory  to  re- 
treat, one  of  their  young  officers,  Prince  Ouroussof,  was 
killed.  From  the  beginning  of  the  war  Prince  Ouroussof 
had  tried  to  join  the  army  for  active  service,  but  for  some 
unknown  reason  his  appointment  was  kept  back.  It  was 
therefore  something  of  an  irony  of  fate  that  he  should  have 
been  killed  in  his  first  battle  —  he  joined  his  regiment  only 
the  evening  before.  I  have  often  noticed,  not  only  in  this 
war,  that  men  who  surmount  apparently  insuperable  ob- 
stacles so  that  they  may  serve  in  the  army  usually  die  the 
death  of  a  hero  in  their  first  battle  but  after  a  deed  that 
exceeds  ordinary  bravery. 

With  the  approach  of  dusk,  little  by  little  the  fighting 
ceased.  In  those  days  the  Germans  did  not  carry  out 
operations  at  night,  so  that  sometimes  we  were  able  to  take 
a  much-needed  rest.  All  that  disturbed  the  stillness  of  the 
night  was  the  sound  of  a  German  armoured  car  which 
would  rush  up  to  our  barricades  on  the  macadamised  roads, 
fire  a  few  rounds  from  a  small  gun,  and  then  scuttle  off  into 
the  darkness.  Probably  they  were  searching  for  our 
bivouacs,  but  they  rarely  succeeded  in  doing  any  damage. 
During  the  night  I  quartered  my  troops  in  a  village  close 
by,  leaving  strong  bodies  to  guard  against  any  attempt  to 


1914]  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS  57 

rush  the  necks  of  the  lakes.  I  could  not  at  the  time  decide 
what  to  do  next  day.  During  the  night  it  became  clear  that 
the  2nd  Army  Corps  had  received  orders  to  begin  its  re- 
treat to  the  Russian  frontier,  a  distance  of  about  thirty-six 
hours'  march.  Considering  that  I  had  achieved  my  object 
in  securing  the  left  flank  of  the  army  and  compelled  the 
German  cavalry  to  make  a  wide  detour,  I  came  to  the  con- 
clusion that  it  was  time  for  me  to  carry  out  my  original 
orders  and  join  the  loth  Army.  No  countermanding  or- 
ders had  been  received,  and  I  thought  this  was  by  far  the 
wiser  plan,  for  I  had  received  information  that  the  left 
flank  of  the  retreating  army  was  now  perfectly  safe,  the 
2nd  Cavalry  Division  of  the  Guards  having  been  entrusted 
with  that  task. 

Communicating  my  decision  to  Rennenkampf  and  Pflug, 
who  was  now  commanding  the  loth  Army,  I  decided  to  move 
off  in  the  direction  of  Graevo.  I  should  have  liked  to  visit 
Marggrabowa  again,  where  we  had  fought  in  the  first  days 
of  the  war,  but  could  not  find  the  time,  although  my  heavy 
transport  passed  through.  The  ofl'icer  in  charge  afterwards 
told  me  the  town  was  perfectly  peaceful;  all  the  shops  were 
trading,  and  he  himself,  in  the  course  of  an  hour's  rest,  had 
drunk  some  excellent  coffee  with  different  German  kitchen 
in  some  of  the  local  cafes.  None  of  the  inhabitants  suspected 
that  German  troops  would  enter  the  town  again  during  the 
war,  and  had  quite  settled  down  to  Russian  rule.  Ev^en  less 
did  they  imagine  that  Marggrabowa  would  become  the  scene 
of  some  of  the  heaviest  fighting  of  the  campaign. 

The  inhabitants  evidently  did  not  suspect  the  near  ap- 
proach of  the  German  troops,  who  only  stayed  long  enough 
to  make  a  battle  area  of  the  town,  and  to  spoil  it  consider- 
ably, destroying  its  peaceful  life,  and  causing  its  shops  to 
be  looted  by  both  the  Russian  and  German  soldiery. 


58  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS  [ch.  v 

It  was  in  this  half-destroyed  state,  full  of  our  troops  and 
rear  institutions  and  transports,  that  I  found  it  in  the  first 
days  of  November  19 14  when  I  had  left  the  command  of 
the  mixed  Cavalry  Corps.  I  was  journeying  to  take  over 
the  command  of  the  6th  Army  Corps  and  en  route  called 
on  the  loth  Army  Staff,  whose  chief  was  then  General  Sivers 
and  whose  headquarters  were  on  the  outskirts  of  the  town. 


CHAPTER  VI 

OUR    DASH    THROUGH    THE    GERMAN    LINES 

Without  doubt  the  most  characteristic  episode  in  the  first 
months  of  the  war  performed  by  the  troops  under  my  com- 
mand, was  their  dash  through  the  German  hnes  to  Allen- 
stein  from  the  line  Angersburg-Lindenhof.  This  opera- 
tion was  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  instructions  from  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  Gilinsky,  to  General  Rennenkampf. 
My  instructions  from  General  Rennenkampf  were  that  the 
Cavalry  Divisions  were  to  penetrate  the  enemy's  position 
and  even  approach  Allenstein  by  a  concentric  movement 
from  the  front  occupied  by  Rennenkampf's  Army,  to  find 
out  and  get  evidence  of  the  condition  and  whereabouts  of 
Samsonoff's  Army,  news  of  which  for  two  days  had  not  been 
received  by  General  Gilinsky's  Staff. 

A  copy  of  this  order  was  delivered  me  by  Captain  Male- 
vanoff,  who  arrived  at  3  p.m.  on  (August  29th)  In  a  motor- 
car, just  as  I  sat  down  to  lunch  with  my  Staff,  having  given 
my  troops  orders  to  have  a  complete  rest  that  day. 

I  handed  these  instructions  after  perusal  to  my  Chlef-of- 
Staff,  who  wonderingly  asked  me  what  I  intended  to  do, 
and  how  I  proposed  to  execute  such  an  order.  The  day 
before,  my  troops  had  had  a  comparatively  prolonged  en- 
gagement with  the  German  cavalry,  supported  by  infantry, 
and  on  the  following  day  reconnaissance  had  established 
the  fact  that  all  the  populated  territory  towards  the  enemy 
was    occupied    by    German    troops.     This    meant    that    to 

59 


6o         OUR  DASH  THROUGH  GERMAN  LINES    [ch.  vi 

get  to  Allenstein  it  would  be  necessary  to  cut  our  way 
through  territory  in  the  enemy's  hands. 

Answering  my  Chief-of-Staff,  I  stated  that  our  division 
consisting  of  three  regiments  of  cavalry  and  one  battery 
of  mounted  artillery  should  move  out  from  bivouac  at  mid- 
night. The  route  to  be  taken  would  be  announced  when 
the  division  was  assembled  and  ready  to  move. 

While  the  Chief-of-Staff  was  making  the  necessary  ar- 
rangements, I  took  the  opportunity  to  inquire  from  the 
Staff  Captain,  Malevanoff,  if  he  could  enlighten  me  as  to 
what  was  the  motive  of  such  an  extraordinary  order,  and 
what  reason  could  be  given  for  it.  I  could  not  get  a  satis- 
factory reply;  all  that  he  could  tell  me  was  that  for  several 
days  no  information  whatever  had  been  received  from  Sam- 
sonoff's  Army  by  Rennenkampf's  Staff,  According  to  the 
last  information  the  Staff  had,  Samsonoff  had  moved  for- 
ward so  as  to  turn  round  the  Masurian  Lakes  front.  The 
first  news  of  the  commencement  of  this  movement  was 
rather  favourable  than  otherwise,  but  following  the  receipt 
of  this  information  there  had  been  complete  interruption 
of  all  communication  with  General  Samsonoff's  Staff.  It 
was  evident  that  the  Commander-in-Chief,  taking  advantage 
of  the  considerable  strength  in  cavalry  with  Rennenkampf's 
Army,  wished  to  re-establish  touch  with  Samsonoff,  and 
had  resolved  not  to  get  in  touch  by  the  route  previously  used, 
but  through  enemy  territory. 

It  was  apparent  from  a  careful  study  of  the  map,  that 
to  penetrate  to  the  Allenstein  region  where  Samsonoff's 
Army  was  supposed  to  be,  it  would  be  necessary  to  cover 
over  fifty  kilometres  of  enemy  territory,  taking  the  short- 
est route,  and  several  railways  would  have  to  be  crossed 
en  route;  and  as  the  Germans  always  guarded  all  railways 
more  or  less  closely,  it  meant  that  we  could  not  count  on 


1914]     OUR  DASH  THROUGH  GERMAN  LINES  6i 

the  movements  of  a  cavalry  column  several  thousand  strong 
remaining  undiscovered  by  the  Germans.  The  only  chance 
of  success  for  such  an  enterprise  lay  in  a  sudden  penetra- 
tion of  the  German  lines,  taking  advantage  of  the  night, 
which  happily  at  this  time  was  moonless,  and  of  speed. 
Small  patrols  were  immediately  sent  to  find  out  which  route 
gave  us  the  best  chances  of  concealment  under  cover  of 
darkness.  About  midnight  the  division,  with  the  Petro- 
grad  Lancer  Regiment  as  advance  guard,  moved  off  through 
the  German  lines,  happily  without  a  shot  being  fired  at  them; 
their  success  was  largely  due  to  the  fact  that  they  travelled 
by  a  small  road  through  a  wood  which,  for  some  reason  or 
other,  the  enemy  was  not  guarding. 

By  dawn  the  division  had  already  passed  the  zone  oc- 
cupied by  German  troops,  and  about  6  a.m.  had  their  first 
brush  with  enemy  infantry  guarding  the  railroad. 

I  have  already  mentioned  that  the  Petrograd  Lancers 
were  the  advance  guard.  At  that  time  I  was  unaware  of 
the  superstitious  belief  in  the  division  that  whenever  lancers 
were  the  advance  guard,  there  would  be  heavy  fighting  with 
the  enemy.  This  belief  was  substantiated  by  the  fact  that 
the  lancers,  compared  with  other  regiments,  had  had  the 
heaviest  losses,  especially  amongst  the  officers,  and  more 
particularly  in  advance-guard  fighting.  As  will  be  seen 
further,  this  belief  was  confirmed  on  this  day.  Through- 
out the  entire  war  this  regiment  distinguished  itself  bril- 
liantly, its  bravery  being  famous  throughout  the  army. 

In  every  case  of  a  division  advancing,  regiments  for  ad- 
vance guard  invariably  had  to  take  this  duty  in  turn.  I 
was  extremely  grateful  to  chance  that  this  duty-turn  fell  to 
this  lancer  regiment,  as,  with  the  utmost  confidence,  I  could 
leave  the  most  difficult  and  responsible  operations  for  them 
to  carry  out. 


62         OUR  DASH  THROUGH  GERMAN  LINES    [ch.  vi 

To  cross  the  first  railway  line  as  quickly  as  possible  it 
was  necessary  to  engage  the  German  railway  guards  with 
about  half  a  dozen  squadrons,  as  there  was  no  certainty 
that  this  movement  through  their  lines  had  not  been  no- 
ticed, and  that  they  would  not  undertake  some  movements 
against  my  rear,  especially  as  they  might  understand  what 
was  taking  place  by  the  rifle  fire  at  the  railway.  The  di- 
vision took  about  an  hour  in  crossing  the  railway,  from 
which  point  they  went  forward  at  an  increased  pace  direct 
to  Allenstein,  I  had  not  the  slightest  information  about  the 
enemy  in  this  district,  as  it  was  remote  from  our  base  of 
operations.  The  crossing  of  the  second  railway  was  at- 
tended by  about  the  same  amount  of  resistance.  Just  about 
noon  an  officers'  patrol  sent  out  from  the  cavalry  division, 
which  was  moving  towards  Allenstein  from  the  north  to 
get  in  touch  with  us,  came  in.  The  officer  told  me  that  they 
reckoned  that  the  cavalry  division  could  soon  get  to  Allen- 
stein. This  knowledge  raised  our  confidence.  We  pushed 
on  to  the  railway  which  separated  us  from  Allenstein  and 
was  not  far  distant  from  the  town  itself  (a  railway  junc- 
tion). En  route  my  troops  found  a  machine  gun  In  perfect 
order,  which  turned  out  to  be  of  Russian  make,  showing 
clearly  that  Russian  troops  had  been  In  action  there. 

As  we  approached  the  railway,  we  sent  out  parties  under 
officers  to  blow  up  the  railway  line  to  prevent  the  Germans 
bringing  up  reserves.  This  measure,  taken  In  time,  was  of 
Inestimable  value  to  us,  although  the  explosions  must  have 
drawn  the  enemy's  attention,  but  a  column  of  cavalry  with  a 
front  of  over  two  versts  must  have  drawn  his  attention  in 
any  case. 

The  reason  that  we  had  passed  through  this  zone  un- 
noticed was  that  the  Germans  had  evacuated  the  inhabitants 
earlier.      Soon  after  noon  our  advanced  guard  exchanged 


I9I4]     OUR  DASH  THROUGH  GERMAN  LINES  63 

shots  with  the  enemy,  the  firing  becoming  more  and  more 
intense.  Riding  at  the  head  of  my  column,  I  could  see  the 
dismounted  lancers  advancing  and,  retreating  before  them, 
the  comparatively  weaker  German  infantry  in  extended  or- 
der. In  the  distance  the  buildings  and  the  barracks  in 
AUenstein  could  be  seen  with  the  naked  eye.  Our  battery 
was  called  up  and  immediately  opened  fire  on  the  German 
reserves,  and  also  on  the  retreating  line.  Information  was 
brought  in  that  several  German  dead  had  been  found,  and 
it  was  gathered  from  the  equipment  of  these  men  that  we 
were  fighting  infantry.  A  German  battery,  evidently  of 
howitzers,  opened  fire  and  shortly  afterwards  another 
joined  in,  both  paying  special  attention  to  our  battery.  The 
battle  front  was  gradually  extending,  and  I  found  it  neces- 
sary to  throw  in  a  regiment  of  hussars  and  some  machine 
guns.  The  Cossacks  were  detailed  to  the  flanks.  Informa- 
tion came  from  our  patrol  guards  that  a  train,  evidently 
filled  with  troops,  was  stopped  by  the  destruction  of  part 
of  the  railways,  and  was  trying  to  retire.  This  move,  how- 
ever, did  not  prevent  the  debarkation  of  troops  at  some 
other  point,  and  a  march  by  them  against  our  flanks  and 
an  enveloping  of  our  rear.  At  the  same  time  the  Germans 
who  had  been  retreating  in  extended  order  before  our 
lancers  were  reinforced,  and  every  minute  we  expected  them 
to  make  a  counter-attack.  At  any  rate,  it  was  to  be  sup- 
posed that  the  methodical  German  was  awaiting  the  result 
of  the  enveloping  manoeuvre  of  the  column  sent  by  train, 
and  by  other  troops  which  so  far  we  had  not  discovered. 
The  body  of  Pankratieff,  one  of  the  colonels  of  the  lancers, 
at  this  moment  was  carried  past  me  on  a  Red  Cross  cart, 
and  soon  afterwards  the  commander  of  the  First  Lancer 
Squadron  was  also  killed. 

It  was  clear  by  the  development  of  the  battle  that  with 


64         OUR  DASH  THROUGH  GERMAN  LINES    [ch.  vi 

a  comparatively  weaker  force  —  I  had  barely  more  than 
1,500  dismounted  rifles,  made  up  of  various  cavalry  units 
—  I  should  not  be  able  to  force  my  way  through  to  Allen- 
stein. 

When  the  answering  cannonade  was  heard  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  battle,  it  came  into  my  mind  that  this 
might  be  our  cavalry  division  attacking  from  the  north; 
I  even  stopped  our  firing  to  make  sure.  However,  my  ar- 
tillerymen soon  discerned  from  the  nature  of  the  explosions 
that  it  was  German  firing. 

Neither  in  this  way  nor  by  the  network  of  scouts  could 
news  be  obtained  of  the  approach  of  Russian  cavalry  who, 
according  to  calculation,  should  have  been  near. 

Before  commencing  a  retreat,  I  felt  much  inclined  to  fire 
several  rounds  from  the  artillery  into  Allenstein,  but  as  I 
was  not  certain  that  whether  any  of  the  German  Staff  and 
troops  were  in  the  town,  I  did  not  do  so,  particularly  when 
I  remembered  that  the  peaceful  civilian  inhabitants  might 
still  be  in  occupation  of  their  homes. 

About  3  p.m.,  having  travelled  more  than  fifty  kilometres 
according  to  the  map,  having  fought  several  small  engage- 
ments at  the  railways,  and  a  more  serious  fight  before  the 
town  of  Allenstein  itself,  and  not  having  seen  any  signs  at 
all  of  Russian  troops,  and  having  distinguished  part  of  the 
German  troops  with  which  we  had  been  engaged  outside 
Allenstein,  I  felt  that  I  had  done  all  that  was  possible  for 
my  force.  Under  the  circumstances,  I  felt  it  my  duty  to 
lead  the  troops  out  of  battle,  and  to  find  a  way  to  our  main 
forces,  the  most  difficult  part  of  our  problem.  I  was  also 
faced  with  the  necessity  of  breaking  off  the  battle  so  that 
both  men  and  horses  might  have  rest  and  food,  as  they  had 
been  in  the  saddle  and  without  food  for  the  whole  day. 

Unavoidably,  the  first  part  of  the  retreat  had  to  be  ef- 


I9I4]     OUR  DASH  THROUGH  GERMAN  LINES  65 

fected  along  the  same  route  as  the  advance,  that  being  the 
shortest  and  best  known. 

Later,  I  decided  that  perhaps  under  the  cover  of  dark- 
ness I  would  change  the  route  and  in  this  way  outwit  the 
Germans  who,  without  doubt,  had  already  taken  steps  to 
intercept  the  division  on  its  way  back  to  our  main  force. 
Of  course  there  might  still  be  a  possibility  of  advancing  to 
join  up  with  Samsonoff's  Army,  which  had  been  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Allenstein,  but  as  the  direction  taken  by 
him  could  not  be  ascertained,  such  an  advance  would  be  a 
matter  of  guesswork. 

Fortunately,  the  German  troops  travelling  by  train  met 
by  the  explosions  when  we  destroyed  the  line,  and  by  the 
firing  of  our  scouts,  instead  of  detraining  returned  to  their 
starting-point.  This  gave  me  the  chance  to  withdraw  all 
the  regiments  from  the  fight,  and,  having  left  a  rear-guard 
of  several  hussar  squadrons  with  machine  guns  to  follow 
us  immediately,  to  begin  my  retreat. 

Our  horses  were  so  fresh  that  over  the  first  few  kilo- 
metres we  went  at  a  smart  trot.  I  placed  General  Niloff 
—  the  brother  of  the  Admiral  who  was  always  in  attendance 
to  the  late  Emperor  —  at  the  head  of  the  column  and  my- 
self accompanied  the  rear.  By  6  p.m.  we  had  traversed 
a  considerable  part  of  our  road,  and  as  it  was  nearly  dusk 
I  decided  to  give  the  men  a  rest  and  the  horses  food.  See- 
ing an  isolated  farm  on  one  side,  I  ordered  the  column  to 
turn  in  that  direction,  to  send  out  small  guarding  detach- 
ments all  round  the  place,  and  to  feed  the  horses  without 
unsaddling  or  unlimbering  the  guns.  The  farm  was  com- 
pletely deserted;  the  barns  crammed  full  of  forage.  The 
living  houses  showed  signs  of  recent  occupation;  food  was 
in  course  of  preparation.  Less  than  a  quarter  of  an  hour 
after  our  arrival,   I  was  informed  that  while  the  soldiers 


66         OUR  DASH  THROUGH  GERMAN  LINES    [ch.  vi 

were  taking  hay  from  the  loft  they  found  two  German 
women,  who  were  the  owners  of  the  farm,  deeply  Imbedded 
In  the  hay.  They  were  at  first  very  tearful,  but  when  they 
were  told  that  everything  taken  by  the  officers  would  be  paid 
for,  and  that  for  all  requisitioned  forage  a  receipt  would  be 
given  them,  they  became  calmer  and  commenced  preparing 
food  for  us.  We  had  had  nothing  for  twenty-four  hours, 
and  the  unrecognisable  but  very  tasty  German  food  proved 
very  acceptable  to  us.  With  the  approach  of  darkness, 
about  8  p.m.,  both  women  were  caught  trying  to  get  over 
the  fence  to  escape.  This  manoeuvre  on  their  part  was  not 
seriously  enough  considered.  Nevertheless  I  gave  orders 
for  them  to  be  watched.  Having  learned  from  the  chiefs 
of  the  various  units  the  tired  condition  of  our  force,  I  de- 
termined to  give  the  horses  a  prolonged  rest  as  we  had  still 
thirty  to  forty  kilometres  to  cover.  I  had  to  choose  a  more 
circuitous  route,  out  of  range  of  possible  fights  at  the  rail- 
way crossings,  and  such  points,  before  we  came  Into  direct 
communication  with  our  m.ain  army. 

We  had  given  the  Instructions  for  bivouacking,  and  pos- 
sibly the  majority  had  already  fallen  asleep,  when  I  was 
awakened  and  told  that  both  the  German  women  had  dis- 
appeared in  the  darkness,  and  all  search  for  them  had  been 
in  vain.  The  only  conclusion  I  could  come  to  was  that 
their  disappearance,  before  they  had  received  either  money 
or  receipts  for  food  and  forage,  could  only  be  for  the  pur- 
pose of  alarming  the  local  authorities,  who  would  telephone 
for  help  to  the  German  forces.  We  had  not,  I  may  here 
Interpose,  been  able  to  cut  all  the  telephone  and  telegraph 
wires.  All  my  unit  commanders  and  especially  the  chief 
of  the  artillery  asked  me  to  move  off  not  later  than  1 1  p.m., 
though  the  troops  and  the  artillery  were  very  exhausted. 
Weighing  all  the  pros  and  cons  of  the  women's  escape,  I 


I9I4]     OUR  DASH  THROUGH  GERMAN  LINES  67 

decided  to  accede  to  their  request.  The  women  deceived 
us  by  speaking  Polish,  not  very  fluently  it  Is  true,  and  by 
pretending  to  have  sympathy  with  us.  Nevertheless,  It 
seemed  to  me  that  the  reasons  for  our  moving  off  finally 
were  indispensable. 

At  1 1  p.m.  the  column  moved  off  on  the  way  we  had  come, 
and  I  again  ordered  the  lancer  regiment  to  form  the  ad- 
vance guard.     Owing  to  the  darkness  the  lancers  lost  their 
way.     This  mishap  only  became  known  to  Captain  Novlkoff 
of  my  Staff,  riding  at  the  head  of  the  first  squadron  with 
the  commander  of  the  brigade.  General  Leoff,  and  the  com- 
mander of  the  squadron,  when  they  read  the  signs  at  the 
cross  roads  by  electric  flash  lamps.     Turning  into  the  right 
way  they  did  not  realise  that  they  had  no  outposts  In  front 
of  them.     This  incident  occurred  in  a  village  which  seemed 
completely  dead.     Not  a   sound  was  to  be  heard;  not  a 
glimpse  of  light  shone  from  any  window.     Arriving  at  the 
middle  of  the  village,  the  riders  in  front  were  suddenly  met 
by  a  point-blank  volley  from  some  ten  rifles.     The  volley 
was  fired  so  closely  that  Captain  Shevtsoff  was  killed.     He 
was  the  third  commander  of  the  third  lancer  squadron  to 
be  killed  and  had  taken  these  duties  at  noon;  he  had  previ- 
ously been  my  personal  orderly.     He  came  from  Moscow 
on  his  own  initiative,  and  joined  up  in  a  rather  Irregular 
manner.     Having  been  ordered  to  remain  with  the  Military 
School,  to  get  out  of  Moscow  he  got  leave  from  the  school, 
counting  on  being  able  to  get  his  transfer  back  to  his  lancer 
regiment.     He  was  killed  before  his  transfer  was  received. 
A  bullet  struck  the  field  glasses  worn  by  one  of  the  officers 
riding  beside  him;  It  was  a  lucky  hit  and  saved  the  rider's 
life.     General  Leoff  was  thrown  from  his  horse,  which  had 
been  struck  by  a  bullet  on  one  of  the  brass  bridle  ornaments. 
The  charger  ran  off  Into  the  darkness,  and  when  General 


68         OUR  DASH  THROUGH  GERMAN  LINES    [ch.  vi 

Leoff  recovered  consciousness  he  thought  it  best  to  roll  on 
one  side  and  await  developments. 

Hearing  this  volley  close  at  hand  —  at  night  sounds  al- 
ways seem  nearer  and  more  violent — I  immediately  gave 
orders  for  a  chain  of  dismounted  troops  to  clear  the  vil- 
lage if  possible  without  firing.  The  line  of  men  moved  up 
and  soon  I  was  able  to  ride  up  to  the  spot  where  the  volley 
had  been  fired.  In  the  middle  of  the  road  lay  Squadron 
Commander  Shevtsoff's  body.  A  few  paces  from  the  body, 
drawn  across  the  road,  was  a  large  village  cart,  from  which 
wires  were  stretched  and  fastened  to  the  trees  on  the  sides 
of  the  street.  It  was  evident  that  an  ambush  formed  of  a 
small  cavalry  unit  had  been  prepared  for  us.  The  soldiers 
riding  immediately  behind  the  officers  of  the  ambushed 
squadron  said  that  as  soon  as  the  volley  was  fired  they  heard 
the  sound  of  galloping  horses. 

At  this  time  I  was  told  that  General  Leoff's  horse  had 
been  found,  but  that  he  himself  had  not  been  seen.  At 
first  I  thought  he  had  been  captured,  perhaps  wounded,  dur- 
ing the  first  confusion,  either  by  the  Germans  or  by  the 
local  inhabitants  who  had  locked  him  up  somewhere  in  the 
village.  I  decided  to  give  orders  to  have  the  place  searched, 
however  difl'icult  it  might  be  in  the  darkness,  and  notwith- 
standing the  delay  it  would  cause.  However,  before  a  re- 
port was  brought  to  me  that  the  whole  village  had  been  gone 
through,  by  the  Cossacks  and  lancers.  General  Leoff  walked 
up  to  us  in  person.  He  said  that  on  falling  from  his  horse 
he  had  deemed  it  best  to  take  cover.  Finally,  he  heard 
voices  and  the  artillery  wheels  and  decided  to  leave  his 
hiding-place.  The  division  was  ordered  to  proceed  on  Its 
way.  About  midday,  without  any  particular  Incidents  hap- 
pening, no  signs  of  German  troops  In  the  neighbourhood 
having  been  seen,  I  thought  we  were  out  of  their  reach,  and 


I9I4]     OUR  DASH  THROUGH  GERMAN  LINES  69 

as  I  realised  that  in  the  past  thirty-six  hours  my  men  had 
travelled  more  than  100  kilometres  —  without  counting  the 
engagements  that  had  been  fought  —  I  decided  to  bivouac 
the  whole  division,  so  that  they  could  have  food  and  rest, 
even  to  allowing  the  horses  to  be  unsaddled.  Fortune  was 
on  our  side  again,  for  before  this  order  could  be  carried 
out,  first  a  non-commissioned  officer  reported,  and  then 
Cornet  Tutcheff  reported  personally,  that  from  a  neigh- 
bouring hillock  a  chain  of  German  infantry,  about  a  regi- 
ment strong,  could  be  seen  hurriedly  approaching,  close 
enough  to  be  seen  even  with  the  naked  eye.  The  direction 
of  this  approach  was  from  south  to  north  —  from  which  a 
deduction  could  be  made  that  the  Germans  had  waited  for 
my  return  on  the  same  route  by  which  I  had  penetrated 
their  lines.  They  had  made  a  flank  movement  either  to  cut 
me  off  on  my  return  or  to  make  a  flank  attack. 

The  extreme  weariness  of  my  troops,  especially  of  the 
artillery  horses,  made  it  impossible  to  give  battle.  The 
horses  might  not  have  had  the  strength  to  pull  out  the  guns 
if  we  had  to  take  up  position  in  a  ploughed  field,  for  even 
when  moving  along  the  hard  roads  spare  mounts  had  to  be 
linked  on,  and  those  most  tired  unlinked;  the  troopers  dis- 
mounted and  drove  them  before  us  like  cattle,  so  tired  were 
they. 

I  gave  orders  for  the  column  to  move  off  towards  the 
north-east  so  as  to  avoid  a  fight  with  an  enemy  so  much 
stronger  than  we  were  and  to  endeavour  to  get  into  direct 
touch  with  our  own  forces.  However,  our  rear-guard,  the 
Hussar  Regiment,  was  heavily  fired  on  by  rifles  and  artil- 
lery. I  was  obliged  to  leave  the  front  of  the  column  to 
one  of  the  brigade  commanders,  and  go  to  the  rear,  which 
was  commanded  by  the  Hussar  Commander,  Colonel  Grot- 
ten.     Afterwards  we  found  out  that  our  troops  had  moved 


70         OUR  DASH  THROUGH  GERMAN  LINES    [ch.  vi 

in  an  eastern  direction  on  August  31st;  this  was  why  we 
found  the  Germans  in  possession.  On  taking  up  my  place 
at  the  rear  of  our  column,  my  troops  discovered  another 
chain  of  German  cavalry  and  infantry,  and  as  I  was  about 
to  give  orders  to  prepare  for  battle  —  to  give  the  enemy  as 
much  as  he  gave  —  a  deluge  of  rain  fell  and  completely 
hid  us  from  the  enemy.  By  the  time  the  rainfall  ceased 
we  had  passed  a  small  wood  which  screened  us  from  the 
enemy's  sight  and  firing.  One  and  a  half  to  two  hours  later 
we  came  up  to  our  main  army's  outposts  and  felt  that  at  last 
we  were  out  of  hostile  territory  after  doing  our  utmost  to 
carry  out  our  orders. 

Some  days  later  I  learnt  that  at  dawn  on  the  17th  (30th) 
a  message  from  General  Gilinsky  had  come  in  to  the  village 
from  which  we  first  started  for  Allenstein  and  where  part 
of  our  ammunition  carts  had  remained,  countermanding  the 
order  given  us.  This  was  sent  after  me,  but  of  course  in 
the  daylight  the  small  patrol  who  bore  it  could  not  carry  it 
through  the  German  lines.  The  other  cavalry  divisions 
had  received  this  new  order  and  had  not  started.  I  recog- 
nise that  we  only  managed  to  execute  this  "  dash  through  " 
and  get  safely  back  by  sheer  luck. 

It  would  be  interesting  to  know,  and  perhaps  the  future 
will  enlighten  us,  how  the  Germans  accounted  for  the  pres- 
ence of  a  fairly  large  force  with  artillei-y  deep  within  their 
lines. 

It  was  found  out  later  that  at  the  time  of  the  raid  one  of 
the  German  Army  Staffs  was  in  Allenstein,  which  makes  me 
confess  that  I  am  sorry  now  that  I  prevented  our  artillery 
from  firing  a  few  rounds  into  the  town.  It  would  probably 
have  been  the  first  occasion  on  which  the  German  Army 
Headquarters  Staff  had  been  directly  under  the  fire  of  field 
artillery. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE    BATTLE    OF    TANNENBERG 

As  I  have  already  pointed  out,  General  Rennenkampf  de- 
cided to  invade  East  Prussia  without  waiting  for  the  com- 
plete organisation  of  his  rear.  What  urged  him  to  this  de- 
cision was  his  desire  first  to  take  the  initiative,  and  secondly 
to  take  advantage  of  the  small  number  of  German  troops 
concentrated  on  the  East  Prussia  frontier.  In  this  way  he 
hoped  to  upset  the  enemy's  calculations. 

General  Samsonoff  was  then  facing  the  East  Prussian 
frontier,  having  finished  the  concentration  and  continuing 
the  organisation  of  his  rear,  had  pushed  forward  his  cavalry, 
strengthened  by  small  infantry  units,  over  the  frontier. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  a  big  success  might  have  been  at- 
tained if  Rennenkampf  and  Samsonoff  had  moved  simul- 
taneously. However,  it  is  difficult  to  say  definitely  whether 
such  a  combined  offensive  could  have  been  undertaken  In 
the  first  days  of  the  war.  The  Germans  had  a  complete 
knowledge  of  our  theatre  of  war  close  to  East  Prussia,  and 
knew  all  the  difficulties  we  had  in  bringing  forward  means 
for  an  advance  in  the  early  days  of  the  campaign;  that  is 
why  they  did  not  expect  an  invasion.  Possibly  the  moving 
forward  of  forces,  as  large  as  these,  would  have  been  most 
difficult  in  the  first  week  of  the  campaign. 

But  one  thing  is  certain,  that  if  this  advance  had  been  put 
off,  the  Germans  would  not  have  had  to  regroup  their 
armies  nor  have  been  forced  to  draw  troops  from  France 

71 


72  THE  BATTLE  OF  TANNENBERG        [ch.  vii 

for  East  Prussia.  Further,  they  would  have  had  to  furnish 
much  less  ammunition  and  artillery  for  the  East  Front, 
both  of  which  causes  weakened  them  in  the  Marne  battle 
which  proved  to  be  the  turning-point  of  their  operations  in 
France.  The  Marne  battle  was  lost  to  them  because  of 
their  lack  of  fresh  reserves  and  their  shortage  in  artillery 
ammunition.  One  must  not  forget  that  the  fighting  in  East 
Prussia  used  up  not  only  large  quantities  of  German  shells, 
but  caused  them,  to  increase  their  local  ammunition  reserves 
at  the  expense  of  their  central  stores. 

General  Rennenkampf's  invasion,  commencing  in  the  first 
days  in  August,  continued  victoriously  for  about  ten  days, 
and  then  came  to  a  stop  from  natural  causes.  Even  if  all 
Rennenkampf's  transport  and  rear  organisations  had  been 
completely  ready  and  in  a  position  to  be  of  service  to  his 
troops,  it  would  still  have  been  necessary  to  stop  the  move- 
ment, as  the  greater  part  of  his  forces  were  so  far  from  a 
railway  base  as  to  make  transportation  by  horse  almost  im- 
possible. The  railroads  in  East  Prussia  had  to  be  altered 
from  narrow  to  broad  gauge,  an  operation  which  was  re- 
tarded because  formations  of  workmen  had  not  yet  been 
prepared  by  the  engineers.  The  Germans  had  removed 
nearly  all  the  rolling  stock  to  their  rear.  From  the  rolling 
stock  captured  we  were  only  able  to  make  up  a  few  trains, 
the  lack  of  locomotives  especially  hindering  us.  We  ex- 
pected rolling  stock  from  Warsaw,  where  nearly  everything 
was  at  a  standstill.  The  only  narrow  gauge  we  had  was 
the  Warsaw— Vienna  line  with  its  branches  to  Alexandrova. 

The  reason  for  building  the  first  Russian  broad-gauge 
railway  commenced  in  the  19th  century  was  to  prevent,  or 
at  any  rate  to  make  difl^cult,  a  German  invasion,  which 
could  not  have  been  undertaken  without  completely  relaying 
the  Vim, 


1914]  THE  BATTLE  OF  TANNENBERG  73 

In  those  days  this  decision  was  sound,  for  reconstructlonal 
work  was  much  more  slowly  performed  than  now.  At  pres- 
ent with  sufficient  workmen  and  engineering  staff  such  work 
can  almost  keep  pace  with  an  advancing  field  army,  and  in 
a  war  of  trenches  there  is  time  to  build  completely  new  lines. 
Owing  to  our  track  being  wider  than  theirs,  the  Germans 
in  reconstructing  the  railways  had  to  cut  our  sleepers  to 
fit  their  own  gauge,  which  in  time  necessitated  us  laying 
down  a  new  set  of  sleepers,  a  much  longer  process. 

Rennenkampf's  successful  advance  and  the  daily  increas- 
ing fighting  and  manoeuvring  powers  of  General  Samsonoff's 
Army  led  to  the  decision  that  it  should  support  the  advance 
made  by  Rennenkampf's  Army,  by  a  thrust  in  a  northerly 
direction.  It  seemed  as  if  this  must  be  successful,  for  Sam- 
sonoff's cavalry  met  no  special  difficulty  and  no  serious  op- 
position in  German  territory.  It  was  decided  that  Samson- 
off  should  advance  with  four  army  corps  and  several  cavalry 
divisions,  on  a  front  of  about  thirty  kilometres.  The  actual 
advance  was  to  be  organised  with  the  13th  and  15th  Army 
Corps  in  the  centre,  having  the  heads  of  their  vanguard  in 
line  and  in  close  contact  with  each  other. 

On  the  outside  flanks  of  these  central  army  corps,  at  a 
distance  of  about  half  a  day's  march  from  the  flanks  and 
marching  slightly  to  the  rear,  were  to  be,  on  the  right,  the 
6th  Army  Corps,  and  on  the  left  the  ist  Army  Corps. 

It  was  understood  that  the  main  attack  was  to  be  borne 
by  the  two  central  army  corps,  whilst  those  marching  slightly 
to  the  rear  on  the  flanks  were  to  serve  as  protection  from 
any  possible  envelopment;  but  in  case  of  the  central  army 
corps  being  held  up  by  battle,  they  could  in  their  turn  move 
ahead  to  get  round  the  flanks  of  the  enemy  holding  up  the 
two  central  army  corps. 

The    Battle    of   Tannenberg,    as    it    afterwards    became 


74  THE  BATTLE  OF  TANNENBERG        [ch.  vii 

known,  took  its  name  from  a  large  wood  behind  the  battle- 
field into  which  the  two  central  corps  were  driven  and  sur- 
rounded by  the  Germans,  the  entire  forces,  with  all  their 
remaining  officers,  being  captured.  The  plans  which  had 
been  made,  owing  to  tactical  errors  on  the  part  of  the  corps 
commanders  on  the  flanks,  were  never  carried  out,  and  the 
two  corps  in  the  centre,  left  entirely  without  support  and 
surrounded  by  the  living  wall  of  the  enemy,  had  no  option 
but  to  lay  down  their  arms  after  a  heavy  fight. 

Fighting  began  on  the  morning  of  September  28th,  and 
from  the  beginning  the  corps  on  the  flanks  met  with  some 
resistance,  the  Germans  threatening  an  attack  on  their  ex- 
terior, which  was  but  poorly  protected  with  cavalry.  Prob- 
ably this  resistance  was  unexpected,  for  both  corps,  without 
half  their  troops  having  come  into  action,  began  to  retire  at 
the  moment  the  two  central  corps  were  heavily  engaged. 
On  the  front  the  battle  had  been  going  well  for  the  Russian 
troops;  a  few  thousand  prisoners  had  been  taken,  and  there 
was  every  possibility  of  a  great  victory.  Things  moved 
normally  for  some  time  afterwards  and  heavy  losses  had 
been  incurred  by  both  sides,  when  suddenly  fresh  German 
columns  made  their  appearance,  marching  to  strike  a  blow 
at  both  flanks  of  the  Russian  troops  attacking  in  the  north- 
erly direction.  It  was  reported  at  the  same  time  that  these 
enemy  columns  could  turn  both  flanks  of  our  forces,  which, 
of  course,  would  mean  that  both  army  corps  would  be  en- 
circled. 

Headquarters  of  the  central  corps  were  entirely  without 
information  as  to  what  had  happened  to  the  corps  on  the 
flanks.  They  were  supposed  to  be  holding  in  check  any 
turning  movement  attempted  by  the  Germans.  In  reality 
they  were  retreating  and  had  altogether  lost  touch  with  the 
enemy.     Probably  it  is  quite  natural  to  ask  why  General 


1914]  THE  BATTLE  OF  TANNENBERG  75 

Samsonoff  did  not  give  orders  to  compel  the  flanking  corps 
to  stop  their  retreat,  to  reattack  and  by  a  single  frontal  blow 
strike  hard  at  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  German  columns 
which  were  then  beginning  to  surround  the  two  corps  in  the 
centre.  Failing  this  in  any  case  he  could  have  had  given 
orders  in  due  time  to  withdraw  from  a  fight  that  was  fast 
threatening  to  become  unequal. 

General  Samsonoff  and  his  Staff  were  at  an  observation 
post  in  company  with  General  Martson,  the  commander  of 
the  15th  Corps,  watching,  within  the  limits  of  their  visibility, 
the  attack  which  was  successfully  developing  before  them. 
It  was  subsequently  reported  by  eye-witnesses  that  during 
the  battle  Samsonoff  several  times  inquired  from  General 
Martson  if  any  information  had  been  received  from  the 
corps  on  the  flanks.  Each  time  the  answer  was  in  the  nega- 
tive. The  absence  of  news  was  due  to  the  difficulty  of 
maintaining  connection  in  such  open  fighting  and  also  to  the 
fact  that  both  the  flanking  corps  were  moving,  and  had  the 
utmost  difficulty  in  maintaining  any  kind  of  communication 
with  the  other  commanders.  Destitute  of  any  information 
concerning  the  other  troops  under  his  control,  Samsonoff 
lost  all  power  of  directing  operations  and  thus  infringed 
one  of  the  elementary  rules  of  military  strategy,  that  which 
provides  that  the  commander  of  an  army  shall  choose  as 
his  headquarters  some  spot  where  information  can  readily 
be  brought  to  him  and  whence  he  can  communicate  with  all 
the  forces  under  his  command. 

The  worse  the  organisation  of  communication,  the  more 
an  army  commander  is  disinclined  to  come  close  to  the 
actual  scene  of  the  fighting  and  by  personal  supervision 
counterbalance  the  failure  to  maintain  communication  be- 
tween himself  and  the  unit  under  his  command.  Again 
the  tendency  to  generalise,  which  nearly  every  man  pos- 


76  THE  BATTLE  OF  TANNENBERG        [ch.  vii 

sesses,  will  Inevitably  lead  an  army  commander  to  Imagine 
that  an  operation  happening  before  his  eyes  must  be  similar 
to  that  of  the  other  areas  where  fighting  is  taking  place, 
which  he  cannot  see.  The  defeat  or  success  of  a  unit  un- 
der the  Immediate  observation  of  the  army  commander  may 
result  In  such  orders  being  given  to  the  whole  army  as  would 
certainly  meet  the  situation  Immediately  within  vision  but 
might  prov^e  disastrous  taking  the  battle  altogether. 

In  the  Battle  of  Tannenberg  the  preliminary  success  en- 
joyed by  the  troops  under  General  Samsonoff's  Immediate 
observation  was  such  an  encouraging  picture  that  final  vic- 
tory appeared  a  matter  of  certainty.  Unfortunately,  just 
at  this  time  the  retreat  of  the  two  flanking  corps,  of  which 
Samsonoff  was  totally  unaware,  was  leading  from  hour  to 
hour  towards  the  catastrophe  which  was  ultimately  to  over- 
take the  corps  in  the  centre.  Every  hour  that  passed 
brought  confirmation  of  the  fact  that  the  13th  and  15th 
Corps  were  being  more  and  more  completely  surrounded  by 
the  Germans.  General  Martson  set  out  for  the  scene  of 
the  frontal  attack  to  Issue  orders  for  a  gradual  retirement, 
for  the  divisions  to  withdraw  one  by  one.  Simultaneously, 
Samsonoff  set  off  In  a  different  direction,  presumably  to  get 
In  touch  with  the  other  army  corps  of  his  army.  But  these 
measures  were  taken  too  late. 

Disaster  had  already  overtaken  the  13th  and  15th  Corps; 
German  turning  columns  had  already  penetrated  their  flanks 
and  rear  so  deeply  that  only  a  portion  of  the  transport  and 
a  comparatively  insignificant  number  of  Infantrymen  man- 
aged to  escape  from  the  ring  of  German  masses  which  every 
minute  became  more  contracted.  The  two  army  corps  fell 
back  slowly  into  the  shades  of  Tannenberg  Wood,  abso- 
lutely helpless  and  unable  to  use  their  artillery.  The  result 
of  this  disaster  was  that  the  Germans  captured,  almost  in 


1914]  THE  BATTLE  OF  TANNENBERG  77 

full  strength,  two  army  corps  with  all  their  officers,  and 
recovered  possession  of  their  own  troops  who  had  been 
captured  earlier  during  the  battle.  Caught  in  the  ring,  al- 
though the  Germans  did  not  know  it,  was  General  Samsonoff 
and  his  personal  staff. 

•  •  •  •  • 

Night  fell.  Samsonoff,  accompanied  by  five  other  staff 
officers,  was  guiding  himself  through  the  thick  forest  to- 
wards the  Russian  frontier.  Their  motor-cars  had  been 
abandoned,  for  it  was  too  risky  to  use  the  roads.  The  lit- 
tle party  mounted  on  horseback,  passing  out  of  the  forest, 
despite  the  darkness  were  seen  by  a  party  of  German  in- 
fantry armed  with  machine  guns.  Amidst  a  hail  of  bullets 
the  party  dismounted  and  continued  their  way  on  foot,  into 
another  belt  of  forest.  Utter  darkness  surrounded  them. 
The  sounds  of  fighting  died  away,  and  all  that  could  be 
heard  was  the  trampling  of  the  undergrowth  and  an  occa- 
sional voice  as  members  of  the  little  party  called  out  to 
each  other  in  order  to  keep  together.  From  time  to  time 
a  halt  was  called  and  all  drew  closer  to  make  sure  that  no- 
body was  missing. 

General  Samsonoff,  who  suffered  from  heart  trouble,  and 
found  his  breathing  more  and  more  difficult,  lagged  behind. 
There  came  a  time  when  everybody  had  been  called  and  all 
had  answered  but  Samsonoff.  General  Postovski,  the  Chief 
of  his  Staff,  immediately  called  a  halt  and  in  the  thick  dark- 
ness led  a  search  for  the  missing  general.  It  was  fruitless. 
Samsonoff  had  evidently  stopped  some  distance  behind,  for 
a  careful  and  systematic  search  in  the  black  darkness  and 
repeated  calling  of  his  name  produced  no  result.  Knowing 
of  Samsonoff's  heart  trouble,  General  Postovski  surmised 
that  he  had  sat  down  for  a  rest  and  decided  that  it  would  be 
better  for  the  little  party  to  push  on  and  leave  him  to  make 


78  THE  BATTLE  OF  TANNENBERG        [ch.  vii 

his  way  as  best  he  could.  Before  daybreak  the  five  officers 
met  a  body  of  Russian  cavalry  returning  from  a  recon- 
naissance. Making  themselves  known  to  the  officer  in 
command,  they  were  provided  with  horses,  though  two 
sometimes  had  to  share  one  horse,  and  ultimately  crossed 
the  Russian  frontier  in  safety. 

•  •  •  •  • 

Samsonoff's  ultimate  fate  has  never  been  definitely  cleared 
up,  although  little  doubt  remains  that  he  died  a  lonely 
death  during  that  melancholy  flight  through  the  darkened 
forest.  Much  later  an  artilleryman  related  that  he  had 
seen  General  Samsonoff  sitting  alone  in  the  forest.  He  had 
spoken  to  the  general  and  together  they  had  continued  their 
way.  But  with  every  step  Samsonoff  grew  more  and  more 
tired.  Daylight  came,  and  poor  Samsonoff,  feeling  it  quite 
impossible  to  move  a  step  farther,  sat  down  on  a  hillock 
and  ordered  the  soldier  to  make  his  escape  without  waiting 
for  him.  Artillery  and  rifle  fire  was  heard,  and  the  unfor- 
tunate general  gave  up  all  hope  of  getting  away.  As  it 
turned  out,  this  despair  was  ill-founded.  The  artilleryman 
found  a  way  through  the  German  cordon  and  ultimately  re- 
joined his  unit. 

Nobody  will  ever  know  the  terrible  gloom  which  must 
have  entered  the  soul  of  General  Samsonoff  as  he  sat  there 
on  the  ground,  unable  to  drag  one  foot  after  the  other. 
The  bitterness  of  defeat  was  in  his  heart  and  no  gleam  of 
hope  was  visible  for  the  future.  Who  knows  that  his  weak- 
ened heart  did  not  rebel  under  the  strain  of  this  awful  mis- 
fortune and  that  General  Samsonoff  did  not  die.  In  the  most 
literal  sense,  of  a  broken  heart? 

In  the  course  of  time,  after  the  soldier  who  had  last  seen 
Samsonoff  and  all  the  inhabitants  In  the  immediate  neigh- 
bourhood had  been  closely  questioned,  we  ascertained  that 


1914]  THE  BATTLE  OF  TANNENBERG  79 

in  that  locality  an  unknown  soldier  had  been  buried  and 
that  from  his  dead  body  a  gold  medallion  had  been  taken. 
We  obtained  possession  of  the  medallion  and  found  in  it 
the  portrait  of  Samsonoff's  wife.  There  can  be  little  doubt 
that  Samsonoff  died  and  was  buried  in  that  lonely  forest. 

But  this  information  was  not  obtained  for  some  time,  and 
during  the  first  months  after  the  catastrophe  it  was  widely 
rumoured  that  Samsonoff,  disguised  as  a  common  soldier, 
had  been  taken  prisoner  by  the  Germans.  It  was  even 
reported  that  his  wife  had  received  direct  news  from  him 
confirming  his  captivity. 

■  •  •  •  • 

Rumours  were  long  circulated,  as  is  always  the  case  In 
such  circumstances,  that  the  reason  of  the  defeat  of  Sam- 
sonoff's Army  in  the  Tannenberg  Woods  was  treachery,  but 
I  can  say  confidently  that  these  rumours  had  absolutely  no 
foundation.  The  defeat  was  the  result  of  faulty  instruc- 
tions and  unhappy  circumstances.  The  chance  of  war  that 
day  was  on  the  side  of  the  Germans. 

•  •  •  •  • 

It  might  have  been  assumed  that  the  Germans  would  have 
developed  such  a  complete,  and  possibly  unforeseen,  vic- 
tory, so  as  to  Invade  Russian  territory,  especially  as  there 
were  almost  no  troops  for  defence  at  this  particular  point. 
However,  in  this  case  the  Germans,  although  believers  In 
the  principle  of  an  undertaking  being  carried  out  to  the 
end,  evidently  did  not  wish  to  appear  drawn  by  an  easy,  but 
maybe  temporary,  victory.  Later  events  showed  that  this 
plan  had  been  carefully  thought  out,  and  perfectly  accom- 
plished. From  this  explanation  one  can  see  that  when  Gen- 
eral Samsonoff's  victorious  advance  was  noticed  and  when 
the  Germans  withdrew  several  army  corps  from  the  Western 
Front  to  stop  the  movement,  they  were  threatened  by  the 


8o  THE  BATTLE  OF  TANNENBERG        [ch.  vii 

possibility  of  simultaneous  invasion  by  two  Russian  armies 
moving  concentrically  into  East  Prussia.  The  Germans  had 
to  decide  whether  they  would  stop  both  armies  at  once  by 
reinforcements  from  the  Western  Front,  or  whether  they 
would  concentrate  a  large  body  of  troops  against  one  of 
them,  attacking  one  after  the  other. 

The  natural  inclination  would  be  to  throw  themselves 
against  that  army  which  had  already  invaded  German  ter- 
ritory. But  on  the  other  hand,  the  Germans  must  have 
known  that  Rennenkampf's  advance  of  itself  must  be 
stopped,  or  at  any  rate  slowed  down,  to  allow  of  organisa- 
tion in  the  rear  and  on  the  railroads.  Against  this,  how- 
ever, was  to  be  set  the  fact  that  Samsonoff' s  Army  could 
immediately  take  up  the  invasion  exactly  as  Rennenkampf's 
had  done,  his  advance  being  more  dangerous  for  the  Ger- 
mans than  Rennenkampf's.  On  this  account  the  Germans 
threw  the  army  corps,  which  they  evidently  drew  from  the 
French  Front  or  from  the  interior  reserves,  straight  against 
Samsonoff's  Army,  even  strengthening  this  force  with  di- 
visions from  the  army  opposing  Rennenkampf.  I  had  evi- 
dence of  this  fact  during  my  raid  on  Allenstein  when  we 
found  clear  traces  of  large  bodies  of  troops  having  moved 
from  north-east  to  south-west.  These  traces  were  not  very 
fresh,  but  served  to  prove  that  the  troops  thrown  over  had 
moved  in  this  direction  by  several  routes.  Finally,  the  Ger- 
mans evidently  decided  to  take  advantage  of  the  temporary 
halt  of  Rennenkampf's  Army  to  throw  a  large  part  of  their 
forces  on  Samsonoff's  Army,  which  had  just  commenced 
a  forward  move,  and  after  defeating  him  to  turn  against 
Rennenkampf. 

General  Rennenkampf,  on  learning  of  the  catastrophe 
that  had  overtaken  two  army  corps  of  General  Samsonoff's 
Army,  immediately  began  preparations  for  a  further  inva- 


1914]  THE  BATTLE  OF  TANNENBERG  81 

slon  of  East  Prussia.  He  was  able  to  get  the  Commander- 
in-Chief's  sanction  to  this,  who  even  promised  to  send  him 
an  army  corps,  the  22nd,  to  support  him.  This  army  corps 
was  to  be  taken  from  the  loth  Army  at  that  time  collected 
to  the  south  of  Graevo,  and  should  have  been  sent  by  way 
of  the  town  of  Lyck  so  as  to  get  round  the  Lotzen  fortress 
and  to  protect  the  left  flank  of  Rennenkampf's  Army.  Or- 
ders had  already  been  given,  and  the  plan  of  such  an  ad- 
vance was  in  its  initial  stages  when  the  Germans,  who  ap- 
parently had  had  time  to  transfer  the  army  corps  which 
fought  Samsonoff's  Army,  attacked.  Although  the  prom- 
ised army  corps  actually  did  advance,  it  brought  no  essential 
benefit,  for,  meeting  opposition  to  its  advance,  it  was  obliged 
to  retire  to  its  original  place,  thus  giving  the  Germans  the 
opportunity  to  turn  General  Rennenkampf's  left  flank. 

Every  hour  the  pressure  of  the  German  troops  on  Ren- 
nenkampf's Army  became  greater.  Our  regiments,  heavily 
reduced  during  the  fight  in  East  Prussia,  were  not  able  to 
withstand  the  pressure  of  the  full-manned  German  battalions, 
am.ongst  which  were  the  units,  drawn  from  the  south-west, 
most  of  which  had  not  incurred  any  serious  losses  in  the 
Tannenberg  Wood  fight.  Moreover,  battalions  which  had 
been  fighting  in  East  Prussia  had  very  probably  had  their 
losses  replaced  also.  Our  regiments,  on  the  other  hand, 
during  this  stage  of  the  campaign  had  not  been  reinforced; 
our  inadequate  railway  system  had  not  completed  the  trans- 
port to  the  war  zone  of  either  the  first  service  regiments  or 
the  second  line  units,  both  of  which  had  been  mobilised  in 
the  interior  of  the  Empire.  Our  ever-dwindling  forces 
were  not  being  augmented.  Nevertheless,  General  Rennen- 
kampf  still  declined  to  admit  that  victory  was  in  favour  of 
the  enemy;  he  hoped  all  the  time  that  the  advance  of  the 
promised  loth  Army  Corps  on  his  flank  would  have  good 


82  THE  BATTLE  OF  TANNENBERG        [ch.  vii 

results,  and  he  hesitated  to  give  the  order  to  retreat.  News 
came  in  from  several  parts  of  the  front  of  successful  en- 
gagements, of  determined  attacks  by  the  Germans  beaten 
off,  and  of  prisoners  and  war  booty  taken.  At  this  same 
time  the  Germans,  well  informed  by  past  battles  of  the 
strength  and  composition  of  Rennenkampf's  Army,  and 
evidently  knowing  their  superiority  in  strength,  and  en- 
couraged by  the  successful  envelopment  of  two  Russian  army 
corps  in  Tannenberg  Wood,  boldly  moved  their  forces 
wherever  they  met  the  least  resistance. 

In  this  way  a  comparatively  negligible  German  cavalry 
unit,  with  a  battery  of  guns,  found  an  undefended  opening 
and  penetrated  our  lines  deeply,  and  suddenly  opened  fire 
on  the  town  and  station  of  Gumbinnen. 

The  bombardment  of  Gumbinnen  and  the  panic  it  caused 
amongst  the  transport  there  were  reported  to  Rennen- 
kampf's headquarters  by  two  officers.  But  this  news  was 
not  taken  seriously  by  the  Staff,  notwithstanding  that  the 
capture  of  the  station  meant  cutting  them  off  from  their  base. 
It  was  only  next  morning  that  the  picture  changed  and 
orders  were  hurriedly  given  for  the  forces  to  retire  towards 
the  Russian  frontier.  The  difficult  position  of  Rennen- 
kampf's Army  was  due  to  the  Germans  having  delivered 
their  main  attack  on  its  left  flank.  Such  a  blow  was  quite 
to  be  expected,  because  the  Germans  could  easily  concen- 
trate troops  against  this  flank,  and  its  success  gave  promise 
of  big  results.  Rennenkampf's  right  flank  was  more  drawn 
out  towards  the  west,  and  consequently  the  Germans  could 
calculate  the  shortest  route  to  cut  off  the  right  army  corps 
from  our  frontiers. 

Having  given  his  Chief  of  Staff  instructions,  with  a  view 
to  an  organised  retreat  of  the  whole  Army  to  the  Russian 
frontier,   General   Rennenkampf  evidently  was  himself  so 


1914]  THE  BATTLE  OF  TANNENBERG  83 

shaken  by  the  successive  reports  received  that  he  had  lost 
all  self-control,  and,  leaving  his  Staff,  departed  by  motor- 
car for  the  Russian  frontier.  He  eventually  arrived  In 
Kovno,  abandoning  all  power  over  his  forces  and  leaving 
them  to  get  through  the  hazards  of  the  retreat  fight  on  their 
own  account.  This  step  undoubtedly  threw  the  entire  blame 
on  to  General  Rennenkampf,  and  consequently,  in  Novem- 
ber, on  the  left  banks  of  the  Vistula,  when  the  accusa- 
tion was  made  against  him  that  because  of  his  faulty  dis- 
positions two  German  army  corps  had  failed  to  be  sur- 
rounded, although  this  had  been  reckoned  on  as  an  accom- 
plished fact,  the  higher  command  decided  to  depose  him 
from  his  position  as  commander  of  an  army. 

This  episode  created  a  great  sensation  not  only  In  Russia, 
but  throughout  the  whole  of  Europe,  showing  that  General 
Rennenkampf  was  considered  a  military  star  of  the  first 
magnitude.  There  are  no  people  without  their  failings, 
and  it  happens  not  infrequently  that  an  Individual  under  this 
or  that  Influence  temporarily  acts  in  direct  opposition  to  the 
experiences  of  his  mind  and  character,  and  in  this  way  vio- 
lates the  reputation  he  has  attained. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  the  exchange  of  Rennenkampf  for 
another  person  brought  any  benefit.  Possibly  the  errors 
made  In  the  first  months  of  the  campaign  would  have  pre- 
vented him  making  similar  ones  In  the  last  periods.  In  any 
case,  he  himself  was  terribly  overcome  by  the  fate  that  over- 
took him.  It  is  difficult  to  say  whether  he  acknowledges  that 
he  suffered  justly  for  the  big  mistakes  made.  At  that  time 
many  of  the  troops  were  sorry  for  his  retirement,  as  they 
continued  to  believe  In  him,  In  his  energy,  in  his  talents  and 
decisive  nature,  notwithstanding  the  temporary  weakness 
he  showed  in  the  days  of  the  first  invasion  of  East  Prussia. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

FIGHTING    IN    POLAND    AND    GALICIA 

Having  gained  their  victory  over  Samsonoff's  Army,  the 
Germans  had  put  aside  their  natural  desire  to  develop  it, 
and  hastened  to  throw  their  troops  over  to  stop  the  new  at- 
tack by  Rennenkampf's  Army.  When  the  Germans  had 
broken  the  ist  Army's  obstinate  resistance  and  had  forced 
it  to  retreat  to  the  frontier,  they  had  no  reason  for  delaying 
their  own  advance,  and  therefore  continued  their  thrust  in 
the  wake  of  the  retreating  Russians  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

The  Germans  could  not  have  suffered  any  serious  hin- 
drance from  difficulties  of  food  supplies  or  transports  of 
the  troops,  for  they  had  well-made  roads  and  railroads  to 
serve  them.  Though  the  Russian  troops  had  destroyed 
several  railways  and  stations  in  their  retreat,  our  main  work 
of  relaying  the  lines  on  our  wide-gauge  principle  had  not 
even  been  commenced,  as  at  this  time  we  preferred  to  use 
the  rolling  stock  of  the  Warsaw-Vienna  railroad,  which 
then  was  almost  at  a  standstill. 

The  numerical  superiority  of  the  German  troops  and  the 
disorganised  condition  of  the  Russians  after  the  last  un- 
successful fights,  but  mainly  their  heavily  depleted  ranks, 
prevented  them  from  making  a  stand  on  their  own  frontiers, 
especially  as  at  this  point  there  was  no  ground  naturally 
adapted  for  a  defensive  position  not  already  prepared. 
Wire-entanglement  defences  then  had  not  even  been  thought 
of  in  the  Russian  Army.     The  first  supply  of  barbed  wire 

84 


I9I4]       FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA  85 

the  Russian  troops  received  was  in  December  19 14.  The 
nearest  point  to  which  the  Russian  troops  could  be  with- 
drawn, and  behind  which  they  could  be  reorganised  to  full 
battle  strength  again,  was  the  River  Nieman  for  the  ist 
Army  and  for  the  2nd  and  loth  Armies  the  River  Narew 
and  the  Augustoff  Canal.  For  this  purpose  this  line  was 
strengthened  by  the  proximity  of  a  fort  and  further  rein- 
forced (a  part  had  been  prepared)  by  a  series  of  defensive 
works  contemplated  at  an  earlier  date. 

By  this  time  the  formation  of  the  loth  Army  may  be 
said  to  have  been  completed,  if  one  does  not  include  the 
organisation  of  the  rear  — -  and  in  this  way  the  space  be- 
tween the  I  St  and  2nd  Armies  was  filled  up. 

My  cavalry  division  was  included  in  this  army  and  was 
ordered  to  proceed  to  the  town  of  Graevo.  The  division 
had  barely  approached  this  town  when  I  received  instruc- 
tions to  move  on  to  the  loth  Army's  right  flank  within  the 
Augustoff  Woods  for  the  purpose  of  scouting  for  them  and 
also  to  maintain  communication  with  the  ist  Army,  which 
had  retired  to  the  right  banks  of  the  Nieman.  Every  day 
the  Russian  Army  grew  stronger,  and  the  Germans  en- 
countered more  opposition  to  their  invasion  of  Russian 
territory.  And,  further,  every  step  the  Germans  advanced, 
their  advantage  in  railroad  communications  diminished. 
Even  the  few  macadamised  roads  were  unsuitable  for  the 
transport  of  heavy  German  artillery  and  waggons. 

These  difficulties  were  increased  by  several  days'  rain, 
in  consequence  of  which  both  earth  and  macadamised  roads 
became  impassable;  indeed,  passage  over  the  latter  became 
more  laborious  than  over  the  unprepared  ground  roads.  A 
story  circulated  amongst  the  troops  at  this  time  was  to  the 
effect  that  a  German  officer  prisoner  had  remarked  during 
a  private  conversation  which  had  taken  place  after  he  had 


86        FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA      [ch.  viii 

been  questioned:  "You  Russians  affirmed  that  you  had 
not  prepared  for  war,  but  then  how  was  it  possible  for  you 
to  transform  the  roads  into  so  impassable  a  state  in  so 
short  a  time?     Evidently  you  spoilt  them  a  long  time  ago." 

At  this  time  operations  on  the  Austrian  front  were  dis- 
tinctly in  our  favour.  The  Austrian  troops,  which  had 
crossed  the  Russian  frontier  at  the  beginning  of  the  cam- 
paign, were  moving  in  a  direction  south  to  north,  their  main 
attack  being  directed  against  the  front  Lyublin-Kholm,  they 
were  attacked  in  their  turn  by  our  advancing  armies,  the 
first  engagements  being  fought  with  alternating  success.  In 
many  of  the  battles  the  Austrians  were  superior  in  numbers, 
but  day  by  day  the  opposition  offered  by  them  grew  weaker, 
and  soon  they  began  to  suffer  serious  failures,  losing  large 
numbers  of  prisoners  and  considerable  quantities  of  war 
material.  When  in  the  first  days  of  September  the  Aus- 
trians began  to  retreat,  they  were  unable  to  make  a  stand 
on  their  own  frontiers.  Even  at  so  strong  a  defensive  po- 
sition as  the  swampy  valley  of  the  River  San  they  could 
not  withstand  the  impetuous  advance  of  our  troops,  who 
attacked  in  face  of  their  intense  concentrated  fire  and  waded 
the  river  with  the  water  up  to  their  throats.  It  was  diffi- 
cult for  the  Austrians  to  stop  our  troops,  animated  by  their 
rapid  successes,  later  on.  The  whole  of  Russia,  and  all  our 
Allies,  were  gladdened  by  the  news  of  capture  of  the  town 
of  Lemberg,  the  capital  of  Eastern  Galicia,  by  our  armies 
which  began  their  invasion  from  Volhynia. 

Our  advance  was  very  considerably  aided  by  the  de- 
veloped net  of  railroads  and  macadamised  roads  on  Aus- 
trian territory,  and  the  rapidity  of  our  advance  enabled  our 
troops  to  seize  a  sufficient  quantity  of  rolling  stock  of  suit- 
able gauge,  a  large  part  of  which  belonged  to  the  Dekovil 
railroad,  the  lines  of  which  in  Galicia  enabled  us  to  get  for- 


1914]       FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA  87 

ward  speedy  supplies.  Further,  at  that  season  of  the  year 
we  found  locally  in  this  rich  country  almost  all  the  supplies 
necessary  to  feed  troops.  The  only  article  the  supply  of 
which  we  had  to  organise  during  the  advance  was  bread. 

Up  to  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  in  all  wars, 
until  the  troops  began  to  be  supplied  by  a  military  commis- 
sariat, they  always  received  rusks.  Bread  was  only  baked 
while  stopping  at  large  towns,  where  the  local  bakeries  were 
used.  Light  movable  baking-machines  had  not  even  been 
thought  of.  General  Kuropatkin  in  his  consideration  for  his 
troops,  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  was  the  first  to  introduce 
military  movable  bakeries  on  a  large  scale,  so  that  his  troops 
ate  almost  entirely  new  bread  baked  on  the  spot.  It  is 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  it  was  mainly  due  to  this  cause 
that  this  was  the  first  campaign  where  an  army  had  fewer 
sick  than  killed  and  wounded,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
the  war  took  place  in  a  climate  to  which  they  were  unac- 
customed and  in  a  country  which  even  in  peace  time  is  sub- 
ject to  epidemics,  including  cholera.  The  knowledge  gained 
in  this  direction  during  the  Japanese  War  was  successfully 
used  in  this  campaign.  One  cannot  help  thinking  that  hence- 
forth, in  the  present  as  well  as  in  future  wars  between  civil- 
ised people,  the  possibility  of  troops  melting  away  to  a 
greater  extent  from  sickness  than  from  the  losses  by  the 
enemy's  fire  will  pass  to  the  region  of  unhappy  memories. 
Losses  by  gunfire  are  inevitable  in  warfare;  losses  by  sickness 
and  epidemics,  although  they  influence  the  course  of  military 
events  still,  are  to  a  large  extent  preventable.  On  the  other 
hand,  feeding  the  troops  with  bread  and  not  with  rusks 
greatly  increased  the  difliculties  of  bringing  up  supplies  to 
the  troops.  Naturally  the  inconvenience  pressed  on  us  more 
heavily  than  on  the  enemy,  especially  whilst  the  fighting  was 
going  on  nearer  our  own  frontiers,  where  both  sides  had 


88        FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA      [ch.  viii 

railways  at  their  disposal  In  widely  different  grades  of  de- 
velopment. 

It  is  very  possible  that  one  of  the  reasons  which  induced 
the  Germans  to  transfer  their  main  attack  to  Warsaw  was 
that  by  this  means  they  hoped  to  provide  definite  assistance 
for  their  allies,  the  Austro-Hungarlans.  In  the  first  months 
of  the  war  the  whole  of  the  Polish  Kingdom  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Vistula  was  outside  the  sphere  of  any  consider- 
able military  action.  The  Germans  satisfied  themselves  by 
taking  Kalisz,  where  they  subjected  the  inhabitants  to  un- 
warranted cruelty,  which  eventually  went  very  much  against 
them,  because  it  was  especially  directed  against  the  Polish 
population  and  consequently  roused  an  Intense  hatred  for 
all  Germans  amongst  the  Polish-Russian  subjects.  This  may 
have  been  a  kind  of  vengeance  taken  by  the  Germans  for 
hopes  which  had  been  frustrated.  So  far  as  is  known,  the 
Germans  always  felt  that  In  case  of  mobilisation,  the  popu- 
lation of  Polish  Governments  would  not  willingly  join  the 
ranks  In  the  Russian  Army.  They  even  counted  on  large 
numbers  of  desertions  to  German  territory.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  mobilisation  of  the  Poles  passed  over  as  smoothly 
as  It  did  the  rest  of  the  Russian  Governments.  The  cruelty 
of  the  Germans  to  the  inhabitants  of  Kalisz  were  similar  to 
their  atrocities  In  Belgium,  so  that  when  a  list  of  German 
vandalisms  and  enormities  appeared  in  the  Belgian  news- 
papers, it  was  evident  that  Kalisz  and  Louvain  were  victims 
of  the  same  system  of  terror. 

The  aim  and  purpose  of  this  system  evidently  are  by 
acts  of  inhuman  cruelty  to  carry  such  fear  into  the  hearts 
of  the  local  population  as  to  prevent  possibility  of  acts  of 
hostility  to  the  enemy  conqueror.  Evidently  the  Germans 
regard  this  system  as  beneficial,  not  only  for  themselves  but 
for  the  populations  of  countries  taken  by  force  of  arms. 


1914]       FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA  89 

They  seem  to  believe  in  it  as  a  warning  and  an  insurance 
against  having  to  use  measures  even  more  cruel  in  case  of 
any  hostile  act  against  the  invading  enemy.  The  Germans 
must  judge  for  themselves  what  benefit  these  measures 
brought  them,  but  as  to  its  effect  on  the  Belgians,  Poles, 
Serbs,  and  all  the  Allies,  there  can  be  no  two  opinions.  One 
could  say  that  I  advocated  a  similar  system  when  I  affirmed 
that  one  must  be  severe  so  that  the  moment  should  not  arise 
when  conditions  forced  one  to  be  cruel.  However,  com- 
parison is  not  proof.  Severity  can  be  used  towards  persons 
who  in  any  case  are  partly  guilty,  in  order  to  prevent  others 
following  their  example. 

In  the  German  system  their  "  warning  "  cruelty  is  exer- 
cised as  soon  as  a  place  falls  into  their  hands,  without  any 
consideration  of  the  degree  of  guilt  of  the  victims.  But 
between  severity  and  cruelty  lies  a  complete  abyss. 

We  could  only  spare  a  few  cavalry  divisions  for  action 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula,  all  the  infantry  being  con- 
centrated on  the  right  bank,  and  at  first  even  the  Warsaw 
garrison  was  comparatively  small  in  number.  The  Ger- 
mans, however,  strictly  following  the  principle  of  concen- 
trating all  available  forces  at  the  point  of  a  main  blow,  at 
the  first  period  of  the  war  completely  ignored  this  part  of 
Russian  territory.  On  the  invasion  of  the  Polish  King- 
dom by  German  columns,  the  considerable  hiatus  which  had 
existed  up  to  this  time  between  the  German  and  Austro- 
Hungarian  armies  was  filled  in. 

The  war  gradually  assumed  the  character  of  line  strategy, 
and  at  this  point  was  not  far  from  taking  the  next  step 
in  line  tactics  —  position  or  trench  warfare. 

The  hiatus  between  the  armies  was  filled  up  by  Ger- 
man troops  at  the  expense  of  weakening  the  hnes  on  the 


go       FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA      [ch.  viii 

River  Nieman  and  Augustoff  Canal,  as  well  as  by  the  army 
corps  transferred  from  the  French  front. 

By  Invading  Russia  on  the  line  Kovno-Grodno,  the  Ger- 
mans calculated  on  forcing  this  defensive  line  at  one  blow, 
and  on  gaining  a  victory  here  similar  to  that  which  our 
troops  had  gained  when  they  forced  the  Austrian  lines, 
including  the  River  Dnieper  with  its  strong  fortifications. 

For  the  purpose  of  forcing  a  passage  over  the  Nieman, 
the  Germans  threw  forward  strong  infantry  columns  com- 
posed of  several  divisions  with  heavy  artillery,  the  small 
town  of  Druskeniki  being  the  centre  of  the  attack.  This 
town  lies  about  midway  between  Kovno  and  Grodno. 
These  two  fortresses  during  the  last  few  years  were  being 
strengthened  on  the  lines  of  the  latest-known  military  and 
engineering  science,  and  should  have  been  armed  with  the 
latest  type  of  heavy-calibre  guns.  When  the  war  started 
the  work  was  in  full  operation,  but  for  some  reason  or  other 
no  part  was  completed.  When  the  mobilisation  order 
came,  this  work  was  pushed  on,  but  exclusively  by  the  use 
of  earth  and  wood;  any  rapid  constructions  of  cement  build- 
ings could  not,  of  course,  be  thought  of. 

The  Germans  managed  to  reach  the  Narew  and  even 
succeeded  in  throwing  across  it  a  small  infantry  unit,  which, 
however,  was  speedily  thrown  back  to  the  left  bank  by  our 
troops. 

Having  suffered  this  failure,  the  Germans  decided  to  give 
up  this  operation  and  engaged  In  a  fresh  enterprise,  which 
was  a  seizure  of  the  whole  of  the  Polish  Kingdom  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Vistula,  evidently  meaning  to  take  advan- 
tage of  the  rapid  means  they  had  for  transferring  troops, 
and  also  because  our  forces  on  this  part  of  the  front  were 
negligible  in  quantity,  and  could  be  concentrated  only  with 
considerable  difficulty.     Notwithstanding  this,  the  Russian 


1914]       FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA  91 

Higher  Command  was  able,  by  rail  and  road,  to  bring  a 
sufficient  force  up  to  the  lines  on  the  Vistula;  part  of  this 
force  they  threw  over  to  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  In 
those  days,  when  the  Germans  approached  the  walls  of 
Warsaw  itself,  and  had  dreams  of  taking  the  forts  which 
we  had  partly  destroyed,  our  Higher  Command  trans- 
ported to  Warsaw  the  Siberian  regiments,  mobilised  In  the 
Far  East.  They  were  met  with  ecstasy  by  the  Inhabitants, 
who  called  them  their  deliverers.  These  regiments  were 
disembarked  from  the  trains,  passed  through  the  town  and 
thrown  straight  Into  battle.  In  their  ranks  were  many 
officers  and  men  who  had  taken  part  in  the  Japanese  War, 
and  were  thoroughly  seasoned  troops.  They  gained  an  ex- 
cellent reputation  'In  the  Japanese  campaign,  and  more 
than  upheld  this  reputation  In  this  v/ar. 

Under  the  walls  of  Warsaw  the  Germans  first  felt  the 
impetuosity  of  a  bayonet  attack  by  the  Siberian  riflemen. 

In  the  elan  of  these  regiments  is  presented  a  notable  ex- 
ample of  the  philosophy  of  cultivating  and  developing  regi- 
mental traditions. 

Every  army  has  its  co?-ps  d'elite,  distinguished  before  all 
others  for  its  vehemence  in  battle  and  Its  reputation  for 
superlative  daring. 

Enlistment  for  these  units  Is  generally  made  through  no 
special  channels  permitting  of  choice  or  preferment,  yet, 
thanks  to  the  vitality  of  their  traditions,  they  lose  nothing 
of  their  fighting  ardour  or  military  pre-eminence. 

Often  it  happens  after  an  engagement  that  these  famous 
regiments  find  their  ranks  decimated.  The  losses  are  made 
up  by  ordinary  recruiting  and  reinforcement  procedures,  but 
the  old  spirit  is  in  no  way  abated  and  flourishes  as  lustily  as 
before. 

To  this  class  of  troops  belong  African  and  Alpine  rifle- 


92        FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA      [ch.  viii 

men  in  the  French  Army,  the  Scottish  regiments  in  the  Brit- 
ish Army,  and  the  BersagHeri  in  the  Itahan  Army.  The 
latter  especially  distinguished  themselves  in  October  19 17 
when  the  Austrians  and  Germans  invaded  Lombardy,  and 
they  alone  withstood,  like  granite  cliffs,  the  assaults  of 
the  German  drunken  with  an  easy  victory  —  receiving  on 
their  breasts  the  blows  of  overwhelming  human  waves. 

Under  Warsaw,  the  Siberian  riflemen,  after  nearly  a 
month's  weary  journey  in  close  goods  trucks,  immediately 
went  into  battle  with  a  foe  encouraged  by  many  victories, 
and,  notwithstanding,  inflicted  on  him  a  serious  defeat  in 
the  first  stages  of  his  violent  charge.  The  Germans  after 
this  hurriedly  retreated  to  their  frontier.  The  enemy  had 
been  so  sure  of  victory,  and  the  early  capture  of  Warsaw, 
that  the  Ceremonial  Marshal  to  the  Court  of  Saxony  was 
with  the  troops,  riding  in  a  court  motor-car  in  which  the 
King  of  Saxony  or  the  heir  to  the  throne  was  to  have  made 
a  procession  from  the  Warsaw  Palace  to  the  Cathedral. 
This  sovereign  or  his  prince  was  to  have  been  crowned 
with  the  croAvn  of  the  Polish  Saxon  kings  who  long  ago  sat 
on  the  throne.  Unhappily  for  them,  however,  our  Cos- 
sacks captured  both  the  motor-car  and  the  Marshal. 

Warsaw  rejoiced,  and  made  holiday  in  honour  of  being 
freed  from  the  Teuton  invasion,  and  all  were  convinced 
that  the  city  would  never  fall  into  German  hands.  In 
their  next  attack  with  larger  forces,  the  Germans  in  fact 
only  managed  to  get  to  the  line  between  the  Rivers  Bzura 
and  Rava. 

The  old  fortress  —  old  from  a  modern  point  of  view  — 
of  Ivangorod  played  an  essential  part  in  beating  off  the 
Germans  from  the  Vistula  line,  which  they  had  dreamed  of 
forcing  without  any  special  effort. 

The  effect  achieved  by  this  fortress  is  well  worth  describ- 


1914]       FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA  93 

ing  separately  to  show  again  what  influence  Is  exercised  by 
the  personality  of  the  fortress  commandant,  or  his  imme- 
diate subordinate,  who  are  generally  afterwards  known 
as  the  "  Spirit  of  the  Defence  "  of  the  fortress.  Such  a 
personality  was  defender  of  the  Port  Arthur  fortress.  Gen- 
eral Kondratenko,  who  was  killed  in  the  siege.  With  his 
death  fled  the  spirit  of  the  fortress  and  soon  it  fell  Into  the 
hands  of  the  Japanese. 

The  commandant  and  spirit  of  the  Ivangorod  fortress 
was  General  Schwartz,  a  man  of  exceptional  bravery  and 
ability  who  had  been  one  of  the  subordinates  of  General 
Kondratenko.  It  might  be  supposed  that  Schwartz  was  a 
Baltic  Province  German.  His  ancestors  already  in  Cather- 
ine the  Great's  time  were  pure  Russian  people  in  spirit  and 
blood,  and  his  Christian  name  points  in  the  same  direction; 
he  was  called  Alexi  and  his  father's  name  was  Vladimir. 
The  Germans  were  well  informed  as  to  the  work  of  the 
engineers  in  preparing  the  fortress  of  Ivangorod,  and  were 
fully  alive  to  the  advantage  which  they  would  have  In  at- 
tacking It  with  long-range  artillery,  and  probably  concluded 
that  it  would  fall  a  comparatively  easy  victim.  They  did 
not  know  the  man  they  would  find  there  as  its  commandant; 
the  appointment  of  General  Schwartz  was  made  only  after 
the  mobilisation.  They  reckoned  on  taking  Ivangorod  by 
assault,  applying  what  is  called  the  "  hastened  attack " 
method.  This  method,  however,  is  evidently  only  effec- 
tive when  important  victories  have  been  gained  in  the  open- 
field  fighting.  Then  the  main  advantage  of  the  attacking 
troops  comes  not  so  much  from  the  "  hastened  attack  "  as 
from  the  lowering  of  the  moral  of  the  troops  defending  the 
fortress. 

In  this  war  the  Russian  fortresses,  I  am  sorry  to  say, 
neither  played  the  part  nor  gave  the  assistance  expected  of 


94        FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA      [ch.  viii 

them.  The  chief  reason  for  this  failure  lay  in  the  condi- 
tions I  have  already  mentioned  as  preceding  our  defeats  in 
field  fighting,  but  besides  this  there  were  technical  causes. 
For  several  years  after  the  Japanese  War,  as  also  for  years 
before  it,  no  fundamental  repairs  were  made  to  these 
fortresses.  At  that  time  Russia  was  carrying  out  a  most 
peaceful  policy  —  if  one  does  not  count  the  Japanese  War, 
into  which,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  she  was  drawn  by  Ger- 
many—  and  on  that  account  probably  reckoned  that  she 
would  not  be  required  to  defend  her  own  frontiers.  Nat- 
urally our  fortifications  and  the  artillery  were  far  behind 
the  requirements  of  engineering  and  gunnery  science.  An- 
other fundamental  failing  in  our  fortresses  was  that  two  or 
three  years  before  the  war  General  Soukhomlinoff  intro- 
duced a  reform,  the  basis  of  which  was  the  abolition  of 
special  bodies  of  fortress  troops.  Up  to  that  time  every 
Russian  fortress  had  its  own  garrison,  consisting,  in  pro- 
portion to  its  size,  of  several  battalions,  regiments,  or 
brigades  of  fortress  units.  In  the  event  of  a  campaign  the 
forces  became  more  mobile,  and  were  specially  prepared  for 
the  defence  of  their  fortress,  carefully  learning  all  the  sci- 
ence of  attack  and  defence.  Field  exercises  were  also  car- 
ried out  in  accordance  with  the  tactics  possible  within  the 
sphere  of  the  fortress's  influence.  After  the  application  of 
this  new  reform,  all  the  ordinary  field  troops  in  fortresses 
were  removed.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  they  were 
sent  from  the  fortresses  and  attached  to  one  of  the  other 
armies,  as  they  were  units  of  the  field  army  corps.  Their 
place  in  the  fortresses  was  taken  by  a  formation  of  militia 
units  made  up  of  elderly  men  or  insufficiently  trained  troops 
completely  without  knowledge  of  the  fortress.  In  the  course 
of  time,  when  our  field  forces  stood  on  the  lines  of  the  for- 
tresses, it  can  be  safely  stated  that  not  one  of  these  strong 


I9I4]       FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA  95 

places  received  Its  full  peace  garrison  back  again.  And  If 
any  of  them  did  return  It  was  generally  only  a  small  part  of 
those  who  originally  served  In  the  fortress. 

In  due  course  the  unsatisfactory  conditions  of  their  ma- 
terial and  moral  properties  became  sadly  evident  in  the 
degrees  of  resistance  of  the  fortress  defenders  when  at- 
tacked by  an  enemy.  An  exception  to  this  In  a  better 
sense,  besides  the  Ivangorod  fortress,  was  the  action  at 
the  small  fortress  of  Osovetz  covering  the  defile  to  the 
swampy  valley  of  the  River  Narew.  This  fortress  was 
twice  strongly  attacked  by  the  Germans,  plentifully  supplied 
with  parks  of  the  heaviest  siege  artillery  and,  In  the  second 
attack,  with  mortars  of  calibre  up  to  the  famous  42  centl- 
'  metres  which  played  such  a  disastrous  role  for  the  Allies 
when  the  Belgian  fortresses  were  captured  after  being 
counted  as  invulnerable  to  siege  artillery.  The  successful 
defence  of  Osovetz  was  largely  due  to  the  fact  that  not  only 
was  the  whole  of  the  fortress  staff  well  acquainted  with  it 
and  its  surroundings,  but  the  garrison  was  composed  not  of 
militia  but  of  field  regiments.  At  the  second  attack  this 
was  not  the  case.  The  main  strength  In  the  defence  lay  not 
so  much  in  the  strong  construction  of  the  permanent  forti- 
fications, as  In  the  successful  and  well-masked  disposition  of 
the  fortress  artillery.  When  they  besieged  it  the  second 
time  the  Germans  remained  about  six  months  before  the 
fortress,  but  had  no  essential  success  in  their  frontal  attack. 
The  fortress  fell  to  the  Germans  only  after  the  retirement  of 
the  army  corps  in  its  neighbourhood  and  the  advance  of 
the  enemy  across  the  River  Narew,  which  threatened  to 
surround  this  small  fort.  The  tete-de-pont  was  not  cal- 
culated to  stand  a  siege  as  well  as  a  blockade. 

At  this  time  the  weakening  of  the  German  forces  in  East 
Prussia  gave  us  the  chance  of  making  another  advance  from 


96        FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA      [ch.  viii 

the  lines  of  the  River  Narew  and  the  Augustoff  Canal, 
taking  advantage  of  the  fact  that  at  many  points  we  held 
the  left  banks.  This  advance  of  the  whole  front  was  made 
from  a  point  having  the  town  of  Stalloupenen  close  to  our 
right  flank,  up  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Vistula.  But  the 
main  attack  was  directed  against  the  front  Kalvaria-Su- 
walki-Augustoff.  The  advance,  although  successful,  was 
conducted  much  more  slowly  than  the  first  advance  into 
East  Prussia  at  the  beginning  of  August  19 14.  Although 
the  Germans  had  not  then  used  barbed-wire  entanglements 
for  defence,  the  field  fortifications  were  greatly  developed. 
Troops  taking  up  positions  set  about  making  field  forti- 
fications, even  if  they  were  only  light,  before  anything  else 
was  considered;  and  if  a  fight  continued  on  the  same  spot 
for  several  days  these  fortifications  were  strengthened  dur- 
ing the  nights.  During  the  beginning  of  October  the  Rus- 
sian troops,  gradually  pressing  on  the  Germans,  again 
crossed  the  Prussian  frontier.  I,  with  my  division,  had  to 
cross  the  frontier  to  the  north  of  the  Romlnten  forests. 

In  the  days  Immediately  following,  the  Romlnten  forests 
were  the  arena  of  stubborn  battles.  The  Emperor  Wil- 
liam's hunting  castle,  in  reality  its  ruins,  changed  hands  more 
than  once.  Battles  lasting  several  days,  with  varying  suc- 
cess, were  fought  on  the  very  frontier.  At  this  time  my  com- 
mand was  not  only  over  the  ist  Cavalry  Division,  but  in- 
cluded also  the  2nd  and  3rd,  temporarily  forming  a  Cavalry 
Corps,  which  were  strengthened  by  the  addition  of  the  Ural 
Foot  Regiment  with  two  batteries  of  artillery.  The  de- 
velopment of  the  war  operations  on  the  farthest  right  flank 
of  the  I  St  Army,  of  which  at  that  time  I  became  a  component 
part,  demanded  the  transfer  of  the  ist  and  2nd  Cavalry 
Divisions  under  me,  to  the  neighbourhood  of  the  town 
Stalloupenen.     Here  I  crossed  the  German  frontier  fight- 


I9I4]       FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA  97 

ing  for  the  third  time.  During  the  past  two  months  the 
picture  in  EaslurRussia,  where  Russian  and  German  troops 
had  passed  five  times,  had  naturally  considerably  changed. 
The  border  had  finally  become  depopulated.  I  am  con- 
vinced that  all  the  people  we  met  with  were  either  spies  or 
people  allowed  to  remain  as  so-called  residents,  whose  duty 
it  was  to  inform  the  German  military  authorities,  by  differ- 
ent means,  of  the  activities  and  movements  of  the  Russian 
troops.  Very  possibly  this  may  explain  the  fact  that  their 
relations  with  the  Russian  troops  was  generally  of  a  friendly 
nature.  Further,  I  can  say  that  also  in  the  first  campaign 
in  East  Prussia  we  encountered  no  special  hostility  from  the 
local  village  inhabitants;  there  were  even  cases  of  the  peas- 
ants bringing  out  on  to  the  road  not  only  pails  of  fresh 
water,  but  also  apples,  and  even  baked  bread,  when  we 
marched  through.  Our  own  soldiers'  attitude  to  the  local 
inhabitants  was,  generally  speaking,  friendly  and  trustful. 
As  for  the  town  populations,  their  attitude  was  on  the  whole 
indifferent,  but  one  could  buy  anything  they  had  for  money. 
At  this  time  Germany,  including  East  Prussia,  was  not  short 
of  food. 

Cases  did  occur  indicating  a  directly  opposite  condition. 
Single  horsemen  carrying  dispatches  passing  through  vil- 
lages or  Isolated  farms  were  constantly  fired  on  from  the 
windows.  Instances  were  even  known  where  the  men  were 
fired  on  at  the  moment  they  were  trustfully  taking  from 
the  hand  of  the  inhabitants  a  cup  of  water  to  slake  their 
thirst.  The  population  of  such  towns  as  Gumbinnen,  who 
had  not  suffered  in  the  least  from  either  the  war  operations 
or  during  our  march  through,  or  from  the  troops  quartered 
on  them,  were  known  to  open  a  heavy  fire  on  our  troops 
when  the  retreat  commenced,  and  especially  at  the  transport, 
who  were  thrown  into  confusion  by  the  sudden  firing.     The 


98        FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA      [ch.  viii 

nearness  of  the  enemy  and  the  absence  of  any  regular  Rus- 
sian troops  produced  a  greater  confusion,  if  one  cannot  call 
it  a  panic,  and  made  it  impossible  to  use  any  kind  of  repres- 
sive measures  on  the  faith-breaking  inhabitants. 

When  we  made  our  second  advance  we  found  most  of 
the  larger  villages  burnt  or  destroyed.  Appalling  also  was 
the  picture  of  ruin  in  the  depopulated  towns,  where  most 
of  the  shops  had  been  broken  into  and  looted. 

This,  it  can  be  confidently  stated,  was  done  equally  by  the 
troops  of  both  sides.  I  can  confirm  this,  as  I  personally 
happened  several  times  to  enter  small  German  towns  and 
villages,  which  had  some  fairly  good  shops  with  plate-glass 
windows.  I  came  in  just  behind  our  patrols  and  found 
the  deserted  shops  and  neighbouring  buildings  completely 
looted,  in  a  way  which  my  advanced  units,  however  they 
may  have  desired  it,  could  not  have  carried  out  in  the  time 
at  their  disposal.  The  bad  example  was  shown  where  the 
soldiers  were  not  under  the  immediate  notice  of  their  officers. 
They  first  of  all  completed  the  looting  of  those  places  al- 
ready broken  into,  and  then  started  on  the  untouched  dwell- 
ings and  shops.  It  is  astonishing  to  what  extent  an  instinct 
for  wanton  destruction  enters  the  brains  of  people  in  such 
circumstances.  In  looted  dwelling-houses  you  will  invari- 
ably find  looking-glasses  smashed  by  blows  from  rifle  butts. 
And  this  happens  not  only  when  troops  are  retreating,  when 
they  do  not  wish  to  leave  the  enemy  anything  but  destroyed 
property,  but  also  when  troops  are  advancing,  and  the 
troops  always  have  the  feeling  that  seized  territory  remains 
in  the  hands  of  the  invaders. 

The  second  advance  into  East  Prussia  showed  more  than 
ever  the  agricultural  richness  of  this  country.  It  was  for 
the  second  time  overrun  by  enemy  troops,  who  of  course 
would  not  be  sparing  of  the  stores  of  food  and  forage,  if 


1914]       FIGHTING  IN  POLAND  AND  GALICIA  99 

only  for  the  reason  that  the  owner  almost  invariably  was 
not  to  be  found  near  the  warehouses  and  could  not  protect 
his  interests.  Notwithstanding  all  this,  we  were  astounded 
at  the  quantities  of  forage  found.  As  for  the  wealth  in 
horned  cattle,  not  only  were  the  troops  abundantly  fed 
on  them,  but  when  retreating,  every  unit  drove  a  huge  herd 
before  it.  The  finding  of  winter  quarters  for  the  troops 
when  autumn  started  was  at  times  difficult,  as  many  popu- 
lated points  and  single  farms  had  been  either  burnt  or  de- 
stroyed. The  Russian  and  German  troops  were  equally 
to  blame  for  this.  At  this  time  rumours  were  commonly 
prevalent  that  the  Germans  had  poisoned  the  wells  before 
retreating.  I  must,  however,  say  that  nothing  was  found 
to  confirm  this  rumour.  The  health  of  our  troops  was  bet- 
ter even  than  in  peace  times,  and  we  were  less  disposed  to 
believe  these  rumours  because  such  a  barbarian  method 
might  be  double-pointed,  and,  in  case  of  a  change  of  the 
fortune-of-war,  might  recoil  on  the  instigator  himself. 


CHAPTER  IX 

BEGINNING    OF    TRENCH    WARFARE RETREAT    OF 

THE    RUSSIAN    ARMIES 

The  simultaneous  advance  of  the  Russian  troops,  at  the 
very  beginning  of  the  war,  Into  Galicia  and  East  Prussia, 
at  a  time  when  the  Russian  Army  was  far  from  having 
its  full  strength  in  the  field,  naturally  caused  a  weakening 
of  our  forces  in  the  centre  on  the  Vistula  line,  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  doubtless  gave  us  victory  on  both  our 
flanks.  Naturally  Germany  should  have  taken  some 
decisive  step,  not  so  much  in  her  own  interest  as  for  the 
sake  of  her  ally.  Austria  awakened  her  to  this  fact  by 
her  persistent  representations,  by  yielding  us  at  the 
beginning  of  September,  almost  without  a  fight,  the  town 
of  Lemberg  (Lvoff),  before  she  demanded  assistance 
from  her  more  powerful  ally. 

The  German  higher  authorities,  faithful  to  their  prin- 
ciple of  operating  on  the  line  of  least  resistance,  decided 
to  take  advantage  of  our  weakness  on  the  Vistula  line  — 
mentioned  In  the  previous  chapter  —  and  in  September 
started  their  first  advance  into  territory  of  the  late  Polish 
Kingdom,  and  not  meeting  any  serious  opposition  easily 
got  to  the  outskirts  of  Warsaw.  To  do  this  they  had  to 
withdraw  several  army  corps  from  the  French  front. 
The  Imperative  need  of  parrying  this  blow,  which 
threatened  the  taking  of  Warsaw,  compelled  us  to  trans- 
fer three  armies  to  the  left  banks  of  the  Vistula,  thus  weak- 
ening the   forces   operating  in   Galicia   and  East  Prussia, 

100 


1914]         BEGINNING  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE  loi 

which  had  to  be  strengthened  by  fresh  army  corps 
gradually  coming  forward  from  the  interior  governments 
and  Siberia.  The  first  advance  of  the  Germans  was  com- 
pletely defeated,  and  they  were  obliged  to  retreat  beyond 
their  own  frontiers. 

The  delay  in  bringing  forward  all  that  was  necessary 
for  the  troops,  and  in  waiting  for  reinforcements,  com- 
pelled us  to  give  up  pursuit  of  the  Germans.  When  we 
had  been  reinforced  we  commenced  our  advance  with  the 
object  of  invading  Eastern  Silesia,  meeting  the  Germans 
advancing  into  our  territory  at  the  beginning  of  Novem- 
ber, to  the  west  of  Lodz.  Probably  the  chief  reason  that 
forced  the  Germans  to  make  both  advances  against  the 
centre  of  the  whole  of  the  Russian  front  was  the  wish  to 
help  their  ally,  who  had  been  compelled  to  retreat  to  the 
Carpathians  and  had  begun  to  be  uneasy  about  the  safety 
of  Krakau.  At  this  time,  that  is  about  the  beginning  of 
November,  the  strongest  Austrian  fortress,  Przemysl,  had 
been  surrounded.  Neither  the  first  German  advance  on 
Warsaw  nor  the  weakening  of  our  troops  on  both  flanks 
stopped  the  Russian  Army,  however.  With  the  arrival 
of  fresh  army  corps  from  the  interior  and  Siberia,  our 
advance  was  renewed. 

This  condition  of  things  more  than  ever  induced  the 
Germans  to  renew  and  hasten  their  advance  against  War- 
saw; this  they  undertook  in  the  middle  of  November  19 14. 
In  this  advance  their  main  blow  was  directed  along  the 
left  banks  of  the  Vistula,  from  the  fortress  of  Thorn,  to 
turn  two  of  our  armies,  which  had  made  an  advance  from 
the  west  through  Lodz  towards  Kalisz.  This  movement 
of  the  German  columns  not  only  stopped  our  advance  in 
this  direction,  but  compelled  us  to  weaken  our  troops  which 
were  still  advancing,  although  slowly,  into  East  Prussia. 


I02  BEGINNING  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE       [ch.  ix 

The  first  stages  of  the  German  advance  along  the  banks 
of  the  Vistula  and  to  the  west  of  Lodz  almost  ended  for 
them  in  a  similar  catastrophe  to  that  which  befell  the  army 
corps  under  Samsonoff  in  the  Tannenberg  Woods.  Two 
German  army  corps  belonging  to  Mackensen's  Army,  taken 
between  two  fires,  could  see  the  minute  approaching  when 
they  would  have  to  lay  down  their  arms. 

After  a  series  of  successful  engagements  the  Germans 
had  met  a  strong  resistance  from  our  army  corps  which 
had  stopped  their  advance  to  the  west  and  north-west  of 
Lodz;  and  at  the  same  time  from  the  east,  along  the  banks 
of  the  Vistula,  they  were  attacked  by  the  columns  of 
Rennenkampf's  Army. 

We  could  already  see  how  the  columns  of  German  trans- 
port several  times  changed  their  direction  to  diametrically 
opposed  points,  searching  for  an  exit  from  the  ever-nar- 
rowing circle  of  Russian  troops.  Later  it  was  known  that 
one  of  Emperor  William's  sons,  fearing  the  danger  of 
being  taken  prisoner  along  with  these  army  corps,  was  taken 
up  in  an  aeroplane  and  flew  away  over  our  lines.  The 
feeling  of  success  on  our  side  was  so  great  that  the  rear 
organisations  gave  orders  to  have  rolling  stock  collected  in 
Warsaw  to  take  away  the  prisoners.  But  owing  to  tactical 
errors  for  which  General  Rennenkampf  was  blamed,  the 
living  circle  was  not  closed,  and  the  Germans  were  enabled/ 
to  get  out  of  the  noose  and  escape. 

The  final  result  was  that  the  forces  in  East  Prussia  on 
either  side  were  equalised,  and  the  fight  went  on,  now, 
however,  with  different  prospects  of  victory.  At  this  time 
my  post  was  on  the  extreme  right  flank  of  our  whole  front 
to  the  north-west  of  the  town  Stalloupenen.  I  had  under 
me  two  Divisions  of  Cavalry,  the  ist  and  2nd,  to  protect 
the  right  flank  of  the  loth  Army,  which  had  in  its  composi- 


1914]         BEGINNING  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE  103 

tlon  most  of  the  army  corps  of  the  ist  Army,  after  the 
Staff  of  this  army  had  been  transferred  to  Warsaw.  The 
successful  move  into  East  Prussia  at  first  continued,  but 
later  died  away  somewhere  to  the  west  of  Gumbinnen. 
In  the  later  operations  the  engagements  were  compara- 
tively small  and  of  varying  success. 

On  November  21st  I  received  orders  to  go  forward 
to  the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula  to  join  up  with  the  ist  Army, 
and  take  command  of  the  6th  Field  Army  Corps  which 
had  only  just  been  transferred  from  the  right  banks  of  the 
Vistula  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  town  of  Lowicz. 
Having  handed  over  my  command  of  the  Cavalry  Division, 
I  set  out  the  next  day,  and  for  greater  speed  crossed  the 
whole  of  East  Prussia  via  Lyck  in  a  motor-car  and  from 
the  town  of  Graevo  travelled  by  rail  via  Warsaw,  my 
destination  being  the  town  of  Sochatoff,  where  the  staff  of 
General  Rennenkampf's  ist  Army  was.  Having  received 
the  necessary  directions  at  the  headquarters  of  the  army, 
on  November  26th  I  arrived  at  the  staff  quarters  of  the 
6th  Army  Corps  —  which  was  just  about  to  attack  the 
Germans  who  were  advancing  in  their  turn  against  the 
town  of  Lowicz.  This  army  corps  was  made  up  of  three 
divisions,  and  was  to  attack  on  a  front  of  about  twenty- 
five  kilometres.  At  first  this  advance  was  successful,  but 
when  the  Germans,  turning  my  flank  with  fresh  columns, 
made  a  direct  move  to  seize  the  railway  junction  at 
Lowicz,  I  had  to  detach  a  considerable  part  of  my  forces 
to  defend  this  point,  and  any  further  advance  on  my  part 
became  impossible.  At  the  same  time,  the  Army  Staff, 
recognising  the  importance  of  Lowicz,  sent  some  fresh  divi- 
sions there,  and  ordered  me  to  organise  its  defence.  The 
front  of  my  army  corps  had  already  increased  to  forty 
kilometres.     But  before   these   divisions,    which   were    en- 


I04  BEGINNING  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE       [ch.  ix 

tirely  composed  of  second  reserves,  could  join  me  they  were 
met  by  a  violent  attack  from  German  columns.  Going 
for  the  first  time  into  action  they  could  not  withstand  this 
blow  of  German  troops  seasoned  in  battle  and  reinforced 
with  heavy  artillery,  which  was  entirely  lacking  with  us 
on  this  front.  I  had  to  organise  the  defence  of  Lowicz 
with  my  own  forces  and  at  the  same  time  take  measures  to 
get  the  unnerved  troops  re-formed.  Eventually  these 
units  not  only  withstood  the  enemy's  hurricane  of  fire,  and 
the  furious  charges  of  their  infantry,  but,  in  their  turn,  they 
beat  the  Germans  by  a  counter-attack.  When  it  was  pos- 
sible to  bring  up  fresh  units  we  were  not  only  able  to 
strengthen  the  position  at  Lowicz,  but  even  pushed  the 
Germans  back  sufficiently  to  permit  the  Lowicz  railroad 
to  continue  running.  In  their  first  attack  the  Germans  got 
to  the  very  outskirts  of  this  small  town. 

At  this  time  the  whole  of  the  sector  from  Lowicz  to 
the  Vistula  was  unoccupied  and  consequently  there  was  a 
free  macadamised  road  through  Sochatoff  to  Warsaw. 
Several  signs  showed  that  the  Germans  wished  to  take 
advantage  of  this  route.  To  protect  it,  the  2nd  Caucasian 
Army  Corps  under  General  Meeshtchenko,  one  of  the 
heroes  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  was  moved  forsvard. 
The  suppositions  were  justified.  After  three  days'  profit- 
less attempts  to  seize  Lowicz,  the  Germans  gave  up  the  at- 
tacks, and  turned  all  their  attentions  towards  Sochatoff,  and 
against  General  Meeshtchenko's  army  corps.  At  this  time 
my  army  corps  of  five  very  depleted  divisions  occupied  a 
front  of  about  forty-five  kilometres.  During  a  week  the 
Germans  delivered  blow  after  blow  against  General 
Meeshtchenko's  army  corps  without  in  the  meantime  ceas- 
ing to  attack  my  army  corps,  though  with  considerably  less 
intensity.     General   Meeshtchenko   lost   80  per   cent,    and 


I9I4-I5]    BEGINNING  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE  105 

more  of  some  of  the  Caucasian  regiments,  which  neverthe- 
less still  continued  to  fight,  and  from  time  to  time,  by 
counter-attacks,  threw  the  Germans  back. 

To  every  kind  of  stubbornness  there  is  a  limit,  and  in 
the  beginning  of  December  an  order  came  in  from  the 
new  army  Chief,  General  Litvinoff,  who  had  replaced  Ren- 
nenkampf,  saying  that  all  the  army  corps  of  the  Army  were 
to  retreat  to  new  lines  of  defence  on  the  rivers  Bzura  and 
Rava.  By  such  change  of  position  it  was  calculated  to 
shorten  the  line  of  defence  and  to  take  advantage  of  the 
river  valleys  as  natural  barriers.  My  army  corps  had 
to  go  into  reserve.  I  counted  on  giving  my  troops  a  rest, 
and  receiving  reinforcements  and  stocks  of  ammunition, 
but  the  rest  only  lasted  for  two  days,  after  which  I  re- 
ceived orders  to  take  the  place  of  the  2nd  Army  Corps, 
which,  weakened  by  the  pressure  of  continual  German  at- 
tacks, held  positions  at  the  junction  of  the  Rivers  Bzura 
and  Rava,  between  the  ist  Siberian  and  ist  Field  Army 
Corps.  To  occupy  a  front  of  about  fifteen  kilometres  I 
had  at  my  disposition  three  divisions,  which  were  far  from 
being  of  full  complement.  This  was  in  the  middle  of  De- 
cember 1 9 14. 

Here  commenced  for  me  as  well  as  for  most  of  the 
army  corps  a  new  period  of  the  war  —  the  war  of  position 
or  trench  warfare.  In  these  positions,  with  negligible 
changes,  the  Russian  troops  remained  up  to  midsummer 
19 1 5.  At  first  the  positions  by  no  means  got  the  develop- 
ment that  they  attained  afterwards.  This  was  prevented 
in  the  first  place  by  the  coming  of  frosts  which  made  the 
preparation  of  trenches  and  ways  of  communication  ex- 
tremely difficult,  but  the  main  reason  was  the  niggardly 
supply  of  barbed  wire  the  troops  received.  The  lack  of 
this   material  without   doubt   gave   our   enemy   an   ascend- 


io6  BEGINNING  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE       [ch.  ix 

ancy;  evidently  they  were  no  more  short  of  this  material 
than  they  were  of  artillery  ammunition.  At  this  stage  of 
the  war  all  other  methods  of  position  warfare  were  being 
used.  The  making  of  fortified  lines,  in  case  of  having  to 
remove  to  a  new  position,  was  started  not  only  for  units 
of  troops,  but  also  for  whole  armies.  The  troops  began 
to  invent  and  use  hand  grenades  and  trench  mortars  made 
by  themselves  from  materials  found  on  the  spot,  such  as 
empty  food-tins,  spent  shell-cases,  cut  gas-pipes,  etc.  For 
fuses,  ordinary  wicks,  which  it  might  have  been  thought 
had  served  their  generation,  were  used. 

Taking  advantage  of  being  close  to  Warsaw  with  its 
workshops,  the  troops  themselves  ordered  light-rockets, 
rifle-grenades,  and  bomb-throwers;  but  these  were  of  such 
a  primitive  pattern,  I  am  sorry  to  say,  as  to  make  the  profit 
gained  by  their  use  very  problematical.  In  a  successful 
counter-attack  we  seized  from  the  Germans  a  supply  of 
up-to-date  hand  and  rifle-grenades,  incendiary  bombs, 
trench  mortars,  and  a  vast  quantity  of  illuminating 
rockets,  etc.  It  was  quite  clear  that  all  the  German  manu- 
facturers had  concentrated  on  the  invention  and  manu- 
facture of  every  possible  article  for  destroying  and  defeat- 
ing their  enemy.  About  the  end  of  December  the  Germans 
introduced  a  method  of  fighting  which  up  to  this  time  had 
never  been  used  in  warfare  beween  civilised  nations  — 
shells  charged  with  asphyxiating  gases.  This  new  medium 
of  destruction  was  met  with  general  abhorrence  not  only 
by  those  fighting  the  Germans,  but  also  by  all  the  nations 
who  were  still  neutral. 

After  the  Germans  had  rudely  broken  the  neutrality 
guaranteed  in  1839  by  the  Great  European  Powers  to  Bel- 
gium, after  they  had  openly  declared  from  the  very  begin- 
ning of  war  operations  that  every  international  treaty  was 


1914-15]     BEGINNING  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE  107 

a  "scrap  of  paper,"  that  necessity  knows  no  law  —  of 
course  no  reason  existed  for  them  to  hesitate  about  adopt- 
ing any  sort  of  method  to  destroy  their  enemies,  to  be 
restrained  by  the  International  laws  of  centuries,  or  before 
the  rules  made  by  the  Hague  Conference,  and  acknowl- 
edged by  their  own  government. 

On  my  right  flank  I  had  the  55th  Division  which  stood 
not  far  from  the  enemy's  position  near  the  Borjimovsky 
Wood.  Several  attacks  made  by  the  Germans  against 
them  were  beaten  off  successfully  about  December  28th. 
After  midday  the  trenches  stretching  for  about  a  kilometre 
along  this  wood  were  again  heavily  fired  on.  With  the 
approach  of  dusk  the  Germans  made  an  attack,  and  to  the 
astonishment  of  the  Chief  of  the  division  took  the  wood 
without  special  trouble.  By  this  time  our  troops  had  got 
used  to  "  the  hurricane  of  fire  "  of  the  German  artillery 
used  just  before  an  attack,  and  had  worked  out  methods 
of  defence  so  that  they  should  suffer  the  minimum  effect 
from  this  fire.  They  had  arranged  to  meet  the  enemy's 
attack  with  fire,  and  If  the  Germans  got  a  temporary  suc- 
cess to  re-establish  themselves  by  a  counter-attack  before 
the  foe  had  time  to  collect  themselves  or  to  organise  a  de- 
fence of  the  trenches  they  had  seized.  This  time  we  had 
to  call  In  the  divisional  reserves  and  to  organise  a  more 
careful  counter-attack  with  larger  forces.  About  3  a.m. 
I  received  a  report  that  It  had  been  successfully  carried 
out,  and  that  the  Germans  had  been  thrown  out  of  the 
wood.  At  the  same  time  It  was  reported  to  me  that  our 
trenches  were  filled  with  Russian  and  German  dead,  and 
that  new  ones  were  being  made  to  take  their  places.  The 
old  trenches  were  filled  In  as  a  general  grave.  There  was 
no  frost  at  the  time,  and  by  morning  the  work  was  com- 
pleted.    Next  morning,  however,  I  received  an  additional 


io8  BEGINNING  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE       [ch.  ix 

report,  to  the  effect  that  bodies  In  a  state  of  collapse  with 
little  sign  of  life  were  lying  in  the  wood,  and  that  about 
200  in  a  similar  state  had  been  taken  to  the  rear.  It  was 
late  in  the  morning  before  the  majority  of  these  regained 
consciousness.  Naturally  the  two  questions  which  first 
suggested  themselves  were:  what  was  the  reason  for  this 
unusual  occurrence  and  had  some  of  those  already  buried 
been  in  the  same  state  of  coma  and  not  dead  at  all?  At 
the  same  time  the  medical  officers  reported  that  from  the 
clothes  of  those  brought  in,  in  a  half-conscious  state,  was 
a  distinct  smell  of  formalin.  Those  who  came  out  of 
the  fight  confirmed  the  fact  that  during  the  artillery  action 
the  same  smell  was  much  stronger,  to  which  at  the  time 
they  attached  no  significance,  thinking  that  this  was  some 
new  explosive,  and  not  knowing  what  the  results  of  breath- 
ing these  gases  would  be.  German  troops  who  had  used 
the  trenches  as  cover  from  our  fire  must  have  come  under 
the  action  of  the  suffocating  gases,  and  as  a  final  result  the 
Borjimovsky  Wood  remained  in  our  hands,  the  attack  cost- 
ing the  Germans  very  heavy  losses. 

Notwithstanding  this,  the  enemy  evidently  remained 
satisfied  with  his  invention,  as  a  month  later  he  repeated 
the  experiment  on  a  much  larger  scale  when  he  prepared 
to  make  an  attack  on  Volya  Shidlovska's  dwelling-house 
and  spirit  distillery,  in  the  centre  of  my  sector.  This 
was  the  most  serious  attempt  that  the  Germans  made  dur- 
ing the  winter  to  break  their  way  through  to  Warsaw. 
They  prepared  for  the  attack  by  an  artillery  bombardment 
lasting  the  whole  day,  largely  using  shells  with  asphyxiating 
gases.  No  protective  masks  had  as  yet  been  thought  of; 
all  we  had  was  ammonia  spirit  in  small  quantities,  which 
was  distributed  in  medium-sized  jars  throughout  the 
trenches,    for    sprinkling    round.     The    troops,    however, 


1915]       RETREAT  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMIES  109 

could  only  take  advantage  of  this  when  the  firing  stopped, 
and  then  only  to  purify  the  air  in  the  bottoms  of  the 
trenches  and  in  the  dug-outs.  Only  at  this  period  did  the 
troops  commence  to  build  protecting  shelters.  By  all  this 
artillery  work,  and  at  the  price  of  repeated  attacks  deliv- 
ered against  the  position  of  two  of  my  divisions  on  a  front 
of  about  six  kilometres,  the  Germans  were  only  able  to 
take  the  dwelling-house  and  distillery,  and  to  compel  our 
troops,  in  the  formation  of  a  widely  arched  bend,  to  retire 
at  the  very  most  slightly  more  than  a  thousand  paces.  I 
must  remark  that  it  was  very  unprofitable  for  us  to  hold 
the  stone  buildings  of  the  distillery  and  the  massive  barns, 
etc.,  of  the  gentleman  farmer,  as  our  troops  were  not  only 
wounded  by  shell  splinters  from  the  shells  fired  from  the 
German  heavy  guns,  but  also  by  pieces  of  stone  and  brick. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Germans  were  in  quite  a  different 
position  when  they  took  the  place,  as  at  this  time  we  did 
not  possess  a  single  heavy  gun  in  all  our  army  corps  and 
our  light  artillery  had  not  the  strength  to  destroy  stone 
buildings. 

Nevertheless,  General  Russky,  who  at  this  time  was 
commanding  the  north-western  front,  determined  to  restore 
our  position  at  Volya  Shidlovska's.  Realising  that  my 
army  corps  of  three  divisions  was  not  sufficiently  strong. 
General  Russky  gave  orders  for  one  division  after  the 
other  to  be  brought  and  placed  under  my  orders.  During 
this  time  the  Germans  continued  their  attacks,  wishing  to 
develop  a  success  on  the  road  to  Warsaw.  This  compelled 
me  to  make  counter-attacks  as  fresh  divisions  arrived.  It 
was  necessary  to  throw  in  three  divisions,  of  which  two 
were  Siberian.  By  the  strength  of  these  troops  the  Ger- 
man break-through  was  stopped.  I  then  received  two  more 
divisions  and  was  promised  as  many  more.     I  was  ordered 


no  RETREAT  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMIES     [ch.  ix 

to  organise  a  general  advance  to  restore  the  situation.  At 
the  same  time  I  had  two  fortress  6-inch  guns  sent  me,  and 
later  two  more  were  sent,  so  that  with  their  help  I  could 
smash  the  stone  buildings  of  the  works  and  farm.  These 
four  guns  did  comparatively  little  damage.  The  Germans, 
however,  had  time  to  bring  within  the  boundaries  of  the 
farm  —  which  because  of  its  surrounding  ditches  was  like 
a  natural  fort  —  a  quantity  of  machine  guns  of  which  we 
knew  nothing.  They  concentrated  the  machine  guns  at 
one  point.  I  must  add  that  my  stock  of  shells  was  so  small 
that  only  a  percentage  of  the  batteries  coming  in  with  the 
new  divisions  could  be  sent  to  take  up  a  position,  and  their 
supplies  of  shells  were  sent  to  batteries  already  in  position. 
Consequently  these  batteries  had  to  be  most  sparing  in  using 
the  shells. 

Two  of  our  counter-attacks  were  not  attended  by  success. 
Our  chain  of  troops  In  places  got  within  one  hundred  paces 
of  the  tactical  key  of  Volya  Shidlovska's  by  taking  advan- 
tage of  local  road  ditches  as  cover,  although  the  actual 
capture  of  the  position  was  not  attained.  The  frost-bound 
state  of  the  country  made  it  difficult  to  obtain  cover  of  any 
kind  from  the  German  machine  guns.  Notwithstanding 
this,  the  Higher  Command  would  not  give  up  the  idea  of 
restoring  the  position. 

For  this  purpose  I  received  several  more  divisions. 
Two  had  already  been  collected,  one  made  up  from  two 
brigades  of  30th  and  40th  Divisions  of  the  ist  Field  Army 
Corps,  and  the  other  of  four  regiments  from  various  divi- 
sions. 

Altogether  I  had  eleven  divisions.  My  original  divi- 
sions were  the  4th  under  General  Mlliant,  the  i6th  under 
General  Tregouboff,  and  the  55th  under  Zaharoff.  Later, 
in  order  of  arrival,  were  two  Siberian  divisions  under  Gen- 


1915]        RETREAT  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMIES  ni 

erals  Taube  and  Andreleff,  the  69th  under  Psheloutsky, 
the  53rd  under  Gounsadze,  the  25th  under  Kouzmin- 
Karavaieff,  the  75th  under  Sokovnin,  one  from  the  ist 
Army  Corps  under  General  Karepoff,  and  one  under  Gen- 
eral Stremouchoff.  Most  of  these  divisions  had  already 
been  heavily  depleted,  but  the  two  last  named  had  not  been 
in  action,  and  one  other  had  barely  suffered  any  losses. 

I  was  convinced  that  the  Germans  would  not  make  any 
further  attempt  to  advance,  but  I  also  foresaw  that  the 
only  result  of  a  new  advance  on  our  part  would  be  the  dis- 
arrangement of  our  last  fresh  divisions.  We  were  un- 
equally matched  in  regard  to  artillery  and  machine  gims, 
and  having  weighed  up  all  the  existing  conditions,  I  re- 
ported to  General  Smirnoff,  Commanding  the  2nd  Army, 
that  I  thought  it  impossible  to  continue  these  futile  attacks, 
and  that  if  the  Higher  Command  insisted  on  continuation 
of  the  attempt  to  restore  our  position  they  must  send  some 
other  commander  for  this  purpose,  and  if  they  liked  they 
might  think  I  had  not  the  ability  to  organise  a  counter- 
attack. General  Russky's  arrival  at  headquarters  was  ex- 
pected that  day. 

At  the  same  time  I  asked  for  the  free  Staff  of  the  6th 
Siberian  Army  Corps,  which  had  sent  me  in  turn  all  its 
divisions,  to  be  sent  to  me  that  I  might  hand  over  to  them 
a  part  of  my  command,  for  to  take  charge  of  eleven  divi- 
sions is  very  difficult,  and  detrimental  to  the  fighting  in 
hand.  The  last  of  these  requests  was  acceded  to,  and  the 
half  of  my  command  on  my  right  was  placed  under  the 
Commander  of  the  6th  Siberian  Army  Corps,  General 
Vasilieff.  But  the  Higher  Command  would  not  at  once 
give  up  the  idea  of  restoring  our  position.  For  the  pur- 
pose of  clearing  up  the  situation,  the  Army  Chief  of  Staff 
arrived    the    following    day.     At    first    the    advance    was 


112  RETREAT  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMIES     [ch.  ix 

gradually  put  off,  and  finally  was  countermanded.  Two 
days  had  not  passed,  however,  when  the  divisions  that  I 
had  not  thrown  in  to  the  fighting  were  hurriedly  sent  off 
to  East  Prussia,  where  our  weakened  and  drawn-out  troops 
had  been  unable  to  withstand  the  sudden  advance  of  the 
fresh  German  Army  Corps,  and  again  had  had  to  retreat 
and  even  to  cross  our  frontiers.  Evidently  the  Germans' 
effort  to  advance  where  my  army  corps  stood  at  the  Volya 
Shidlovska  position,  had  a  double  meaning  —  first,  in  case 
the  advance  was  successful,  to  capture  Warsaw,  and 
secondly,  in  any  case,  to  draw  to  the  points  of  attack  all 
our  free  reserves.  Carrying  out  this  plan  the  Germans 
threw  fresh  army  corps  by  rail  into  East  Prussia,  and 
choosing  our  weakest  point  attacked  it  and  threw  us  back, 
after  which  they  made  a  general  advance  against  the  whole 
of  our  front  in  East  Prussia  —  from  Stalloupenen  to 
Johanisburg.  If  the  idea  to  make  a  break  through  to 
Warsaw  did  not  succeed,  the  draining  of  the  reserves  of 
the  north-western  front  was  thus  successfully  carried  out. 
This  can  be  proved  from  the  fact  that  the  last  divisions 
sent  to  me  were  collected  from  different  army  corps  and 
that  the  last  one  was  made  up  of  four  regiments  from 
various  divisions.  The  most  substantial  victory  the  Ger- 
mans gained  was  at  the  Augustoff  Woods,  where  the  larger 
part  of  two  army  corps  was  caught  in  a  roadless  place, 
surrounded  by  a  turning  movement  of  the  enemy  columns, 
and  mostly  taken  prisoners.  In  addition  the  Germans  re- 
captured about  2,000  of  their  troops  previously  taken  pris- 
oners by  us  in  a  successful  counter-attack. 

At  this  period  of  the  war  the  superiority  of  the  Ger- 
mans was  especially  emphasised  in  the  developed  state  of 
their  railroads.  Although  our  railroads  at  that  time  were 
working  absolutely  smoothly  and  the  rolling  stock  was  in 


I9I5]        RETREAT  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMIES  113 

full  repair,  nevertheless  there  were  too  few  lines  leading 
into  the  interior,  and  especially  parallel  to  the  frontiers. 
The  Germans  could  bring  up  to  any  part  of  their  frontiers 
a  sufficient  number  of  army  corps  to  make  an  attacking 
army.  We,  on  our  side,  were  unable  in  supplying  one 
army,  except  on  very  rare  occasions,  to  receive  or  send  off 
simultaneously  more  than  one  army  corps  with  all  its  rear 
organisations. 

On  the  occasions  when  we  had  rapidly  to  concentrate 
several  army  corps,  we  were  compelled  first  to  send  the 
troops,  and  the  result  was  that  their  rears  were  not  con- 
nected up,  and  they  had  to  have  their  needs  supplied  by 
the  army  corps  already  on  the  spot.  The  lack  of  railways 
was  specially  felt  when  we  were  compelled  by  circum- 
stances, and  especially  by  the  shortage  of  every  kind  of 
artillery  material,  to  change  from  attacking  to  position 
warfare. 

The  advancing  forces  have  the  initiative  in  their  own 
hands,  and  are  able  to  concentrate  or  weaken  their  forces 
as  suits  them.  From  the  minute  initiative  passed  into  the 
enemy's  hand,  the  defenders,  if  they  are  under  any  diffi- 
culties in  making  troop  transfers,  are  obliged  to  arrange 
the  disposition  of  their  forces  more  or  less  equally,  and 
feed  the  fighting  line  so  that  it  can  withstand  the  enemy's 
pressure  long  enough  to  allow  for  the  bringing-up  of  re- 
serves. And  if  you  add  to  this  the  fact  that  the  fortifica- 
tion of  the  defensive  positions  and  barbed-wire  entangle- 
ments had  not  nearly  attained  the  development  they 
reached  later,  it  is  clear  that  an  enterprising  enemy  trans- 
ferring troops  over  his  own  ground,  and  more  easily  keep- 
ing such  transfers  secret,  can  always  expect  success  at  the 
commencement  of  an  engagement. 

The  operations  on  our  front  during  the  winter  of  19 14- 


114  RETREAT  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMIES     [ch.  n 

15  went  on  incessantly.     This  was  partly  due  to  the  very 
mild  winter.     The  greatest  factor  of  superiority  which  the 
Germans   had  was   the   circumstance  that   all  their   forces 
were  guided  by  one  will,  and  the  transfer  of  troops  from 
the  western  to  the  eastern  front  was  carried  out  without 
hindrance,    and   at   the    required   time.     At  this   time   the 
Allies   did  not   in   the   least   co-ordinate   in   their   actions. 
The  timely  advance  by   Rennenkampf  s  Army  which  had 
such  an  influence  on  the  Marne  battle  was  not  the  result 
of  a  thought-out  plan  or  agreement  of  the  Allies.     And 
in  the  same  way,  when  the  Germans  showed  the  greatest 
activity  on  their  eastern  front,  our  Allies  made  no  move- 
ments on  the  western  front,  answering  to  the  requirements 
developing  on  ours.      It  was  considerably  later,  when  ef- 
forts were  made  to  co-ordinate  the  activities,  that  an  ef- 
fective realisation  and  actual  result  took  place.     That  was 
in  the  spring  of  the  first  year  when  General  Brussiloff  com- 
menced  an   advance   earlier  than    arranged   for,   with   the 
object  of  drawing  off  the  Austrian  troops  who  were  threat- 
ening  an   invasion   of   Lombardy   from   the   north.     This 
actually  came  about  because  the  Itahans,  weakening  under 
the    pressure    of    the    Austro-Hungarians,    petitioned    our 
Commander-in-Chief   for   an   immediate   advance   to   save 
Lombardy  from  a  hostile  invasion. 

The  necessity  to  parry  the  German  advance  against  our 
centre  and  right  flank  during  the  winter  of  19 14-15 
naturally  weakened  our  forces  operating  in  Galicia.  Our 
troops  in  Galicia  at  this  time  had  been  extended  over  a 
big  front,  because  by  stopping  the  general  advance  we 
were  obliged  to  hold  an  unbroken  line;  notwithstanding 
which  we  gained  some  local  victories  such  as  the  capture 
of  some  densely  populated  point  on  Austrian  territory, 
thereby  crossing  the  Carpathian  Mountains  in  places  and 


I9I5]        RETREAT  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMIES  115 

descending  on  to  the  Hungarian  plains,  taking  prisoners 
and  military  booty. 

While  in  this  way  the  field  troops  gradually  advanced 
and  could  already  see  the  day  approaching  when  they  would 
be  able  to  reach  the  ancient  walls  of  Krakau,  in  their  rear 
the  siege  of  the  largest  Austrian  fortress,  Przemysl,  was 
being  continued.  The  inadequate  numbers  of  field  troops 
made  it  necessary  to  form  special  army  corps  of  militia 
and  use  them  to  invest  the  fortress,  with  General  Selivanoff, 
one  of  the  distinguished  participants  in  the  Russo-Japanese 
War,  as  their  commander.  General  Selivanoff  was  killed 
in  the  first  days  of  the  Revolution. 

These  forces  had  simultaneously  to  do  the  siege  work 
and  learn  how  to  do  it.  The  siege  progressed  very  slowly 
because  of  the  small  numbers  of  troops  and  the  compara- 
tively negligible  quantity  of  artillery  materials  available. 

The  calculation  that  the  fortress  would  soon  have  to 
surrender  owing  to  the  insufliciency  of  artillery  and  com- 
missariat materials  had  absolutely  no  foundation.  To 
have  attempted  to  storm  the  place  without  first  subjecting 
it  to  a  most  thorough  artillery  bombardment,  and  with 
troops  drawn  from  the  militia,  would  have  been  absolute 
madness.  We  were  obliged  to  be  satisfied  with  a  slowly 
progressive  siege.  Early  in  the  spring,  however,  about 
the  middle  of  March,  the  Austrians  opened  a  most  dis- 
orderly artillery  fire,  starting  early  in  the  morning  with 
very  small  result.  On  the  cessation  of  this  bombardment, 
heavy  explosions  were  heard  emanating  from  various  forti- 
fications and  also  from  the  fortress  itself. 

Very  few  of  the  besiegers  guessed  that  the  fortress  was 
either  on  the  point  of  being  surrendered  or  that  the  garri- 
son intended  attempting  a  sally  to  break  through  our  lines, 
and  join  up  with  their  field  army.     Soon  afterwards  the 


ii6  RETREAT  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMIES     [ch.  ix 

enemy  was  seen  in  thick  lines  in  extended  order  behind 
which  followed  infantry  columns.  Evidently  they  had 
chosen  the  second  course.  Being  met  by  stubborn  opposi- 
tion from  the  line  of  our  besieging  troops,  the  Austrians 
turned  back.  Soon  the  white  flag  was  hoisted  over  the 
fortress  and  the  firing  gradually  died  down. 

When  the  surrendered  garrison  had  been  counted  and 
the  war  materials  that  he  held  had  been  totalled  up,  it 
was  made  clear  that  their  infantry  alone  was  double  the 
strength  of  the  besiegers. 

Again  the  rule  was  confirmed,  "  that  the  fate  of  a 
fortress  is  decided  in  the  field."  This  severe  defeat,  com- 
bined with  the  continued  advance  of  our  troops,  of  which 
several  cavalry  units  had  already  descended  on  to  the  Hun- 
garian plains,  compelled  Austria  to  turn  to  Germany,  not 
so  much  with  a  request  as  a  summons  for  her  immediate 
active  help  to  stop  the  Russian  troops  invading  Hungary. 
At  this  time  there  was  not  a  Russian  soldier  remaining  on 
German  territory. 

On  the  approach  of  the  spring  break-up  the  operations 
on  the  Russo-German  front  lost  their  intensity.  The 
earlier  spring  made  it  possible  to  recommence  operations 
in  the  Austrian  theatre  of  war  some  six  weeks  earlier.  By 
this  time  the  Germans  must  have  found  out  that  we  had 
a  large  deficit  in  all  kind  of  artillery  munitions,  and  for 
that  reason  could  decide  that  we  should  not  be  able  to 
make  a  widespread  and  continuous  advance,  and  thus  they 
would  still  be  able  to  keep  the  initiative  in  their  hands. 
This  condition  made  it  possible  for  them  to  carry  out  the 
plan  of  transferring  a  considerable  number  of  German 
army  corps  to  Austria,  under  Mackensen,  using  them  like 
a  battering  ram  to  smash  down  on  our  thin  line  of  extended 
positions  and  to  develop  a  success  right  and  left  along  our 


I9I5]        RETREAT  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMIES  117 

positions  and  compel  our  whole  line  to  retreat.  Having 
fulfilled  this  part  of  their  plan,  the  Germans  had  in  view 
an  attack  on  us  along  the  Warsaw  route,  or  another  to  be 
decided  on  according  to  which  had  been  weakened  most 
by  reserves  having  been  drawn  off  to  stop  the  Austro-Ger- 
man  advance  in  Galicia.  This  plan  of  the  Germans  was 
attended  by  success,  as,  for  the  reasons  I  have  mentioned, 
the  initiative  was  in  their  hands  and  could  not  be  disputed, 
and  especially  because  during  the  summer  campaign  of 
191 5  the  Russian  Army  had  passed  through  a  severe  crisis 
in  shortage  of  guns  and  ammunition  and  particularly  of 
rifles  and  even  of  cartridges. 

Finally,  at  this  time  the  German  superiority  was  most 
sharply  emphasised  by  their  predominance  in  heavy 
artillery. 


CHAPTER  X 

MUNITIONS    OF    WAR 

Of  all  wars  waged  by  mankind  at  any  time,  whether  in 
regard  to  materials  used  or  in  the  variety  of  methods  em- 
ployed to  destroy  the  enemy,  none  has  been  so  remarkable 
as  the  present. 

From  this  it  is  clear  that  the  belligerent  country  which 
possesses  developed  industries  —  especially  if  part  of 
these  industries  have  been  directed,  even  in  times  of  peace, 
towards  the  manufacture  of  every  kind  of  war  material  — 
has  a  great  advantage  in  the  conversion  of  its  machinery 
from  manufacturing  ordinary  goods  to  the  production  of 
those  necessary  for  an  army  in  the  field. 

In  this  respect  there  can  be  no  comparison  with  the 
Central  Powers  and  the  Allies  and  especially  between 
Germany  and  Russia.  Germany  calculated  on  the  pos- 
sibility of  manufacturing  everything  required  by  the  Army 
during  war.  With  this  end  in  view  she  prepared  an  in- 
dustrial mobilisation  for  many  years.  In  this  she  was 
greatly  assisted  by  the  majority  of  the  small  Powers  of 
Europe  and  America  placing  all  their  war  orders  with  the 
German  works.  Thus  she  was  able  to  develop  and  to  in- 
crease the  number  of  works  manufacturing  war  materials. 
Nevertheless,  Germany's  calculations  were  inadequate  and 
purely  theoretical,  for  she  herself  passed  through  a  sharp 
crisis  in  the  supply  of  artillery  munitions.  Russia's  system 
in  this  respect  was  diametrically  opposed  to  her  require- 
ments, 

Ii8 


1914-15]  MUNITIONS  OF  WAR  119 

On  the  experiences  of  the  Japanese  War,  an  average 
was  taken  of  the  numbers  of  guns,  rifles,  and  cartridges  re- 
quired for  a  war  of  unknown  duration;  and  a  proportion- 
ate quantity  of  war  and  artillery  materials  was  got  ready 
in  peace-time.  When,  just  prior  to  the  war  this  stock  of 
munitions  had  been  prepared,  the  Government  works  were 
decreased,  and  even  a  part  of  the  experienced  workpeople 
were  discharged.  So  far  as  is  known  no  plans  had  been 
formed  for  their  mobilisation  when  war  was  declared. 
Such  were  the  conditions  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign. 
With  comparatively  large  stocks  of  munitions  in  hand,  no 
refusals  were  given  to  the  demands  for  rifle  and  artillery 
munitions  in  the  first  two  months  of  the  war,  but  in  October 
a  circular  order  was  sent  calling  for  as  much  economy  as 
possible  in  the  use  of  artillery  munitions.  However,  two 
months  had  not  passed  when  a  severe  shortage  appeared, 
especially  in  artillery  munitions.  The  most  critical  period 
was  without  doubt  in  19 15.  For  months,  batteries  in  ac- 
tion daily  did  not  receive  more  than  four  shells  per  gun 
per  day.  Empty  parks  were  then  brought  up,  and  there 
were  cases  where  a  battery  used  its  last  reserve  stocks. 
An  army  corps  would  receive  no  more  than  1,000  shells  at 
one  delivery,  and  would  not  know  the  date  when  another 
delivery  would  be  made. 

By  this  time  the  army  commanders  understood  that  the 
shortage  of  munitions  was  not  a  creation  of  overcaution, 
but  a  sad  reality.  Nevertheless  some  of  the  batteries 
which  received  this  negligible  average  quantity  found  it 
possible  to  economise  so  as  to  keep  enough  to  beat  off  an 
attack  by  the  enemy. 

It  might  be  supposed  that  the  experiences  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  should  have  been  a  clear  proof  of  the  un- 
developed state  of  our  industries  and  of  their  inability  to 


I20  MUNITIONS  OF  WAR  [ch.  x 

supply   the   Army  with  artillery   requirements   in   case   of 
serious  campaigns. 

During  that  war,  which  in  substance  was  a  Colonial  war, 
we  received  a  considerable  quantity  of  artillery  munitions 
from  abroad,  but  the  only  serious  obstacle  to  this  was  the 
transference  of  capital  abroad.  It  was  quite  a  different 
thing  when  from  the  beginning  of  the  European  War  most 
of  our  frontiers  were  closed.  Before  the  present  war 
most  of  the  artillery  staff  orders  were  placed  with  the 
Government  rifle  and  cannon  and  cartridge  works.  A 
comparatively  smaller  part  of  these  orders  were  placed 
with  private  firms.  In  peaceful  times,  when  we  were  re- 
arming throughout,  we  had  to  place  some  orders  abroad, 
and  we  even  had  not  laid  down  the  sound  principle  that 
orders  like  these  should  only  be  placed  with  countries  allied 
to  us. 

On  this  account,  just  before  the  war  broke  out,  the  W^ar 
Office  had  a  severe  quarrel  as  to  the  placing  of  a  large 
artillery  order  —  whether  it  was  to  be  given  to  the  French 
works,   Creusot,  or  to  the  German  Krupp's. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Russian  infantry  was 
armed  with  a  five-clip  small-bore  magazine  rifle.  This 
rifle,  after  a  French  model  had  been  improved  by  a  Russian 
officer,  received  the  name  "  five-clip  magazine  rifle,  pattern 
1891." 

Just  before  the  war  a  new  sharp-pointed  bullet  was  in- 
troduced. This  rifle  came  through  the  trials  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  brilliantly,  and  possibly  was  the  best  model 
of  the  five-clip  magazine  rifles  used  in  the  European 
armies.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  stocks  of  these 
rifles  were  amply  sufficient  for  the  Army,  including  the 
formations  of  regimental  reserves  of  the  second  and  third 
degree.      Consequently  at  the  beginning  of  the   campaign 


1914-15]  MUNITIONS  OF  WAR  121 

the  Russian  Army  felt  no  shortage  In  rifles,  but  later  on 
two  other  factors  appeared  which  had  not  been  calculated 
upon  earlier.  The  first  was  that  the  absolute  necessity 
of  making  new  formations  had  not  been  foreseen.  The 
formations  were  called  for  on  account  of  line  strategy, 
which  we  only  began  to  use  late  In  the  autumn  of  19 14, 
though  our  Allies  had  used  It  since  September  —  Im- 
mediately after  the  Marne  battle.  This  strategy  did  not 
permit  of  any  of  the  frontiers  or  defensive  lines  being  un- 
occupied by  troops.  But  the  second  and  most  important 
reason  for  this  shortage  of  armament  was  the  enormous 
quantity  lost  on  the  field  of  battle. 

Troops  receiving  fresh  supplies  of  rifles  and  ammuni- 
tion from  reserve  stocks  In  the  first  months  of  the  war 
were  quite  certain  that  this  would  be  the  case  in  the  future, 
and  consequently  made  no  effort  to  collect  the  rifles,  etc., 
from  the  field  of  battle.  Naturally  enough  If  the  battle- 
field remained  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  there  could  be 
no  thought  of  any  salvage  work.  It  was  only  In  the  spring 
of  191 5  that  units  were  formed  in  every  part  of  the  Army 
specially  to  collect  rifles,  equipments,  and  munitions. 

Already  at  this  time  some  of  the  reinforcements  had 
come  forward  unarmed,  and  even  when  they  received  their 
arms  they  were  taken  from  the  reserves  being  trained  at 
the  time.  Consequently  there  were  not  sufliicient  rifles  for 
teaching  the  new  formations.  It  was  also  ascertained  that 
our  Government  munition  works  could  not  supply  enough 
rifles  to  cover  these  huge  losses.  It  was  only  then  that 
the  War  Office  hurriedly  searched  for  means  of  placing 
foreign  orders.  Offers  were  plentiful,  especially  from 
America.  The  terms  of  most  of  the  American  offers  were 
first  to  allow  them  to  prepare  for  production,  and  then 
to    begin    production    eri    rnasse.     As    a    consequence    the 


122  MUNITIONS  OF  WAR  [ch.  x 

Ministry  of  War  could  not  determine  how  much  of  any 
order  placed  would  be  fulfilled  at  the  agreed  time,  and  the 
times  of  deliver^'  were  very  distant  on  account  of  these 
terms.  The  result  was  that  the  majority  of  works  with 
which  orders  had  been  placed  were  sure  not  to  fulfil  them. 
Consequently  the  suspicion  arose  that  the  works  accepted 
the  orders  with  the  full  intention  of  not  fulfilling  them, 
having  already  been  bribed  by  the  Germans  or  being  pro- 
German.  Neither  charge  was  proved  to  be  justly  made, 
but  the  orders  were  not  executed  in  time  and  are  not  com- 
pleted to-day.  This  failure  compelled  the  Ministry  of 
War  to  take  other  measures,  although  after  great  delay. 

First  of  all,  when  the  "  Position  "  warfare  began,  the 
supply  organisations  and  transports  were  disarmed  and 
a  beginning  was  made  in  the  repairing  of  rifles  captured 
from  the  Austrians.  Several  lots  of  these  rifles  had 
already  been  sent  to  the  Serbian  Army  when  we  had  no 
shortage  in  this  respect. 

Along  with  this  the  Ministry  of  War  began  to  develop 
the  productiveness  of  the  Government  Works  as  far  as 
possible,  but  here  the  hindrance  was  the  shortage  in 
machinery  and  the  very  small  quantities  that  the  works 
in  the  interior  could  produce  of  this  machinery.  At  the 
same  time  we  turned  to  our  Allies  for  help,  asking  them 
to  let  us  have  rifles,  even  of  an  older  pattern,  so  as  to 
enable  us  to  arm  our  reserves  while  they  were  being 
trained.  Our  reserves  serving  as  a  protection  to  military 
points  in  the  interior,  made  up  of  older  men,  were  armed 
with  Berdan  rifles  using  lead  bullets.  Japan  gave  us  sub- 
stantial help  and  let  us  have  small-calibre  rifles  to  serve  out 
to  our  field  troops. 

All  this  helped  to  lessen  the  crisis,  but  the  position  was 
not  entirely  adjusted  until  the  end  of  191 6. 


1915-16]  MUNITIONS  OF  WAR  123 

At  some  time  or  other  military  theory  proved  that  an 
army  should  only  be  armed  with  standardised  patterns  of 
rifles,  guns,  and  shells,  as  the  existence  of  various  calibres 
raised  difficulties  during  the  training  of  troops  and  was 
also  attended  by  the  danger  that  troops  in  battle  might  be 
served  with  cartridges  or  shells  not  of  the  calibre  with 
which  they  were  armed.  But  the  necessities  of  war  com- 
pletely upset  this  principle.  At  the  end  of  19 15  our  troops 
in  the  firing  line  were  using  Russian,  Austrian,  Japanese, 
and  also  a  comparatively  small  quantity  of  so-called 
Mexican  rifles.  Troops  in  the  rear,  besides  being  armed 
with  a  certain  quantity  of  these  patterns  for  training  pur- 
poses, were  also  armed  with  types  received  from  France, 
England,  and  Italy,  and  also  with  our  Berdan  rifles.  In 
justice  to  our  supply  columns  I  can  say  that  there  was 
not  one  occasion  on  which  troops  in  the  firing  line  re- 
ceived cartridges  not  adaptable  to  the  rifles  they  were 
using. 

The  arming  of  the  artillery  was  not  less  varied,  but  this 
was  due  to  the  demands  of  trench  warfare. 

In  19 1 5  there  was  a  great  shortage  in  cartridges,  and 
the  troops  were  smothered  with  circulars  and  orders  de- 
manding economy  in  their  use.  But  at  this  period,  on 
a  front  of  1,300  kilometres,  owing  to  the  proximity  of  the 
opposing  forces,  firing,  especially  at  the  first  stages  of  posi- 
tion warfare,  Avent  on  nearly  the  whole  of  the  twenty-four 
hours.  In  the  course  of  time,  through  the  efforts  of  the 
army  commanders,  and  especially  of  the  younger  officers, 
we  could  manage  that  many  of  the  regiments,  during  an  in- 
tense fire  from  the  Germans,  observed  the  silence  of  the 
grave,  fire  being  opened  by  us  only  when  the  Germans  had 
begim  their  attack.  When  occupying  a  stationary  posi- 
tion we  could  supply  our  troops  with  fewer  cartridges,  but 


124  MUNITIONS  OF  WAR  [ch.  x 

in  case  of  an  engagement  or  in  beating  off  a  German  attack 
any  shortage  of  cartridges  in  the  trenches  could  not  but 
have  a  bad  effect  on  the  moral  of  the  troops.  This  crisis 
lasted  throughout  19 15  and  was  felt  even  in  19 16.  The 
demands  of  the  Higher  Authorities  for  more  munitions  in 
view  of  the  active  operations  that  were  coming  on  could 
not  be  fully  realised. 

A  crisis  not  quite  so  severe  existed  in  regard  to  machine 
guns.  At  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  all  field  troops 
had  a  section  of  eight  machine  guns  per  regiment,  and  each 
cavalry  division  one  section  of  eight  machine  guns,  but  it 
soon  became  apparent  that  our  opponent  was  much  better 
off  in  this  respect.  Steps  were  taken  to  increase  the 
number  of  machine  guns  per  regiment.  On  one  hand  the 
obstacle  to  this  was  the  necessity  of  forming  new  machine- 
gun  sections  for  the  never-ceasing  new  regiments  of  in- 
fantry, and  on  the  other  hand  the  difficulties  met  with  in 
having  orders  executed  for  two-wheeled  machine-gim  car- 
riages. The  actual  machine-gun  manufacture  was  going 
on  very  successfully,  because  at  the  outset  of  the  campaign 
our  Government  works  were  engaged  in  making  machine 
guns  in  bulk  for  completing  the  stocks  calculated  for  regi- 
ments of  the  next  call-up.  A  considerable  addition  was 
also  gained  in  the  machine  guns  captured  from  the 
Austrians  and  Germans.  These  used  to  be  sent  to  the  rear 
as  trophies;  later  our  workshops  remade  them  to  fire  our 
cartridges,  after  which  they  were  left  with  the  regiments 
who  captured  them  for  immediate  use.  Some  regiments 
had  as  many  as  forty  and  more  machine  guns,  although 
such  instances  were  exceptional. 

I  must  say  that  a  capture  of  large  numbers  of  machine 
guns  did  not  always  give  the  regiments  the  expected  ad- 
vantage,  because   the   supply   of   ammunition   was   only   in 


1915-16-17]  MUNITIONS  OF  WAR  125 

accordance  with  the  number  of  machine  guns  available  at 
the  time. 

Certainly  the  greatest  and  saddest  influence  on  the 
progress  of  military  events  was  the  shortage  in  the 
artillery,  and  especially  in  artillery  ammunition.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  war  our  Army  was  armed  with  guns  of 
types  1900  and  1902,  distinguished  one  from  the  other 
only  in  details.  Nothing  could  be  found  in  construction 
better  than  these  guns.  The  quantity  of  ammunition  pre- 
pared at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  answered  to  the  quantities 
which  could  be  required  by  the  number  of  guns  that 
existed. 

If  the  shortage  of  ammunition  was  In  evidence  much 
earlier  than  the  lack  of  guns,  this  was  due  to  the  fact  that 
guns  were  capable  of  firing  twice,  and  even  thrice,  the 
quantity  of  ammunition  that  theoretically  had  been  pro- 
vided for.  In  December  19 14  the  replacement  of  worn- 
out  guns  met  with  a  certain  amount  of  hindrance.  To 
surmount  this  difficulty  we  had  to  resort  to  the  measure 
of  reducing  all  our  field  batteries  from  eight  to  six  guns 
per  battery,  sending  back  to  the  rear  the  guns  weeded- 
out,  repairing  them  and  forming  a  park  from  which  we 
could  replace  the  others  as  they  became  worn-out.  This 
measure  could  only  afford  a  temporary  relief  to  the  situa- 
tion. We  had  to  arrange  for  an  organised  method  of 
boring  out  the  worn-out  guns  and  refitting  them  with  new 
steel  bores.  In  the  summer  of  19 15,  when  the  crisis  of 
shell  supply  was  at  its  height,  the  Ministry  of  War  asked 
the  Staffs  what  average  of  shells  should  be  allowed  for, 
as  on  the  basis  of  their  calculations  the  organisation  of 
ammunition  works  in  the  interior  was  to  be  made. 

About  this  time  the  War  Trade  Committee  was  formed 
in  Petrograd,   the   elected  President  of  which  was  A.   J. 


126  MUNITIONS  OF  WAR  [ch.  x 

GoutchkoJEf,  who  became  the  first  War  Minister  of  the 
Temporary  Government  after  the  Revolution.  For  the 
manufacture  of  ammunition,  the  idea  was  to  employ  a 
large  number  of  the  private  works  both  large  and  small 
through  the  medium  of  the  War  Trade  Committee.  But 
to  organise  for  the  manufacture  of  ammunition  in  bulk 
without  consideration  for  the  corresponding  requirements 
of  guns,  would  have  put  the  Russian  Army  into  still  worse 
difficulties.  It  was  in  May  19 15,  at  a  personal  interview 
with  General  Alexeielif,  then  the  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  north-western  front,  that  I  clearly  spoke  out  my  mind 
and  showed  him  the  paradox  —  that  the  shortage  in 
artillery  ammunition  had  been  our  salvation  for  the  follow- 
ing reason.  The  manufacture  of  guns,  or  supply  of  guns 
ordered  abroad,  certainly  was  much  more  difficult  than  the 
manufacture  or  delivery  of  artillery  ammunition.  There- 
fore, I  emphasised  the  point  that  if  we  could  have  sup- 
plied our  artillery  with  shells,  in  the  last  part  of  the  cam- 
paign, as  lavishly  as  we  did  in  the  first  months  of  the  war, 
not  having  the  means  to  replace  our  worn-out  guns,  then,  by 
this  time  —  spring  1915,  we  should  not  have  had  a  single 
gun  fit  to  be  fired,  as  they  would  have  all  been  completely 
worn  out.  Therefore,  when  they  asked  me  in  August  19 15 
what  average  rate  of  manufacture  should  be  fixed,  I  said 
the  answer  was  dependent  on  another  consideration  —  by 
finding  out  what  quantities  of  ammunition  could  be  used  up 
in  the  guns  already  in  use,  and  by  all  those  that  could  be 
repaired,  manufactured  here,  or  ordered  from  abroad  in 
a  given  time,  then  to  fix  the  rate  of  ammunition  manu- 
facture required  for  this  number  of  guns  on  the  number  of 
shells  which,  theoretically,  can  be  fired  from  a  gun.  To 
supply  the  troops  with  shells  in  large  quantities  and  to 
have  a  delay  in  replacement  of  worn-out  guns  might  put 


1915-16-17]  MUNITIONS  OF  WAR  127 

matters  into  a  much  worse  plight,  as  it  is  better  to  have 
guns  and  economise  in  shells,  than  to  have  shells  and  not 
to  have  guns  to  fire  them  from. 

This  crisis  in  the  field  artillery  of  the  Russian  Army 
lasted  right  up  to  the  end  of  19 16,  gradually  losing  its 
severity,  but  only  in  19 17  could  this  shortage  in  shells  be 
considered  in  the  realm  of  departed  dreams. 

Much  more  difficult  was  the  question  of  heavy  artillery. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  only  our  field  Army 
Corps  were  supplied  with  mortar  divisions.  But  in  regard 
to  the  supply  of  long-distance  and  heavy  artillery, 
especially  6-inch,  for  our  troops,  the  position  was  very 
much  worse.  It  was  proposed  to  make  an  addition  to  each 
field  army  corps  of  one  division  made  up  of  three  batteries 
of  four  guns  each,  one  battery  being  armed  with  two  long- 
distance 4.2  inch  guns,  and  two  batteries  with  6-inch  guns 
or  howitzers.  During  the  campaign  new  divisions  were 
formed  on  these  lines  for  the  field  army  corps,  and  also 
for  the  newly  formed  army  corps.  The  formation  of 
these  new  divisions  could  not  be  finished  in  time  in  19 16, 
on  account  of  the  formation  of  new  army  corps,  the 
number  of  which  were  nearly  double  those  of  peace  times. 

But  if  the  Russian  artillery  had  a  shortage  in  field-gun 
shells,  the  lack  of  shells  for  the  heavier  guns  was  even 
more  pronounced.  In  19 15,  cases  were  known  where 
heavy  batteries  were  sent  to  the  rear  ostensibly  for  repair, 
but  actually  because  of  lack  of  ammunition  for  them. 
This  position  gradually  got  better,  but  nevertheless  it  was 
only  in  the  spring  of  1917,  while  preparing  for  the  coming 
operations,  that  the  different  armies  were  made  happy  by 
being  able  to  reckon  on  having  several  tens  of  thousands 
of  shells  for  the  6-inch  guns,  and  about  100,000  4.8-inch 
trench  mortar  bombs;  and  this,   in  comparison  with  the 


128  MUNITIONS  OF  WAR  [ch.  x 

hundreds  of  shells  which  were  supplied  In   19 14  and  even 
in  191 5,  might  be  considered  satisfactory. 

By  the  end  of  November  19 14  the  Germans  were  using 
a  12-inch  gun  in  field  battles,  whilst  we  had  nothing  heavier 
than  a  6-inch  gun  till  the  spring  of  19 16. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE    SUMMER    CAMPAIGN    OF     I915 

As  the  winter  of  1914-1915  was  drawing  to  a  close  we  had 
news  that  the  Germans  were  throwing  part  of  their  forces 
on  to  the  Austrian  front.  We  obtained  no  actual  con- 
firmation of  this  immediately,  however,  as  the  Germans 
whilst  making  this  concentration  did  not  bring  these  troops 
into  the  front  line.  Consequently  we  could  not  confirm 
the  arrival  of  the  German  troops  In  Galicia  until  prisoners 
were  taken. 

The  higher  Russian  military  authorities  fully  under- 
stood the  instability  of  the  Galiclan  front,  because  the  in- 
cessant fighting  during  the  winter  had  drawn  away  a  con- 
siderable part  of  the  reserves  of  the  south-western  to  the 
north-western  area.  Our  army  corps,  not  only  in  the 
mountains,  but  at  the  foot  of  the  Carpathians,  held  a  posi- 
tion of  thirty  and  more  kilometres  without  the  necessary 
heavy  reserves.  Moreover,  the  complements  of  the  army 
corps  were  not  full,  because  of  the  lack  of  rifles  for  their 
reserves.  Naturally,  our  positions  could  not  be  given  the 
necessary  development,  owing  to  the  lack  of  working 
hands,  and  further  the  supply  of  barbed  wire  was  quite  in- 
adequate. 

In  addition  our  troops,  who  not  so  long  ago  had  been 
victorious  In  field  fighting,  found  the  wire  not  so  much  a 
means  of  defence  as  an  obstacle  to  their  own  attacks.  It 
required  several  defeats  in  consequence  to  make  the  troops 
understand  the  absolute  necessity  of  this  means  of  defence. 

129 


I30  SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  OF  1915  [ch.  xi 

It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  when  Mackensen's 
phalanxes  poured  like  lava  on  to  one  of  our  army  corps, 
it  could  not  withstand  the  torrent  and  retreated.  Its  re- 
treat compelled  the  Higher  Command  to  order  the  retreat 
of  the  neighbouring  army  corps.  Such  a  thing  as  the  re- 
treat of  a  whole  army,  at  once  and  on  the  same  front  only 
because  one  army  corps  had  been  defeated,  became,  I 
regret  to  say,  a  familiar  occurrence  in  19 15.  This,  how- 
ever, had  its  cause,  which  the  Higher  Command,  of  course, 
did  their  utmost  to  eradicate,  but  not  always  successfully. 
In  order  that  the  retreat  of  less  than  a  day's  march  by  an 
army  corps  holding  a  front  of  some  tens  of  kilometres 
should  not  produce  a  corresponding  retreat  of  its  neigh- 
bours, there  must  be  fresh  reserves  which  can  undertake  a 
vigorous  counter-attack  to  recover  the  position.  Another 
but  more  passive  method  is  to  bring  up  fresh  troops  to  fill 
up  the  space  created  between  the  flanks  of  the  neighbour- 
ing bodies  from  between  which  the  retiring  troops  had 
passed,  and  so  hold  the  position.  But  both  these  methods 
demand  reserves.  And  these  generally  were  not  present; 
to  rail  them  up  into  Galicia,  with  the  necessity  of  having 
to  change  trains  at  our  frontiers  on  account  of  the  differ- 
ence of  the  gauge,  required  time,  and  the  troops  failed  to 
do  this  in  time.  Another  method  of  resisting  an  enemy 
that  has  broken  through  in  this  way,  and  without  retiring 
the  army  corps  that  have  not  been  attacked,  would  be  to 
change  from  position  to  field  warfare,  but  this  would  also 
necessitate  previously  collecting  reserves,  and  during  the 
past  year  our  troops  had  had  such  heavy  losses  in  their 
seasoned  complements  of  oflicers  and  men  that  they  were 
not  quite  fit  for  this.  To  carry  out  this  kind  of  field  war- 
fare, so  far  as  field  defence  tactics  are  concerned,  requires 
much   better  trained   troops   than   is   the   case   where   the 


1915I  SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  OF  1915  131 

initiative  is  completely  in  our  hands.  Without  doubt  the 
most  effective  method  of  resisting  a  German  advance 
would  have  been  for  us  to  attack  in  our  turn  on  the  widest 
possible  front,  but  to  this  was  presented  the  insurmount- 
able obstacle  of  the  ever-increasing  shortage  of  every  kind 
of  artillery  munitions.  Such  an  advance  would  have 
meant  the  exhaustion  of  the  last  of  our  artillery  stocks, 
and  might  have  led  to  absolute  lack  of  ammunition  in  case 
of  defence. 

At  this  stage  of  the  war  there  was  considerable  difficulty 
in  arranging  the  supply  of  officers  for  the  Russian  Army, 
and  in  replacing  the  huge  losses  of  officers  during  the 
Russo-Japanese  War.  To  make  up  the  complements  of- 
ficers were  sent  to  Manchuria  from  regiments  left  in 
Russia,  the  result  of  which  was  that  the  number  of  officers 
left  in  such  units  was  cut  down  by  nearly  half.  After 
the  war,  the  shortage  in  officers,  especially  in  the  infantry, 
was  pronounced.  Various  measures  were  taken  to  in- 
crease the  numbers,  and  of  these  measures  the  most  vital 
was  increase  of  pay,  especially  among  the  younger  officers, 
as  the  rates  paid  were  completely  out  of  date.  Evidently 
in  this  matter  the  governing  economic  principle  of  supply 
and  demand  had  been  violated. 

In  this  case  our  Government  proved  to  be  very  liberal, 
as  from  a  percentage  standpoint  the  largest  increase  was 
awarded  to  the  younger  officers.  The  older  officers  such 
as  commanders  of  Military  Districts  remained  with  their 
old  rates  of  pay  awarded  as  far  back  as  the  time  of 
Alexander  II. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  after  a  series 
of  reforms,  the  War  Ministry  adopted  the  formula  that 
on  a  basis  of  education  officers  should  be  equal.  How- 
ever,   all   this   did  not   decide   the   question   of  providing 


132  SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  OF  1915  [ch.  xi 

reserves  of  officers  in  case  of  increase  in  the  Army  when 
mobilised,  nor  for  the  reinforcements  required  by  losses 
in  battle.  Of  course,  there  did  exist  in  the  Russian  Army 
the  institution  of  an  Officers'  Reserve,  but  their  numbers 
were  far  below  requirements.  This  was  proved  by  the 
Russo-Japanese  War.  Only  two  years  before  that  war, 
a  law  was  passed  requiring  that  every  youth  who  had 
completed  the  higher  education  (in  the  secondary  schools) 
and  served  his  term  of  military  service  should  pass  an 
examination  as  an  officer  of  reserves.  Having  passed 
this  examination  successfully,  and  served  his  term  as  a  non- 
commissioned officer,  he  was  sent  into  the  reserve  and  took 
his  training  periodically  in  the  summer  camps  as  an  officer, 
and  so  kept  his  military  knowledge  up  to  date.  The  opera- 
tion of  this  law  hardly  began  in  time  enough  to  exert  any 
great  influence  on  the  present  war.  It  was  only  when 
irresistible  evidence  was  forthcoming  of  the  enormous  losses 
sustained  by  the  army  in  officers,  especially  in  infantry  offi- 
cers, that  steps  were  taken  to  devise  a  means  of  accelerating 
the  methods  of  teaching  the  young  men  from  the  higher  edu- 
cational courses.  This  measure,  however,  was  not  suffi- 
ciently complete,  as  the  students  who  were  already  engaged 
in  the  higher  educational  institutions  obtained  permission 
to  postpone  their  training  for  the  purpose  of  finishing  a 
course  of  science.  There  was  a  manifest  wish  to  interfere 
as  little  as  possible  with  the  interests  of  individuals  and  not 
to  take  away  their  opportunities  for  completing  advanced 
lectures  in  special  studies  and  technical  subjects,  which  might 
in  the  future  bring  the  Army  greater  benefit.  However, 
when  statistics  were  compiled,  it  was  proved  that  this  com- 
plement was  not  sufficient  to  supply  the  losses  and  require- 
ments of  the  new  formations.  It  was  necessary  to  provide 
special  classes  into  which  the  non-commissioned  officers,  who 


I9I5]  SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  OF  1915  133 

had  shown  special  abiHty  in  the  ranks  or  who  had  an  ac- 
knowledged right  by  education,  could  enter.  This  infringed 
the  rule  that  officers  must  have  the  same  military  education. 
The  result  was  the  appearance  of  officers  who  had  been  well 
prepared  for  the  position  and  of  others  who  had  only  had 
four  months'  preparation.  The  latter  in  their  turn  included 
men  of  good  general  education,  who  had  passed  through  the 
rural  and  town  schools,  and  others  who  had  received  only 
an  elementary  education.  It  is  true,  however,  that  many  of 
the  latter  had  good  fighting  experience. 

The  great  difficulty  we  encountered  in  making  up  our 
complements  of  officers  to  a  standard  comparative  to  those 
of  the  Western  Powers  is  very  easily  to  be  understood,  if 
only  because  of  the  numerical  difference  of  town  and  rural 
populations,  and  of  the  small  percentage  of  educated  classes. 
The  needs  of  an  army  of  millions  is  immense.  There  were, 
however,  many  cases  of  men  who  had  taken  the  rapid  classes 
and  become  officers,  doing  excellent  work;  many  men  who 
began  the  campaign  as  private  soldiers  were  commanding 
battalions  by  the  end  of  19 16.  At  the  same  time,  young 
officers  joining  the  service  at  the  outset  of  the  war  in  most 
cases  were  also  commanding  battalions.  This  rapid  promo- 
tion is  to  be  easily  understood  when  it  is  remembered  that  in 
July  19 1 5  the  divisions  which  came  up  to  join  me  commenced 
with  No.  125,  while  in  peace  times  the  highest  number  of  a 
field  division  was  52. 

No  less  trouble  was  met  with  in  forming  and  supplying 
full  complements  to  staffs,  from  the  divisional  staffs  up- 
wards. This  difficulty  especially  affected  the  service  of  the 
General  Staff.  At  the  opening  of  war  operations,  acting  on 
the  supposition  that  the  war  would  not  be  of  long  duration, 
the  Ministry  of  War  closed  the  Nicolaieffsky  Academy  of 
the  General  Staff,  and  allotted  two  of  the  older  classes  to  a 


134  SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  OF  1915  [ch.  xi 

staff,  returning  the  youngest  class  to  the  ranks.  It  took  them 
two  years  to  understand  the  necessity  of  organising  lectures 
so  as  to  reinforce  the  officers  of  the  General  Staff  with  new- 
comers, as  the  actual  membership  was  completely  inadequate, 
owing  as  much  to  the  conditions  of  war  as  to  the  necessity 
of  forming  new  staffs.  Many  positions  in  the  General  Staff 
had  to  be  closed,  notwithstanding  which  the  shortage  con- 
tinued to  be  felt.  In  the  summer  of  19 16  rapid  lectures 
were  arranged  for  officers  at  the  Nicolaieffsky  Academy,  to 
which  mostly  those  who  had  had  practical  experience  on  the 
regimental  staffs  were  nominated.  No  great  difficulty  was 
met  with  in  finding  people  for  the  higher  positions;  notwith- 
standing the  colossal  increase  of  commanders  of  army  corps 
and  divisions,  it  only  meant  a  speedier  promotion  for  those 
who  had  earned  a  good  reputation  in  fighting.  In  this  way, 
at  the  beginning  of  19 17,  there  were  several  commanding 
armies  who  had  been  chiefs  of  divisions  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  war. 

•  •  •  •  • 

The  Germans  dealt  us  their  first  blow  about  the  middle 
of  April,  and  the  immediate  consequences  were  severely  felt. 
For  reasons  already  mentioned  the  whole  of  the  south- 
western front  had  to  retire,  not  only  the  units  that  had  de- 
scended to  the  Hungarian  plains,  but  also  those  holding 
the  passes  across  the  Carpathian  Mountains.  If  this  re- 
tirement had  not  been  effected,  the  spreading  of  the  German 
troops  in  the  directions  of  Przemysl  and  Lemberg  might 
gradually  have  cut  off  our  forces  from  the  only  route  by 
which  they  could  descend  from  the  mountain  passes.  It  is 
quite  clear  that  to  defend  mountain  passes  takes  fewer 
troops  than  to  defend  mountain  spurs,  where  it  is  always  pos- 
sible to  be  attacked  on  every  spot. 

The  position  of  the  Russian  army  corps,  which  had  just 


I9I5]  SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  OF  1915  i35 

descended  from  the  mountains  to  the  approaches  to  the 
Carpathians,  became  more  difficult,  and  it  was  beyond  the 
strength  of  our  troops  to  withstand  the  pressure  of  the  Ger- 
mans and  Austrians  encouraged  by  their  recent  successes. 
At  that  time  they  were  showing  much  more  stubbornness  in 
their  defence,  and  much  more  impetuosity  in  their  attacks. 
Having  questioned  the  prisoners  as  to  the  reason  for  this, 
we  were  told  that  when  the  Austrian  troops  saw  that  victory 
was  evidently  inclining  our  way  they  saw  no  sense  in  being 
obstinate,  and  in  this  way  prolonging  the  war,  but  that  now, 
when  victory  inclined  to  their  side,  they  were  ready  to  fight 
for  its  realisation  so  as  to  bring  the  war  to  an  end  as  speedily 
as  possible. 

However,  the  Austrian  victories  were  not  of  long  dura- 
tion; with  superhuman  efforts  our  railways  gradually 
brought  the  forces  in  Galicia  on  to  an  equality  with  the 
enemy.  This  was  accomplished  at  the  price  of  considerably 
weakening  the  forces  on  the  north-western  front.  The 
troops  as  they  arrived  often  made  attacks  and  won  local  suc- 
cesses. Amongst  the  other  army  corps  of  the  north-west- 
ern front  which  were  transferred  in  May  to  Galicia  was  my 
army  corps  (the  6th  Infantry). 

When  I  was  called  from  the  lines  of  the  Rivers  Bzura  and 
Rava,  I  went  in  a  motor-car  to  the  town  of  Syedlets  —  my 
army  corps  being  moved  by  rail  —  to  see  General  Alexeieff, 
the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  north-west  front,  who  sent 
me  on  in  the  direction  of  Kholm  of  the  4th  Army  of  General 
Evert,  who  later  became  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
western  front.  Alexeieff  intended  to  call  for  two  army 
corps,  one  of  which  was  mine,  for  the  purpose  of  making  a 
flank  attack  on  the  Austro-German  troops  pressing  on  the 
neighbouring  right  flank  of  the  south-western  front.  I 
learnt  on  arriving  at  General  Evert's  Staff  in  the  town  of 


136  SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  OF  1915  [ch.  xi 

Novo-Alexandria  that  the  increased  pressure  of  the  Aus- 
trians  on  General  Tcherbatcheff's  Army  on  the  River  Dnies- 
ter lines  had  compelled  the  High  Command  to  send  my  army 
corps  on  to  remain  at  Tcherbatcheff's  disposal  instead  of 
taking  part  in  the  blow  on  the  flank  mentioned  above  which 
promised  such  good  results.  In  this  way  the  6th  Army 
Corps,  without  being  detrained,  was  railed  right  through  to 
Lemberg  (Lvoff). 

Having  absolutely  no  knowledge  of  the  position  of  affairs 
in  the  south-western  fighting  area,  I  continued  my  motor-car 
journey  to  the  Staff  of  this  front  to  see  General  Ivanoff  in 
hopes  of  receiving  the  necessary  information  from  him. 
From  the  Staff  and  from  General  Ivanoff  I  personally  heard, 
I  am  sorry  to  say,  nothing  reassuring.  It  had  already  been 
decided  that  should  the  enemy  continue  his  advance  Przemysl 
was  not  to  have  more  than  an  ordinary  stubborn  fortified 
field  defence,  and  as  it  was  quite  clear  that  the  Austro- 
German  troops  were  determined  to  go  round  the  fortress 
from  both  flanks  and  not  attempt  its  capture  by  open  attack, 
the  decision  was  made  that  if  this  movement  of  the  Germans 
were  successful,  the  fortress  was  to  be  evacuated.  Such 
an  order  had  already  been  given,  but  at  the  last  minute 
countermanded  as  the  position  of  our  troops  appeared  to  be 
strengthened.  All  the  same  the  equipment  of  the  fortress 
was  being  taken  out  at  that  very  time.  The  general  im- 
pression I  took  away  with  me  from  my  stay  at  General 
Ivanoff's  Staff  was  that  General  Ivanoff  himself  and  his 
Staff  had  to  a  great  extent  lost  heart  and  faith  in  the  possi- 
bility of  bringing  the  Austro-German  advance  to  a  stop. 
The  slowness  in  moving  my  army  corps  by  rail  and  in  re- 
training at  the  Austrian  frontier  gave  me  hopes  of  arriving 
in  Lemberg  not  later  than  my  Staff,  and  at  the  same  time,  I 
considered,  would  enable  me,  by  taking  advantage  of  motor- 


im^§ 


—  H 
■x  — 

>  2 


J    o 


■J 


I9I5]  SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  OF  1915  i37 

car  communication,  to  go  to  General  Tcherbatcheff's  Staff 
and  get  fuller  directions  about  the  part  of  the  front  to  which 
I  had  to  go  with  my  army  corps. 

At  this  time  General  Tcherbatcheff's  staff  was  in 
Brzezany.  General  Tcherbatcheff's  personal  expectations 
and  especially  those  of  his  Chief  of  Staff,  General  Shish- 
kievitch,  were  distinctly  better  than  those  of  the  Staff  at  the 
front.  Tcherbatcheff  fully  concurred  with  the  proposition 
I  made  of  taking  advantage  of  the  freshness  of  my  divisions 
for  the  purpose  of  making  an  active  defence,  particularly 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  on  the  Dniester  lines  in  the  region 
of  Nicolaieff  no  positions  which  might  have  made  it  possible 
to  offer  a  passive  resistance  had  been  already  prepared. 
Having  had  my  talk  with  General  Tcherbatcheff,  I  left  and 
the  same  evening  arrived  in  Lemberg.  I  was  struck  with 
the  holiday  appearance  of  the  town.  Animated  crowds 
filled  the  streets  and  cafes.  At  that  time,  the  end  of  May, 
the  near  approach  of  the  surrender  of  the  place  was  evi- 
dently not  realised.  Probably  all  hoped  apparently  that  the 
fortress  of  Przemysl  served  as  an  effectual  protection  against 
the  Austro-German  advance.  Next  day  my  Staff  arrived, 
and  my  regiments  commenced  coming  in  and  detraining.  I 
immediately  rode  to  Nicolaieff,  in  which  town  was  the  Staff 
of  the  22nd  Army  Corps,  whose  territory  and  troops  were 
to  come  under  my  authority.  The  22nd  Army  Corps  had 
to  be  thrown  on  the  right  flank  of  General  Tcherbatcheff's 
Army.  At  my  personal  interview  with  the  commander  of 
this  army  corps,  we  agreed  that  I  was  to  replace  them  the 
moment  my  staff  arrived.  Next  day,  while  I  was  attending 
to  the  army  corps  business,  notice  came  of  an  advance  by 
the  Austrians;  this  compelled  me  to  hurry  up  with  the  re- 
ception of  my  new  charge. 

However,  I  was  called  to  the  telephone  in  the  middle  of 


138  Summer  Campaign  of  1915         [ch.  xi 

the  night  by  the  chief  of  one  of  the  divisions  that  had  joined 
me  (of  the  22nd  Army  Corps),  and  asked  if  I  would  not 
permit  him  to  retire  his  division  across  the  Dniester,  because 
a  new  advance  of  the  Austrians  had  been  reported,  and  he 
had  prepared  and  partially  fortified  a  fairly  good  position 
on  the  lines  of  the  River  Dniester.  Instead  of  allowing 
him  to  do  this,  I  gave  him  most  strict  orders  to  make  an 
advance  himself  immediately  and  throw  the  Austrians  back 
from  the  small  part  of  the  front  which  they  had  been  able 
to  occupy.  In  case  of  necessity,  I  told  him,  he  might  bring 
up  his  reserves  from  the  left  bank  of  the  Dniester  and  I 
should  uphold  his  advance  with  the  neighbouring  division. 
Soon  afterwards  news  were  brought  in  that  our  advance  was 
developing  successfully;  it  was  the  Finnish  Division  that  was 
advancing.  (It  was  called  the  Finnish  Division  simply  be- 
cause it  had  been  quartered  in  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Finland; 
as  a  matter  of  fact  these  troops  were  mostly  recruited  from 
the  interior  Governments  of  Russia.) 

These  conditions  and  the  arrival  of  the  fresh  troops  of 
my  army  corps  marked  the  turning-point  of  our  operations 
on  this  part  of  the  front  on  the  River  Dniester.  Happily, 
my  right  flank  was  covered  by  the  wide  district  of  the 
swampy  Dniester  approaches,  so  that  for  a  considerable  time 
I  was  not  compelled  to  worry  about  the  partial  movements 
made  by  my  neighbour  on  this  side.  The  i8th  Army  Corps 
was  on  my  left  strengthened  by  the  3rd  Guards  Division  and 
a  brigade  from  my  army  corps,  which  had  arrived  earlier 
than  I  did. 

Next  day  active  operations  commenced  to  compel  the 
Germans  to  retire  to  the  west.  The  fortune  of  war  again 
favoured  us,  and  in  the  course  of  ten  days  four  divisions, 
although  reduced  in  strength,  by  active  operations,  advanc- 
ing almost  half-way  on  the  road  to  the  town  of  Stryj,  were 


I9I5]  SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  OF  1915  139 

able  to  capture  about  25,000  prisoners  with  a  corresponding 
number  of  officers,  machine  guns,  and  every  other  kind  of 
material.  The  shortage  in  cavalry,  however,  prevented  us 
from  developing  the  victory,  and  maybe  from  capturing  the 
town  of  Stryj.  This  evidently  would  not  have  been  difficult, 
because  amongst  the  prisoners  was  a  half  company,  the  guard 
of  Stryj,  which  had  been  sent  out  by  the  Austrians  as  a  last 
hope  —  apparently  they  had  used  up  all  their  reserves.  At 
the  same  time  the  i8th  Army  Corps  had  a  great  victory, 
compelling  the  Germans  to  retire  to  the  right  shore  of  the 
Dniester  with  heavy  losses  in  prisoners,  guns,  and  war  ma- 
terials. 

Unfortunately  at  this  very  same  time  the  operations  of 
the  neighbouring  army,  defending  Przemysl  and  the  ap- 
proaches to  Lemberg,  were  going  from  bad  to  worse.  The 
fortress  of  Przemysl  was  once  more  in  the  hands  of  the 
Austrians.  Many,  at  the  time,  failed  to  understand  what 
this  meant.  I  think  also  that  in  the  West  of  Europe  people 
could  not  understand  why  the  fortress  had  not  made  more 
resistance,  why  we  had  not  defended  it  to  our  very  utmost. 
The  explanation  must  be  found  in  the  following  circum- 
stances. 

The  Austro-Germans  did  not  make  any  serious  direct 
attack  on  the  fortress  itself,  but  their  successful  movement 
of  troops  outside  its  flanks  threatened  to  surround  the  place. 
It  was  therefore  necessary  to  consider  whether  the  fortress 
could  stand  a  siege  of  such  duration  as  to  give  the  Russian 
troops  in  the  field  time  to  come  to  its  assistance  and  compel 
the  Austro-Germans  to  raise  the  siege.  To  calculate  such 
a  given  time  was  extremely  difficult.  In  any  case,  it  meant 
increasing  the  Russian  Army  in  complement;  this  was  taking 
place,  but  very  slowly.  In  addition  the  Russian  and  foreign 
trade  organisations  abroad  should  have  been  able  to  supply 


140  SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  OF  1915  [ch.  xi 

the  army  with  sufficient  war  materials  for  attacking  opera- 
tions. But  before  everything  else,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
provide  Przemysl  with  an  adequate  garrison  and  the  neces- 
sary war  materials  for  the  complete  equipment  of  the  fort- 
ress. One  must  remember  that  the  Austrian  garrison  of 
Przemysl  was  about  100,000  men,  who  had  given  them- 
selves up  as  prisoners.  Consequently,  our  army  would  have 
had  to  provide  at  the  least  three  or  four  army  corps  as  gar- 
rison for  the  fortress  and,  if  a  further  retirement  was  neces- 
sary, to  have  made  up  for  their  loss  by  filling  up  the  gap  with 
a  similar  body  of  troops. 

This  was  an  insurmountable  difficult}^  —  as,  at  this  time, 
all  our  army  corps  were  either  drawn  out  in  one  line  or  were 
being  transferred  by  rail.  And  more  difficult  still  would 
have  been  the  question  of  supplying  these  army  corps  with 
a  sufficient  quantity  of  materials,  and  especially  with  suffi- 
cient artillery,  for  a  lengthy  defence.  Taking  all  these  con- 
ditions into  consideration,  it  is  obvious  that  the  defence  of 
Przemysl  after  our  armies  had  retreated  eastwards  would 
have  given  our  opponents  an  easy  victory.  Of  course  the 
envelopment  of  Przemysl  would  have  monopolised  the  at- 
tentions of  large  Austro-German  forces,  but  there  was  noth- 
ing to  show  that  by  using  the  railways  they  could  not  bring 
up  these  necessary  forces  in  the  required  time. 

The  retreat  of  our  Army  from  the  neighbourhood  of 
Lemberg  (Lvoff)  exposed  to  danger  the  rear  of  Tcher- 
batcheff's  Army.  An  order  was  received  from  General 
Ivanoff  directing  that  General  Tcherbatcheff's  right  flank 
army  corps  was  to  be  withdrawn  so  that  its  right  wing  came 
into  line  with  the  left  of  the  17th  Army  Corps.  Otherwise, 
there  would  have  been  between  my  forces  and  the  17th  Army 
Corps  a  gap  which  T  was  unable  to  fill  up,  particularly  as  my 
front   was    more    than   thirty   kilometres    in    extent.     The 


1915]  SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  OF  1915  141 

neighbouring  army  could  not  hold  its  front  before  Lemberg 
—  which  was  soon  evacuated  without  a  fight.  The  retreat 
on  the  whole  south-west  front  was  carried  out,  so  to  speak, 
in  leaps  —  that  is,  we  retreated  to  prepared  positions,  one 
after  the  other  along  the  natural  local  Rubicons,  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  affluents  of  the  Dniester,  all  of  them  having  an 
almost  meridianal  course.  Our  troops  held  these  positions 
for  several  days,  sometimes  for  weeks.  By  August  part  of 
our  army  entered  the  boundaries  of  Volhynia  and  part  re- 
mained in  East  Galicia.  A  portion  of  my  army  corps  was 
to  the  west  of  Zbaraz.  Here  our  troops  remained  a  long 
time  and  began  to  make  local  attacks  with  frequent  suc- 
cesses, taking  each  time  from  several  hundred  to  several 
thousand  prisoners  with  corresponding  numbers  of  machine 
guns,  sometimes  whole  batteries.  The  pressure  of  the 
Austro-Germans  troops  had  considerably  weakened  since 
June.  This  can  be  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  the  Ger- 
mans had  turned  their  main  blow  on  to  the  north-eastern 
front  more  especially  in  the  direction  of  Warsaw.  Just  as 
the  German  pressure  in  Galicia  was  successful  according  to 
the  previous  transfer  of  troops  from  south  to  north,  so  the 
necessity  of  holding  the  enemy's  advance  in  our  southern 
area  weakened  our  northern  front  and  used  up  its  reserves 
at  this  time. 

On  account  of  this,  one  cannot  be  astonished  that  when 
the  Germans  collected  another  force  against  Warsaw,  and 
fitted  it  out  with  plenty  of  artillery,  our  troops,  with  their 
severe  shortage  in  guns,  could  not  stand  the  enemy's  pres- 
sure. The  troops  defending  the  part  of  the  territory  on  the 
left  banks  of  the  Vistula  were  much  ahead  of  both  flanks 
of  the  Russian  defensive  lines.  Naturally  the  shortage  of 
reserves  and  the  extended  disposition  of  our  army  corps 
made  it  necessary  to  shorten  the  defensive  lines  before  any- 


142  SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  OF  1915  [ch.  xi 

thing  else.  It  was  this  shortening  of  the  line  that  called 
forth  the  instructions  to  retire  from  the  defensive  lines  on 
the  Rivers  Bzura  and  Rava,  and  to  take  up  the  prepared 
positions  some  thirty  kilometres  to  the  west  of  Warsaw. 
But  if  this  shortening  movement  on  the  one  hand  tended  to 
counterbalance  the  shortage  in  reserves,  on  the  other  hand 
the  withdrawal  of  our  forces  from  well-known  positions 
placed  them  on  worse  terms  of  defence,  in  addition  to  the 
fact  that  retreat  always  lowers  the  moral  of  troops. 

In  cases  where  the  enemy  does  not  immediately  attack 
them,  troops  in  new  positions  have  time  to  look  round  and 
to  learn  all  there  is  to  know  of  their  situation.  One  must 
not  forget  that  in  position  warfare  great  weight  has  to  be 
given  to  the  extent  to  which  the  arms  of  all  kinds  are  ac- 
quainted with  their  positions,  and  with  the  localities  lying 
immediately  in  front  of  them.  For  this  is  required  the  study 
not  of  a  day  but  of  weeks.  We  see  that  troops  on  the  west- 
ern front,  standing  on  the  same  place  for  years,  have  still 
matters  to  learn  and  work  up.  To  what  extent,  then,  can 
such  a  colossal  work  be  done  by  troops  constantly  changing 
their  position?  To  this,  people  who  are  not  experts  in  the 
subject  might  say  that  attacking  troops  are  often  successful 
when  attacking  positions  before  which  they  have  only  just 
arrived.  The  answer  to  this  is  that  this  generally  happens 
when  the  opponent  has  only  just  taken  up  a  new  position  — 
that  is,  when  the  chances  on  both  sides  are  equal.  The 
main  reason,  however,  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  side  attacking 
holds  the  initiative  and  puts  forward  every  effort  to  learn 
all  about  the  locality  of  the  position  to  be  attacked,  whereas 
the  defenders  must  be  everywhere  to  offer  opposition.  Be- 
sides this,  a  huge  advantage  which  the  attackers  hold  is  their 
superior  moral,  an  extremely  important  factor  in  military 


1915]  SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  OF  1915  143 

affairs.     It  Is  always  easier  to  deliver  a  blow  than  to  parry 
one. 

Moreover,  it  remains  to  be  shown  whether  the  Russian 
troops  had  at  this  stage  of  the  campaign  the  opportunity  on 
all  occasions  of  using  this  active  defence,  and  in  their  turn 
of  always  holding  their  opponent  under  the  threat  of  a  pos- 
sible counter-attack.  Reserves  in  troops  and  materials  are 
equally  necessary  for  attack  and  counter-attack.  Our  re- 
mote resources  were  always  too  late  in  supplying,  and  the 
reserves  formed  by  shortening  the  defensive  lines  were  short 
of  materials,  and  the  summer  of  1915,  as  already  stated,  was 
the  heaviest  for  the  Russian  Army  in  respect  to  the  supply  of 
these  materials.  Nevertheless,  on  all  occasions  where  the 
stopping-place  and  means  made  it  possible,  we  attempted  to 
parry  the  German  blows  by  counter-attacks. 


CHAPTER  XII 

FLIGHT   OF    THE    RUSSIAN    POPULATION CARE    OF 

THE    WOUNDED 

The  withdrawal  of  the  Russian  armies  from  the  defence 
line  of  the  Bzura  and  Rava  rivers,  for  reasons  previously 
shown,  indicated  very  clearly  the  nearness  of  the  surrender 
of  Warsaw.  At  this  time  on  the  north-western  front  we  had 
to  hold  up  the  pressure  of  the  German  troops  on  almost  the 
whole  front. 

The  enemy's  attempts  to  break  through  on  the  lower 
reaches  of  the  Narew  near  Osovetz  and  Lomja  were  espe- 
cially dangerous,  for  by  a  successful  advance  they  would  have 
straddled  the  Petrograd-Warsaw  Railway  and  to  a  great 
extent  have  made  it  difficult  to  bring  up  transport  to  the 
armies  defending  the  line  on  the  Vistula.  It  should  be 
borne  in  mind  that  military  operations  during  the  winter  of 
1914-15  went  on  unceasingly,  and  there  was  no  lull  in  which 
we  might  have  accumulated  ammunition  and  reinforced  the 
troops  with  men  supplied  with  rifles.  It  is  not  surprising, 
then,  that  in  the  beginning  of  19 15  our  troops  were  a  long 
way  behind  the  Germans  in  the  number  of  men  available, 
and  in  the  supply  of  fighting  materials.  The  only  means  of 
fighting  the  advancing  Germans  was  by  bringing  up  fresh 
reserves,  but  the  majority  of  these,  as  already  mentioned, 
were  swallowed  up  in  checking  the  Austro-German  advance 
in  Galicia.  The  formation  of  new  units  was  retarded  by  the 
shortage  of  rifles. 

The  result  of  all  this  was  that  the  north-western  front 

144 


I9I5]  MILITIA  AS  FORTRESS  GARRISONS  145 

was  compelled  to  evacuate  one  defensive  line  after  another, 
suffering  heavy  losses  from  the  German  fire.  In  addition, 
when  large  masses  of  soldiers  were  retreating,  tired  out  by 
fighting,  and  demoralised  by  successive  failures  and  the  unin- 
terrupted retreat,  many  became  separated  from  their  regi- 
ments and  were  easily  taken  prisoners.  These  failures  In 
open  warfare,  as  usual,  had  their  effect  on  the  fate  of  the 
Russian  fortresses  of  Novogeorglevsk,  Kovno,  and  Grodno, 
the  smaller  one  of  Osovetz,  and  later  on  the  out-of-date  fort- 
ress of  Brest-LItovsk. 

It  was  not  necessary  for  the  Germans  to  apply  a  direct 
siege  to  any  of  these;  some  of  them  were  evacuated  by  us 
for  reasons  similar  to  those  which  caused  us  to  abandon  the 
defence  of  Przemysl.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fortress  of 
Novogeorglevsk  was  defended  by  Its  garrison  and  was  taken 
by  the  Germans  by  storm.  As  for  this  garrison,  I  cannot  but 
mention  that  the  greater  part  of  It  was  composed  of  militia 
brigades  which,  at  the  commencement  of  the  war,  were  only 
utilised  for  the  construction  of  fortified  field  positions.  It 
was  only  a  comparatively  short  time  before  the  surrounding 
of  Novogeorglevsk  that  they  were  used  for  operations  in  the 
field.  This  militia  was  made  up  either  of  older  men,  or  of 
men  who  had  not  served  the  usual  three  years  in  the  army, 
having  been  exempt  on  account  of  family  reasons. 

Units  made  up  of  such  as  they  were  called  up  for  field 
troops  and  irreproachably  performed  their  tasks  In  the 
ranks;  but  having  been  placed  In  the  militia  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  they  were  imbued  with  the  Idea  that  they  had 
been  acknowledged  as  unfit  for  service  In  the  field  and  that 
they  would  not  have  to  shed  their  blood  in  battle.  Their 
use  In  the  fighting  line  they  must  have  reckoned  as  somewhat 
unjust.  It  is  natural  that  all  this  did  not  assist  in  raising  the 
spirit   of   these   militia   units.     When   the   surrounding   of 


146  MILITIA  AS  FORTRESS  GARRISONS     [ch.  xii 

Novogeorgievsk  was  an  accomplished  fact,  the  moral  con- 
dition of  these  units  was  still  lower.  The  bombardment  of 
Novogeorgievsk,  beginning  immediately  afterwards,  with 
guns  of  the  heaviest  calibre,  finally  broke  their  spirit,  so  that 
they  were  not  fit  to  offer  any  real  resistance  to  the  German 
storming  columns.  The  officers  of  these  units  had  also  been 
taken  from  the  reserve  and  were  mostly  elderly  men. 

Meanwhile  the  retreat  on  the  whole  of  the  north-western 
front  continued.  Several  army  corps,  whose  duty  it  was  to 
hold  back  the  strongest  German  attacks,  melted  away  daily, 
having  no  chance  of  reinforcements,  and  what  increased  the 
difficulty  was  that  they  were  either  fighting  or  moving.  In 
the  early  autumn  of  19 15  there  were  army  corps  formed  of 
two  divisions  numbering  less  than  1,500  bayonets.  At  that 
time,  men  of  a  whole  army  corps  formed  a  miniature  regi- 
ment, which,  properly  speaking,  served  only  as  cover  for 
their  own  artillery,  but  the  guns  could  not  show  much  activ- 
ity owing  to  the  scanty  supply  of  ammunition.  Neverthe- 
less, on  occasions  when  conditions  demianded  It,  such  units 
fought  rear-guard  actions  and  temporarily  checked  the  Ger- 
man advance.  The  months  at  the  end  of  the  summer  and 
the  beginning  of  the  autumn  of  19 15  were  certainly  the  very 
heaviest  of  the  three  years  of  war.  The  Higher  Authori- 
ties understood  perfectly  well  that  there  might  be  a  break 
in  the  course  of  operations,  and  that  we  should  be  able  once 
again  successfully  to  fight  the  Germans.  But  for  this  it  was 
absolutely  necessary  to  have  a  temporary  lull  during  which 
the  moral  of  the  forces  could  right  Itself,  and  reinforcements 
and  fresh  equipment  brought  from  the  rear. 

In  the  late  autumn  a  lull  gradually  occurred,  partly  owing 
to  the  fact  that  the  roads  lines  of  communication  had 
reached  such  a  state  that  the  Germans  were  no  longer  able 
to  bring  up  supplies  for  their  armies,  and  partly  owing  to  the 


1915]  MILITIA  AS  FORTRESS  GARRISONS  147 

considerable  distance  which  separated  the  German  Army 
from  their  base.  They  did  not  possess  the  means  of  bring- 
ing forward  on  to  our  territory  their  transport  by  horses, 
nor  were  there  enough  railroads,  some  of  them  not  having 
been  repaired  nor  changed  to  the  narrow  gauge. 

Notwithstanding  the  successive  failures,  such  as  the  sur- 
render of  Warsaw  and  its  fortress  —  which  was  considered 
by  public  opinion  to  be  a  bulwark  of  our  frontiers  —  the 
population  did  not  lose  their  courage  and  assurance  that  this 
was  only  a  temporary  trial,  and  that  the  chances  of  war 
would  again  turn  things  in  our  favour. 

Nevertheless  the  possibility  of  Petrograd  being  seized 
by  the  Germans  was  foreseen.  In  the  capital,  arrangements 
were  made  for  the  removal  of  the  museum  treasures,  ar- 
chives, and  of  the  gold  reserve.  Calculations  were  made 
concerning  the  evacuation  of  factories  working  for  the  de- 
fence of  the  country.  Happily,  the  wave  of  hostile  inunda- 
tion did  not  reach  the  capital.  The  evacuation  of  national 
treasures,  had  it  taken  place  on  a  larger  scale,  could  pos- 
sibly have  prevented  the  shameless  spoliation  which  took 
place  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  Revolution. 

After  leaving  Brest-Litovsk  the  troops  of  our  centre  re- 
treated to  the  meridian  of  the  town  of  Baranowitchi  in  a 
region  of  boundless  forests  and  impassable  swamps.  On 
this  account  it  is  but  poorly  populated.  Here  the  fighting 
gradually  died  down,  and  by  the  beginning  of  winter  had 
completely  ceased.  The  efforts  of  the  Germans  on  the 
lower  reaches  of  the  Dvina  continued  much  longer.  The 
enemy  naturally  wanted  not  only  to  take  possession  of  this 
comparatively  strong  line  of  defence,  but  also  to  seize  the 
more  populous  districts  lying  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Dvina,  with  the  important  railway  junction,  and  the  towns 
of  Dvinsk  and  Riga.     The  latter  was  the  centre  of  German 


148  MILITIA  AS  FORTRESS  GARRISONS     [ch.  xii 

activities  in  all  the  three  Baltic  Province  Governments. 
Realising  what  was  the  German  Intention  In  regard  to  these 
two  towns,  the  Higher  Authorities  directed  there  a  large 
part  of  the  newly  formed  reserves  that  they  still  possessed, 
and  also  sent  as  much  munitions  as  they  could  supply.  This 
led  to  continuous  and  stubborn  battles,  giving  us  the  chance 
of  holding  In  our  hands  three  vast  salients  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Dvina  at  the  towns  of  Dvlnsk,  Kreutsburg,  and  Riga. 
They  were  so  wide  that  they  secured  these  three  towns  from 
bombardment  by  the  largest  of  the  German  long-distance 
artillery  then  In  action,  and  gave  a  good  outlet  for  attacking 
operations.  The  battles,  with  changing  fortunes,  now 
drawing  nearer,  now  retiring  from  these  towns,  only  died 
down  when  the  winter  frosts  arrived,  just  as  they  had  sub- 
sided before  on  the  rest  of  the  front. 

Both  sides  set  to  work  to  strengthen  their  positions  In 
preparation  for  the  spring  campaign.  This,  however,  did 
not  exclude  the  possibility  of  partial  attacks  during  the  win- 
ter, whenever  our  troops  had  recovered  and  had  been  rein- 
forced. Speaking  of  the  Russian  Army's  retreat  during  the 
summer  and  autumn  of  1915,  one  must  remember  the  diffi- 
culties It  suffered  owing  to  an  unforeseen  circumstance  — 
the  flight  of  the  entire  population  into  the  interior.  An 
example  of  this  was  given  by  Germany  during  our  first  ad- 
vance into  East  Prussia.  Up  to  these  times  such  a  thing 
had  never  been  known  in  the  histories  of  war  between  civil- 
ised nations.  The  reason  of  this  Is  probably  that  in  previ- 
ous wars  the  forces  used  were  not  large  enough  to  enable 
them  to  make  an  advance  with  a  front  extending  right  across 
the  whole  of  the  enemy  territory,  and  that  consequently  It 
was  not  the  whole  of  the  population  that  was  affected  by 
such  an  invasion.  Possibly  part  of  the  population  never  saw 
the  enemy's  troops.     It  is  a  different  matter  In  this  war, 


1914-15]     MILITIA  AS  FORTRESS  GARRISONS  149 

when  the  enemy  invades  in  a  compact  wave  sweeping  every- 
thing before  him  in  his  passage.  Besides,  an  undoubted  in- 
fluence on  this  flight  of  the  population  was  the  circulation 
amongst  them  of  reports  of  the  German  cruelties.  These, 
as  far  as  I  could  make  out,  were  rather  isolated  instances, 
but,  according  to  the  Russian  proverb,  "  Good  news  travels 
slowly  —  bad  travels  fast,"  the  stories  of  cruelties  had 
spread  amongst  the  population  as  much  by  hearsay  as  by 
the  papers.  In  September  19 14  in  the  Augustoff  Woods  on 
the  canal,  I  personally  received  evidence  from  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  burning  alive  by  German  soldiers  of  a  Cossack 
prisoner,  before  which  enormity  they  cut  strips  from  his  legs 
to  correspond  with  the  red  stripes  on  Cossack  trousers. 
The  explanation  of  this  act  may  be  that  the  German  authori- 
ties had  circulated  stories  amongst  their  troops  of  the  un- 
bounded cruelty  of  our  Cossacks,  which  were  pure  fabrica- 
tions. This  unjust  legend  about  the  Cossacks  has  been 
circulated  about  the  world  for  more  than  a  century.  In  the 
days  of  the  liberating  Napoleonic  Wars  there  were  tales  of 
their  eating  children  alive  and  spicing  them  with  tallow 
candles. 

On  the  other  hand  others  met  and  embraced  them  as  their 
liberators.  Actually  all  who  meet  our  Cossacks  acknowl- 
edge their  good-nature  and  kind-heartedness,  although  this 
in  no  way  affects  their  eminent  fighting  qualities. 

Whilst  the  retreat  of  our  troops  was  taking  place  through 
the  Governments  of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland,  the  flight  of 
the  local  inhabitants  had  not  as  yet  taken  on  the  form  of 
unreasonable  panic,  but  as  the  retreat  progressed  deeper  into 
the  country  the  numbers  of  the  population  on  the  move  in- 
creased more  and  more.  It  was  specially  intense  where  the 
people  were  frightened  from  their  homes  by  the  develop- 
ment of  battles.     There  they  hurriedly  loaded  their  house- 


I50  MILITIA  AS  FORTRESS  GARRISONS     [ch.  xn 

hold  goods,  children  and  old  people,  on  to  carts,  and  having 
collected  the  small  and  large  cattle,  joined  the  unbroken, 
ceaseless  current  of  people  moving  from  west  to  east.  The 
rains  naturally  compelled  them  to  take  advantage  of  the 
few  macadamised  roads,  in  consequence  of  which  these  high- 
ways were  quickly  overflowing  with  the  numbers,  and  prog- 
ress was  difficult.  In  course  of  time  this  wave  of  humanity 
moving  without  any  order  quickly  destroyed  all  local  sup- 
plies even  the  litter  for  cattle.  People  met  with  no  less 
difficulty  in  feeding  themselves.  Amongst  the  refugees  ap- 
peared disease  and  a  considerable  mortality.  The  whole 
route  of  this  exodus  was  marked  by  small  hillocks  with  hast- 
ily erected  crosses  over  them.  For  such  an  occurrence 
neither  the  public  organisations  of  the  Zemstvo,  Town  Coun- 
cils, Red  Cross,  nor  the  Government  administration  were 
prepared.  Hurriedly  they  all  began  taking  measures  to 
bring  this  movement  into  some  degree  of  order.  The  rail- 
ways gave  immense  assistance,  receiving  all  those  who  had 
lost  their  horses  on  the  way  and  who  had  to  go  farther  for- 
ward on  foot.     These  were  the  most  happy. 

The  public  organisations  arranged  feeding-points  en 
route,  gave  medical  help,  sent  those  entrained  to  centres, 
which  in  turn  provided  for  their  housing.  Further  attempts 
were  made  to  buy  the  cattle  from  the  population,  so  as  to 
avert  a  famine.  There  were  no  definite  results  from  this 
measure,  on  account  of  wet  snow  falls.  Germany  was  tried 
in  this  way  in  the  evacuation  of  East  Prussia;  Belgium  and 
Northern  France  suffered  it  too,  but  everywhere  the  rail- 
ways were  at  the  service  of  the  refugees,  whose  flight  did  not 
coincide  with  the  late  autumn  and  the  commencement  of  the 
frost  and  snow  blizzards.  This  is  where  the  difference  in 
these  movements  lay.  Only  those  who  have  actually  seen 
the  flight  of  the  Russian  population  can  in  any  way  conceive 


1915-1916]     MILITIA  AS  FORTRESS  GARRISONS        151 

the  horrors  which  attended  it.  Personally,  my  fate  stood 
me  in  good  stead,  and  I  never  saw  the  picture,  as,  during 
our  retreat  from  Galicia,  I  was  holding  a  position  west  of 
Warsaw,  and  several  months  before  the  retreat  from  the 
north-western  front  I  and  my  army  corps  were  transferred 
to  East  Galicia.  Still,  men  who  had  fought  in  several  wars 
and  many  bloody  battles  told  me  no  horrors  of  a  field  of 
battle  which  can  be  compared  to  the  awful  spectacle  of  this 
ceaseless  exodus  of  a  population  knowing  neither  the  object 
of  the  movement,  nor  a  place  where  they  might  find  rest, 
food,  and  housing.  Themselves  in  an  awful  condition,  they 
increased  the  troubles  of  the  troops,  especially  of  the  trans- 
port, who  had  to  move  along  roads  filled  with  this  disorgan- 
ised human  wave.  Many  a  time  our  forces  had  to  stop  and 
fight  a  rear-guard  action,  just  to  allow  this  crowd  to  make 
room  for  the  troops.  The  troops,  however,  had  only  to  be 
held  up  by  a  battle  for  a  day  or  two,  when  a  large  portion  of 
the  refugees  would  turn  from  the  road,  and  form  into  a 
gipsy  camp,  not  wishing  to  move  forward  because  they  felt 
certain  that  the  retreat  of  the  troops  had  stopped,  and  that 
our  advance  v/ould  be  soon  starting  again,  and  so  enable 
them  to  return  to  their  own  homes.  Naturally  when  the 
troops  retreated  again,  and  the  roads  were  taken  up  by 
troops  and  transport,  many  of  these  gipsy  camps  were  left 
behind,  and  in  this  way  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
The  fate  of  these  people  must  have  been  most  bitter.  To 
think  first  of  the  futility  of  all  their  losses,  of  the  difficulty 
they  would  have  in  getting  food  from  the  enemy,  who  him- 
self at  the  time  was  very  much  in  need  of  it,  and  then  of  the 
possibility  of  a  still  greater  difficulty  in  returning  to  their 
homes  and  feeling  almost  certain  they  would  only  find  them 
in  ruins  —  God  only  knows  what  sufferings  were  endured 
here,   how  many  tears  were  shed,  and  how  many  human 


152  MILITIA  AS  FORTRESS  GARRISONS     [ch.  xii 

lives  were  given  as  victims  to  the  inexorable  Moloch  of  War. 

From  the  time  the  army  corps  reached  their  winter 
positions,  things  quieted  down.  Many  of  the  corps  re- 
mained in  the  same  place  for  a  year  and  more.  Most  of 
these  army  corps  were  formed  almost  entirely  from  rear 
formations,  with  a  negligible  number  of  infantry;  happily 
the  majority  retained  their  artillery.  The  rear  organisa- 
tions of  the  army  corps  are  seldom  afflicted  by  shortage  in 
complement.  The  main  reason  of  this  is  that  most  of  them 
possess  a  considerable  number  of  horses,  which  always  re- 
quire the  presence  of  men,  mostly  those  who  are  not  fit  for 
duty  in  the  ranks,  to  look  after  them.  Amongst  our  Allies 
is  a  widely  spread  opinion  that  the  Russian  Army  misuses 
its  administrative  and  supply  units;  but  if  this  condition  is 
actually  so,  then  it  is  only  because  of  cruel  necessity.  The 
main  reasons  are  our  distances,  the  shortage  of  mechanical 
means  of  transport,  and  the  distance  of  the  fighting  lines 
from  the  place  where  they  get  their  reinforcements  and  from 
well-populated  towns.  The  most  heavily  manned  branches 
of  our  rear  organisation  are  the  transport  and  medical  de- 
partments. The  size  of  the  first  is  in  direct  ratio  to  the 
distance  dividing  the  troops  from  the  nearest  station,  and  the 
development  of  the  narrow-gauge  rails,  actually  the  distance 
that  the  troops  may  be  compelled  to  advance  from  their 
forward  stations. 

The  number  of  medical  units  can  be  explained  thus.  Dur- 
ing intensive  fighting  several  army  corps  have  their  base  on 
one  of  the  railroads  and  consequently  several  tens  of  thou- 
sands of  wounded  must  receive  help  and  food  possibly  for  a 
few  days,  until  the  hospital  trains  carry  them  away  to  the 
nearest  well-populated  towns,  where,  also  in  their  turn, 
must  be  extensive  accommodation  to  receive  them.  Only 
after  this  can  the  wounded  gradually  be  carried  in  hospital 


1914-15-16]     MILITIA  AS  FORTRESS  GARRISONS       153 

trains  to  the  interior.  Sending  the  wounded  direct  to  the 
interior  from  hospitals  to  which  they  have  been  brought  by 
horses  from  the  firing  hne  would  require  more  trains  than 
any  railway  could  possibly  supply,  besides  which  the  journey 
would  be  an  exceedingly  slow  one,  and  consequently  inimical 
to  the  successful  healing  of  the  wounds.  France  having  her 
railways  more  highly  developed,  and  with  a  more  liberal 
supply  of  rolling  stock,  and  shorter  distances  to  run,  at  the 
start  of  the  war  adopted  this  system,  but  the  results  were 
more  than  sad.  Cases  were  known  where  trains  with 
wounded  arrived  at  their  destination  after  being  on  the  way 
two  weeks,  besides  which  a  considerable  percentage  of  the 
wounded  contracted  gangrene.  What  statistician  can  calcu- 
late the  numbers  of  limbs  lost  owing  to  this  system?  The 
streets  of  Paris  would  give  some  indication. 

Under  our  conditions  the  results  would  have  been  even 
worse,  if  we  take  into  account  the  inadequacy  of  our  rail- 
roads, which  rendered  it  impossible  to  bring  up  the  medical 
transport  and  hospitals  in  time,  especially  where  serious 
fighting  was  taking  place.  It  is  understood  that  every  army 
corps  to  a  certain  extent  must  have  its  own  transports  for 
wounded,  its  own  distribution  points  and  places  to  treat  the 
wounded  in. 

But  to  understand  why  our  transport  should  be  larger 
than  those  in  the  armies  of  our  Allies  or  the  Germans,  it  is 
suflUcient  to  remember  that  the  work  of  one  three-ton  motor- 
lorry  served  by  two  people  equals  the  work  of  from  120 
to  240  one-horse  vehicles  served  by  as  many  men.  Conse- 
quently, if  one  army  has  only  1,000  three-ton  motor-lorries, 
which  is  considerably  less  than  our  Allies  have  in  theirs,  it 
works  out  as  if  it  had  from  120,000  to  240,000  one-horse 
vehicles  served  by  a  similar  number  of  men.  No  less  a 
service  is  given  by  the  motor-cars  that  our  Allies  use  to 


154  MILITIA  AS  FORTRESS  GARRISONS     [ch.  xii 

carry  their  wounded  from  the  first-line  hospitals  to  the  base. 
In  case  of  actual  necessity  these  motor-cars  can  work  the 
whole  day  round,  only  changing  the  chauffeur,  while  horse- 
drawn  medical  waggons  can  only  work  as  much  as  ten  hours 
a  day.  If,  further,  our  bad  roads  are  taken  into  considera- 
tion, then  we  see  that  even  the  moderate  number  of  medical 
motor-cars  we  have  could  not  always  be  used. 

Notwithstanding  all  these  conditions  and  the  great  diffi- 
culty in  delivering  to  the  troops  everything  necessary,  and 
increasing  quantities,  our  armies  in  two  and  a  half  years' 
campaign  suffered  no  real  shortage  so  far  as  food  and 
equipment  were  concerned.  Only  boots  were  difficult  to  ob- 
tain, and  in  the  course  of  time,  with  the  help  of  public  or- 
ganisation, this  was  remedied. 

In  order  to  give  a  comprehensive  idea  of  our  medical 
work  I  must  mention  this:  the  majority  of  our  wounded 
received  first-aid  on  the  field;  those  who  were  able  walked  to 
the  dressing-station;  the  severely  wounded  were  brought  by 
the  medical  units  on  stretchers  to  the  divisional  points  or  to 
some  mobile  station  belonging  to  a  public  organisation  under 
the  Red  Cross. 

In  the  majority  of  cases  the  extension  of  positions  occu- 
pied by  divisions  compelled  them  to  have  attached  to  them 
for  all  the  war  such  mobile  sections,  because  otherwise  all 
the  wounded  drifting  to  one  point  would  have  had  to  travel 
several  extra  kilometres  to  one  point.  Most  of  such  units 
to  which  the  wounded  came  first,  after  having  passed  only 
through  the  hands  of  the  regimental  surgeons,  were  equipped 
so  that  in  case  of  wounded  needing  immediate  attention  on 
arrival,  they  could  perform  the  most  serious  operations 
under  the  strictest  aseptic  conditions,  after  which  the 
wounded  could  remain  a  few  days  on  the  spot  until  carrying 


1914-15-16]     MILITIA  AS  FORTRESS  GARRISONS       155 

them  In  a  two-wheeled  vehicle  did  not  threaten  mortal  con- 
sequences. The  rest  of  the  wounded  were  only  re-dressed 
if  necessary,  and  then  sent  on  to  the  hospital  belonging  to 
the  army  corps  and,  if  possible,  to  one  of  the  main  reception 
places  organised  and  carried  on  by  the  army  medical  service. 
There  the  wounded  requiring  long  treatment  and  also  those 
giving  hopes  of  early  recovery  were  distributed.  The  latter 
were  sent  to  hospitals  under  the  army  jurisdiction,  and  when 
healed  returned  to  their  regiments.  The  wounded  requir- 
ing prolonged  treatment  were  sent  in  trainloads  to  the  near- 
est populated  centre,  where  hospitals,  mostly  under  the 
orders  of  the  Army  Staff,  were  opened  in  local  buildings  or 
in  specially  constructed  barracks  and  tents. 

In  this  army  reception  hall  the  wounded  were  brought; 
the  severely  wounded,  as  many  as  possible,  in  special  hos- 
pital trains  where  each  man  had  his  own  bunk,  but,  I  am 
sorry  to  say,  we  could  not  choke  the  railways  nearest  to  the 
fighting  line  with  such  trains,  as  the  majority  of  these  were 
required  for  the  transport  of  wounded  from  the  last  recep- 
tion halls  to  the  interior,  for  distances  of  thousands  of  kilo- 
metres. There  was  no  option  but  to  be  satisfied  with  trains 
composed  of  goods  trucks  which  had  detrained  troops  or 
goods  at  the  terminal.  When  making  up  such  a  train, 
there  was  added  a  so-called  unit  (kader)  of  the  hospital 
train,  consisting  of  four  trucks  already  equipped  and  wait- 
ing at  the  stations,  one  truck  for  dressings,  one  for  the  medi- 
cal staff  —  doctor,  sisters,  and  orderlies  —  and  two  for 
goods  —  one  with  stores  for  fitting  up  the  goods  trucks  for 
the  wounded,  and  with  movable  stores  for  winter  use,  and 
one  truck  as  a  kitchen.  On  every  goods  truck  carrying 
wounded  was  a  servant  whose  duty  It  was  to  attend  to  the 
stoves  and.  If  specially  required,  to  help  the  orderlies  at  the 


156  MILITIA  AS  FORTRESS  GARRISONS     [ch.  xii 

first  stoppage  by  reporting  to  the  medical  staff.  During  a 
stoppage  of  the  train,  the  wounded  requiring  immediate  at- 
tention were  carried  to  the  dressing  truck. 

This  system  in  all  its  intricacy  and  primitiveness  was  in- 
evitable, and  if  properly  carried  out  gave  good  results.  The 
most  troublesome  factor  was  the  evacuation  of  wounded  in 
those  cases  where,  after  unexpected  defensive  battles,  army 
corps  after  army  corps  arrived  to  some  army,  and  war  con- 
ditions demanded  a  speedy  transport  of  troops  and  it  was 
necessary  to  give  up  hospital  trains.  In  these  cases  the  rear 
organisation  belonging  to  the  army  corps  invariably  arrived 
too  late,  and  of  course  necessitated  their  utilising  the  medical 
services  of  the  troops  on  the  spot  which  were  organised  for 
a  considerable  number  of  wounded.  Specially  heavy  were 
the  conditions  of  the  evacuation  during  the  December  19 16 
battles  in  Roumania.  With  the  negligible  carrying  power 
of  the  Roumanian  railways  and  the  small  number  of  our 
roads  approaching  the  Roumanian  frontiers,  which  could 
not  even  serve  the  needs  of  the  infantry  alone,  there  could 
be  no  thought  of  any  addition  of  hospital  trains  and  trains 
for  the  rear  organisation.  Additions  would  have  affected 
the  speed  of  transporting  the  troops  and  would  have  risked 
splitting  them  into  groups  when  near  the  enemy.  That  not 
one  case  of  an  epidemic  occurred  amongst  the  troops  proves 
that  they  suffered  no  lack  of  food  and  clothing,  and  that  the 
medical  help  was  effective,  although  there  had  been  signs 
of  an  outbreak  of  illness.  Cholera,  typhoid,  and  intermit- 
tent fever,  and  even  that  plague  of  all  earlier  wars,  typhus, 
with  its  intense  contagion,  were  almost  non-existent.  These 
illnesses  almost  exclusively  attacked  the  populations,  espe- 
cially when  under  flight  before  the  German  invaders.  The 
only  illness  which,  starting  in  the  spring  of  19 16,  took  on 
an  epidemic  form  was  scurvy.     I  am  sorry  to  say  that  medi- 


1915-1916]     MILITIA  AS  FORTRESS  GARRISONS         157 

cine  knows  no  actual  preventive  or  quick  antidote  to  this 
illness.  Scientists  even  quarrel  as  to  its  cause  and  whether 
it  is  contagious  or  not.  Observations  on  it  amongst  the 
troops  gives  positive  indication  of  its  contagion.  The 
causes  of  this  illness  are  mostly  excessive  fatigue,  the  con- 
fined air  in  the  dug-outs,  and  especially  monotony  of  food. 

I  must  say  that  though  our  troops  had  plenty  of  food,  it 
was  only  of  one  kind.  The  daily  dinner  consisted  of  meat, 
soup  with  vegetables  or  with  flour  products  added,  various 
kashas  (porridges),  macaroni,  potatoes,  etc.  The  second 
dish  was  buckwheat  kasha  (porridge)  or  some  other  kind. 
Supper  always  consisted  of  meat  or  fish  soup.  Besides  this 
the  troops  received  as  much  rye  bread,  tea,  and  sugar  as  they 
required. 

Of  the  varieties  of  food  received  by  the  soldiers  in  the 
Allies'  armies,  the  Russian  soldiers  have  no  conception.  It 
would  be  difficult  to  conceive  how  the  commissariat  could 
undertake  a  delivery  of  coffee,  wine,  cheese,  preserved  vege- 
tables in  tins,  or  jam,  to  supply  10,000,000  mouths.  Even 
our  officers  were  very  often  unable  to  procure  these  products 
while  in  the  front  lines. 

Our  medical  organisation  was  due  in  a  great  part  to  the 
activities  of  public  institutions,  such  as  the  United  Zemstvos, 
the  United  Towns,  the  Red  Cross,  and  several  other  smaller 
organisations  and  private  individuals.  And  this  as  a  whole 
resulted  that  the  general  condition  of  the  troops,  with  the 
rarest  exceptions,  was  better  than  in  barrack  life  during 
peace  times  and  the  percentage  of  sickness  was  somewhat 
lower. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE    CRUCIAL   WINTER   OF    1915-16 

The  winter  of  19 15-16  was  In  many  respects  the  turning- 
point  for  the  Russian  Army  in  the  present  campaign.  In 
some  respects  its  condition  was  better,  whereas  in  others  it 
was  somewhat  worse. 

Under  the  first  heading  was  the  considerable  increase  in 
supplies  of  all  materials  required  by  the  artillery,  both  in 
regard  to  those  made  abroad  and  those  produced  in  the  Rus- 
sian works.  The  improvements  in  the  methods  of  carrying 
on  position  warfare,  both  for  attack  and  defence;  the  im- 
provement in  the  officers,  the  gradual,  although  far  from 
sufficient,  increase  of  aviation,  all  tended  to  increase  our 
fighting  power.  Under  the  second  heading  must  be  included 
the  perceptibly  increasing  difficulty  of  delivering  food  prod- 
ucts both  for  the  armies  and  for  the  large  town  centres. 
There  was  a  noticeable  depreciation  in  the  work  of  the 
railways  and  derangements  continually  occurred  in  the  trade 
output. 

The  improvement  in  the  delivery  of  materials  for  the 
artillery  was  brought  about  by  several  means;  partly  be- 
cause our  Allies  and  also  the  Neutral  Powers,  especially 
America,  came  to  our  help,  by  supplying  us,  amongst  other 
articles,  with  a  large  quantity  of  barbed  wire  and  rails. 
Above  all  the  greatest  influence  in  this  direction  was  the 
gradual  development  of  our  own  industries.  New  works, 
mainly  small,  appeared.  At  the  same  time  the  Government 
works  increased  their  activities,  but  thanks  to  this  the  mo- 

158 


1914-16]     THE  CRUCIAL  WINTER  OF  1915-16  159 

ment  arrived  when  the  production  of  local  metals  was  not 
enough  for  the  requirements,  notwithstanding  the  receipt  of 
a  certain  amount  of  iron  ore  from  Sweden. 

This  condition  of  things  mainly  reacted  on  the  articles 
used  by  the  population,  particularly  by  the  peasants  in  their 
agricultural  works,  and  by  the  railways  for  constructive  pur- 
poses. A  special  Committee  of  Distribution  was  formed  in 
conjunction  with  the  Ministry  of  War,  whose  duty  it  was  to 
distribute  the  metals  which  came  in  from  the  foundries. 
The  work  of  increasing  the  production  of  supplies  necessary 
for  the  troops  was  actively  taken  up  by  the  Zemstvos  and 
Town  Councils,  who  in  their  turn  attracted  the  local  indus- 
trial powers  to  the  work.  At  the  same  time  it  was  felt  that 
the  railroads  were  already  unable  to  fulfil  their  work  as  irre- 
proachably as  they  had  done  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
As  time  went  on  this  appeared  to  be  a  "  cercle  vicieux," 
which  later  became  more  and  more  narrow. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  mobilisation,  not  only  were  the 
peasants  called  to  arms,  but  also  the  works  and  mining  cen- 
tre populations,  and  amongst  these  the  workmen  from  rail- 
road workshops  and  coal  mines.  The  reason  for  this  was 
the  wish  not  to  throw  all  the  weight  of  military  service  on 
to  the  agricultural  population.  These  measures  in  the  first 
place  showed  in  the  decrease  of  production  in  the  coal-mining 
industry.  In  the  first  year  of  the  war,  this  influence  had  not 
yet  appeared,  as  the  railways  and  large  works  had  huge 
stocks  of  fuel.  In  the  course  of  time,  however,  these  stocks 
gradually  lessened.  It  was  then  that  this  *'  cercle  vicieux  " 
began.  The  decreasing  production  of  coal  gradually 
lowered  the  production  of  metals.  The  decreased  output 
of  metals  reacted  on  their  delivery  to  the  railroad  work- 
shops, and  on  the  works  producing  railroad  rolling  stock. 
In  its  turn  this  produced  an  ever-increasing  delivery  to  the 


i6o  THE  CRUCIAL  WINTER  OF  1915-16     [ch.  xiii 

railway  workshops  of  locomotives  and  goods  trucks  for  re- 
pairs. The  latter  resulted  in  there  not  being  enough  goods 
trucks  for  coal  haulage.  Here  this  ''  cercle  vicieux  "  com- 
pleted its  evil  course;  the  non-delivery  of  trucks  made  the 
coal  mines  still  further  diminish  their  production,  and  not 
increase  their  stocks  without  good  reason;  the  non-delivery 
of  coal  to  the  foundries  in  the  course  of  time  lowered  their 
productiveness,  and  this,  in  its  turn,  not  only  affected  the 
work  of  the  railway  workshops,  but  also  the  metallurgical 
industries  of  the  country  as  a  whole. 

The  difficulty  in  supplying  food  for  the  troops  was  spe- 
cially noticeable  on  account  of  the  necessity  of  lessening  the 
delivery  of  meat  to  the  troops.  It  may  seem  strange  that 
an  agricultural  and  cattle-producing  country,  having  closed 
its  frontiers  to  exports,  should  become  short  of  any  kind 
of  agricultural  products.  Actually  this  is  easily  explained. 
A  considerable  number  of  the  men  called  to  the  colours  be- 
longed to  the  agricultural  population,  which,  when  at  home, 
is  mainly  fed  on  cereals  and  products  which  cannot  be  put 
on  the  market  by  small  owners.  The  use  of  meat  in  the 
villages  is  an  exception.  Owing  to  the  scattered  state  of  the 
villages,  and  in  the  majority  of  cases,  their  distance  from 
the  towns,  slaughter  of  large  cattle  rarely  takes  place.  At 
the  beginning  of  war  operations,  the  troops'  meat  rations 
were  doubled.  Consequently  the  supply  required  by  the 
army  equalling  about  10,000  head  of  cattle  daily,  a  quantity 
far  from  being  compensated  for  by  the  stoppage  of  the  ex- 
port of  meat.  This  condition  would  not  have  produced  its 
effect  if  the  Siberian  Railway  had  continued  to  work  as  in- 
tensively as  it  had  done  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  as  the 
stocks  of  meat  in  Siberia  could  easily  have  covered  the  re- 
quirements of  the  armies.  Besides  this,  the  curtailment  of 
the  sale  of  spirits  to  the  population  had  its  effect  by  increas- 


I9I4-I6]     THE  CRUCIAL  WINTER  OF  1915-16  161 

ing  the  demand  for  every  kind  of  food  product,  and  also 
was  the  reason  for  the  people  having  more  money.  On  the 
other  side  the  richer  agricultural  population  did  not  see  the 
necessity  of  carrying  to  market  their  small  products  such  as 
poultry,  eggs,  and  butter.  The  other  article,  the  production 
of  which  had  slightly  lessened,  and  did  not  satisfy  all  the 
demands  of  population  and  army,  was  sugar.  Here  the 
same  phenomenon  occurred.  The  colossal  increase  of  army 
sugar  rations,  and  the  increase  of  money  with  the  farming 
populations  from  the  stoppage  of  spirituous  liquors,  made 
the  demand  for  sugar  grow  out  of  all  proportions.  It  is 
enough  to  say  that  the  soldiers  each  received  six  pounds  of 
sugar  monthly,  against  the  two  pounds  they  received  in  peace 
times.  This,  in  itself,  must  have  balanced  our  export,  which 
had  not  been  completely  stopped.  It  was  shipped  by  sea  to 
our  Allies  and  over  the  Persian  frontiers  in  an  attempt  to 
maintain  the  value  of  our  rouble  in  Persia.  An  idea  exists 
that  by  this  route  our  sugar  got  to  Turkey  and  thence  to 
Germany.  This  question  had  to  be  settled  by  legal  process, 
but  It  was  stopped  after  the  Revolution,  and  the  principal 
of  the  people  accused  became  Minister  of  Finance  in  the 
Ukrainian  Rada. 

In  the  winter  of  191 5-16  all  these  phenomena  did  not 
affect  our  army.  The  army  continued  to  live  its  normal  life, 
every  day  healing  the  wounds  it  had  received  from  the  un- 
successful military  operations  in  the  summer  and  autumn  of 
19 1 5.  The  main  attention  of  the  chiefs  was  given  to  the 
training  of  troops,  which  was  most  necessary  as  many  units 
had  to  be  completely  re-formed,  so  great  had  been  their 
losses  during  the  past  six  months.  This,  of  course,  was 
made  easier,  by  the  return  to  the  ranks  of  large  numbers  of 
wounded  men  and  officers.  In  addition,  feverish  prepara- 
tions were  being  made  for  active  operations,  although  there 


i62  THE  CRUCIAL  WINTER  OF  1915-16      [ch.  xiii 

was  no  intention  to  carry  these  out  on  a  large  scale  until  the 
spring  set  in.      But  as  parts  of  the  6th  Army  Corps  which  I 
commanded  had  been  engaged  in  active  operations  right  up 
to  the  beginning  of  November  —  about  the  4th  of  this  month 
a  part  of  my  troops  acting  with  the  17th  Army  Corps  in  a 
short   engagement  had  taken  more   than    10,000  Austrian 
prisoners  and  captured  guns  and  machine  guns  —  it  was  de- 
cided to  give  them  a  rest  until  the  beginning  of  the  spring 
operations.      I  took  advantage  of  the  lull  to  take  a  three 
weeks'  rest,  after  eighteen  m.onths  of  campaigning,  in  the 
Caucasian  water-cure  establishment  in  Kislovodsk.      Before 
my  departure,  however,  I  made  an  agreement  with  General 
Saharoff,  to  whose  army  my  6th  Army  Corps  belonged,  that 
if  my  forces  were  required  for  active  operations,  I  would 
return  before  my  leave  was  up.     A  little  more  than  a  week 
after  my  arrival  in  Kislovodsk  I  received  a  telegram  from 
General  Alexeieff,  the  Chief  of  Staff  to  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  calling  me  to  the  Headquarters  in  Mohileff,  for  some 
purpose  unknown  to  me.     In  two  days  I  arrived  in  Mohileff, 
and  learnt  from  General  Alexeieff  that  owing  to  the  illness 
of  General   Russky,   Commander-in-Chief  on  the  northern 
front  —  the   Russian  Army  then  had  three   fronts,   north, 
west,  and  south-west  —  his  place  would  be  taken  temporar- 
ily by  General  Pleve,  commanding  the  5th  Army,  which  had 
its  position  on  the  Dvina.      I   was  to   go  to  the  town  of 
Dvinsk,  and  take  up  the  command  of  this  army.     General 
Alexeieff  did  not  inform  me,  however,  what  were  to  be  my 
movements  when  General  Pleve  returned  to  command  the 
5th  Army.     The  Emperor  was  not  at  Headquarters  at  this 
time,  and  I  did  not  see  him. 

The  fact  that  I  had  left  my  army  corps  only  for  three 
weeks,  the  possibility  of  my  return  to  it  after  fulfilling  these 
temporary  instructions,  and  the  preparations  for  the  spring 


1915]  THE  CRUCIAL  WINTER  OF  1915-16  163 

operations,  all  gave  me  a  desire  to  go  for  a  day  to  the  town 
of  Zbaraz  —  where  my  Staff  had  been  since  August.  I  did 
not  stay  with  the  army  corps  much  more  than  a  day,  espe- 
cially as  I  had  no  need  to  say  good-bye  to  my  regiments  — 
to  which  naturally  I  had  become  closely  attached  by  a  year's 
fighting  comradeship  —  because  there  was  every  chance  of 
my  returning  to  them.  Nevertheless,  many  of  my  com- 
rades, especially  amongst  the  staff  officers,  expressed  the 
wish  to  accompany  me  and  transfer  to  the  staff  of  the  5th 
Army.  I  was  sorry  not  to  have  the  right  to  authorise  this. 
I  limited  myself  to  taking  with  me  Captain  Arngold,  my  per- 
manent orderly,  who  had  been  with  me  ever  since  the  first 
days  of  mobilisation,  having  been  sent  to  me  in  this  capacity 
from  the  Petrograd  Lancer  Regiment. 

It  was  especially  difficult  for  me  to  leave  my  Chief  of 
Staff,  Major-General  Alexeieff.  We  had  only  been  together 
since  the  first  day  I  took  over  the  command  of  the  6th  Army 
Corps,  but  a  year  of  war  conditions  gives  one  an  opportunity 
of  knowing  a  person  better  than  ten  years  of  association  in 
peace  times.  During  this  year  I  was  able  to  form  an  esti- 
mate of  Major-General  Alexeieff,  both  as  my  nearest  assist- 
ant in  military  duties  and  as  a  man.  What  I  valued  most  in 
him  was  his  straightforwardness  and  frankness,  and  in  work 
his  energetic  presentation  of  his  ideas  and  convictions,  with- 
out considering  whether  they  were  in  line  with  the  views 
and  wishes  of  the  Chief.  In  one  word,  he  distinguished  him- 
self by  an  independent  character,  so  seldom  to  be  found  in 
Chiefs  or  higher  authorities.  Besides  this  he  was  an  ex- 
perienced staff  worker  and  fulfilled  all  instructions  implicitly. 
At  times  rough  and  fiery-tempered,  he  was,  however,  exactly 
the  same  in  this  respects  to  his  juniors  and  to  his  seniors. 
Before  leaving  each  other  we  arranged  that  if  my  new  com- 
mand became  a  permanent  one,  T  would  have  him  with  me  at 


i64  THE  CRUCIAL  WINTER  OF  1915-16     [ch.  xiii 

the  first  opportunity,  and  then  he  agreed  if  this  came  about 
to  take  the  less  independent  duties  as  Quartermaster-General 
to  the  Army  Staff. 

In  this  without  doubt  he  showed  a  lack  of  ambition,  a 
quality  for  which  he  was  noted. 

About  the  middle  of  December  I  arrived  in  Dvinsk,  and 
commenced  my  duties  as  Commander  of  the  5th  Army. 
This  army,  not  long  before,  had  finished  fighting  between 
Dvinsk  and  Kreutzburg,  and  had  already  managed  to  a 
great  extent  to  get  reinforcements.  Soon  after  my  arrival 
I  made  my  rounds  of  the  front  lines,  and  inspected  the  work 
of  the  Staffs.  What  I  noticed  most  was  that  each  army 
corps  more  or  less  had  Its  own  system  in  fortifying  the  posi- 
tions, its  own  system  of  training  the  troops  as  preparation 
for  the  imminent  active  operations.  Not  embarrassed  by 
the  possibility  of  my  post  being  only  a  temporary  one,  I 
Immediately  Issued  orders  which  would  regulate  these  mat- 
ters. The  other  question  which  I  immediately  raised  and 
settled  was  the  gradual  decrease  of  the  numbers  of  army 
corps  standing  in  the  front  lines,  and  the  corresponding  in- 
crease in  numbers  of  army  corps  in  reserve,  my  final  idea 
being  an  advance  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Dvina  by  taking  the 
opportunity  of  crossing  when  It  should  be  frozen  over  In  the 
near  future.  But  my  calculations  were  upset,  for  rapidly 
as  these  army  corps  were  put  in  reserve,  they  were  as  rapidly 
taken  from  me,  their  services  evidently  being  more  urgently 
required  elsewhere.  Either  they  were  taken  into  reserve 
by  someone  higher  in  command  or  sent  to  some  other  front, 
perhaps  because  at  this  time  a  serious  advance  was  contem- 
plated on  the  south-western  front  under  the  command  of 
General  Tcherbatcheff. 

On  account  of  my  army  corps  being  taken  away  and  partly 
joined  up  to  the  reserves  with  the  Commander-in-Chief,  I 


I9I5]  THE  CRUCIAL  WINTER  OF  1915-16  165 

was  obliged  to  defer  active  operations  in  the  near  future  and 
to  direct  all  my  attentions  to  perfecting  my  positions  and 
training  my  troops.  The  reason  that  General  Pleve  had 
been  given  only  a  temporary  command  as  Chief  on  the  north- 
ern front  was  because  General  Tcherbatcheff  was  to  have 
this  post,  but  as  in  December  he  had  active  operations  in 
view,  he  could  not  take  up  the  post  until  these  plans  were 
carried  out.  However,  in  the  beginning  of  February  19 16 
these  intentions  were  altered.  The  Emperor,  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  all  the  Forces,  was  expected  in  the  Dvinsk  region 
during  the  month.  During  his  presence  there  it  was  to  be 
decided  who  was  to  have  the  post  of  Commander  of  the 
northern  armies,  and  evidently  it  was  expected  that  the  de- 
cision would  be  in  favour  of  General  Pleve. 

When  the  Emperor  had  a  personal  interview  with  Gen- 
eral Pleve  he  saw  quite  clearly  that  General  Pleve's  physical 
powers  —  he  was  sixty-six  years  of  age  —  had  so  weakened 
that  he  would  have  great  difficulty  in  undertaking  this  com- 
mand. Having  held  a  review,  the  Emperor  departed  with- 
out speaking  his  mind  over  the  question  of  change  or  con- 
firming the  appointment  of  a  Chief  to  this  area.  It  was 
several  days  later  that  we  knew  that  General  Kuropatkin 
was  appointed  Commander-in-Chief  on  the  northern  front. 

General  Kuropatkin  was  the  late  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  Manchurian  Army.  Naturally  this  appointment  as- 
tonished a  good  many,  while  others  expected  that  the  ex- 
periences Kuropatkin  had  gained  in  the  Manchurian  Cam- 
paign would  enable  him  to  discharge  his  duties  successfully. 
At  the  outset  of  the  campaign.  General  Kuropatkin  had 
more  than  once  applied  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  the 
Grand  Duke  Nicolai  Nicolaievitch,  asking  for  at  least  a 
field  army  corps  to  command,  but  he  always  received  a  re- 
fusal.    It  was  only  when  the  Emperor  took  the  Commander- 


i66  THE  CRUCIAL  WINTER  OF  1915-16      [ch.  xiii 

in-Chief  s  post  himself  that  his  request  was  fulfilled,  and  in 
the  autumn  of  19 15  he  received  the  command  of  the  Grena- 
dier Army  Corps.  His  appointment  to  the  post  of  Com- 
mander-in-Chief on  the  northern  front  most  probably  was 
the  result  of  the  visit  the  Emperor  made  to  the  sector  the 
Grenadier  Army  Corps  held.  All  that  was  seen  there,  the 
extraordinary  carefulness  exhibited  by  General  Kuropatkin 
from  a  fighting,  administrative,  and  commissariat  stand- 
point, evidently  raised  him  in  the  eyes  of  the  Emperor  again. 
I  must  say  that  the  distinguishing  characteristics  of  General 
Kuropatkin  were  always  his  extraordinary  care  of  all  the 
troops  under  his  charge.  This  quality,  in  conjunction  with 
his  undoubtedly  effective  administrative  abilities,  always 
acted  in  his  favour. 

General  Kuropatkin  took  up  his  duties  in  the  middle  of 
February  and,  without  going  to  Pskoff,  where  the  Staff  of 
the  Army  v/as,  commenced  with  a  tour  of  the  army  staffs, 
visited  one  army  corps  of  each  army,  reviewed  the  units 
resting,  and  always  inspected  some  part  of  the  front  trenches. 
Naturally  this  kind  of  action  was  much  in  his  favour.  The 
matter  stood  as  follows:  the  enormous  distances  separating 
staffs  of  a  front  from  their  front  lines  in  their  turn  corre- 
sponded to  the  enormous  extent  of  our  fighting  lines.  Con- 
sequently the  Commander-in-Chief  and  several  of  the  army 
commanders  very  seldom  visited  their  troops  in  the  front 
lines.  As  for  the  Commander-in-Chief  visiting  the  front 
positions,  this  would  require  a  three  days'  absence  from 
Headquarters.  Evidently  to  this  was  due  that  fact  that  I, 
at  any  rate,  had  not  seen  any  Commander-in-Chief  visiting 
the  front  trenches  before.  To  this,  of  course,  it  may  be  re- 
marked  that  it  is  possible  to  visit   a  medium-sized   front 


I9i6]  THE  CRUCIAL  WINTER  OF  1915-16  167 

position,  when  it  would  be  physically  impossible  to 
make  a  tour  of  a  considerable  part  of  the  front,  where 
the  front  is  several  hundreds  of  kilometres  in  extent.  The 
value  of  such  visits  lies  not  only  in  the  appearance  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief  amidst  his  troops  in  the  front  lines, 
but  also  in  the  knowledge  every  unit  has  that  it  is  always 
possible  for  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  appear  in  advanced 
positions  personally  to  check  the  work  of  the  troops  and  the 
Chiefs  on  the  spot. 

Having  remained  three  days  in  Dvinsk,  just  before  his 
departure,  General  Kuropatkin  notified  me  that  he  had  re- 
ceived an  inquiry  from  General  Alexeieff  as  to  whether  he 
had  any  objections  to  my  being  confirmed  in  the  command  of 
the  5th  Army  which  I  had  been  given  temporarily.  Several 
days  later  I  received  the  appointment.  This  condition  of 
things  to  a  certain  extent  lightened  my  work,  gave  me  scope 
to  enforce  such  measures  as  I  had  hesitated  to  introduce  be- 
fore, fearing  that  General  Pleve  on  his  return  would  change 
them. 

After  General  Kuropatkin  took  up  his  post,  he  began  a 
careful  study  of  the  position  of  affairs  at  the  front,  and  along 
with  his  commanders  considered  when  and  at  what  place 
it  would  be  most  profitable  to  commence  the  winter  advance. 
The  choice  fell  within  the  area  held  by  the  5th  Army  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Dvina  near  Jacobstadt.  Heavy  artillery 
was  gradually  brought  up  to  this  district,  not,  however,  more 
than  one  hundred  guns,  and  then  mostly  old  fortress  types 
not  more  than  6-inch  calibre,  taken  from  Kovno  and  Grodno, 
and  adapted  to  the  requirements  of  field  warfare.  Pre- 
paratory work  could  only  be  finished  by  the  end  of  March. 
It  was  calculated  that  the  thaw  would  not  have  started 
yet. 

What  happened  as  a  result  of  the  advance  clearly  showed 


i68  THE  CRUCIAL  WINTER  OF  1915-16      [ch.  xiii 

that  our  preparations  were  not  hidden  from  the  enemy,  who 
concentrated  artillery,  not  less  In  strength  than  ours,  but 
with  the  important  advantage  of  a  plentiful  supply  of  shells, 
against  which  we  had  to  count  every  projectile.  Artillery 
preparation,  on  account  of  this,  was  arranged  for  only  one 
day,  with  the  Idea  that  before  darkness  had  set  In  our  In- 
fantry could  commence  the  attack  and  take  the  front  line  of 
the  enemy  fortifications.  The  advance,  at  first  successful, 
soon  made  It  apparent  that  a  serious  development  of  our 
operations  could  not  be  made  both  on  account  of  the  short- 
age In  material  needs,  and  because  of  the  difficulty  of  making 
an  advance  In  winter  in  position  warfare. 

One  must  take  In  consideration  that  the  earth  here  Is 
frozen  three  to  four  feet  deep,  and  that  consequently  any 
work  of  making  trenches,  during  an  advance  and  under 
enemy  fire,  is  almost  an  impossibility.  No  less  trouble  is 
caused  when  converting  an  enemy's  captured  fortification  to 
our  defence.  Further  the  weather  completely  broke  down, 
frost  changing  to  thaw,  with  frost  by  night.  The  troops 
were  wet  through  lying  In  the  snow,  and  at  night  their  clothes 
were  frozen,  giving  rise  to  a  good  many  cases  of  frozen 
feet  and  hands. 

It  should  be  added  that  the  vigorous  measures  taken  to 
lessen  the  cases  of  frostbite  produced  excellent  results  all 
through  the  war. 

Large  numbers  of  "  trench  feet  "  were  quite  unknown  in 
our  Army,  although  prevalent  In  the  armies  of  our  Allies. 
They  usually  occur  In  damp  weather  when  the  mercury 
stands  nearly  at  zero.  The  reason  of  this  phenomenon  is 
not  so  much  due  to  our  people  having  more  endurance,  as  to 
their  footgear,  which  allows  the  expansion  of  the  foot  and 
calf,  the  restriction  of  which  interferes  with  circulation  of 


I9i6]  THE  CRUCIAL  WINTER  OF  1915-16  169 

blood.  We  had  more  difficulty  in  fighting  this  freezing  of 
feet  in  hard  frosts  because  of  the  difficulty  of  supplying  the 
troops  with  a  sufficient  quantity  of  felt  boots,  used  by  our 
peasants. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

SUMMER    FIGHTING    OF    I916 

Our  advance  in  March  19 16  was  undertaken  under  the  per- 
sistent demands  of  the  French  Headquarters,  who  wanted 
to  secure  some  rehef  for  the  French  Army  defending  the 
approaches  to  Verdun. 

The  attacking  operations  of  the  winter  19 15-16  on 
the  south-western  point,  as  also  those  undertaken  in  March 
19 1 6  in  the  region  of  the  northern  front,  gave  no  funda- 
mental successes.  They,  however,  clearly  showed  that  an 
advance  made  under  the  conditions  of  trench  warfare,  dur- 
ing the  periods  of  frosts  or  winter  thaws,  in  our  climate 
placed  the  advancing  forces  in  a  much  more  difficult  position 
than  are  the  defending  armies.  Besides,  by  personal  ob- 
servations on  the  activities  of  troops  and  their  Chiefs,  I 
clearly  saw  that  the  preparation  of  the  troops,  and  of  our 
staffs  for  making  an  offensive  in  position  warfare  was  in- 
sufficient. 

The  conditions  of  these  tactics  are  so  far  removed  in  their 
details  from  field  warfare,  that  naturally  they  demand  a 
special  form  of  training,  and  a  careful  study  and  execution 
of  every  practical  detail.  Only  in  March  191 6  did  the 
Headquarters  begin  to  issue  regulations  as  to  the  action  of 
troops  in  position  warfare.  These  insistent  directions  had, 
generally  speaking,  been  compiled  from  the  French,  and 
partly  from  the  German  orders,  which  were  not  sufficiently 
adaptable  to  the  conditions  of  the  Russian  theatre  of  war. 
This  gave  me  the  idea  of  composing  my  own  regulations  in 

170 


I9i6]  SUMMER  FIGHTING  OF  1916  171 

this  direction,  without  waiting  the  promised  revision  from 
Headquarters. 

To  assist  me  in  this  I  asked  my  Chief  of  Staff,  General 
Miller,  to  choose  an  officer  of  the  General  Staff,  and  attach 
him  to  me.  I  gave  him  the  general  plan  of  the  work  to  be 
done,  and  as  material  for  him  to  work  on  I  gave  him  the 
orders  I  had  issued  in  19 15  and  19 16  to  the  6th  Army 
Corps  and  to  the  5th  Army.  These  orders,  of  course,  could 
not  give  a  systematic  general  regulation,  because  they  had 
been  issued  for  a  special  purpose  in  consequence  of  my  ob- 
serving if  the  troops  had  not  fulfilled  my  orders  given  by 
word  of  mouth,  or  the  instructions  given  in  view  of  active 
operations.  In  these  same  orders  our  past  active  operations 
were  exam.ined.  As  this  officer  of  the  General  Staff,  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Zamjitsky,  worked  out  any  division  of  this 
General  Order,  I  examined  and  corrected  it;  after  which 
it  was  printed.  Early  in  April  19 16  the  first  edition  came 
out,  and  a  year  later  the  seventh  edition,  each  new  edition 
being  made  fuller  in  detail  and  corrected  up  to  date.  Each 
edition  was  from  10,000  to  30,000  copies.  Further,  at  the 
beginning  of  19 17  I  gave  the  rights  of  this  edition  to  several 
army  staffs  and  to  the  General  Staff  in  Petrograd.  The 
last  edition  was  specially  for  use  as  a  manual  in  the  military 
schools  preparing  ofl'icers  for  the  Army.  The  successful 
issue  of  this  edition  proved  how  much  it  was  needed. 

Immediately  after  the  conclusion  of  the  almost  futile 
March  operations,  projects  were  worked  out  for  the  spring 
campaign,  but  on  a  much  more  extensive  scale.  The  prep- 
arations in  this  case  were  made  with  more  care  so  far  as 
engineering  was  concerned.  For  the  first  time  were  applied 
the  so-called  "  Out-going  (Salients)  Platzdarm  ";  these  are 
fortified  works  to  serve  as  cover  and  outgoing  trenches  for 
attacking  troops.     Particularly  anxious  over  the   artillery 


172  SUMMER  FIGHTING  OF  1916  [ch.  xiv 

preparation,  I  was  fortunate  in  finding  a  very  observant, 
sensible,  and  energetic  officer  of  artillery,  Major-General 
Sheideman,  who  used  all  his  experience  and  all  my  instruc- 
tions in  working  out  a  plan  for  the  preparatory  bombard- 
ment. Although  he  had  a  German  name,  there  was  noth- 
ing German  about  him. 

The  first  proposition  was  to  use  the  air  service  as  widely 
as  possible  in  this  artillery  preparation.  If  we  had  not 
done  this  before,  it  was  not  because  we  had  not  understood 
the  help  aviation  could  give,  but  because  we  had  not  got 
the  flying  material. 

In  the  beginning  of  war  operations,  when  we  had  dis- 
tributed our  aviators  and  their  flying  machines  between  ten 
armies  on  a  front  of  1,300  kilometres,  not  including  the 
Caucasian  front,  we  were  everywhere  weaker  than  our  op- 
ponents. In  the  course  of  time,  when  the  German  aero- 
planes had  gradually  been  increased,  we  were  constantly 
wavering  in  regard  to  increasing  or  decreasing  our  flying 
resources,  because  the  incoming  machines  did  not  always 
equal  the  machines  destroyed  in  use.  Accordingly  we  had 
to  use  our  machines  very  economically  and  almost  entirely 
for  scouting  purposes,  so  that  it  was  not  astonishing  that 
we  could  not  use  our  aeroplanes  to  correct  our  artillery 
fire.  Of  course  the  Germans  had  far  fewer  machines  on 
our  front,  taking  its  extent  into  consideration,  than  they 
had  on  their  western  front,  which  showed  their  need  of 
having  aviation  power  equal  to  our  Allies'  flying  forces. 
Nevertheless  the  Germans  were  always  able  to  have 
superiority  over  us  in  aviation. 

As  already  stated,  we  were  first  able  to  use  our  aviators 
to  correct  artillery  fire  in  the  spring  of  19 16,  but  this  re- 
quired training  both  for  the  aviators  and  artillery.  The 
quantity  of  artillery  which  was  intended  to  be  collected  for 


I9i6]  SUMMER  FIGHTING  OF  1916  173 

our  spring  operations  seemed  to  us  to  be  a  huge  one  and 
was  founded  on  the  idea  that  the  guns  would  be  given 
every  help,  even  including  aviation.  In  round  figures  the 
intention  was  to  collect  150  6-inch  guns  and  about  400 
light  guns  and  field  howitzers  at  the  point  of  attack. 
Later,  circumstances  did  not  allow  us  even  to  put  this 
number  into  action. 

About  this  time  the  intention,  as  determined  by  Head- 
quarters, for  the  spring  operations  became  known  in  gen- 
eral outlines. 

The  main  forces  and  materials  were  to  be  concentrated 
within  the  boundaries  of  the  west  front,  for  making  an 
advance  on  the  Vilna  lines.  The  other  two  fronts,  south- 
western and  northern,  were  to  be  of  secondary  considera- 
tion. All  operations,  if  possible,  were  to  commence 
simultaneously,  in  any  case  with  intervals  of  no  more  than 
ten  days  between  them. 

Troops  and  materials  in  quantities  we  had  never  before 
seen  were  to  be  used  for  these  blows.  Of  course  so  far  as 
materials  were  concerned,  they  could  not  in  any  way  be 
compared  with  those  our  Allies  had  long  ago  been  using. 
It  is  enough  to  say  that  for  operations  in  which  seven  army 
corps  of  infantry  with  150  heavy  and  400  light  guns  were 
to  take  part,  about  60,000  heavy  shells  were  given  and 
about  1,000,000  hght  and  mortar  shells  and  about  100,000 
4.8  inch  calibre. 

To  fulfil  the  plan  determined  on  by  Headquarters,  it 
was  necessary  to  choose  a  sector  on  each  of  the  three 
fronts  suitable  for  carrying  forward  attacking  operations. 
General  Kuropatkin's  final  choice,  so  far  as  the  northern 
front  was  concerned,  was  for  a  blow  in  a  westerly  direc- 
tion from  the  so-called  Dvlnsk  Salient  (Platzdarm)  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Dvina  to  the  west  of  Dvlnsk.     Naturally, 


174  SUMMER  FIGHTING  OF  1916  [ch.  xiv 

therefore,  all  reserves  of  the  Higher  Command  were 
ordered  there,  together  with  part  of  the  heavy  artillery 
from  other  armies  and  army  corps. 

From  this  moment  the  plans  already  commenced  con- 
tinued, with  full  effect.  Seven  army  corps  were  to  take 
part  in  the  proposed  operations.  The  time  of  their  ful- 
filment was  to  be  in  accord  with  the  main  attack  on  the 
western  front,  marked  for  the  first  days  in  July.  The 
Austrians,  however,  at  the  middle  of  May,  on  the  Italian 
front,  commenced  an  energetic  advance,  having  in  view  a 
thrust  from  north  to  south  to  reach  the  sea  at  Venice  and 
cut  off  a  large  part  of  the  Italian  Army. 

The  operations  of  the  Austrian  troops  were  sufficiently 
successful  to  enable  them  to  burst  into  Italian  territory 
and  move  forward  comparatively  quickly.  Evidently  the 
Italian  Government  were  not  hopeful  of  stopping  this 
victorious  advance  of  the  Austrians  with  their  own  forces 
and  therefore  appealed  to  the  Russian  Higher  Command 
asking  its  help  for  Italy,  and  an  immediate  advance  against 
the  Austrian  Army,  calculating  that  this  would  compel  the 
enemy  to  withdraw  to  the  east  a  portion  of  the  troops  at- 
tacking Italy.  The  Russian  Higher  Command,  wishing  to 
come  to  the  help  of  the  Allies,  made  a  heroic  decision  and 
ordered  General  Brussiloff  to  commence  attacking  opera- 
tions in  the  shortest  time  possible,  and  not  to  wait  or  con- 
sider the  time  or  state  of  preparedness  for  the  main  blow 
as  planned  on  the  western  front. 

Under  such  conditions  General  Brussiloff  was  obliged 
to  rely  on  the  element  of  surprise  for  his  main  chance  of 
success  and  to  make  an  attack,  not  on  one  particular  point 
with  concentrated  total  forces,  but  to  attack  within  the 
limits  of  all  his  five  armies  on  the  widest  front. 

The   result  of   General   Brussiloff's   advance   passed    all 


I9i6]  SUMMER  FIGHTING  OF  1916  175 

expectation.  Evidently  what  afforded  us  the  greatest  help 
was  that  the  Austrians  did  not  expect  such  an  attack  at 
this  time,  especially  on  so  wide  a  front.  It  must  not  be 
forgotten,  however,  that  by  the  original  Headquarters 
plans,  the  south-west  front  was  only  to  have  a  secondary 
place,  and  therefore  naturally  the  main  reserves  of  the 
Higher  Command  were  mostly  to  be  found  on  the  western 
front.  Then  on  the  other  side,  just  as  naturally  was  the 
wish  to  use  every  means  to  develop  this  victory  gained 
at  the  outset  by  General  Brussiloff's  troops. 

From  this  moment  commenced  a  transfer  of  army  corps 
as  far  as  the  railroads  could  undertake  It  —  first  from 
the  north  and  then  from  the  north-western  fronts  to  the 
south-western  front.  This  was  the  more  necessary  be- 
cause our  enemies  In  their  turn,  and  more  quickly  than  we, 
were  transferring  reserves  into  Austria  from  the  Italian 
and  Anglo-French  fronts.  The  first  reason  of  Brussiloff's 
attack  had  been  attained.  The  Austrian  advance  into 
Italy  was  first  of  all  checked  and  then  Austria  and  Hun- 
gary began  clearing  out  of  Italian  territory.  This  was  the 
time  when  the  Russian  Army  and  the  name  of  General 
Brusslloff  reached  such  an  extraordinary  height  in  the  esti- 
mation of  all  the  Allies,  particularly  of  the  Italians. 

Then  the  condition  of  Brussiloff's  troops,  still  advancing, 
became  more  and  more  difficult.  Not  only  all  our  re- 
serves, but  our  fighting  materials  also,  had  to  be  sent  to 
him  as  his  were  exhausted,  though  this  hurt  us  very  much 
In  the  armies  of  the  other  fronts.  We  understood  that  the 
Higher  Command  could  not  act  otherwise.  V^f,  recog- 
nised, however,  that  every  departing  army  corps,  every 
transferred  thousand  heavy  or  mortar  shells,  reduced  the 
chances  of  our  future  success.  There  was  no  shortage  at 
this  time  in  light  shells.     We  had  to  cut  down  our  plans 


176  SUMMER  FIGHTING  OF  1916  [ch.  xiv 

for  an  advance  as  a  curtailment  was  made  in  the  plans 
for  an  advance  on  the  north-western  front.  At  the  last 
minute  General  Evert  decided  to  transfer  it  to  a  more 
southern  direction,  in  the  region  of  Baranowitchi.  Under 
these  conditions,  it  had  no  co-ordination  with  the  opera- 
tions on  the  northern  front.  The  only  connection  would 
be  that  the  Germans  would  be  compelled  to  send  their  re- 
serves in  different  directions,  if  the  advances  were  made  at 
the  same  time. 

The  transfer  of  the  several  army  corps  from  the  5th 
Army  naturally  compelled  a  decrease  in  the  scale  of  the 
future  advance  and  even  the  transference  of  it  to  a  more 
northern  part  of  the  Dvinsk  salient.  At  the  middle  of 
July,  Kuropatkin  decided  to  make  an  advance  with  the 
1 2th  Army  of  General  Ratko-Dmitrieff  in  a  south-westerly 
direction.  At  first  attacks  on  both  fronts  were  successful, 
but  they  were  in  no  way  a  surprise  to  the  Germans,  who 
consequently  had  no  difficulty  in  parrying  them.  The 
battles  continued  for  a  couple  of  weeks,  then  died  down, 
our  troops  being  compelled  to  retreat  almost  to  their  start- 
ing-points. These  operations  clearly  showed  that  we  had 
not  sufficient  materials  of  all  sorts  to  carry  on  operations 
on  several  fronts  at  one  and  the  same  time.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  huge  front  we  held  and  the  tremendous  number 
of  army  corps  in  our  armies  made  it  absolutely  necessary 
for  us  to  operate  on  sev^eral  fronts  simultaneously,  because 
acting  otherwise  would  have  given  the  Germans  an  over- 
whelming superiority,  through  their  advantage  in  rail- 
roads, for  quick  concentrations  in  one  direction  of  all  their 
reserves  to  stop  our  advance  even  if  at  first  it  were  a  suc- 
cessful one. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  our  Allies,  with  their  large 
resources  in  materials,  only  operated  on  one  part  of  their 


i9i6]  SUMMER  FIGHTING  OF  1916  i77 

front  at  one  and  the  same  time,  while  we,  on  account  of 
geographical  conditions,  had  to  distribute  our  forces,  both 
of  troops  and  material.  Of  course,  in  our  advance  we 
took  into  account  the  great  size  of  our  living  forces,  and 
utilised  them  to  counterbalance  our  shortage  in  material 
resources.  The  event  showed  that  such  a  calculation  had 
no  sufficient  foundation.  However  excellent  the  living 
force  was,  however  high  its  warlike  spirit,  nevertheless 
there  existed  a  limit.  One  cannot  under  such  conditions 
utilise  living  strength  against  dead  materials.  Moreover 
in  course  of  time,  as  the  operations  draw  out,  the  stock 
of  moral  force  wears  out,  while  the  flow  of  material  force, 
at  any  rate  of  our  enemies,  remains  at  the  same  level. 

This  circumstance  affected  Brussiloff's  advance.  It  was 
inevitable  that  the  troops  should  grow  weary  by  the  middle 
of  summer,  and  although  the  advance  continued  it  could 
not  of  course  give  the  same  brilliant  results.  In  this  way, 
the  advance  of  Brussiloff's  troops  about  the  end  of  August 
nearly  ceased.  The  reason  lay,  not  so  much  in  the  short- 
age of  reserves  —  because  these  reserves  were  sufficient  to 
fill  a  part  of  the  new  Austro-Roumanian  front,  whereas 
this  had  been  given  to  two  armies  —  as  in  that  misfortune 
that  followed  us  from  the  very  outset  of  the  campaign, 
shortage  In  ammunition  for  the  artillery,  and  particularly 
for  the  heavy  guns. 

Nevertheless,  the  weariness  of  the  troops  had  its  effect 
to  a  certain  extent,  but  there  can  be  no  question  that  the 
stoppage  of  the  advance  was  premature,  and  founded  on 
orders  from  Headquarters,  under  a  pretext  which  could 
not  be  openly  spoken  about,  whereas,  amongst  our  Allies, 
if  not  In  the  Press,  such  reasons  were  publicly  mentioned 
or  whispered. 

I   never  could  understand  how  it  was  that  our  Allies, 


178  SUMMER  FIGHTING  OF  1916  [ch.  xiv 

having  at  their  disposal  means,  and  more  than  we,  even 
in  tactical  units,  if  we  take  units  in  proportion  to  the  length 
of  front,  had  one  law  for  their  advances  and  another  law 
for  our  advances.  The  best  proof  that  our  Higher  Com- 
mand had  no  intention  of  prematurely  stopping  the  advanc- 
ing operations  was  that  I  was  given  the  possibility  to  con- 
tinue active  operations  in  September  and  October,  and 
further,  as  far  as  possible,  they  supplied  me  with  ammuni- 
tion more  generously  than  they  did  the  other  armies,  which 
had  to  stop  their  advance  owing  to  the  lack  of  fresh 
reserves. 

•  •  •  •  • 

One  of  the  consequences  of  the  advance  on  the  northern 
front  was  General  Kuropatkin's  removal  from  his  com- 
mand and  his  assignment  to  a  post  much  more  in  keep- 
ing with  the  qualities  of  his  intellectual  powers  and 
character  —  namely,  the  office  of  Governor-General  of 
Turkestan.  This  transfer  was  caused  by  an  outburst  of 
disorders  on  the  part  of  the  native  population  of  Sarts, 
as  a  protest  against  their  being  sent  into  the  interior  of 
Russia  to  be  organised  into  bands  of  workmen.  These 
people  did  not  come  under  the  conscription  law.  Kuro- 
patkin  left  on  the  very  shortest  notice,  and  I  was  then  in- 
structed to  go  to  Pskoff  to  take  up  the  command  of  the 
northern  front  temporarily,  until  such  time  as  somebody 
v/as  chosen  for  the  post.  I  had  to  fulfil  these  duties  for 
two  weeks. 

Under  instructions  from  Headquarters,  I  had  to  go  to 
Riga,  the  12th  Army,  and  to  the  Port  of  Reval.  At  this 
time  a  new  plan  of  an  advance  from  the  Riga  salient  was 
set  on  foot,  and  to  combine  this  advance  with  the  disem- 
barkation of  about  two  divisions  of  infantry  on  the  shores 
of  the  Gulf  of  Riga.     I  had  to  come  to  the  conclusion  that 


i9i6]  SUMMER  FIGHTING  OF  1916  179 

this  place  would  be  absolutely  unfitted  for  our  advance,  but 
on  the  contrary  would  give  our  opponents  a  considerable 
advantage  in  defence.  The  unprofitable  conditions  would 
not  be  compensated  by  the  advantages  which  a  descent  to 
the  rear  of  the  left  German  flank  might  give  us,  even  if 
the  Germans  were  surprised.  It  was  sufficient  to  stay  in 
Riga  to  know  that  no  secret,  especially  one  of  such  large 
proportions  as  the  preparation  of  a  descent  in  the  two 
ports  of  Riga  and  Reval,  could  fail  to  leak  out  from  the 
observations  of  the  populace,  which  included  too  many 
elements  sympathising  with  the  Germans  and  sure  to  pass 
the  secret  over  to  our  enemy.  I  reported  the  result  of  my 
observations  to  Headquarters,  to  General  Alexeieff,  send- 
ing to  him  a  staff  officer  with  a  personal  report. 

In  the  middle  of  August  the  new  Commander-in-Chief, 
General  Russky,  arrived  in  Pskoff.  He  had  left  this  post 
in  December  19 15,  owing  to  illness.  His  stay  in  the 
Caucasus  evidently  had  completely  cured  him.  With  him 
arrived  the  new  Chief  of  Staff,  General  Daniloff,  the  late 
Quartermaster-General  to  the  Grand  Duke  Nicolai,  and 
latterly,  for  about  a  year,  commanding  an  army  corps  of 
the  Army.  Having  placed  my  observations  on  the  Riga 
front  before  General  Russky,  I  returned  to  Dvinsk  to  my 
own  army.  At  this  time  I  was  making  preparations  for  a 
third  advance,  but  of  much  smaller  dimensions,  as  recently 
another  army  corps  and  part  of  the  heavy  artillery  and 
also  shell  stocks  were  withdrawn,  and  transferred  to  the 
south.  Whilst  in  the  midst  of  these  preparations,  in  the 
end  of  August,  I  received  a  telegram  from  General 
Alexeieff  in  which  he  informed  me  that  the  Emperor  had 
chosen  me  for  the  command  of  the  newly  formed  army 
which  had  before  it  a  serious  problem  on  the  south-western 
front,  and  that  in  its  composition  was  included  the  Imperial 


i8o  SUMMER  FIGHTING  OF  1916  [ch.  xiv 

Guard  —  two  infantry  and  one  Guards  cavalry  army  corps. 
I  was  also  given  permission  to  use  the  Staff  of  tlie  Guard, 
and  was  to  take  with  me  from  the  5th  Army  any  officers 
I  thought  necessary.  General  Alexeieff  closed  the  tele- 
gram by  asking  if  I  was  agreeable  to  take  up  the  post.  I 
replied  that  I  had  no  right  to  refuse  any  service  instruc- 
tions in  time  of  war.  At  the  same  time  I  pointed  out  the 
person  to  whom  I  asked  to  be  allowed  to  hand  over  my 
command  of  the  5th  Army  until  the  arrival  of  the  person 
selected  by  Headquarters. 

The  permission  to  take  with  me  whom  I  pleased  from 
the  Staff  naturally  aroused  the  desire  to  be  accompanied 
by  my  closest  assistant,  the  Chief  of  Staff,  Major-General 
Miller,  and  also  the  Quartermaster,  Major-General 
Alexeieff,  who  several  months  earlier  had  been  my  Chief 
of  Staff  in  the  6th  Army  Corps.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
I  could  not  but  understand  the  impossibility  of  taking  both 
of  these  with  me  when  I  left,  especially  General  Miller, 
who  had  been  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  5th  Army  from 
the  beginning  of  the  war.  I  consider  General  Miller  pre- 
eminent in  capacity  to  execute  the  higher  duties  that  be- 
long to  officers  of  the  General  Staff.  That  he  got  no  pro- 
motion during  the  whole  of  the  campaign  was  because  his 
presence  on  the  Army  Staff  gave  the  assurance  to  the  High 
Command  that  everything  was  in  good  hands,  and  that 
Pleve  himself  could  give  full  attention  to  commanding  the 
Army.  But,  acknowledging  all  the  injustice  of  this  atti- 
tude towards  General  Miller,  I  promised  to  give  him  the 
command  of  an  army  corps,  which  would  open  the  way  for 
further  promotion  in  the  service.  Remembering  what 
help  he  had  given  me  in  the  first  days  of  taking  up  the 
command  of  the  5th  Army,  I  thought  it  not  quite  right  to 
deprive  my  successor  of  the  same  advantage.      It  was  only 


I9i6]  SUMMER  FIGHTING  OF  1916  181 

very  much  later,  when  I  was  temporary  Chief  of  Staff  to 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  that  I  was  able  to  offer  General 
Miler  the  command  of  an  army  corps  on  the  south-west 
front.  Circumstances  connected  with  the  Revolution  com- 
pelled him  in  May  19 17  to  resign  this  duty,  and  in  August 
the  Temporary  Government  sent  him  as  head  of  the  war 
mission  to  Italy,  where  for  several  years  prior  to  the  war 
he  had  been  Military  Attache. 

When  General  Sluysarenko  arrived  —  the  same  general 
who  commanded  the  2nd  Army  Corps  when  my  ist 
Cavalry  Division  defended  the  flank  of  the  ist  Army,  in 
which  was  his  army  corps,  from  a  turning  of  a  German 
column  —  I  handed  over  the  command  of  the  5th  Army, 
and  gave  my  substitute  all  the  dispositions.  I  immediately 
left  for  Mohileff,  where  I  could  see  General  Alexeieff. 
From  him  I  learnt  that  the  Guards  detachment  had  been 
moved  in  support  of  the  8th  Army  under  General  Kaledin, 
who  in  May  had  brilliantly  taken  the  town  of  Lutsk. 

Thanks  to  the  addition  to  the  Guards  of  several  army 
corps,  there  was  a  full  army  now,  but  the  action  of  the 
Guards  commander  had  not  satisfied  Headquarters,  and 
his  temporary  command  had  not  been  confirmed.  On 
Alexeieff's  recommendation  the  Emperor  had  agreed  to  my 
being  appointed  to  this  region  for  the  formation  of  a  new 
army,  which  was  to  be  called  "  the  Special  Army."  I  made 
no  direct  question,  but  I  think  that  this  name  was  not  so 
much  given  because  it  included  the  Guards  detachments  as 
because  they  did  not  wish  to  give  it  the  number  13. 

Making  inquiries  by  telephone.  General  Alexeieff  ascer- 
tained that  the  Emperor  had  driven  off  somewhere  and 
would  only  return  in  time  for  dinner,  and  that  I  should 
arrive  at  that  time  at  the  house  where  the  Emperor  lived. 
The  Headquarters,  just  before  the  Grand  Duke  resigned, 


i82  SUMMER  FIGHTING  OF  1916  [ch.  xiv 

moved  from  BaranowltchI  to  the  Government  town  of 
Mohileff.  The  Grand  Duke  had  lived  in  the  Governor's 
house,  which  stood  on  the  high  banks  of  the  Dnieper,  with 
a  large  garden  sloping  to  the  river  bank.  The  Head- 
quarters Staff  lived  in  the  Government  Office  building 
which  was  alongside.  The  buildings  have  become  histori- 
cal now. 

Arriving  at  the  appointed  time,  I  met  several  of  the 
suite  in  the  waiting-room.  They  always  dined  at  the  Im- 
perial table  along  with  all  the  senior  officers  of  the  Foreign 
Missions,  amongst  which  I  had  already  met  Count  Rikkel, 
the  head  of  the  Belgian  mission.  He  came  to  me  in  the 
spring  of  191 5,  when  he  arrived  with  a  Belgian  general 
from  the  Belgian  front,  when  I  was  commanding  an  army 
corps  defending  the  line  of  the  Bzura.  The  senior 
English  officer  was  General  Waters,  who  temporarily  held 
the  post  while  General  Sir  John  Hanbury  Williams  was 
away  on  leave.  I  had  first  met  General  Waters  in  Man- 
churia, where  at  one  time  he  was  with  the  Staff  of  the  ist 
Siberian  Army  Corps  under  General  Baron  Shtakelberg 
and  where  I  was  temporarily  Chief  of  Staff.  Well  do 
I  remember  Waters,  a  colonel  at  the  time  of  the  Wafangou 
fight.  I  remember  that  he  expressed  hearty  sympathy  for 
Russia  and  the  Russian  troops,  not  regarding  the  fact  that 
England  was  then  allied  to  our  enemies.  I  remember  how 
he  expressed  sincere  sorrow  that  the  fight  at  Wafangou, 
which  commenced  so  brilliantly  for  us,  ended  in  Shtakel- 
berg's  troops  making  a  general  retreat.  Since  that  time 
we  never  met  again,  as  he  went  to  Kuropatkin's  Staff  where 
I  seldom  went,  and  my  fate  took  me  from  the  extreme 
right  to  the  extreme  left  of  the  Manchurian  Army. 


CHAPTER  XV 

AT   GENERAL    HEADQUARTERS    IN   MOHILEFF 

ENTRY    OF   ROUMANIA 

The  Staff  of  the  Generalissimo,  the  so-called  "  Stafka  " 
(which  means  in  ancient  Russian  "  camp,"  especially  the 
military  camp  of  a  Chief)  established  itself  at  Mohileff 
in  the  autumn  of  19 15,  when  the  Grand  Duke  Nicolai  was 
still  the  Commander-in-Chief.  The  removal  of  the  Grand 
Duke  and  the  taking  over  by  the  Emperor  of  the  duties  of 
Commander-in-Chief  were  little  expected  by  the  Army,  and 
though  for  a  long  time  rumours  had  been  circulated  that 
the  Tsar  intended  to  take  the  command,  little  credence  was 
given  to  these  statements.  Naturally  when  it  became  an 
accomplished  fact,  the  causes  for  it  were  commented  upon 
on  every  side,  but  the  real  cause  of  it  was  unknown. 

One  can  suppose  that  in  this  case,  as  in  the  majority 
of  big  events,  the  change  appeared  to  be  the  result  of  a 
combination  of  different  causes,  the  principal  of  which  was 
dissatisfaction  as  to  the  direction  of  military  operations 
and  especially  the  want  of  experience  and  knowledge  in 
some  of  the  closest  helpers  of  the  Grand  Duke,  with  whom 
he  would  not  part.  But,  in  addition  to  this,  several  of 
those  people  familiar  with  the  Court  asserted  that  it  was 
the  result  of  the  influence  of  some  of  the  people  nearest 
to  the  Emperor,  who  wanted  to  be  in  closer  touch  with  the 
immediate  direction  of  military  operations,  hoping  that  on 
them  too  would  be  reflected  some  of  the  glory  of  the 
military  success.     And  besides  this,   their  principal   argu- 

183 


i84  AT  HEADQUARTERS  IN  MOHILEFF     [ch.  xv 

ment  was  that  in  taking  over  the  supreme  command  him- 
self, the  Tsar  would  increase  his  prestige  and  deepen  the 
love  of  the  people  and  army,  and  it  was  pointed  out  that 
in  many  kingdoms  taking  part  in  the  great  European  War 
the  monarchs  stood  at  the  head  of  their  armed  forces. 
It  was  hinted  that  it  had  not  happened  without  the  influence 
of  the  Empress  Alexandra.  She  was  considered  a 
domineering  and  ambitious  woman  who  calculated  that  if 
her  husband  were  absorbed  wholly  in  military  affairs  he 
would  probably  give  her,  if  not  the  entire  control  of  Im- 
perial  affairs,   in  any  case   a  greater  influence  over  them. 

All  these,  of  course,  were  more  or  less  probable  reasons; 
so  far  as  I  know.  His  Majesty  did  not  announce  to  any- 
body his  real  motives  for  the  decision  he  had  taken,  but 
one  must  remember  that  in  the  beginning  of  the  war  it  was 
openly  declared  that  'the  nomination  of  the  Grand  Duke 
was  only  temporary. 

With  the  arrival  of  the  Emperor  at  Mohileff,  the  daily 
life  of  the  General  Headquarters  was  little  altered;  only 
the  people  of  the  immediate  suite  of  the  Generalissimo 
were  changed,  as  the  ofl'icers  composing  the  suite  of  the 
Grand  Duke  Nicolai  all  left  together  for  the  Caucasus. 
With  the  Emperor  came  his  entourage.  The  whole  Staff 
suffered  no  untoward  change  in  its  personnel,  as  Gen- 
eral Alexeieff  entered  upon  his  duties  as  Chief  of  the 
Headquarters  Staff  shortly  before  this,  when  the  change 
in  the  Supreme  Command  was  probably  already  decided 
upon.  The  Tsar,  on  his  arrival  at  Headquarters,  occupied 
the  residence  lately  used  by  the  Grand  Duke.  This  build- 
ing was  so  small  that  when  the  Empress  with  her  daughters 
came  to  Mohileff  they  lived  in  the  train,  passing  only  a 
part  of  the  day  at  the  Governor's  house.  The  Imperial 
suite  was  comparatively  small,  and  the  number  of  people 


—  f- 


V.  T 


y. 


•r. 


I9i6]         AT  HEADQUARTERS  IN  MOHILEFF  185 

not  belonging  to  the  General  Staff  was  only  ten  to  twelve, 
without  counting  three  people  exclusively  occupied  with  the 
Tsarevitch  as  tutors.  The  Tsarevitch  lived  with  his 
father  nearly  all  the  time  at  the  Headquarters,  and  used 
to  accompany  him  in  his  visits  to  the  troops.  The 
Tsarevitch  used  to  spend  the  whole  of  his  spare  time  with 
his  father  when  the  latter  was  free  from  his  army  duties, 
and  even  slept  in  the  same  room  with  him,  using  only  simple 
camp  beds. 

Among  the  members  of  the  suite,  mention  must  be  made 
of  the  elderly  Count  Frederiks,  the  Minister  of  the  Court, 
and  Chief  of  the  Imperial  Headquarters  on  the  civil  side, 
a  man  of  dignified  bearing  with  great  personal  charm  and 
affability  of  manner.  Count  Frederiks  came  of  an  old 
Swedish  family.  There  was  an  established  opinion  that 
he  took  no  part  in  the  Court  intrigues,  and  his  personal 
influence  over  the  Emperor  was  not  exerted  at  all  for  his 
own  interests.  His  assistant  as  Chief  of  the  Tsar's  Head- 
quarters was  General  Voeikoff.  Though  married  to  the 
daughter  of  Count  Frederiks,  he  was  far  from  enjoying 
the  favour  of  his  father-in-law.  Words  are  quoted  v/hich  \ 
were  supposed  to  have  been  said  by  Count  Frederiks  — 
"  Here  everyone  intrigues,  and  most  of  all  my  son-in-law."  ' 
About  General  Voeikoff  an  opinion  was  formed  that  he 
had  great  influence  over  the  Tsar,  but  I  could  not  say  if  it 
was  justified,  as  I  never  had  proof  of  it.  The  Master  of 
the  Household,  the  person  whose  duties  lay  in  the  direction 
of  the  affairs  of  the  Household  of  the  Court,  was  the  com- 
paratively young  Major-General,  Prince  Dolgorouky.  As 
was  known  to  me,  he  busied  himself  exclusively  with  his 
work,  and  was  very  much  liked  by  the  Tsar,  but  I  never 
heard  that  he  took  advantage  of  the  influence  he  possessed 
over  the  Emperor. 


1 86  AT  HEADQUARTERS  IN  MOHILEFF     [ch.  xv 

The  Chief  of  the  personal  Imperial  Guard  was  General 
Count  Grabbe.  It  was  said  of  him  that  by  his  natural 
tact,  greatly  surpassing  his  inborn  mental  capacities,  he 
kept  himself  wonderfully  clear  of  the  influences  of  the 
different  parties  and  was  appreciated  by  those  who  in- 
trigued, as  he  did  not  interfere  with  their  plans,  and  also 
by  those  who  stood  aside,  because  he  did  not  intrigue  in 
spite  of  his  intimacy  with  the  Tsar.  The  Tsar  greatly 
appreciated  his  abstinence  from  everything  that  did  not 
concern  him.  Besides  these  people,  there  were  always 
aides-de-camp,  some  of  them  permanent,  others  coming 
only  for  a  spell  of  duty. 

The  working  day  of  the  Emperor  began  at  ten  in  the 
morning,  without  counting  the  time  he  spent  in  his  cabinet 
for  business.  At  this  hour  His  Majesty  passed  to  the 
neighbouring  building,  occupied  by  his  Staff,  and  there  the 
Chief  of  the  Headquarters,  General  Alexeieff,  in  the 
presence  of  the  Quartermaster-General,  reported  to  him, 
by  reading  the  daily  accounts  of  all  the  fourteen  armies 
and  of  the  four  fronts.  The  Quartermaster-General,  on 
the  already-noted  plans  of  a  large  scale,  showed  the  posi- 
tion of  the  armies  and  the  place  of  the  inhabited  and 
geographical  points.  Then  the  Chief  of  the  Staff  reported 
to  the  Tsar  the  instructions  which  were  to  be  given  and  re- 
ceived for  approval.  After  this  report,  which  was  purely 
strategical,  the  Quartermaster-General  left,  and  the  Chief 
of  Staff  made  reports  concerning  all  the  other  questions 
which  affected  the  military  operations,  as  for  instance  great 
questions  regarding  the  basis  of  the  general  position  of  af- 
fairs and  also  important  questions  concerning  internal  and 
external  politics  as  they  might  influence  the  course  of 
military  events.  The  greater  part  of  the  smaller  prob- 
lems, which  really  only  required  the  formal  sanction  of  the 


I9i6]         AT  HEADQUARTERS  IN  MOHILEFF  187 

Highest  Authority,  were  sent  to  the  Tsar's  residence  as 
written  reports.  The  verbal  reports  lasted  almost  till  the 
luncheon  hour,  which  was  appointed  for  half-past  twelve. 
To  this  was  invited  the  greater  part  of  the  higher  military- 
ranks  who  came  to  the  Army  Headquarters  on  their  private 
or  official  affairs,  and  who  wished  to  be  introduced  to  the 
Tsar.  All  high  ranks  of  foreign  missions  were  invited. 
The  places  at  table  which  remained  empty  —  there  being 
accommodation  for  about  forty  —  were  occupied  by  the 
people  of  His  Majesty's  suite.  During  lunch  the  Tsare- 
vitch  always  sat  on  the  left  hand  of  his  father.  The 
place  allotted  to  Chief  of  the  Staff,  General  Alexeieff,  was 
on  the  Tsar's  right  hand,  but  he  usually  excused  himself, 
only  coming  to  the  Tsar's  table  every  other  day  for  lunch; 
on  the  other  days  and  for  dinner  he  went  to  the  Staff 
Officers'  mess,  as  it  gave  him  the  opportunity  of  having 
intercourse  with  the  people  subordinate  to  him,  whom  of 
course  he  would  very  seldom  otherwise  see,  and  also  to  see 
at  the  table  people  coming  to  the  General  Headquarters 
for  business  and  conversation  to  whom  he  otherwise  would 
have  had  to  give  his  precious  time. 

After  lunch  everyone  went  into  the  next  room,  when 
the  Tsar,  passing  from  one  to  another,  talked  to  those 
with  whom  he  had  no  opportunity  of  speaking  at  the  table, 
and  who  came  to  the  General  Headquarters  to  be  intro- 
duced to  him.  After  this  reception,  he  received  Ministers 
and  other  people  who  came  from  Petrograd,  although 
rarely  more  than  one  or  two.  These  reports  lasted  until 
three  o'clock,  and  if  they  were  not  finished  by  then  the 
Ministers  were  readmitted  at  six  o'clock  till  dinner  time, 
and,  in  exceptional  cases,  even  after  dinner.  From  three 
to  five  every  afternoon  the  Emperor,  with  the  Tsarevitch 
and  with  some  persons  of  his  suite,  went  in  motors  out  of 


1 88  AT  HEADQUARTERS  IN  MOHILEFF     [ch.  xv 

the  town  and  afterwards  generally  took  an  hour's  walk  in 
the  forest  or  in  the  fields. 

For  dinner  a  smaller  number  of  people  was  generally 
invited,  but  the  heads  of  the  foreign  missions  were  present. 
The  Tsarevitch  was  not  present  at  dinner,  as  he  dined  a 
little  earlier  and  went  to  bed  early.  Once  a  week  a  cinema- 
tograph performance  was  given  in  the  theatre  of  the  town 
from  six  o'clock  to  half-past  seven,  chiefly  for  the 
Tsarevitch.  To  this  performance  were  invited  all  ranks 
of  the  General  Staff;  the  top  rows  in  the  theatre  were  oc- 
cupied by  the  lower  ranks  of  the  St.  George  Battalion  and 
clerks  of  the  Staff.  This  was  the  only  distraction  at  the 
"  Stafka." 

On  Sundays  the  reports  began  an  hour  later,  as  the  Tsar 
was  present  at  Mass.  In  winter,  during  the  calm,  the 
Emperor  visited  the  front,  inspecting  the  troops  who  were 
resting.  During  these  tours  he  was  usually  accompanied 
by  the  Tsarevitch  and  by  the  persons  of  his  suite,  but  Gen- 
eral Alexeieff  always  stayed  at  the  "  Stafka." 

•  •  •  •  • 

Some  time  after  my  coming  to  the  reception-room  where 
were  already  assembled  those  people  invited  to  the 
Emperor's  table,  his  personal  attendant  came  from  the 
Tsar's  cabinet  asking  me  to  come  and  see  the  Tsar.  After 
some  words  of  greeting  the  Tsar  told  me  that  his  choice 
had  fallen  on  me  for  the  command  of  the  Special  Army, 
in  order  that  the  command  of  the  Guards,  of  these  select 
Russian  troops,  should  be  given  into  efficient  hands.  The 
Tsar  said  that  he  regretted  that  the  Guards,  being  as  they 
were  such  a  powerful  force,  when  it  was  necessary  to  ac- 
complish an  energetic  advance  were  seldom  used  cautiously 
enough,  and  suffered  big  losses  without  bringing  correspond- 
ing advantages.      I  told  the  Tsar  that  I   fully  shared  his 


I9i6]         AT  HEADQUARTERS  IN  MOHILEFF  189 

opinion;  that  If  on  one  hand  the  care  which  was  bestowed 
on  the  Guards  gave  the  right  to  require  at  the  necessary 
moment  that  they  should  repay  It  to  their  Tsar  and  country 
on  the  field  of  battle  by  self-denying  work,  then,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  was  necessary  to  consider  that  in  the  Guards 
was  gathered  the  flower  of  Russian  manhood,  and  that 
on  account  of  this  It  was  necessary  to  take  an  advantage 
only  when  the  results  would  correspond  to  the  sacrifices 
made.     In  a  word,  "  Who  receives  much,  gives  much." 

Our  conversation  lasted  rather  long,  and  probably  the 
Emperor's  cooks  were  afraid  that  their  meals  would  be 
over-cooked. 

It  is  necessary  to  say  that  the  Tsar's  table  was  very 
modest  and  was  not  distinguished  by  its  abundance.  In 
general  it  reminded  one  more  of  a  good  and  wholesome 
family  table.  Twice  a  week  no  meat  was  served.  After 
dinner,  I  went  to  General  Alexeleff  to  continue  our  con- 
versation. During  the  time  we  were  talking  together, 
about  ten  o'clock  at  night,  General  Alexeieff's  private  secre- 
tary came  and  reported  that  the  Tsar  was  on  the  stairs,  prob- 
ably wishing  to  see  the  Chief  of  Staff.  General  Alexeleff 
went  to  meet  the  Tsar,  and  in  half  a  minute  they  both 
entered  the  room.  Coming  In,  the  Tsar  said  he  was  con- 
vinced that  I  had  not  finished  my  conversation  with  General 
Alexeleff,  and  that  he  wanted  to  discuss  what  was  the 
best  role  to  be  played  by  the  Special  Army,  especially  by 
the  two  corps  of  the  Guards.  I  answered  that  it  would 
probably  be  necessary  to  make  some  change  In  the  ground- 
work of  the  proposals  which  were  sent  from  the  front, 
and  it  could  only  be  done  after  acquaintance  with  the  con- 
ditions on  the  spot.  After  being  with  us  about  half  an 
hour,  the  Tsar  returned  home  accompanied  by  Alexeleff. 

That  same  night  I  left  via  Kieff,  and  on  the  second  day 


I90  AT  HEADQUARTERS  IN  MOHILEFF     [ch.  xv 

arrived  at  the  station  of  Rojitche,  which  was  ten  kilometres 
from  Lutsk,  where  in  the  only  houses  which  were  not 
ruined,  belonging  to  the  Jewish  population,  was  established 
the  Staff  detachments  of  the  Guards.  The  town  itself, 
situated  at  a  distance  of  two  kilometres,  was  composed  en- 
tirely of  ruins.  Here  in  July  the  advance  of  the  8th  Army 
of  General  Kaledin  had  taken  place,  the  result  being  the 
capture  of  the  town  and  its  environs  with  much  military 
booty.  Fortunately  Lutsk  itself  did  not  suffer  any  great 
devastation,  and  the  big  building  of  the  Catholic  Seminary 
of  the  sixteenth  century,  which  was  the  palace  of  the 
Catholic  Bishops,  remained  untouched.  I  was  met  at  the 
station  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Guards,  Count  Ignatieff, 
brother  of  the  Minister  of  Public  Education  and  the  son 
of  our  Minister  in  Constantinople  before  the  Turko-Rus- 
sian  War.  From  him  I  learnt  that  General  Bezobrazoff, 
who  was  formerly  the  Commander  of  the  Guards,  on  hear- 
ing of  the  reorganisation  of  this  detachment  and  the  forma- 
tion of  the  new  Special  Army  which  was  not  to  be  under 
his  command,  left  Rojitche  and  went  to  Headquarters. 
He  had  handed  over  his  duties  to  his  second  in  command, 
the  commander  of  the  ist  Corps  of  Guards,  the  Grand 
Duke  Paul  Alexandrovitch.  With  me,  as  stated  before, 
came  Major-General  Alexeieff,  who  was  to  take  the  post 
of  Chief  of  the  Staff  of  this  army.  I  always  thought  that 
to  carry  out  successfully  the  duties  of  a  Chief  of  an  army 
staff  it  was  necessary,  above  all  things,  to  be  thoroughly 
experienced  in  the  work,  and  that  also  the  person  chosen 
should  be  intimately  acquainted  with  the  Chief  with  whom 
he  would  have  to  work.  I  frankly  told  Count  Ignatieff 
that,  in  spite  of  all  his  qualities  as  a  soldier  and  a  man,  he 
was  unable  to  undertake  this  post;  after  passing  the 
Academy  of  the  General  Staff,  he  had  served  in  the  ranks. 


I9i6]         AT  HEADQUARTERS  IN  MOHILEFF  191 

and  only  during  the  war  had  he  occupied  a  post  on  the  Staff. 
Certainly  everyone  could  learn,  but  it  was  necessary  to 
avoid  learning  when  it  might  be  paid  for  with  human  lives. 

Directly  we  began  our  duties,  Major-General  Alexeieff 
and  I  threw  ourselves  into  the  work.  Having  given  in- 
structions generally  concerning  the  re-formation  of  the 
Staff  and  the  organisation  of  the  work,  I  departed  for  an 
inspection  of  the  troops  and  to  acquaint  myself  with  the 
area  where  the  advance  was  to  be  made  and  in  which  the 
corps  of  the  Guards  were  to  play  an  important  part.  But 
unfortunately,  here  and  in  many  other  cases  was  revealed 
the  want  of  direction,  and  by  this  the  failure  to  adopt  the 
new  ideas  with  regard  to  the  defending  and  attacking  of 
positions.  The  inspection  of  the  sector  which  was  chosen 
for  the  advance  showed  that  it  offered  to  the  enemy  too 
many  advantages  of  defence.  This  was  due  to  the  fact 
that  after  our  previous  rapid  advance  the  Austro-Germans 
remained  in  chosen  positions,  not  only  very  well  fortified, 
but  excellently  adapted  to  the  country.  Besides  this,  it  was 
evident  that  in  any  case  our  advance  could  be  on  a  com- 
paratively small  scale,  about  ten  kilometres,  after  which  the 
ground  was  so  muddy  that  it  was  impossible  to  conduct 
serious  operations.  There  we  should  come  upon  the  so- 
called  Kovel  swamps.  Mature  consideration  of  this  con- 
vinced me  that  the  projected  advance  would  not  give  any 
chance  of  success,  and  unwillingly  we  had  to  renounce  this 
plan. 

At  this  time  the  Staff  of  the  8th  Army  of  General 
Kaledin  was  established  in  Lutsk.  On  the  first  free  day 
I  visited  Kaledin  in  order  to  learn  what  were  his  inten- 
tions and  how  to  arrange  our  military  activity.  Kaledin 
told  me  in  conversation  that  he,  like  myself,  had  to  make 
preparations  for  the  coming  operations,  and  that  his   re- 


192  AT  HEADQUARTERS  IN  MOHILEFF     [ch.  xv 

sources  in  troops  and  artillery  were  by  no  means  sufficient 
for  the  great  attack  which  was  projected;  that  after  his 
quick  advance,  in  June  and  July,  the  enemy  considerably 
fortified  their  front  positions,  equalling  him  in  force  and 
even  surpassing  him  with  regard  to  artillery. 

Having  exchanged  opinions  we  left  and  promised  to 
have,  as  often  as  possible,  personal  meetings,  which  greatly 
helped  the  arrangement  of  our  activities  to  our  mutual 
convenience.  Soon  afterwards  my  surmises  about  the 
futility  of  the  intended  advance,  in  the  sector  chosen,  were 
confirmed  by  the  High  Command,  and  it  was  proposed  to 
try  another  place  in  a  more  suitable  sector.  But  soon  came 
instructions  from  General  Brussiloff,  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  south-western  front,  that  he  had  decided  to 
attack  the  enemy  with  the  help  of  the  8th  Army,  with  a 
view  to  obtaining  greater  results.  For  this  two  infantry 
corps  of  Guards  had  to  be  transferred  to  the  east  of  Lutsk 
and  given  over  to  the  command  of  General  Kaledin. 
These  corps  accomplished  their  passage  from  one  army 
to  another  in  the  beginning  of  September.  At  the  same 
time  two  flank  corps  from  the  army  of  Kaledin  came  to 
join  my  command.  It  was  said  that  in  case  of  the  success 
of  the  8th  Army  I  ought  to  develop  this  success  by  the 
activity  of  my  left  flank,  which  was  close  to  the  front  of 
the  coming  attack.  However,  as  the  attack  of  the  8th 
Army  in  the  middle  of  September  did  not  give  the  ex- 
pected results,  I  did  not  take  part  in  the  development  of  the 
operations. 

■  •  •  •  • 

At  this  stage,  on  the  extreme  left  flank  of  the  whole 
Russian  front,  new  and  important  events  were  develop- 
ing. In  August  19 1 6  the  armies  fighting  the  Central 
Powers  were  joined  by  Roumania  after  her  long  hesitation 


I9i6]         AT  HEADQUARTERS  IN  MOHILEFF  193 

as  to  what  course  she  should  take.  In  time  history  will 
explain  why,  after  this  hesitation,  Roumania  joined  in  at 
the  moment  most  unfavourable  for  her  and  the  Allies.  As 
was  known  to  me,  the  Russian  Government  tried  to  per- 
suade Roumania  to  enter  the  war  in  June,  at  the  time  when 
General  Brussiloff's  advance  across  the  Carpathians  was  in 
full  swing,  and  it  was  possible  to  count  that  for  one  or  two 
months  yet  the  Russian  Army  would  have  sufficient  re- 
serves and  materials  for  the  continuation  of  an  energetic 
advance.  But  this  chance  was  missed  by  Roumania;  her 
troops  took  the  field  only  in  the  last  days  of  August,  during 
the  time  when  the  advance  of  General  Brussiloff  was 
gradually  dying  away.  Besides  the  insufficiency  of  re- 
serves and  munitions,  the  fatigue  of  the  army,  which  dur- 
ing three  months  was  under  the  great  strain  of  incessant 
fighting,  began  to  become  evident.  At  the  same  time 
General  Alexeieff  showed  the  Roumanian  Government  that 
the  length  of  their  frontier  did  not  permit  of  the  possibility 
of  their  own  troops  defending  it  all  from  enemy  invasion 
and  also  did  not  permit  an  advance  on  the  whole  front. 
For  that  purpose  it  was  necessary  to  transfer  the  Russian 
troops  to  Transylvania,  which  was  then  thinly  occupied 
by  the  Austrians  and  to  recall  the  Roumanian  troops  hold- 
ing the  extreme  eastern  part  of  the  province  of  Wallachia 
close  to  the  Serbian  border,  to  the  line  of  defence  on  a 
meridian  a  little  to  the  East  of  Bukarest;  both  these 
measures  were  designed  to  shorten  the  Roumanian  fight- 
ing line  and  to  free  a  part  of  the  Roumanian  troops  for  the 
offensive  in  the  chosen  direction.  However,  Roumania 
did  not  take  advantage  of  either  course,  but  began  by  an 
invasion  on  a  large  front,  along  the  whole  length  of  her 
frontier.  It  is  difficult  to  say  how  far  it  was  right,  but 
it  was  affirmed  that  the  Roumanian  Government  did  not 


194  AT  HEADQUARTERS  IN  MOHILEFF     [ch.  xv 

want  to  consent  to  the  Russian  plans  for  the  occupation 
of  Transylvania  because  it  was  feared  that  this  temporary 
occupation  would  change  into  a  permanent  one.  Gener- 
ally at  this  time  the  Allies  "  divided  the  skin  of  a  bear  they 
had  not  yet  killed."  Already  an  agreement  had  been 
made  between  Russia  and  Roumania  by  virtue  of  which  a 
part  of  Bukovina  with  the  town  of  Tchernovitz,  at  this 
time  really  occupied  by  us,  was  to  pass  under  Roumanian 
dominions.  Simultaneously  was  also  defined  which  Aus- 
trian provinces  with  a  Roumanian  population  were,  after 
the  treaty  of  peace,  to  form  a  part  of  Roumania ! 

As  is  known,  the  first  advance  of  the  Roumanian  troops 
was  successful,  as  in  the  Transvlyania  there  were  almost 
no  Austrian  troops.  This  was  probably  because  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  continued  to  hope  that  Roumania  would  re- 
main neutral.  Scarcely  two  weeks  had  passed  before  the 
Austro-Germans,  gathering  their  forces,  stopped  the 
Roumanian  advance,  and  soon  afterwards  themselves 
began  a  general  offensive.  About  this  time  it  was  the 
general  opinion  that  Roumania  was  counting  upon  the 
neutrality  of  Bulgaria.  With  the  entry  of  the  Bulgars,  not 
only  did  the  lines  of  the  Roumanian  Army  become  longer 
and  the  danger  to  the  Dobroudja  greater,  but  there  was  a 
possibility  of  the  Bulgarian  troops  crossing  the  Danube. 
Then  naturally  they  had  to  revert  to  the  idea  of  General 
Alexeieff  and  to  occupy  a  part  of  the  Roumanian  frontier, 
turned  to  the  west,  with  Russian  troops.  But  this  necessi- 
tated the  lengthening  of  our  front.  The  poverty  of  the 
Roumanian  railways,  like  those  of  ours  which  were  close 
to  Moldavia,  did  not  present  a  chance  of  counting  on  the 
successful  transfer  of  the  troops  by  this  means.  We  had, 
little  by  little,  to  transfer  to  the  south  the  left  flank  of  the 
Russian  Army,  and  thus  gradually  replace  the  Roumanian 


I9i6]         AT  HEADQUARTERS  IN  MOHILEFF  195 

troops.  This  task  was  allotted  to  the  left  flank  of  the 
9th  Army  under  General  Lechitzky.  Between  the  nth 
and  9th  Armies  it  was  decided  to  place  the  8th  Army. 
For  this  purpose  only  the  staff  of  General  Kaledin  was 
transferred  to  the  region  of  Tchernovitz,  and  to  his  com- 
mand was  given  a  part  of  the  troops  already  there  who 
had  come  from  the  different  parts  of  the  Russian  front. 
In  the  middle  of  September  this  Order  was  received,  and 
within  twenty-four  hours  I  took  command  of  all  the  corps 
of  the  8th  Army,  together  with  all  the  corps  of  my  own 
army,  amongst  which  were  two  corps  of  cavalry.  From 
this  moment  the  "  Special  Army  "  became  really  Special, 
not  only  because  it  was  composed  of  troops  of  the  Guards, 
but  also  because  of  its  unusual  size,  having  fourteen  army 
corps.  Especially  difficult  was  the  work  of  my  Staff,  which 
had  still  to  form  the  different  bases,  to  deal  directly  with 
the  different  military  detachments  and  organisations  which 
were  under  its  command. 

During  the  first  part  of  September  the  advancing  opera- 
tions of  General  Brussiloff  were  slowly  ceasing.  This  was 
caused,  as  was  explained  before,  partly  by  the  exhaustion 
of  the  reserves  of  these  armies  as  well  as  of  those  on  the 
other  fronts.  It  had  been  found  necessary  to  send  the  re- 
maining reserves  from  other  fronts  to  lengthen  the  left 
wing  of  the  Russian  Army  on  the  Roumanian  frontier. 
But  the  principal  cause  of  our  reduced  activity  was  the 
deficiency  in  artillery  munitions,  which  were  as  much 
exhausted  by  Brussiloff's  attacks  as  by  secondary  opera- 
tions in  the  Riga  and  Baranowitchi  sectors.  In  time  the 
enemy  so  strengthened  himself  that  in  certain  places  he 
could  concentrate  sufficient  reserves  to  paralyse  our  at- 
tacks even  although  they  were  successful  in  the  beginning. 
But  at  the  same  period  the  whole  stoppage  of  the  offensive 


196  AT  HEADQUARTERS  IN  MOHILEFF     [ch.  xv 

on  our  part  might  have  been  taken  advantage  of  by  the 
Germans  to  transfer  these  reserves  from  GaHcia  to  Tran- 
sylvania, whence  they  could  travel  by  railway  sooner  than 
our  troops  could  by  foot. 

The  danger  lay  in  the  seizure  of  the  mountain  passes 
of  the  Transylvanian  Carpathians  and  the  invasion  of  the 
Austro-Germans  into  Roumanian  territory  to  surround  our 
left  flank.  At  this  stage  the  greatest  concentration  of  the 
German  troops  was  prepared  against  the  Special  Army, 
and  for  that  reason  it  was  imperative  for  me  to  continue 
active  operations.  Our  reconnaissances  had  fixed  the 
number  of  German  divisions  on  this  comparatively  small 
front  at  twenty-three.  Knowing  this,  I  proposed  to  Gen- 
eral Brussiloff  that  I  should  continue  the  attacks  only  if 
they  would  give  me  a  corresponding  quantity  of  munitions 
—  realising  as  I  did  how  difficult  it  was  to  break  the  re- 
sistance of  twenty-three  German  divisions.  I  proposed  to 
undertake  the  preparation  of  the  artillery  on  a  front  of 
about  fifteen  kilometres  of  three  corps  and  from  time  to 
time  to  accompany  it  with  infantry  attacks.  However,  the 
whole  of  the  artillery  on  my  front,  which  was  about  150 
kilometres  in  extent,  was  not  to  be  moved  from  its  place, 
because  the  guns  were  to  work  more  for  the  preparation 
of  the  advance  than  for  the  infantry,  and  I  did  not  have 
sufficient  artillery  at  my  command  even  to  enable  it  to  rest 
during  the  necessary  transfer  from  the  front  to  the  rear  of 
my  lines. 

The  three  staffs  of  the  corps  were  also  unchanged,  and 
took  part  in  the  advance.  During  September  and  October 
these  advances  were  not  less  than  five  in  number.  Some 
of  them,  in  order  to  preserve  the  infantry  forces,  were 
limited  only  to  artillery  preparation,  and  this  was  stopped 
by  the  rainy  and  stormy  weather. 


i9i6]         AT  HEADQUARTERS  IN  MOHILEFF  197 

During  this  time  nearly  all  divisions  took  part  In  the 
attacks  and  much  blood  was  shed  on  both  sides.  But  be- 
fore half  of  their  effective  force  was  lost  they  were  sent 
Into  reserve  In  order  that  they  might  be  quickly  reinforced. 
Towards  the  end  of  October,  the  whole  of  the  artillery 
and  Infantry  were  mixed  and  fresh  regrouping  was  neces- 
sary for  normal  reorganisation  of  the  army  corps.  But 
the  main  object  was  accomplished:  the  Germans  were  un- 
able to  take  away  their  divisions  from  my  sector;  they  were 
even  compelled  to  reinforce  them  with  fresh  troops.  Our 
troops  meanwhile  occupied  their  appointed  positions  in 
Transylvania  and  prevented  the  access  of  the  Austro-Ger- 
mans  to  Moldavia. 

From  thence  onward  the  withdrawal  of  the  corps  of  the 
Special  Army  began,  but  on  account  of  the  extended  front 
the  number  left  could  not  be  less  than  nine.  My  principal 
assistant  In  directing  the  advancing  operations  was  General 
Korniloff,  who  came  to  me  as  commander  of  the  25th  Army 
Corps  In  the  middle  of  September,  after  his  escape  from 
captivity  In  Austria. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

GENERAL    KORNILOFF MY    APPOINTMENT   AS    CHIEF 

OF    THE    STAFF 

KoRNlLOFF  succeeded  in  escaping  from  his  captivity,  as 
happens  generally  in  such  cases,  owing  to  the  audacity  and 
coolness  which  he  displayed.  He  was  taken  prisoner  in 
the  summer  of  19 15,  during  the  retreat  of  the  south- 
western army  from  Galician  territory,  when  he,  in  order  to 
secure  the  safe,  uninterrupted  retreat  of  the  corps,  in  which 
he  commanded  a  division,  maintained  an  obstinate  fight, 
remaining  with  a  comparatively  small  rear-guard.  The 
corps  succeeded  in  escaping  from  the  difficult  position,  but 
at  the  price  of  the  capture  of  the  rear-guard,  including 
General  Korniloff  himself. 

He  had  to  prepare  his  escape  little  by  little,  so  as  not 
to  arouse  the  suspicion  of  the  Austrians,  who  kept  him 
under  strict  supervision.  He  intentionally  behaved  so 
rudely  to  the  Austrian  authorities  that  they  in  time  began 
to  avoid  immediate  relations  with  him.  When  everything 
was  ready  for  the  escape,  he  was  secretly  supplied  with  the 
uniform  of  a  common  soldier  of  the  Austrian  Army. 
Korniloff  pretended  to  be  ill,  but  the  doctor  who  came  to 
see  him  was  received  so  curtly  that  he  did  not  renew  his 
visit.  Then  came  the  moment  for  the  escape.  His 
orderly,  a  Russian  soldier,  was  of  course  In  the  plot,  and 
after  Korniloff's  disappearance  continued  to  assert  that  his 
General  was  ill,  and  did  not  want  to  see  anybody.  Mean- 
while, Korniloff,  in  the  uniform  of  an  Austrian  soldier,  was 

J98 


I9i6]  GENERAL  KORNILOFF  i99 

going  by  train  in  the  direction  of  the  Roumanian  frontier. 
There  was  a  dangerous  moment  when  Korniloff  was  leav- 
ing the  building  in  which  he  was  confined,  but  the  Austrian 
sentry  evidently  took  him  for  a  comrade,  and  did  not  even 
challenge  him  when  he  was  leaving  the  enclosure  and,  as 
he  passed,  asked  the  sentry  to  light  his  cigarette. 

When  he  had  arrived  close  to  the  Roumanian  frontier, 
Korniloff  thought  it  wiser  to  leave  the  train  and  continue 
his  journey  on  foot,  making  use  of  a  compass  and  a  map 
which  he  had  taken  care  to  procure.  The  most  difficult 
part  of  his  scheme  had  not  yet  come.  It  was  essential  to 
avoid  any  dangerous  meeting,  and  for  that  it  was  necessary 
to  keep  clear  of  inhabited  places.  He  was  obliged  to  sup- 
port himself  upon  what  he  could  find  in  the  fields.  On 
the  third  night  he  decided  to  approach  some  shepherds, 
who  appeared  to  be  Austro-Roumanians.  He  described 
himself  as  a  deserter,  and  received  from  them  the  neces- 
sary information  as  to  how  to  get  to  the  Roumanian 
frontier,  in  avoiding  the  Austrian  troops.  Next  day  he 
found  himself  in  Roumania  among  friends,  who  helped  him 
to  return  to  Russia. 

On  reaching  me,  Korniloff  received  the  command  of  the 
25th  Army  Corps,  already  preparing  to  take  a  most  active 
part  in  the  coming  operations.  He  threw  himself  into  this 
work  with  extraordinary  energy;  but  he  had  to  learn  much 
himself,  as  during  the  year  of  his  imprisonment,  the  process 
of  arranging  the  positions  of  the  fighting  line  and  the 
methods  of  offence  had  made  great  progress.  For  this  I 
had  often  to  visit  his  corps,  examining  the  positions  with 
him,  in  order  to  give  the  necessary  instructions.  Here  I 
had  full  opportunity  of  appreciating  the  attainments  of  this 
remarkable  personality.  One  of  the  peculiarities  of  strong 
characters  is  that  they  never  refuse  an  opportunity  of  learn- 


200  GENERAL  KORNILOFF  [ch.  xvi 

Ing  something,  adopting  some  new  idea,  perceiving  at  once 
in  what  measure  the  new  is  rational  and  useful.  At  this 
time  I  realised  that  Korniloff  was  a  splendid  man  of  action, 
able  to  show,  in  measure  as  it  was  required,  the  necessary 
personal  initiative.  If  one  adds  to  this  his  extraordinary 
energy,  his  just,  soldier-like  opinions,  his  great  austerity 
in  relation  to  himself,  which  gave  him  the  right  of  behaving 
severely  and  of  being  exacting  with  his  subordinates,  then 
one  can  depict  the  personality  of  this  man  for  whom  fate 
prepared  such  an  eminent  role  during  the  time  of  the  Rus- 
sian Revolution. 

In  addition  to  this,  the  distinctive  trait  of  Korniloff  is 
his  personal  courage  —  which  quality  so  strongly  influences 
the  troops  under  a  chief.  But  this  does  not  prevent  him 
from  adopting  the  wise  and  soldier-like  principles  with 
which  every  commanding  oflScer  ought  to  guide  himself. 
Napoleon  expresses  this  in  these  words:  "  Se  prodiguer 
a  la  reconnaissance,  se  menager  a  la  bataille  "  ("Not  to 
spare  oneself  during  reconnoitring,  but  to  save  oneself  dur- 
ing the  battle  ").  And,  in  fact,  during  the  period  of  prep- 
aration Korniloff  personally  inspected  his  positions,  ap- 
peared in  the  most  dangerous  places  among  his  troops,  but 
during  the  battle  he  never  left  his  post  of  command,  from 
which  he  could  communicate  constantly  with  his  subordin- 
ates and  with  myself. 

Korniloff's  appearance  is  not  less  characteristic.  By 
birth  a  Cossack  from  beyond  the  Balkans,  undoubtedly  one 
of  his  ancestors  was  of  Bouriat,  i.e.  of  Mongol,  origin. 
His  prominent  cheek-bones,  his  piercing,  slanting  eyes,  his 
skin  of  light  olive  tint,  are  clear  evidence  of  this. 

For  nearly  a  month  and  a  half  the  operations  of  ad- 
vance lasted,  alternating  with  periods  of  calm.  After  this 
preparations  again  began  for  infantry  attacks.     In  almost 


I9i6]  GENERAL  KORNILOFF  201 

all  of  these,  although  operating  with  different  divisions, 
General  Korniloff  and  his  staff  took  part.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  November,  as  I  said  before,  our  position  on  the 
Transylvanian  frontier  was  fully  strengthened.  I  consid- 
ered the  task  which  I  intended  to  carry  out  —  the  holding 
of  German  troops  on  my  front  —  finished,  and  I  asked  the 
permission  of  General  Brussilof?  to  stop  the  attacks,  to 
withdraw  the  greater  part  of  the  divisions  as  a  reserve, 
and  to  begin  to  prepare  troops  for  the  spring  offensives. 
But  it  was  by  no  means  intended  to  stop  the  military  opera- 
tions. At  the  front  of  the  Army,  to  every  commander  of 
a  corps  it  was  proposed  to  allot  a  small  district  —  in  prefer- 
ence where  the  enemy  was  not  farther  than  some  100  paces 
—  and  from  time  to  time  to  provoke  close  fighting  in 
trenches,  especially  using  trench  mortars  instead  of  artil- 
lery, and  hand-grenades  instead  of  bayonets.  These 
districts  had  to  be  also  a  fighting-school  for  the  divisions 
of  the  corps. 

At  this  time  the  Germans  showed  very  little  activity, 
sending  only  clouds  of  asphyxiating  gases  accompanied  by 
the  firing  of  shells  containing  chemicals.  As  in  December 
19 14,  regiments  of  the  6th  Corps  were  the  first  to  experi- 
ence the  effects  of  the  firing  of  chemical  shells,  so  also  in 
the  middle  of  May  19 15,  almost  on  the  eve  of  the  de- 
parture of  my  corps  to  the  reserve,  and  its  consequent  dis- 
patch to  Galicia,  one  of  my  regiments,  together  with  its 
neighbours,  the  Siberians,  were  the  first  to  come  under  the 
effects  of  the  gas  wave,  although  the  regiment  of  my  corps 
was  caught  only  by  the  end  of  the  gas.  The  attack  itself 
was  led  by  the  Germans  against  the  neighbouring  Siberian 
regiments  of  the  6th  Siberian  Corps.  This  gas  attack, 
being  the  first,  caused  us  a  great  loss  in  men,  and  one  of 
the  Siberian  Regiments,  moved  up  from  the  reserve  to  help 


202  GENERAL  KORNILOFF  [ch.  xvi 

the  attacked  region,  especially  suffered.  The  number  of 
gas  masks  then  was  only  sufficient  to  supply  the  troops  in 
the  front  lines.  The  gas  wave  was  so  strong  that  its  effect, 
though  naturally  in  a  weaker  degree,  was  felt  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Second  Army  at  Grodisko, 
a  distance  of  thirty  kilometres  from  the  place  where  the 
gas  was  sent.  But,  as  in  the  first  case  of  shelling  with 
chemical  substances,  so  also  in  this,  the  Germans  had  no 
success,  because  in  the  final  result  in  both  cases  they  were 
forced  back  to  their  positions  by  counter-attacks.  From 
this  time  onward  the  troops  under  my  command  more  than 
once  experienced  the  effects  of  the  gas  wave,  but  I  cannot 
point  out  any  case  in  which,  after  the  so-called  "  gas  at- 
tack," the  Germans  had  any  success  in  their  advance. 

Then,  more  than  once,  it  was  reported  from  the  front 
lines  that  the  projected  gas  cloud,  owing  to  the  caprices  of 
the  air  currents,  did  not  reach  our  lines,  but  returned  to  the 
Germans  and,  still  worse  for  them,  passed  along  their 
lines.  This  invariably  resulted  in  the  German  soldiers 
escaping  from  the  trenches,  under  heavy  fire  from  our 
artillery. 

In  time  the  Germans  came  to  the  conclusion  themselves 
that  the  gas  attacks  were  of  very  little  advantage  to  them, 
and  in  19 17  we  heard  no  more  of  them.  I  do  not  think 
that  the  gas  waves  which  we  sent  were  more  successful, 
but  the  shelling  with  the  chemical  substances  was  another 
matter.  As  exclusive  means  of  fighting,  especially  for 
shelling  the  front  lines,  they  probably  never  gave  results 
which  the  Germans  expected.  But  as  an  auxiliary  in  lead- 
ing artillery  preparation  for  an  attack  in  order  to  paralyse 
the  hostile  batteries,  in  the  course  of  time  they  began  to 
obtain  greater  importance  and  wider  use.  But  every  stick 
has  two  ends,  says  a  Russian  proverb,  and  if  the  chemical 


I9I4-I6]  GENERAL  KORNILOFF  203 

shells  helped  the  Germans,  so,  by  and  by,  when  we  and 
our  Allies  began  to  adopt  them,  they  caused  also  a  great 
deal  of  damage  to  the  Germans.  In  general,  every  new 
Invention  tending  to  a  more  perfect  method  of  destroying 
the  enemy  gives  a  real  advantage  only  so  long  as  the  ad- 
versary has  not  equally  adopted  It.  But  the  chemical  gases 
applied  as  a  wave  had  not  even  this  nature,  as  they  often 
brought  more  harm  to  the  Inventors;  and  not  only  when 
the  wave  turned  on  those  who  sent  It,  but  also  when  it 
enveloped  the  enemy  trenches.  German  troops  sent  to  the 
attack  entering  the  zone  Infected  by  the  gas  wave  consid- 
ered themselves  victorious,  and  entered  the  captured 
trenches,  which  were  full  of  gas.  They,  therefore.  In- 
haled the  air  with  all  the  greater  force,  because  of  the 
rapid  advance,  and  In  spite  of  their  gas  masks  did 
not  gain  so  much  as  they  suffered  from  the  effect  of  their 
own  gases.  This  may  explain  the  comparative  ease  with 
which  we  succeeded  in  the  counter-attacks  after  the  Ger- 
man offensive. 

The  calm  gave  me  the  opportunity  of  making  frequent 
tours  of  the  corps  and  the  front  lines.  On  November  19th 
I  was  first  able  to  visit  my  extreme  left  flank,  the  5th  Corps 
of  which,  owing  to  their  distance,  did  not  participate  In  the 
active  operations  of  the  attack  In  the  months  of  September 
and  October.  For  this  particular  tour  I  had  to  leave 
Headquarters  for  two  days.  The  district  of  the  5th 
Corps  interested  me,  as  I  had  planned  a  part  of  Its  dis- 
position for  the  future  spring  active  operations.  I  also 
wished  to  become  better  acquainted  with  the  commander 
of  the  corps.  General  Baloueff,  with  whom  I  had  not  come 
into  contact. 

On  the  second  day  of  my  stay,  having  returned  from 
the  front  lines  to  the  Headquarters  of  the  corps  and  having 


204  GENERAL  KORNILOFF  [ch.  xvi 

talked  by  telephone  with  my  Chief  of  the  Staff,  Major- 
General  Alexeieff,  and  having  learned  that  for  the  moment 
he  did  not  need  my  interference,  Geaeifal  Baloueff,  I,  and 
the  officers  who  accompanied  us  dufiog  the  inspection  sat 
at  the  dinner,  or  supper,  which  was  prepared.  But  I  had 
not  finished  my  plate  of  soup  when  I  was  told  that  my  Chief 
of  the  Staff  wished  me  to  come  to  the  telephone.  It  was 
clear  that  he  had  something  of  importance  to  tell  me. 
What  he  did  say  was  quite  unexpected.  His  message  was 
that  a  telegram  had  been  received  for  me,  not  even  in 
cipher,  with  the  signature  "  Nicolai."  It  said  that  owing 
to  the  illness  of  General  Alexeieff,  who  needed  a  long  rest, 
the  choice  of  His  Majesty  had  fallen  upon  me  to  execute 
par  interim  the  duties  of  Chief  of  the  General  Staff.  I  in- 
formed Major  General  Alexeieff  that  in  an  hour's  time  I 
would  leave  for  my  Headquarters. 

I  finished  my  dinner,  told  General  Baloueff  what  had 
happened  and  asked  him  to  dispatch  my  answer  to  the 
Emperor.  I  intimated  that  I  had  received  the  Tsar's  tele- 
gram; that  I  was  at  the  time  on  the  further  flanks  of  my 
army;  that  I  was  leaving  immediately  for  my  headquarters 
and  asked  permission  to  give  the  command  of  the  Special 
Army  to  General  Baloueff.  In  twenty-four  hours  I 
counted  upon  leaving  for  my  destination.  I  informed 
General  Baloueff  of  my  decision  to  hand  over  to  him  the 
command  of  the  Special  Army  for  the  indefinite  period  of 
my  absence.  This  decision  was  in  reality  the  result  of 
chance.  If  I  had  received  the  Tsar's  telegram  two  days 
earlier  I  could  never  have  made  such  a  decision.  I  did 
not  know  General  Baloueff  well  enough,  and,  besides,  he 
was  not  the  senior  among  my  corps  commanders.  But 
all  that  I  saw  in  his  corps,  his  will  and  persevering  energy, 
the  personal  carrying-out  of  all  my  numerous,  complicated, 


I9i6]  GENERAL  KORNILOFF  205 

and  difficult  military  commands,  and  the  sensible  measures 
which  he  adopted  in  developing  them,  disposed  me  in  his 
favour.  These  hazards  that  play  not  only  with  the  fate 
of  the  individual  man,  but  also  reflect  on  the  fate  of  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  people  depending  upon  him  —  are 
they  really  simple  hazard?  War  and  its  chances  develop 
fatalism  in  people,  and  fatalism  in  its  turn  reconciles  us 
with  those  so-called  hazards  in  our  life. 

Having  given  to  the  Chief  of  my  Staff  the  necessary 
instructions,  I  received  an  inquiry  from  the  General  Head- 
quarters asking  whether  I  desired  to  go  to  Mohileff  by  an 
express  train  or  by  an  ordinary  one.  On  the  way  I  in- 
tended to  call  at  Berditcheff,  where  General  Brussiloff  was 
staying,  as  I  understood  that  of  all  the  commanders  at  the 
fronts  I  should  have  to  deal  with  him  the  most.  Already 
the  inequality  of  the  Roumanian  fight  with  the  Austro- 
Germans  was  becoming  apparent,  and  it  was  clear  that  we 
should  have  to  come  to  her  help. 

As  I  was  leaving  for  an  indefinite  time  I  wanted  to  say 
good-bye  to  my  wife,  who  then  worked  as  a  Sister  of 
Charity  in  the  dressing  detachment  of  the  corps  of  General 
Korniloff.  Her  presence  in  the  army  detachments  needs 
some  explanation.  When  the  Balkan  War  concluded  in  so 
unexpected  a  manner  in  the  winter  of  1911-12,  my  wife 
—  we  lived  at  this  time  at  Moscow  —  came  to  the  con- 
clusion that  this  was  only  the  prelude  to  a  future  European 
War.  As  a  result  of  her  provision,  she  took  an  eight- 
months'  course  of  training  next  winter  so  that  at  the  out- 
break of  war  operations  she  should  have  at  once  the  right 
to  engage  herself  as  a  Sister  of  Charity.  In  the  spring  of 
19 1 2  she  had  for  the  first  time  in  her  life,  though  already 
of  mature  age,  to  pass  an  examination  and  to  endure  emo- 
tions which  are  generally  associated  with  one's  young  days. 


2o6  GENERAL  KORNILOFF  [ch.  xvi 

Holding  the  diploma  of  a  Sister  of  Charity  in  the  early 
days  of  August,  she  was  able  to  accompany  the  ist  Army 
of  General  Rennenkampf,  and  could  be  nominated  to  a 
divisional  hospital.  She  made  only  one  condition  —  that 
they  would  not  send  any  other  sister  there.  However,  the 
work  of  the  divisional  hospital  did  not  satisfy  her.  She 
asked  to  be  transferred,  and  she  worked  during  the  periods 
of  fighting  in  the  nearest  divisional  dressing  station. 

I  cannot  say  that  it  helped  her  to  get  news  from  me. 
During  the  greater  part  of  the  war  she  was  cut  off  from 
me  by  such  great  distances,  that  It  made  not  only  personal 
meetings  but  postal  communication  very  difficult,  some- 
times impossible. 

After  some  months  she  succeeded  In  being  transferred 
to  a  divisional  dressing  detachment  somewhere  near 
me,  but  soon  afterwards  I  was  again  moved  on.  Never- 
theless, our  rare  meetings  brought  me  a  considerable  share 
of  help.  From  her  I  could  always  learn  the  good  and 
bad  points  of  the  regulations  and  organisation  for  the  treat- 
ment of  the  wounded.  This  enabled  me  to  issue  necessary 
instructions,  dealing  with  infringements  of  the  rules  and 
other  abuses,  concerning  reports  on  sanitary  and  medical 
matters,  and  as  her  duties  during  the  whole  time  were  in 
direct  connection  with  the  front  line,  where  first  aid  must 
be  given  to  the  wounded,  and  where  carelessness  and  un- 
trustworthiness  may  wreak  the  most  Irreparable  damage, 
I  could  naturally  pay  great  attention  to  these  matters 
among  the  troops  which  were  under  me.  It  was  the  easier 
because  my  wife,  during  the  three  years  of  war,  had  been 
in  at  least  ten  medical  establishments.  During  this  time 
fate  led  her  into  those  institutions  which  distinguished 
themselves  for  rather  bad  qualities  of  order  and  organisa- 


I9i6]  GENERAL  KORNILOFF  '   207 

tion,  but  it  also  took  her  into  contact  with  chiefs  and 
doctors  who  gave  their  whole  souls  to  the  work  of  helping 
the  wounded. 

For  instance,  during  the  retreat  of  the  64th  Division  of 
the  24th  Corps  in  the  Augustoff  Woods,  which  might  have 
ended  in  the  complete  encircling  of  the  corps,  she  saw 
medical  men  so  busy  taking  care  of  themselves  as  to  forget 
that  they  were  required  for  the  help  of  the  wounded,  even 
if  they  were  in  a  most  difficult  and  dangerous  position.  In 
Galicia,  on  the  other  hand,  she  could  observe  how,  under 
the  most  difficult  conditions,  living  in  dug-outs  and  half- 
ruined  buildings,  the  doctors  could  comply  with  the  most 
severe  aseptic  and  surgical  requirements;  how  they  could 
give  surgical  help  in  the  cases  of  wounds  which  demanded 
immediate  attention,  and,  under  active  artillery  fire,  could 
have  a  dressing  station  corresponding  to  the  strictest  re- 
quirements of  modern  surgery.  At  this  time,  as  always, 
she  was  the  only  sister  In  the  dressing  detachment  of  the 
division  which  was  under  the  direction  of  the  well-known 
Karkoff  surgeon,  Strounnikoff. 

As  I  was  commanded  to  go  to  the  front,  we  had  to 
part  again  for  an  indefinite  time,  for  she  would  not  leave 
her  work  in  the  divisional  dressing  attachment  of  Korni- 
loff's  corps.  Delayed  by  bad  roads,  she  arrived  at  Lutsk 
just  before  my  departure,  and  during  the  last  few  hours 
there  I  did  not  see  her  at  all.  I  was  busy  giving  orders 
concerning  the  programme  of  the  work  of  the  action  of 
the  troops  for  the  approaching  winter  period.  In  view  of 
this  there  was  nothing  for  me  to  do  but  to  take  her  with 
me  to  Mohlleff,  especially  as  the  carriage  which  was  taking 
me  there  at  once  had  to  return  to  Lutsk.  During  the 
journey,  naturally,  I  was  able  to  devote  some  time  to  her. 


2o8  GENERAL  KORNILOFF  [ch.  xvi 

On  my  leaving  Lutsk  I  took  with  me  my  adjutant  who  had 
been  with  me  from  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  Captain 
Arngold,  and  the  second  adjutant,  Captain  Arapoff. 

I  stayed  for  some  hours  in  Berditcheff  at  General  Brussi- 
loff's  and  In  about  twenty-four  hours  I  was  In  Kleff. 
There,  while  awaiting  the  departure  of  the  train  to 
Mohlleff,  I  learnt  that  the  train  alongside  mine  was  that 
of  the  Grand  Duke  Nicolai,  who  had  just  arrived  from 
the  General  Headquarters,  and  was  that  night  going  back 
to  his  home  at  Tiflls.  I  sent  at  once  to  his  train  one  of 
my  adjutants,  and  learnt  that  he  had  gone  to  visit  the 
patronal  saints  of  Kieff,  and  afterwards  that  he  would 
probably  dine  with  the  Dowager  Empress  Maria  Feo- 
dorovna,  and  was  expected  to  return  towards  evening. 
Having  finished  my  business  in  the  town  and  returned  in 
the  evening  to  my  train,  I  learnt  that  the  Grand  Duke  had 
several  times  sent  to  inquire  if  I  had  come  back.  There 
remained  an  hour  and  a  half  before  the  departure  of  our 
trains  in  different  directions,  and  I  passed  the  time  in 
animated  conversation  with  the  Grand  Duke. 

Until  this  time,  although  I  had  had  the  opportunity  of 
seeing  the  Grand  Duke  in  an  official  capacity,  I  had  never 
had  an  unrestrained  conversation  with  him.  I  had  even 
reason  to  suppose  that  I  did  not  belong  to  those  whose 
Intimacy  he  desired.  But  here  I  met  a  man  extremely 
affable  and  frank,  fully  approving  my  selection  as  a  succes- 
sor to  General  Alexeleff.  From  the  Grand  Duke  I  first 
learnt  that  the  illness  of  Alexeleff  was  very  grave,  that  the 
serious  danger  was  not  over,  and  that  a  relapse  might  be 
fatal.  From  his  words  I  understood  that  with  such  a  sad 
alternative  my  temporary  nomination  might  become  per- 
manent. I  am  bound  to  say  that  such  an  alternative 
troubled   rather  than  pleased  me.     During  our   conversa- 


I9i6]  GENERAL  KORNILOFF  209 

tion  the  Grand  Duke  touched  on  the  personality  of  the 
Emperor  and  told  me  that  the  opinion  circulated  by  the 
crowd  did  not  give  a  proper  impression  of  the  man.  The 
Grand  Duke  advised  me  to  be  fully  frank  with  the  Tsar  in 
all  things,  and  not  to  hide  the  reality  with  an  idea  of  spar- 
ing him  grief.  To  that  I  could  only  reply  that  this  advice 
fully  coincided  with  my  character  and  principles.  I  parted 
from  the  Grand  Duke  with  a  warm  embrace,  and  he  as- 
sured me  that  he  would  in  all  cases  be  ready  to  give  me  as 
far  as  possible,  in  the  limits  of  his  power,  every  help  and 
co-operation,  and  then  again,  as  in  the  beginning  of  our 
conversation,  he  mentioned  that  my  dead  father,  Field- 
Marshal  Gourko,  was  very  friendly  with  his  own  father. 
Soon  our  trains  took  each  of  us  to  his  destination,  him  to 
his  familiar  work,  governing  the  troops  and  land  of  the 
Caucasus,  myself  to  the  unknown  and  difficult  problem  of 
directing  the  life  and  military  activity  of  10,000,000  of 
men's  lives;  men  whose  combined  efforts,  though  extremely 
various,  it  was  essential  to  lead  with  one  will,  one  thought, 
to  the  final  goal. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

FIRST    DAYS    AT    GENERAL    HEADQUARTERS 

Towards  night,  on  November  23rd,  19 16,  I  arrived  at  the 
station  of  Mohileff.  First  of  all  I  went  to  see  General 
Alexeieff,  but,  from  his  wife,  who  had  been  called  to  him 
on  account  of  his  illness,  I  learnt  that  he  was  very  weak, 
and  she  asked  me  not  to  tire  him  much.  My  visit  did  not 
last  more  than  three  minutes. 

By  telephone  from  the  Governor's  house  I  was  later  on 
informed  that  the  Tsar  would  receive  me  before  dinner. 
At  the  stated  hour  I  entered  the  audience  chamber  where, 
already  waiting  the  arrival  of  the  Tsar,  were  collected 
about  twenty  people,  among  them  officers  of  high  rank 
from  foreign  missions.  But  my  old  acquaintance,  the 
English  General,  Waters,  was  not  among  them;  he  was  re- 
placed by  General  Sir  John  Hanbury  Williams,  with  whom 
I  was  to  have  in  the  future  not  a  few  serious  conversa- 
tions. 

The  first  person  whose  presence  astonished  me  was 
General  Gilinsky,  whom  I  had  thought  was  at  the  French 
Headquarters.  It  was  explained  that,  not  long  before  the 
illness  of  General  Alexeieff,  he  was  called  from  France  on 
the  plausible  pretence  of  giving  a  personal  report  on  the 
work  of  his  mission,  but  in  reality  it  was  in  order  to  replace 
him.  Gilinsky  had  not  yet  had  an  audience  with  the  Tsar. 
Soon  the  door  from  His  Majesty's  cabinet  was  opened  and 
I  was  asked  to  enter.  After  the  first  words  of  greeting, 
I  considered  it  my  duty  to  assure  the  Tsar  that  my  appoint- 

210 


I9i6]  AT  GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS    '  211 

ment  to  the  General  Headquarters  was  quite  unexpected; 
that  on  my  future  work  I  would  concentrate  all  my  force 
of  mind  and  will  for  the  best  execution  of  the  difficult  task 
confided  to  me;  and  I  asked  him  to  believe  that  always,  and 
in  all  cases,  I  would  be  guided  by  one  motive  —  to  achieve 
the  greatest  advantage  for  my  Tsar  and  country.  I 
further  told  the  Tsar  that  I  was  not  an  ambitious  man;  that 
all  my  life  I  had  guided  myself  on  definite  principles  from 
which  I  never  deviated,  and  would  never  deviate;  and  that 
the  first  of  these  was  truthfulness  and  sincerity  in  all  my 
aims  and  actions. 

I  pointed  out  the  difficulties  of  a  temporary  occupation 
of  such  a  responsible  position,  but  the  rule  I  would  lay 
down  would  be  that  I  would  carry  out  my  duties  as  though 
they  were  confided  to  me  permanently,  not  binding  myself 
implicitly  to  the  plans  of  my  predecessor,  though  knowing 
General  Alexeieff  I  thought  that  we  should  not  clash  in 
serious  things.  In  conclusion  I  told  the  Tsar  that  I  would 
always  be  frank  with  him;  and  would  only  tell  the  truth, 
and  the  whole  truth. 

His  Majesty's  answer  proved  to  me  that  he  fully  ap- 
preciated all  that  I  said.  He  was  not  only  convinced,  but 
desired  me  to  follow  out  the  principles  which  I  had  laid 
down.  After  a  short  talk  we  went  together  to  the  dinner 
table.  At  the  Tsar's  table  the  conversation  in  which  the 
representatives  of  the  foreign  missions,  sitting  opposite  the 
Tsar,  took  part,  was  general;  the  talk  was  generally  in 
French,  and  His  Majesty  joined  with  great  animation. 
Sitting  at  his  left  hand,  in  the  usual  place  of  the  Tsarevitch, 
was  the  oldest  of  the  foreign  representatives,  the  Belgian 
General,  Count  Rikkel.  The  Minister  of  the  Court, 
Count  Frederiks,  was  not  in  Mobile!^  at  the  moment,  and 
his    place     was     taken    by     the     General    Aide-de-Camp, 


212  AT  GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS        [ch.  xvii 

Maximovitch,  who  was  the  Governor-General  of  Warsaw 
during  the  Revolution  of  1905.  The  other  persons  of  the 
Tsar's  suite  were  those  whom  I  have  described  in  a  previous 
chapter. 

After  dinner  I  returned  to  the  quarters  of  the  Staff. 
Awaiting  the  departure  of  General  Alexeieff  to  the  south, 
I  temporarily  chose  a  small  room  as  my  private  office,  in 
which,  in  the  morning,  His  Majesty  received  the  reports 
of  the  Chief  of  the  Staff  and  which,  except  at  these  hours, 
was  usually  free.  From  this  moment  there  moved  before 
me  a  kaleidoscope  of  people  not  known  to  me;  some  came 
with  reports,  and  some  only  came  into  contact  with  me  in  a 
general  way.  In  these  days  I  appreciated  what  invaluable 
service  my  two  weeks'  visit  to  Pskoff  for  the  temporary 
taking  of  the  position  of  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
northern  front  had  rendered  me.  This  two  weeks'  work 
gave  me  a  greater  insight  into  the  duties  of  the  highest 
staffs,  the  General  Staff  in  Petrograd,  and  also  into  the 
business  of  the  Central  Governments  of  the  capital,  as  it  is 
with  these  the  Commanders-in-Chief  have  often  to  deal. 
Naturally,  every  new-comer  had  not  only  to  report  to  me 
his  present  duties,  but  also  to  make  me  acquainted  with  the 
general  sphere  of  the  work  confided  to  him. 

The  chief  assistant  of  General  Alexeieff  with  regard  to 
strategic  operations  was  the  Quartermaster-General 
Poustovoitenko,  with  whom  General  Alexeieff  had  served 
from  the  very  beginning  of  the  war.  But  at  our  first  meet- 
ing General  Alexeieff  had  told  me  that  in  case  I  wished 
to  choose  another  assistant  he  had  already  asked  His 
Majesty's  approval  for  General  Poustovoitenko  to  be  ap- 
pointed Chief  of  a  division.  General  Alexeieff  further 
remarked  that  I  should  probably  wish  to  have,  in  the 
capacity  of  my  first  assistant,  my  former  Chief  of  Staff  of 


I9i6]  AT  GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS  213 

the  6th  Corps,  and  at  present  Chief  of  the  Staff  of  the 
Special  Army,  Major-General  Alexeieff.  I  did  not  oppose 
my  predecessor,  but  all  the  same  this  was  not  my  intention. 
The  simultaneous  departure  of  Major-General  Alexeieff 
and  myself  from  the  Special  Army,  for  whose  deeds  I  was 
always  responsible,  would  have  upset  too  much  the  normal 
course  of  the  work  of  the  Staff  and  the  life  of  the  Army. 
Besides,  I  intended  to  choose  for  the  post  of  the  Quarter- 
master-General of  the  General  Staff  a  person  who,  after 
my  departure,  could  continue  to  work  with  General 
Alexeieff.  I  could  not  answer  for  this,  so  far  as  my  Chief 
of  Staff,  Major-General  Alexeieff,  was  concerned,  for 
General  Alexeieff  did  not  know  him  at  all. 

On  this  and  on  succeeding  days  I  began  to  become 
acquainted  with  all  branches  of  work  of  the  General  Head- 
quarters which  required  the  direction,  instructions,  and  ar- 
rangement of  the  Chief  of  the  Staff.  A  mere  list  of  the 
heads  of  this  work  would  fill  whole  pages,  as  the  Chief  of 
the  Staff  had  to  direct  not  only  the  strategic  work  of  the 
Army,  but  had  to  introduce  reforms  and  the  inevitable  re- 
organisation of  the  Army.  And  further,  to  his  duties  be- 
longed the  direction  of  the  railways  in  the  region  occupied 
by  the  Army  and  its  base.  By  this  network  of  railways, 
military  transport  was  exclusively  accomplished  when  the 
troops  were  transferred  from  one  army  to  another.  The 
Chief  of  the  Staff  had  to  direct  the  work  of  the  supply 
branches  as  much  as  it  concerned  the  distribution  of  sup- 
plies on  the  different  fronts.  He  had  also  to  busy  him- 
self in  deciding  in  principle  the  distribution  of  artillery 
supplies  and  periods  of  new  formations  of  the  artillery, 
and  for  that  he  had  to  deal  with  the  Inspector  of  the 
Artillery,  the  Grand  Duke  Serge  Michailovitch,  though  the 
latter,  while   subordinate  to  the   Commander-in-Chief  ac- 


214  AT  GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS        [ch.  xvii 

cording  to  the  law,  in  regard  to  his  work  very  rarely  re- 
quired to  consult  His  Majesty.  Under  these  conditions 
the  Chief  of  the  Staff  had  to  direct  the  activity  of  the 
"  Field  Ataman  "  of  all  the  Cossack  troops,  who  was  the 
Grand  Duke  Boris  Vladimirovitch ;  to  direct  the  rear  ad- 
ministrative work  of  aviation,  and  the  supplying  of 
materials,  which  depended  upon  the  Grand  Duke  Alexander 
Michailovitch.  Not  less  important  were  the  engineering 
and  medical  departments,  and  finally  all  the  affairs  passing 
through  the  Civil  Chancery,  and  the  Chancery  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  Through  these  departments  passed  the  affairs 
and  relations  with  all  Ministers,  especially  with  the 
Ministers  of  the  Interior  and  Foreign  Affairs  as  well  as,  in 
some  exceptional  cases,  the  immediate  relations  with 
foreign  Governments. 

I  shall  not  enumerate  the  other  persons  and  institutions 
with  whom  the  Chief  of  the  Staff  had  to  deal,  in  which 
number  were  included  the  immediate  relations  with  the 
heads  of  foreign  missions.  In  order  to  obtain  a  compre- 
hensive idea  of  his  duties  one  must  add  to  all  this  the 
number  of  people  visiting  the  Chief  of  the  Staff  every  day, 
and  those  who  came  to  the  General  Headquarters  on  duty 
or  for  their  semi-private  matters.  Among  these,  naturally, 
the  most  important  and  most  lengthy  conversations  were 
with  Ministers  who  brought  reports  to  the  Tsar.  As  I 
became  acquainted  with  the  people  and  the  work,  know- 
ing the  character  of  General  Alexeieff,  who  himself  at- 
tended to  work  which  could  have  been  done  successfully  by 
his  assistants,  I  understood  why  the  gradual  and  imper- 
ceptible illness  finally  broke  down  his  health. 

There  were  many  affairs  which  could  easily  have  been 
handed  over  to  another  person,  for  instance  to  a  Sub-Chief 
of  the  Staff,  who  would  receive  general  instructions,  but  as 


I9i6]  AT  GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS  215 

no  such  post  existed,  I  determined  to  establish  it.  If  Gen- 
eral Alexeieff  had  not  come  to  this  decision  himself,  it  was 
not  because  he  wanted  to  keep  all  matters,  even  those  of 
smaller  importance,  exclusively  in  his  hands,  but  it  was 
owing  to  his  extraordinary  natural  delicacy.  Understand- 
ing that  for  such  a  post  it  was  necessary  to  choose  a  man 
with  great  qualities,  he  did  not  want  to  deprive  the  Army 
of  him,  knowing  as  he  did  the  difficulty  of  replacing  him. 
But  the  most  important  reason  which  Influenced  me  was 
the  thought  that  what  had  happened  to  General  Alexeieff 
might  happen  to  anyone  —  unexpected  illness,  depriving 
him  of  the  possibility  of  continuing  his  responsible  work. 
From  such  a  contingency  I  was  not  free,  nor,  in  particular, 
was  General  Alexeieff,  in  the  case  of  his  return  to  his  post, 
as  probably  his  strength  would  not  be  fully  recovered.  It 
was  indispensable  that  near  the  Chief  of  Staff  should  be  a 
person  fully  able,  if  only  temporarily,  to  replace  him  with- 
out any  detriment  to  the  work. 

Next  morning  the  ordinary  routine  work  began.  At 
first  I  found  it  very  tiring,  physically,  as  there  were  not 
enough  hours  In  a  day  for  Its  accomplishment,  and  men- 
tally, because  there  was  so  much  new  information  which 
had  to  be  assimilated,  and  so  many  questions  to  be  decided. 
Naturally  with  every  day  the  work  became  easier.  On  the 
next  day,  at  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning,  I  commenced  the 
usual  reports  to  the  Tsar.  This  day  they  were  a  little 
longer,  as  besides  the  ordinary  reading,  in  the  original, 
of  military  reports  which  came  from  all  the  armies  and 
headquarters,  from  the  staffs  of  the  fronts  and  the 
Caucasian  Army,  some  reports  had  to  be  made  for  personal 
report  to  the  Tsar  as  to  what  had  happened  during  the  ill- 
ness of  Alexeieff  and  until  my  arrival.  For  almost  a  week 
General    Alexeieff    had    not    made    any    report    to    the 


2i6  AT  GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS        [ch.  xvii 

Emperor.  This  fact  was  explained  by  the  necessity  of  al- 
lowing four  days  for  my  journey,  and  by  the  circumstance 
that  it  was  not  at  once  decided  who  would  be  chosen  as 
temporary  successor  of  General  Alexeieff.  My  appoint- 
ment to  the  General  Headquarters,  as  far  as  I  know,  was 
the  wish  of  General  Alexeieff. 

When  my  reports  were  finished,  the  Emperor  went  to 
the  sick  general  as  he  had  done  from  the  time  when 
Alexeieff  did  not  rise  from  his  bed.  Before  he  went  to  the 
sick  man  the  Emperor  asked  his  wife  about  the  course  of 
the  illness.  Towards  the  end  of  the  reports  the  Tsarevitch 
came  with  the  aide-de-camp  on  duty,  and  waited  for  his 
father  on  the  landing-place,  as  there  was  no  other  room. 

On  the  next  day  at  midday,  in  the  large  hall  of  the  local 
district  Law  Courts,  which  had  been  taken  over  by  the 
different  departments  of  the  General  Headquarters,  I  gave 
an  audience  to  all,  without  any  exception,  who  served  in  the 
different  offices  that  were  dependent  on  the  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff. 

It  was  necessary  to  divide  this  audience  into  two  parts, 
and  even  then  each  of  these  comprised  about  500  people; 
this  number  will  not  surprise  those  who  are  acquainted 
with  the  number  of  persons  serving  in  the  Headquarters 
of  our  Allies.  I  intended  to  gather  all  my  co-workers  and 
subordinates,  snatching  them  for  a  time  from  their  work, 
instead  of  making  a  round  of  their  posts,  as  only  in  this 
way  could  I  explain  to  them  in  a  few  words  how  I  inter- 
preted the  work  of  the  Staff,  especially  under  war  condi- 
tions. I  asked  them  above  all  to  be  directed  by  the  knowl- 
edge that  the  Staffs  exist  for  the  troops,  and  not  the  troops 
for  the  Staffs;  in  this  was  the  only  justification  for  their 
existence  and  for  the  comparatively  large  number  of  those 
called  to  this  work. 


I9i6]  AT  GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS  217 

I  also  asked  everyone  to  remember  always  that,  although 
they  have  to  deal  with  dead  paper,  yet  behind  that  dead 
paper  always  stood  living  deeds,  living  people,  whose  lives 
and  activity  entirely  depended  upon  the  degree  of  con- 
scientiousness which  good  workers  put  into  every  task  con- 
fided to  them.  In  addition  I  reminded  them  that  acci- 
dental mistakes  in  war  time  are  very  often  paid  for  with 
the  price  of  men's  blood,  and  that  however  small  and  in- 
significant might  be  the  work  confided  to  the  willing, 
modest  worker,  its  result  might  at  the  last  have  a  great  in- 
fluence on  the  general  work  of  the  Army.  Almost  the 
same  thing,  though  probably  in  other  words,  I  repeated 
to  the  assembled  officials  of  the  Administration  of  Military 
Communication,  only  adding  that  their  work  was  more 
complicated  in  that,  hand  in  hand,  they  had  to  work  on  two 
different  Administrations  —  the  Administration  of  Mili- 
tary Communications  and  the  Ministry  of  Ways  and  Com- 
munication; that  if  during  the  time  of  peace,  so-called 
rivalite  de  metier  —  rivalry  of  profession  —  and  friction 
among  different  administrations  give  sad  results,  any  such 
manifestation  in  time  of  war  would  be  simply  a  crime,  bear- 
ing a  heavy  punishment  in  the  moral  code. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE    POLITICAL   SITUATION    IN    1916 

General  Alexeieff  recovered  his  strength  a  little,  and 
I  had  the  opportunity  of  having  with  him  almost  every 
day,  longer  and  longer  conversations,  as  I  wanted  to  fix 
with  him  the  general  view  with  regard  to  some  military  and 
political  questions,  which  would  not  bear  delay. 

During  these  conversations  I  learnt  from  him  that  he 
had  succeeded  in  persuading  the  Tsar  of  the  desirability  of 
replacing  the  President  of  the  Council  of  Ministers, 
Stuermer,  by  another  person.  The  Emperor  had  been  con- 
vinced by  his  arguments,  and  his  choice  fell  on  the  Minister 
of  Ways  and  Communications,  Alexander  Trepoff,  who  In 
taking  up  the  post  of  President  of  the  Council  of  Ministers 
did  not  leave  the  post  of  Minister  of  Ways  and  Communi- 
cations, a  post  that  he  had  occupied  since  the  spring  of 
19 1 5.  The  Empress  Alexandra  now  arrived,  and  General 
Alexeieff  explained  that,  having  lost,  in  the  person  of 
Stuermer,  her  protege,  the  Empress  probably  wanted  to 
influence  the  Tsar  to  keep  in  office  as  Minister  of  the  In- 
terior Protopopoff,  who.  It  was  generally  thought,  had  been 
appointed  at  her  wish. 

The  approaching  arrival  of  Alexander  Trepoff  and  the 
events  which  preceded  It  confirmed  this  opinion,  as  it  oc- 
curred at  the  same  time  as  the  visit  to  Mohileff  of  the 
Empress.  During  his  audience  with  the  Tsar,  Trepoff 
presented  to  him,  for  the  signature  of  the  Senate,  the  decree 

already  prepared  for  the  dismissal   from  his  post  of  the 

218 


i9i6]  THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION  219 

Minister  Protopopoff,  but  the  Tsar  left  it  with  him,  promis- 
ing Trepoff  before  his  departure  from  Mohileff  to  Petro- 
grad  on  the  same  evening  to  give  a  final  decision.  This 
happened  on  the  next  day  after  the  departure  of  Alexeieff 
from  Mohileff,  about  December  4th,  19 16. 

Directly  after  his  audience,  Trepoff,  whom  I  had  known 
before  these  days,  came  to  me  and  expressed  his  fear  that 
the  dismissal  of  Protopopoff  would  not  take  place.  Mean- 
while the  opening  of  the  new  Session  of  the  Imperial  Duma, 
in  which  he  held  the  prominent  position  of  Minister  and 
President,  was  approaching.  His  address  should  have 
been  based  principally  upon  the  possibility  of  the  har- 
monious and  consistent  work  of  the  Duma,  after  the  re- 
placement of  those  persons  with  whom  it  was  felt  they 
could  not  get  on.  Trepoff  frankly  asked  me,  did  I  also 
intend  to  examine  the  affairs  of  internal  politics  or  busy 
myself  exclusively  with  the  immediate  direction  of  military 
operations?  He  appealed  to  my  patriotic  feelings,  ask- 
ing me  if  it  were  possible  for  me  to  help  him,  and  before  it 
was  too  late  to  talk  the  situation  over  with  the  Tsar  and  to 
try  to  convince  him  that  Trepoff's  request  for  Protopopoff's 
resignation  was  imperative.  On  the  spot  I  asked  by  tele- 
phone the  aide-de-camp  on  duty  when  I  could  see  the 
Emperor,  and  received  the  answer  that  the  Tsar  in  about 
an  hour  would  be  leaving  as  usual,  to  dine  with  his  family 
in  the  Imperial  train,  in  which  the  Empress  with  her 
daughters  lived,  and  for  this  reason  the  Emperor  asked  me 
to  come  if  possible  immediately. 

Having  first  discussed  another  affair  connected  with  the 
course  of  military  events,  I  asked  the  permission  of  the 
Emperor  to  touch  upon  a  question  which  did  not  immedi- 
ately pertain  to  my  office.  I  said  that  I  considered  that 
I   had  the   right  to  do  this,   for,   as  I   reminded  him,   no 


220  THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION  [ch.  xviii 

longer  ago  than  the  same  day  at  lunch,  when  the  Emperor 
saw  Trepoff  and  myself  engaged  In  animated  conversation 
he  had  turned  to  us  with  words  in  which  he  expressed  the 
hope  that  we  should  both  work  amicably  for  the  general 
cause,  and  also  be  entirely  frank  with  each  other.  To  this, 
half  jokingly,  I  had  answered  the  Tsar  that  the  future 
would  show,  but  that  there  certainly  would  be  no  lack  of 
frankness  on  my  side.  Trepoff  was,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
frank  with  me,  and  told  me  the  subject  of  his  visit  to 
the  Tsar,  especially  concerning  the  expected  removal  of 
Protopopoff.  Having  received  the  permission  of  the  Tsar, 
in  a  long  conversation,  I  endeavoured  to  convince  His 
Majesty  that  even  if  Protopopoff  could  be  considered 
efficient  for  the  post  he  occupied,  about  which  I  had  some 
doubt,  I  thought  that  under  the  present  conditions  it  was 
of  paramount  importance  that  there  should  be  perfect 
harmony  between  the  Ministers  he  chose  and  the  Imperial 
Duma.  This  harmony  I  told  him  was  jeopardised  by  the 
presence  In  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  Protopopoff;  that 
to  close  the  Duma  now  would  be  rather  dangerous,  as  ad- 
vantage could  be  taken  of  It  by  those  elements  hostile  to 
the  present  State  organisation;  that  It  was  necessary  to  dis- 
miss Protopopoff,  even  if  it  had  to  be  done  reluctantly 
and  considered  as  a  sacrifice  or  concession  to  the  public 
opinion.  The  Emperor  listened  attentively  to  the  end,  but 
he  did  not  give  me  a  direct  answer,  and,  on  leaving,  I  had 
not  gathered  the  impression  that  he  was  willing  to  accede 
to  the  wish  of  Trepoff.  In  the  hall  outside  I  met  the 
Minister  of  Justice,  Makaroff,  who  was  awaiting  an 
audience.  I  told  Makaroff  in  a  few  words  the  subject  of 
my  conversation  with  the  Emperor,  asking  him  to  try  to 
Influence  him  in  the  same  direction.  Returning  home  I  in- 
formed Trepoff,  who  waited  for  me  In  my  cabinet,  of  the 


ry. 


o 
o 


o 


I9i6]  THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION  221 

subject  of  my  conversation  and  the  request  I  had  made  to 
Makaroff. 

Without  losing  hope  that  the  Tsar  would  consent  to  the 
dismissal  of  Protopopoff,  Trepoff  invited  me  to  name  a 
person  who  would  be  able,  during  the  time  of  war,  to  per- 
form the  duties  of  Minister  of  the  Interior,  and  then  he 
considered  the  possibility  of  appointing  a  military  man  to 
this  post.  When  we  took  leave  of  each  other,  he  agreed 
that  he  would  let  me  know  If  he  received  the  decree  signed 
by  the  Tsar  for  the  dismissal  of  Protopopoff  before  he 
left.  I  did  not  receive  the  promised  information,  and  I 
understood  that  Trepoff's  request  was  not  granted  by  the 
Tsar. 

On  the  succeeding  days,  the  Ministers  one  after  another 
came  to  Mohileff,  and  almost  all,  after  making  their  re- 
ports to  the  Tsar,  found  an  opportunity  before  their  de- 
parture of  remaining  with  me  for  some  time,  in  order  to 
discuss  personally  the  general  position  of  things.  On  the 
second  day  after  my  conversation  with  the  Tsar,  entering 
before  lunch  the  Audience  Chamber,  I  met  among  the  wait- 
ing visitors  the  Minister  of  Interior,  Protopopoff,  who  had 
arrived  with  General  Kourloff,  who  was  doing  the  duty 
of  Assistant  Minister  In  the  Police  Department.  Both  of 
these  persons  were  so  hostile  to  me  that,  passing  them,  to 
take  the  usual  place  of  the  Chlef-of-Staff  on  the  right  flank 
of  those  awaiting  the  appearance  of  the  Tsar  near  the 
door  of  his  cabinet,  I  greeted  them  silently,  confining  myself 
to  a  cold  handshake. 

As  I  have  already  said,  the  Ministers  who  came  to  the 
General  Headquarters,  especially  on  their  first  arrival,  con- 
sidered it  their  duty  to  see  and  to  converse  with  the  Chief 
of  the  General  Staff.  To  find  the  Chief  of  Staff  at  home 
was  not  difficult,  as  I  left  my  cabinet  only  during  the  hours 


222  THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION  [ch.  xviii 

of  my  meals,  and  I  had  in  these  early  days,  owing  to  the 
quantity  of  work,  time  neither  to  pay  official  visits  nor 
even  to  indulge  in  a  walk.  I  had  to  confine  myself  to  the 
stroll  to  the  Staff  mess,  which  was  about  ten  minutes  from 
the  building  in  which  I  worked.  In  spite  of  this,  Pro- 
topopoff  found  an  opportunity  of  visiting  me  at  a  time  when 
I  was  not  at  home.  It  is  probably  of  a  certain  interest, 
though,  on  general  hnes  to  show  what  Protopopoff  was,  as 
he  played  such  an  important  role  in  the  approaching  Rus- 
sian Revolution. 

Protopopoff  received  his  military  education  at  a  school 
for  junior  officers,  and  not  at  the  Military  Academy.  His 
first  years  of  service  as  an  officer  he  passed  in  the  ranks 
of  a  mounted  Grenadier  regiment.  At  that  time  we  each 
had  the  rank  of  cornets  ("sous-lieutenant"  in  the 
cavalry),  and  were  nearly  of  the  same  year,  so  that  I  had 
sometimes  happened  to  meet  him,  but  our  paths  had  di- 
verged, and  I  had  soon  lost  sight  of  him. 

Not  long  afterwards  he  received  a  large  fortune  from 
the  Russian  General  Seliverstoff,  well  known  in  Paris 
between  1 880-1 890,  who,  as  his  office  was  a  sinecure,  took 
the  opportunity  of  spending  the  whole  of  his  time  abroad. 
After  receiving  this  fortune  Protopopoff  left  the  Army,  oc- 
cupied himself  in  business  affairs  and  began  to  serve  in  the 
position  of  a  provincial  delegate  of  the  Zemstvo.  He  was 
then  elected  to  the  post  of  a  marshal  of  nobility  of  one  of 
the  Volga  provinces.  It  was  said  that  during  the  year  be- 
fore the  war,  in  consequence  of  his  unsuccessful  financial 
speculations,  his  circumstances  had  become  straitened,  but 
with  the  beginning  of  the  conflict  they  improved.  As  a 
result  of  his  election  to  the  Zemstvo  he  had  an  opportunity 
to  be  elected  a  member  of  the  Imperial  Duma  from  a  party 
of    the    "  Octobrists."     One    of    the    peculiarities    of    his 


/ 


i9i6]  THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION  223 

character  was  a  talent  for  adapting  himself  to  people  who 
were  of  different  political  views.  Such  a  phenomenon  may 
not  be  uncommon  in  countries  where  political  and  constitu- 
tional life  has  been  long  established;  it  is  not  usual  in 
States  which  are,  politically,  young  —  where  for  the  most 
part  the  differences  of  political  views  tend  to  preclude 
friendly  discussions,  especially  among  those  who  give  them- 
selves up  entirely  to  political  work.  Naturally  this 
phenomenon  in  fairly  definite  form  still  exists  in  Russia. 
There  is  no  conviction  in  political  parties  that  only  at  the 
price  of  mutual  concession  can  the  normal  life  of  the 
country  be  attained. 

In  the  Fourth  Duma,  Protopopoff  was  elected  to  the 
post  of  Vice-President  of  the  Imperial  Duma,  thanks  to 
the  influential  party  of  "  Octobrists,"  otherwise  known  as 
the  Centre.  The  occupation  of  this  post  enabled  him  to 
be  included  among  the  members  of  the  Duma  elected  by  the 
latter  to  the  Staff  of  Delegates  who  in  the  spring  of  19 15 
went  to  the  Allied  countries.  The  object  of  the  delegates 
was  to  enter  into  immediate  relations  with  the  Legislate  As- 
semblies of  our  western  Allies.  In  this  way  Protopopoff 
became  head  of  the  group  of  the  members  of  the  Imperial 
Duma  who  went  abroad,  while  at  the  head  of  the  members 
of  the  Imperial  Council  was  elected  my  brother,  a  member 
of  the  Imperial  Council  from  the  Zemstvo.  As  the  senior 
representative  of  the  Imperial  Duma,  Protopopoff  visited 
all  the  capitals  of  our  Allies;  he  was  welcomed  by  all  the 
legislations,  and  to  such  greetings  he  had,  in  turn  with  my 
brother,  to  answer.  In  this  way,  of  course,  he  became 
known  to  Western  Europe.  He  showed  himself  to  those 
with  whom  he  had  to  deal  in  Western  Europe  in  quite  a 
different  role  from  that  which  he  soon  began  to  play  on  his 
return    to     Russia,     especially    when    he    was    appointed 


224  THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION  [ch.  xviii 

Minister  of  the  Interior,  and  his  actions  then  were  not  quite 
comprehended. 

Protopopoff  did  not  return  to  Russia  with  the  other  dele- 
gates of  the  Russian  Legislature,  but  remained  in  London. 
About  his  activity  and  relations  there  much  gossip  was 
afterwards  circulated.  I  will  not  repeat  it,  as  it  may  be 
of  doubtful  value.  His  stay  in  one  of  the  capitals  of  the 
Scandinavian  Kingdom,  after  his  return  from  abroad, 
greatly  influenced  his  future  fate.  Here  he  stayed  with 
one  of  the  delegates  of  the  Imperial  Council,  P.  A.  Olsou- 
fieff,  who  had  remained  there  for  his  own  affairs.  Proto- 
popoff, on  neutral  territory,  had  to  meet  in  the  neutral 
diplomatic  circles  with  one  whom  afterwards  he  alleged  to 
be  a  German  diplomat,  but  who  in  reality  did  not  occupy 
any  diplomatic  post,  though  he  undoubtedly  was  an  agent 
of  the  German  Ministry  of  the  Exterior.  In  this  meeting 
Protopopoff  asked  Olsoufieff  to  take  part,  and  he  accepted. 
In  the  course  of  time  in  the  Russian  Press  a  polemic  opened 
between  Protopopoff  and  Olsoufieff,  as  both  explained  differ- 
ently the  circumstances  concerning  this  meeting.  But  this 
polemic  began  much  later,  when  Protopopoff,  then  occupy- 
ing the  post  of  Minister  of  the  Interior,  definitely  broke 
with  the  Legislature  and  with  his  party.  Protopopoff  after 
his  return  to  Petrograd  affirmed  that,  during  this  meeting, 
he  was  only  a  listener,  but  what  he  heard  from  the  German 
diplomat  he  said  was  so  interesting  that  informing  the 
President  of  the  Duma,  M.  V.  Rodzianko,  of  it,  he  asked 
him  to  procure  him  an  audience  with  the  Emperor  in  order 
to  inform  the  Tsar  what  he  had  heard  in  Stockholm  about 
the  person  mentioned.  Afterwards  it  was  asserted  that 
his  story  of  what  he  had  heard  from  the  German  quasi- 
diplomat  was  concocted  by  him  only  for  the  purpose  of 
having    sufficient    cause    for    asking    an    audience    of    the 


I9i6]  THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION  225 

Emperor,  and  also  to  be  introduced  to  the  Empress.  The 
real  purpose  is  difficult  to  explain,  but  undoubtedly  his  first 
audience  with  the  Tsar  was  not  the  last. 

Here  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  Protopopoff  took  ad- 
vantage of  his  natural  ability  of  entering  into  the  soul  of  a 
man  by  his  pleasing  and  affable  manner.  Probably  he  fully 
succeeded,  as  in  a  comparatively  short  time  Russian  social 
opinion  was  astonished  by  the  appointment  of  Protopopoff 
as  Minister  of  the  Interior.  But  it  was  not  the  first  time 
that  a  Minister  had  been  chosen  from  the  Imperial  Duma. 
Protopopoff,  in  this  post,  replaced  the  Minister  Hvostoff, 
who  was  also  a  member  of  the  Imperial  Duma,  The 
Minister  of  Agriculture,  formerly  a  member  of  the  Im- 
perial Duma,  and  later  a  member  of  the  Imperial  Council, 
was  Count  Bobrinsky.  But  if  such  appointments  were 
looked  upon  sympathetically,  that  cannot  be  said  about  the 
appointment  of  Protopopoff.  The  discord  between  Proto- 
popoff and  the  greater  part  of  the  Imperial  Duma  was 
already  known,  and  for  that  reason  his  appointment  could 
not  facilitate  but  rather  make  more  difficult  the  co-opera- 
tion between  the  Government  and  the  Imperial  Duma. 

During  the  early  days  of  my  stay  in  the  General  Head- 
quarters, the  President  of  the  Imperial  Duma,  Rodzianko, 
arrived  with  a  report  for  the  Tsar,  as  the  reopening  of  the 
Duma  was  shortly  expected.  The  members  of  the  Duma 
were  agitated  on  account  of  the  rumour  that  the  Minister 
of  the  Interior,  Protopopoff,  was  leading  events  so  as  to 
close  the  Duma,  and  naturally  they  feared  such  a  measure 
the  result  of  which  it  was  impossible  to  forecast.  The 
well-intentioned  people  of  the  whole  of  educated  Russia 
could  not  have  two  opinions  about  the  results  of  such  a 
decisive  political  stroke.  The  meeting  of  Rodzianko  with 
the  Emperor  did  not  in  any  way  confirm  the  reality  of  such 


226  THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION  [ch.  xviii 

fears.  But  having  been  Invited  to  His  Majesty's  luncheon, 
Rodzianko  was  not  asked  to  dinner,  though  his  train  did 
not  leave  until  rather  late  at  night.  As  this  did  not  coincide 
with  what  had  happened  during  his  previous  visits,  he  saw 
in  it  some  allusion  to  the  sense  of  the  dissatisfaction  of  the 
Tsar  with  the  work  of  the  Duma  in  general  or  with  Rod- 
zianko's  own  report  in  particular. 

The  conspicuous  part  which  the  personality  of  M.  V. 
Rodzianko  played  in  the  first  days  of  the  coup  ductal  de- 
serves a  more  detailed  mention  of  him.  Belonging  him- 
self to  a  good  old  family  from  one  of  the  "  Little  Russian  " 
(Ukraina)  Provinces,  he,  while  still  a  young  officer  in  the 
Guards,  by  his  marriage  with  Princess  Golitzin  became 
related  to  the  whole  Russian  aristocracy.  However,  not 
satisfied  with  the  prospects  of  a  military  career,  he  soon 
retired  and  began  to  serve  as  a  delegate  of  the  Zemstvo 
(Country  Council).  In  his  day,  as  the  President  of  the 
country  Government  of  a  province  he  excited  great  news- 
paper polemics,  which  made  his  name  known  to  all  in- 
tellectual Russia.  With  the  entrance  of  Russia  into 
political  life  after  the  first  Revolution  in  1905,  he,  having 
first  become  a  member  of  the  most  numerous  and  influential 
political  party  of  the  "  Octobrists,"  entered  the  Imperial 
Duma,  and  the  Duma  at  the  third  and  fourth  sitting  chose 
him  as  their  President.  In  this  capacity  he  undoubtedly 
attained  great  popularity,  but  it  cannot  be  said  that  his  in- 
fluence on  the  course  of  work  in  the  Imperial  Duma 
showed  itself  very  definitely.  His  activity  as  President  un- 
doubtedly pleased  the  greater  part,  not  only  of  the  Centre, 
but  the  members  of  both  extreme  wings  of  the  Duma. 
Possessing  oratorial  talent,  and  what  in  French  is  called 
un  esprit  d'apropos  (presence  of  mind),  he  in  all  cases 
knew  how  to  represent  in  a  worthy  way  this  great  institu- 


I9i6]  THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION  227 

tion  of  which  he  was  President.  He  understood  that  his 
duty  lay  in  the  preservation  of  the  value  and  prestige  of 
this  young  institution,  in  which  in  certain  cases  the  extreme 
Left  and  extreme  Right  parties  were  opposed  to  each  other, 
and  which  the  higher  institutions  of  the  Government  did 
not  always  want  to  take  into  consideration.  The  owner  of 
considerable  wealth,  he,  in  all  the  events  of  his  life,  showed 
a  complete  independence  which  in  its  time  had  raised  his 
prestige  in  social  circles.  My  old  acquaintance  with  him 
made  our  relations  and  conversations  easier;  for  the  rest 
this  was  not  a  time  to  avoid  entire  frankness  in  judgments 
and  views. 

In  his  turn,  the  Minister  of  Public  Education,  Count 
Ignatieff,  cousin  of  our  Military  Attache  in  Paris,  visited 
me.  Being  in  his  ideas  definitely  monarchical,  he  neverthe- 
less showed  great  liberality  in  his  views  and  in  his  actions, 
understanding  the  meaning  of  the  word  in  its  best  sense. 
Notwithstanding  the  exceptional  conditions  of  the  country 
during  the  three  years  of  war,  he  always  found  it  possible 
to  develop  and  continue  the  work  of  reforming  the  Russian 
high  and  middle  schools  (Universities  and  Colleges),  and 
to  help  all  provincial  Russia  to  bring  to  life  general  ele- 
mentary education,  a  reform  needing  above  all  the  realisa- 
tion of  the  programme  for  building  and  opening  schools 
in  all  the  large  territories  of  rural  Russia.  Only  people 
acquainted  with  the  peculiarity  of  Russian  provincial  life 
can  understand  the  difficulties  which  faced  the  realisation 
of  this  programme,  especially  in  the  short  time  allotted  for 
its  accomplishment.  As  he  did  not  agree  on  vital  points 
with  the  action  of  Protopopoff,  Ignatieff  more  than  once 
asked  the  Tsar  to  be  allowed  to  retire  from  ministerial 
duties,  but  every  time  was  obliged  to  accede  to  the  insistent 
desire  of  the  Emperor  that  he  should  keep  his  post.     The 


228  THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION         [ch.  xviii 

man  who  came  most  often  to  the  General  Headquarters 
was  the  Minister  of  War,  General  Shouvaeff,  who  in  191 6 
took  the  place  of  General  Soukhomlinoff's  successor,'  Gen- 
eral  Polivanoff.     His   appointment   to   such   a   responsible 
position  was  in  its  time   criticised   on   every  side,   as  the 
people   who    knew    him    intimately   did    not   consider   him 
sufficiently  experienced.     The  best  justification  for  such  an 
appointment   was   that   the   most   important   work   of   the 
Ministry  of  War  was  centred  in  supplying  the  Army  with 
all  the  necessities  for  conducting  operations.     In  this  work 
General  Shouvaeff  was  a  pastmaster,  as  for  four  years  he 
had  been  the  Chief  of  the  Army  Commissariat.     But  on 
the  other  hand,  this  led  to  his  giving  his  attention  exclu- 
sively to  the  equipment  of  the  Army.     They  said  about  him 
that   in   every   question  which   he   discussed  he   invariably 
turned  to  that  of  boots.     And,  really,  the  business  of  sup- 
plying and  manufacturing  the  Army  foot-gear  he  learnt  to 
perfection.     I  heard  from  him  himself  that  he  gave  an  en- 
tire lecture  to  the  assembly  of  Ministers  about  the  manu- 
facturing of  boots,   explaining  that  to   equip  the   Russian 
Army  with  tens  of  millions  of  pairs  of  boots  on  the  method 
adopted  of  making  them  from  one  single  piece  of  leather, 
there  was  not  a  sufficient  number  of  horned  cattle  grazing 
on  the  whole  vast  fields  of  Russia  and  Siberia. 

I  must  say  about  General  Shouvaeff  that  he  was  of  a 
perfectly  honest  and  straightforward  nature;  perhaps  he 
had  a  habit  of  saying  about  himself  a  little  too  often  that 
he  was  an  "  old  soldier  " —  and  by  this,  in  Russia,  is  under- 
stood a  man  straightforward  and  disinterested,  devoted  to 
his  Tsar  and  to  his  country,  albeit  devoted  to  his  work, 
and  not  to  personalities,  as  General  Shouvaeff  in  reality 
was. 

But  the  Minister  with  whom  I  was  the  most  thrown  into 


Ay 


I9i6]  THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION  229 

contact  was  the  Minister  of  Agriculture.  He  had  only 
recently  entered  into  the  work  of  this  complicated  and 
responsible  office,  and  was  so  overwhelmed  with  his  duties 
that  it  was  difficult  for  him  to  spare  the  time  to  go  to 
Mohileff.  In  November  and  December  he  was  obliged  to 
undertake  an  extended  tour  through  the  whole  of  Russia 
in  order  to  arrange  in  the  most  important  centres  of  the 
corn  trade,  with  the  public  establishments,  and  especially 
with  the  Zemstvos,  for  the  supply  of  provisions  required 
for  the  military  commissariat.  During  this  tour  he  in- 
tended to  go  to  the  General  Headquarters.  However,  this 
plan  was  altered  by  His  Majesty's  arrival  at  the  Capital  in 
the  beginning  of  December.  I  had  temporarily  to  consult 
with  his  assistants  who  had  come  to  the  General  Head- 
quarters, and  at  last  I  was  obliged  to  go  to  the  Capital  my- 
self, owing  to  the  necessity  of  preparing  the  ground  for  the 
coming  International  Conferences  in  December  or  January. 
To  make  it  clear  how  extensive  was  the  work  of  the 
Ministry  of  Agriculture,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  this 
Ministry  had  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  think  about 
all  the  necessities  of  military  intendancy,  i.e.  the  supply  of 
the  Army,  with  most  of  the  food  products  needed.  It  is 
necessary  to  add  that  in  the  first  years  of  war,  when  at 
the  head  of  this  work  stood  such  an  active  and  energetic 
man  as  A.  W.  Krivosheyn,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  was 
more  than  successful.  All  military  exigencies,  in  spite  of 
the  partly  insufficient  productiveness  of  the  country  and  the 
possible  duration  of  the  war,  were  always  fully  satisfied. 
But  while  Count  Bobrinsky  was  Minister  of  Agriculture, 
in  accordance  with  the  demands  of  the  social  leaders  who 
were  protecting  exclusively  the  interests  of  the  town  and 
working  population,  fixed  prices  were  established  for  the 
products  of  the  country,  without  at  the  same  time  such 


230  THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION  [ch.  xviii 

prices  being  fixed  for  the  products  of  the  greatest  necessi- 
ties for  the  use  of  the  country  people.  This  was  violation 
of  the  fundamental  economical  principle  of  supply  and  de- 
mand. Unnoticed,  but  unavoidably,  the  number  of  those 
who  dealt  in  the  market  for  the  rural  products,  began  to 
diminish,  consequently,  also  unavoidably,  but  for  the  Army 
very  noticeably,  the  provisions  of  the  warehouses  began 
to  diminish.  There  was  a  time  when  in  regard  to  some 
products  warehouses  were  filled  with  half  a  year's  supply 
of  provisions  for  the  requirements  of  the  whole  army. 
But  after  the  number  of  soldiers  was  increasing,  and  the 
provisions  were  diminishing,  food  supplies  began  to  melt 
away.  Besides,  it  was  necessary  to  provide  for  the  ap- 
proach of  the  spring-time,  the  time  of  impassable  ways  and 
bad  roads,  the  period  of  the  beginning  of  work  in  the  fields, 
when,  even  in  time  of  peace,  the  supply,  in  the  hands  of 
the  middleman  between  the  producer  and  consumer,  almost 
stops.  At  this  time  they  could  take  the  provisions  from 
the  warehouses,  established  in  the  winter-time  in  the  docks 
of  our  powerful  rivers.  With  the  opening  of  navigation 
these  provisions,  amounting  to  millions  of  tons,  were  sent 
by  water  to  the  centres  of  need,  or  to  the  important  rail- 
way junctions.  The  Minister  of  Agriculture  had  to  con- 
sider the  supplying  of  these  warehouses. 

Let  me  say  for  the  honour  of  the  Russian  peasants  and 
landlords  that  they  never  refused  to  supply  for  the  market 
the  country  products,  when  they  were  sure  that  these 
products  were  destined  for  the  needs  of  the  Army.  And 
many  were  the  cases  in  which  the  peasants  willingly  collected 
different  things  of  military  necessity  and  by  chosen  men 
sent  them  directly  in  waggon  loads  to  the  Army.  While 
I  still  commanded  my  corps,  unknown  people  came  to  me 
from  the  centre  of  Russia  and  far  Siberia  bringing  with 


i9i6]  THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION  231 

them  the  offerings  of  their  fellow  villagers.  This  hap- 
pened for  the  greater  part  before  Christmas  and  Easter 
during  the  time  of  calm  In  the  Army.  Towards  summer 
these  generally  were  stopped,  because  the  winter  frosts 
alone  made  It  possible  to  bring  to  the  Front  the  majority 
of  those  products  unspoilt. 

Of  no  small  Interest  for  me  was  the  visit  to  the  General 
Headquarters  of  the  Minister  of  the  Board  of  Trade, 
Prince  Shahovskoy,  who  had  the  general  direction  of  the 
disposition  of  the  mineral  fuel  excavated  In  Russia.  The 
question  of  mineral  fuel  was  for  us  of  the  greatest  Im- 
portance, and  its  successful  or  unsuccessful  decision  almost 
mechanically  influenced  the  other  branches  of  the  commer- 
cial life  of  the  country.  But  these  were  all  questions  of  the 
internal  life  or  Interior  politics,  and  notwithstanding  the 
general  military  calm  on  all  our  fronts,  as  well  as  on  that 
of  our  Allies,  the  most  Important  question  for  the  Chief 
of  the  General  Staff  was  undoubtedly  the  leading  of  the 
military  operations. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE    FIGHTING   IN   ROUMANIA 

The  winter  of  1916-17  did  not  bring  any  calm  to  the 
Russian  High  Command.  The  cause  lay  in  the  manner 
in  which  the  military  events  developed  along  the  Roumano- 
Austrian  and  Roumano-Bulgarian  frontiers. 

The  successful,  not  to  say  victorious,  advance  of  the 
Roumanian  troops  into  the  boundaries  of  Transylvania  at 
the  end  of  August  and  in  the  beginning  of  September  191 6 
was  not  long  continued.  The  gradual  calm  in  the  autumn 
of  19 16  on  all  important  fronts  gave  an  easy  opportunity 
to  the  Austro-Germans,  and  enabled  them  by  transferring 
the  troops,  first,  to  stop  the  further  moving  of  Roumanian 
troops,  and  then  to  begin  the  advance.  The  Roumanian 
troops,  being  scattered  over  almost  the  whole  length  of 
their  frontier,  really  could  not  show  serious  resistance  to 
the  Austro-Germans,  the  more  so  because  the  reserves 
which  they  had  at  the  beginning  were  quickly  sent  to  the 
fighting  lines.  The  first  aid  which  we  gave  to  Roumania 
—  the  aid  which  she  refused  before  the  military  action  — 
consisted  in  the  gradual  lengthening  of  our  left  flank  along 
the  Roumanian-Transylvanlan  frontier.  Naturally  such  a 
replacing  of  Roumanian  troops  by  the  Russians  gave  to  the 
Roumanian  command  fresh  reserves;  unfortimately,  owing 
to  the  natural  conditions,  these  reserves  could  only  be  sent 
in  comparatively  small  quantities.  Another  help  given  by 
Russia  to  Roumania,  soon  after  she  took  the  field,  con- 
sisted in  sending  a  special  corps  composed  of  Russian  and 

2.32 


I9i6]  THE  FIGHTING  IN  ROUMANIA  233 

Serbian  divisions  on  the  left  side  of  the  Danube  to 
Dobroudja. 

When  these  troops  were  sent,  people  in  Russia  were 
holding  the  delusive  hope  that  the  Bulgarians  would  not 
decide  to  unsheathe  the  sword  and  to  shed  the  blood  of 
brothers  and  the  descendants  of  those  soldiers  who,  less 
than  forty  years  ago,  drenched  Bulgarian  earth  with  their 
blood  and  with  the  price  of  it  created  Bulgarian  independ- 
ence. However,  these  illusions  soon  faded,  and  finally 
died  away  as  this  Russo-Serbian  corps,  having  met  with  the 
larger  Bulgarian  forces  in  a  very  bloody  fight,  suffered  a 
serious  defeat  and  gradually  fell  back  to  the  railway  line 
of  Tchernavody-Konstantza  in  order  to  shorten  the  front 
defence.  This  sector  began  to  acquire  greater  and  greater 
importance,  so  that,  in  the  middle  of  November,  the 
separate  corps  was  increased  until  it  became  the  Separate 
Danube  Army,  and  was  directly  dependent  upon  the  Gen- 
eral Headquarters.  This  army  was  entrusted  to  General 
Saharoff.  His  Chief  of  Staff  was  General  Shishkievitch. 
In  course  of  time  these  persons  and  the  Staff  of  the  Danube 
Army  formed  the  nucleus  of  the  Command  and  of  the  Staff 
of  the  Roumanian  front,  but  this  happened  only  at  the 
end  of  the  month  of  December. 

The  heaviest  time  for  the  Roumanian  Army  was  un- 
doubtedly November  —  December.  Defending  its  fron- 
tier from  the  projecting  corner  of  Transylvania  to  Orsovy 

—  and,  further,  watching  the  whole  length  of  the  Danube 

—  the  Roumanian  Army  had  to  fight,  with  comparatively 
weak  forces,  against  an  adversary  larger  in  numbers.  But 
the  great  advantage  of  the  Germans  lay  in  another  direc- 
tion. On  their  side  were  troops  and  Chiefs,  both  juniors 
and  seniors,  who  were  experienced  in  warfare.  The 
troops  were  well  taught  and  fully  equipped.     On  the  con- 


234  THE  FIGHTING  IN  ROUMANIA        [ch.  xix 

trary,  in  the  hands  of  the  Roumanian  Command  was  only 
raw  material.  As  to  the  capacity  of  this  material,  with 
regard  to  the  soldiers,  the  general  answers  to  the  call 
were  good,  but  it  was  quite  different  in  the  case  of  the 
Staffs  and  Officers,  which  were  not  technically  at  the  re- 
quired height  and  were  not  possessed  of  sufficient  theoretic 
military  knowledge.  The  best  weapon  was  acknowledged 
to  be  the  artillery,  but  even  in  this  they  did  not  know 
at  all  how  to  adopt  the  new  methods  which  had  been  used 
during  the  present  war.  So  the  Allies  went  to  the  help 
of  the  Roumanian  Army  by  sending  instructors  from  the 
French  Army  and  special  artillery  instructors  from  the  Rus- 
sian. 

At  the  head  of  the  French  instructors  was  appointed 
General  Berthelot,  and  he  also  was  the  closest  adviser  of 
the  Roumanian  King,  Ferdinand,  in  regard  to  military 
operations.  Evidently  it  was  not  easy  to  direct  the  opera- 
tions of  troops  whose  merits  and  inadequacies  were  not 
sufficiently  known  to  the  leaders.  Only  by  this  can  I  ex- 
plain that  all  operations  undertaken  for  meeting  the  Ger- 
man attack  —  these  undoubtedly  possessing  the  quality  of 
initiative  and  of  mobility  of  troops  —  were  calculated  as 
though  the  troops  were  just  as  able  to  lead  the  war  in 
trenches  or  to  manoeuvre  in  the  field.  This  was  especially 
shown  when,  in  the  end  of  November,  the  Germans  in 
several  directions  crossed  the  frontier  and  invaded 
Roumania.  The  desire  of  arresting  this  invasion  by  flank 
movements  and  rear  attacks  on  the  German  columns  in- 
variably resulted  in  the  defeat  of  the  Roumanian  troops, 
and  not  seldom  in  their  capture.  With  every  day  the 
number  of  the  more  efficient  Roumanian  divisions  became 
smaller,  and  the  danger  of  invasion  by  the  German  troops 
increased.     It  was  easy  to   foresee  the  possibility  of  the 


I9i6]  THE  FIGHTING  IN  ROUMANIA  235 

arrival  of  the  Austro-Germans  in  the  Roumanian  capital. 

Then  it  was  that  the  Roumanian  High  Command  and 
the  Roumanian  Government,  through  their  mlhtary  repre- 
sentative at  the  "  Stafka,"  General  Koanda,  turned  to  His 
Majesty  asking  him  to  give  a  still  more  real  help  to  Rou- 
mania,  not  only  by  replacing  her  army  by  ours  on  our  left 
flank,  but  by  sending  some  corps  for  the  direct  defence  of 
Bukarest.  On  the  next  morning  the  Tsar  told  me  of  the 
conversations  with  General  Koanda.  Thanks  to  this  I 
learnt  by  chance  that  in  the  "  Stafka  "  an  order  had  been 
adapted  according  to  which  the  oldest  representatives  of 
foreign  military  missions  asked  audience  of  His  Majesty 
without  informing  the  Chief  of  Staff.  Such  an  order,  of 
course,  could  not  be  considered  normal,  for  this  reason. 
Having  a  direct  conversation  with  the  Tsar,  they  could 
easily  put  him  in  an  awkward  position  for  an  immediate 
and  correct  answer,  for  it  could  not  be  expected  that  the 
Commander-in-Chief  would  always  sufficiently  know  the 
true  facts  with  regard  to  such  questions  as  might  thus  be 
raised  by  the  foreign  representatives.  Such  a  simple 
method  is  never  observed  in  any  country  as  between  the 
head  of  the  State  even  for  foreign  ambassadors;  the  latter 
always  seek  an  audience  through  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs. 

This  incident  gave  me  the  opportunity  of  informing  the 
heads  of  the  foreign  missions,  through  their  senior 
member,  that  they  should  warn  me  when  they  wished  to 
have  a  conversation  concerning  affairs  with  His  Majesty, 
and  tell  me  more  or  less  about  its  subject. 

To  comply  with  the  demand  of  the  Roumanian  Com- 
mand was  not  an  easy  one,  for  It  was  necessary  to  transport 
the  reserves  by  our  railways  and  those  of  Roumania.  It 
would  have  been  necessary  for  these  reserves  to  be  so  big 


236  THE  FIGHTING  IN  ROUMANIA        [ch.  xix 

that  we  could  only  rely  upon  them  for  the  success  of  our 
side;  or  that  in  an  extremity  they  would  form,  independ- 
ently, the  new  centre  of  resistance.  It  was  indispensable 
at  the  same  time  to  explain  the  mutual  agreements  between 
the  Chiefs  of  the  Russian  and  Roumanian  command.  The 
bringing  in  of  small  Russian  units  into  the  composition  of 
Roumanian  troops  would  only  cause  them  to  be  broken  up 
in  parts,  and  consequently  increase  the  number  of  the  troops 
retreating.  For  this  reason  the  immediate  fulfilment  of 
the  Roumanians'  request  could  not  be  even  entertained,  but 
preparative  measures  were  undertaken  at  once.  As  for 
the  rest,  it  was  only  the  confirmation  of  the  measures  taken 
before,  which  on  general  lines  led  to  the  gradual  drawing 
together  of  whole  armies  for  future  filling  of  a  large  break 
between  our  left  flank  army,  under  General  Lechitzky,  on 
the  frontier  of  Transylvania,  and  the  right  flank  of  the 
Danube  Army,  at  this  time  active  in  Dobroudja.  But  the 
realisation  of  these  plans  could  only  be  tardy,  and  could 
not  provide  help  in  time  to  keep  Bukarest  in  our  hands; 
and  that  is  why  at  the  price  of  weakening  the  defence  of  the 
Dobroudja,  General  Saharoff  received  orders  to  gradually 
lengthen  the  lines  of  his  defence  along  the  Danube  with  the 
aim  to  include  finally  in  them  the  protection  of  the  Rou- 
manian capital. 

While  these  instructions  were  being  carried  out,  to  the 
left  flank  of  the  Army  of  Lechitzky  came  a  disengaged  re- 
serve corps  under  the  command  of  General  Denikin,  the 
same  General  who,  during  the  time  of  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment, successfully  occupied  these  posts:  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  with  Alexeieff  and  Brussiloff,  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  western  front,  where  he  replaced  me,  and 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  south-western  front  at  the 
time   of   Korniloff's   advance    against   Kerensky.     At   this 


i  ^S^iM  \ 


s^ 


I9i6]  THE  FIGHTING  IN  ROUMANIA  237 

time  he  was  arrested  by  the  "  Soviet "  Council  of  Soldiers 
as  a  Commander-in-Chief  who  openly  proclaimed  his 
loyalty  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  all  the  Armies, 
General  Korniloff. 

The  existence  of  this  corps  gave  me  the  opportunity  of 
proposing  to  General  Koanda  to  ask  the  Roumanian  Com- 
mand in  what  manner  and  where  they  could  send  this  corps 
with  the  object  of  directly  protecting  Bukarest.  Rather 
late  at  night  in  the  cabinet  and  in  the  presence  of  the  Tsar 
there  was  a  conference  in  which  General  Koanda  informed 
me  that  the  Roumanian  Government  needed  reinforce- 
ments, and,  thanks  to  the  improved  working  of  her  rail- 
ways, such  a  help  would  be  opportune  and  real.  It  is  neces- 
sary to  note  that  already  at  that  time  the  working  of  the 
Roumanian  railways  caused  complaints  from  all  the  Rus- 
sian military  chiefs.  This  work  was  so  unsatisfactory  that 
officers  coming  from  Roumania  affirmed  that  the  cause  was 
not  only  ignorance  in  the  execution  of  this  complicated  task, 
but  was  a  real  manifestation  of  ill-will  by  the  railway  men, 
who  exhibited  an  actual  pro-German  tendency.  I  will  not 
attempt  to  judge  of  this.  It  ought  not  to  be  forgotten 
that  in  all  these  times,  and  in  all  countries  during  military 
unsuccessfulness,  suspicions  arise  of  treachery.  And  as  the 
presence  of  pro-German  circles  in  Roumania  was  accepted 
as  an  undoubted  fact,  this  circumstance  gave  still  more  food 
for  talk  and  suspicion  of  treachery  in  the  country. 

Having  discussed  this  directly  with  the  Roumanian 
General  Staff,  General  Koanda,  quite  distressed,  informed 
me  next  day  that  Roumania  unfortunately  had  to  refuse 
the  offered  help.  He  explained  that  the  transfer  to 
Bukarest  of  the  whole  corps  could  be  only  done  by  rail- 
,  way,  and  the  railway  line,  which  could  be  taken  advantage 
of,  was  even  unable  to  bring  to  Bukarest  the  Roumanian  divi- 


238  THE  FIGHTING  IN  ROUMANIA         [ch.  xix 

sion  which  was  replaced,  on  the  right  Roumanian  flank,  by 
the  troops  of  Lechitzky.  This  may  be  explained  in  a  great 
measure  by  the  fact  that  this  railway  was  at  that  time  oc- 
cupied with  the  evacuation  of  Bukarest,  and  thanks  to  this 
was  blocked  by  the  superfluous  rolling  stock.  In  the  course 
of  time  the  evacuation  of  the  rolling  stock  of  Western  Rou- 
manian network  caused  the  Roumanian  authorities  many 
troubles  and  difficulties.  The  answer  of  General  Koanda 
made  me  understand  that,  for  the  strategic  development  of 
the  above-mentioned  Russian  corps  to  fill  the  break  between 
Lechitzky  and  Saharoff,  no  reliance  could  be  placed  on  the 
help  of  the  Roumanian  railways.  To  save  time  and  for  the 
possible  stopping  of  the  German  advance  it  was  necessary 
to  take  advantage  of  the  numerous  Russian  cavalry.  Al- 
ready division  after  division  had  marched  down  to  the  back 
of  the  south-western  front,  and  was  gradually  directed  to 
the  centre  of  Roumania,  leaving  behind  our  infantry  corps. 

One  ought  not  to  forget  that  it  was  autumn;  highways 
are  almost  unknown  in  Roumania;  the  roads  on  the  soft 
earth  do  not  allow  a  big  movement  without  becoming  an 
impassable  marsh.  Our  cavalry  in  the  trenches  could  not 
keep  the  horses  useful  for  making  long  journeys;  during  the 
march  through  Roumania  they  had  to  feed  their  horses 
more  with  Indian  corn  than  with  oats.  All  this  could  not 
but  retard  the  movements  of  the  cavalry,  and  impair  its 
efficiency  in  the  field  campaign,  for  which  in  a  great  measure 
military  activity  would  be  necessary  in  Wallachia. 

The  time  necessary  for  the  achievement  of  all  these 
measures  did  not  give  us  any  right  to  hope  that  we  could 
keep  Bukarest  in  our  hands.  But  sooner  or  later  the  join- 
ing together  of  Brussiloff's  front  and  the  Danube  Army  was 
to  be  brought  about.  On  account  of  this  the  question  arose 
as  to  how  the  High  Command  on  this  front  was  to  be  con- 


I9i6]  THE  FIGHTING  IN  ROUMANIA  239 

stituted.  It  had  to  be  taken  Into  consideration  that  on  this 
front  would  occur  the  mixing  up  of  Russian  and  Roumanian 
troops.  On  the  other  hand  there  could  not  be  a  divided 
command,  nor  the  establishing  of  a  front,  defending  the 
access  to  the  South  Russian  fertile  provinces,  which  would 
not  be  submissive  to  the  Russian  High  Command.  It  had 
to  be  decided  by  whom  would  be  accomplished  the  subor- 
dination of  the  Roumanian  troops  to  the  Russian  Generalis- 
simo. On  the  one  hand  this  question  was  easy,  as  the  latter 
was  the  Tsar,  but  on  the  other  hand  it  was  difficult,  as  at 
the  head  of  the  Roumanian  troops  was  the  Roumanian  King, 
Ferdinand. 

It  was  true  that  forty  years  ago  the  Roumanian  King 
Charles,  at  that  time  Grand  Duke,  submitted  to  the  Grand 
Duke  Nicolai,  brother  of  the  reigning  Emperor,  Alexander 
II.  An  exchange  of  telegrams  commenced,  but  did  not  lead 
to  a  simple  decision,  so  as  to  organise  the  Roumanian  front 
on  the  same  basis  and  under  the  same  control  as  the  rest 
of  the  Russian  fronts.  It  was  necessary  to  evolve  a  more 
complicated  system  which  would  lead  to  the  following  situa- 
tion: King  Ferdinand  was  regarded  by  us  as  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  Roumanian  front,  which  had  to  be 
composed  of  the  Roumanian  and  Russian  troops;  but  no 
word  was  said  as  to  whether  he  was  or  was  not  under  the 
control  of  the  Russian  High  Command.  By  him  was  ap- 
pointed —  as  the  assistant  of  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
responsible  for  the  military  events  to  the  Russian  general- 
issimo —  General  Saharoff,  who,  as  regards  the  Russian 
troops,  possessed  the  right  of  Commander-in-Chief. 
With  him  was  established  a  Russian  Staff,  at  the  head  of 
which  stood  General  Shishkievltch,  and  also  a  Roumanian 
Staff  for  relations  with  the  Roumanian  troops,  at  the  head 
of   which    was    appointed    General    Presano.     The    result 


240  THE  FIGHTING  IN  ROUMANIA        [ch.  xix 

showed  that  such  an  arrangement  did  not  cause  any  unusual 
friction.  The  relations  of  General  Saharoff  with  the  Rou- 
manian King  were  normal.  Finally  the  combined  military 
activity  of  the  Russian  and  Roumanian  troops  was  normal, 
because  of  the  freely-shown  mutual  help. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  Russian  troops  from  the  right  to 
the  left  bank  of  the  Danube,  to  the  number  of  two  corps, 
was  first  directed  to  the  attempt  to  keep  Bukarest  and  then 
to  fill  up  the  left  sector  of  the  future  Roumanian  front,  which 
led  to  the  necessity  of  Russian  troops  leaving  the  line  of 
Tchernavody-Konstantza.  First  they  went  back  a  little  in 
order  to  shorten  their  front  and  to  occupy  better  positions, 
but  they  were  pushed  by  the  larger  numbers  of  the  Bulgar- 
Turkish  forces  farther  in  the  direction  of  the  valleys  of  the 
lower  Danube.  In  the  beginning  of  19 17,  after  obstinate 
fights,  the  Russian  troops  had  gradually  to  evacuate  the 
whole  of  the  Dobroudja.  Of  the  two  it  was  the  more  im- 
portant to  keep  ourselves  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Seret, 
than  to  hold  the  small  space  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Danube.  It  had  to  be  considered  that  the  Danube  every 
year  during  some  weeks,  thanks  to  floating  blocks  of  ice, 
was  quite  unnavigable.  The  Russian  troops  which  re- 
mained on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube  could  communi- 
cate at  this  time  with  their  base  and  receive  thence  every- 
thing indispensable  by  means  of  the  rope  ferry  near  Ismail. 
This  was  not  sufficient  for  such  a  large  detachment,  and  it 
was  quite  possible  that  our  troops  which  remained  on  the 
right  side  of  the  Danube  might  have  been  put  into  a  critical 
position,  having  before  them  an  adversary  larger  in  number, 
and  not  having  behind  them  a  safe  line  of  advance  for  re- 
inforcements, nor  a  road  for  retreat.  The  concentration 
of  about  six  divisions  of  Russian  cavalry  towards  the  west 
from  the  line  of  the  Seret  gave  us  an  opportunity  of  con- 


I9I7]  THE  FIGHTING  IN  ROUMANIA  241 

centrating  the  Russian  corps  which  for  this  purpose  had  to 
follow  ordinary  roads.  There  they  could  support  with 
combined  effort  the  retreating  Roumanian  troops  and  stop 
the  advance  of  the  Germans  towards  the  east.  One  could 
count  upon  the  fact  that  the  Russian  corps  which  were 
brought  up  would  soon  be  in  a  position  to  fill  the  whole 
space  between  the  left  flank  of  General  Lechitzky's  Army 
and  the  right  flank  of  the  Danube  Army  under  General 
Saharoff,  the  latter  having  gradually  retreated  from 
Bukarest  in  a  north-east  direction.  Then,  notwithstanding 
the  continued  retreat  of  the  Roumanian  troops,  after  a  suc- 
cession of  obstinate  battles,  the  Russian  troops  succeeded 
in  stopping  the  further  advance  of  the  Austro-Germans  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  River  Seret. 

In  measure  as  the  Russian  troops  came  in  contact  with 
the  German  troops,  the  remainder  of  the  Roumanians  which 
had  already  sufficiently  suffered  were  sent  farther  back, 
where  they  had  to  be  reformed,  reinforced,  and,  it  may  be 
said,  taught  before  they  could  again  take  part  in  military  ac- 
tion. However,  a  part  of  the  Roumanian  troops  which  com- 
posed the  right  flank  of  the  whole  Roumanian  position  still 
kept  its  military  efficiency.  Among  the  number  of  these 
troops  was  specially  noted  the  brigade  of  eighteen  battalions 
of  Kalarash,  under  General  Stroudza.  The  remaining  Rou- 
manian troops  which  possessed  military  efficiency  were  re- 
inforced with  some  divisions  of  Russian  cavalry,  among  this 
number  the  corps  which  was  under  General  Mannerheim, 
the  same  whose  name  was  known  to  the  whole  world  in  the 
beginning  of  the  spring  of  19 18,  as  he  undertook  the  organi- 
sation and  command  of  the  White  Guards  of  Finland. 
Every  day  the  strength  of  the  resistance  of  the  Roumanian 
troops  and  the  extent  of  the  front  confided  to  her  gradually 
diminished.     At  the  beginning  of   19 17  to  the  defence  of 


242  THE  FIGHTING  IN  ROUMANIA         [ch.  xix 

the  Roumanian  troops  could  be  entrusted  only  a  front  of 
thirty  kilometres  in  the  Transylv^anian  Carpathians.     Little 
by  little,   the  arrangements  for  the  direction  of  the   Rou- 
manian front  were  organised,  though  there  were  many  diffi- 
culties, owing  to  the  indispensability  of  forming  new  staffs. 
But  the  greatest  difficulties  were  caused  by  the  regulation 
and  reorganisation  of  railway  affairs.      It  was  necessary  to 
co-ordinate  the  work  of  the  Russian  and  Roumanian  rail- 
ways.     Neither  of  them  worked  normally,  but  from  differ- 
ent causes  which  still  more  complicated  the  position.     The 
Roumanian  railways  suffered  from  the  blocking  of  the  road 
.and  stations  by  the  "rolling-stock"  taken  from  the  lines 
which  had  already  fallen  into  the  adversary's  hands.     This 
stock  was  for  the  greater  part  loaded  with  different  com- 
modities from  the  evacuated  capital.     The  second  bad  point 
of  the  Roumanian  railways  was  the  insufficient  preparation 
of  the  men  for  the  heavy  work  of  the  time  of  war.     Our 
railways  at  the  time,  on  the  contrary,  already  suffered  from 
the   insufficiency   of  the   "  rolling-stock,"   but  the   personal 
Staff  were  already  accustomed  to  their  work,  and  found  It 
possible  with  insufficient  means  to  obtain  the  greatest  ad- 
vantage from  such  means  as  they  did  possess.      It  was  still 
more  difficult  because  the  gauge  of  our  tracks  did  not  corre- 
spond with  that  of  the  Roumanian  railways.     But  every  day 
our  position  on  the  new  Roumanian  front  became  easier,  and 
the  work  gradually  resumed  its  normal  state.     There  were 
other  questions  giving  much  trouble  to  the  military  authori- 
ties of  both  Allies,  and  especially  to  the  Roumanian  Gov- 
erment  —  the  question  of  the  supply  of  the  troops  and  of 
the  population,  especially  of  that  part  which  had  emigrated 
from   Wallachia   at  the   invasion   of  the   Austro-Germans. 
These  things  were  all  intimately  connected  with  the  work 
of  the  railways.     If  the  Russian  troops,  which  hurried  to 


1917]  THE  FIGHTING  IN  ROUMANIA  243 

the  help  of  the  Roumanian  troops,  had  to  march  hundreds 
of  kilometres  in  order  of  campaign,  it  can  well  be  deduced 
that  the  railways  did  not  satisfy  the  requirements.  How- 
ever, at  the  price  of  incredible  efforts  and  of  mutual  conces- 
sions from  our  side  and  that  of  Roumania,  neither  the  troops 
in  the  Roumanian  frontiers  nor  the  population  suffered 
from  severe  want  of  supplies.  The  greatest  failure  of  the 
railways  was  shown  in  the  evacuation  of  the  sick  and 
wounded,  but  even  in  this  all  that  was  physically  possible 
was  done.  To  arrange  this  affair  in  the  right  way  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  Medical  Departments,  Prince 
Alexander  Oldenburg,  in  spite  of  his  age  showed  untiring 
energy.  Being  extremely  irascible,  he  could  not  endure  in 
other  people  unconscientious  work.  Of  course  all  feared 
his  irascibility,  but  in  preparation  for  his  arrival  everything 
was  arranged  and  repaired;  all  that  was  lacking  was  sup- 
plied, because  it  was  difficult  to  hide  anything  from  his  ob- 
servant and  experienced  eye.  In  this  respect  his  inspections 
of  all  the  base  sanitary  establishments  were  beneficial. 

Thus  a  complete  change  of  the  Roumanian  Army  was 
made  by  the  Russians,  although  on  a  shortened  front.  That 
change  could  only  be  effected  at  the  price  of  the  exhaustion 
of  our  reserves  on  the  other  fronts,  and  could  be  only  per- 
mitted for  the  period  of  the  winter  calm.  It  was  necessary 
to  think  of  the  approaching  spring  together  with  the  ex- 
pected advance  of  all  the  Allies.  The  Conference  of  the 
representatives  of  the  Allied  Armies  which  took  place  in 
the  month  of  November  in  Paris  decided  on  the  necessity  of 
agreeing  that  the  advances  of  the  Allies  should  take  place 
as  far  as  possible  at  the  same  time.  It  was  also  decided  to 
commence  the  first  combined  advance  in  the  first  months  of 
19 1 7.  Such  a  decision  was  made  on  the  basis  that  winter 
is  for  the  Russian  troops  the  best  season  for  offensive  opera- 


244  THE  FIGHTING  IN  ROUMANIA         [ch.  xix 

tions.  It  must  be  supposed  that  in  this  case  they  remem- 
bered the  successful  winter  campaign  of  1812  which  led  to 
the  complete  confusion  of  the  Army  of  Napoleon.  Per- 
haps this  would  also  refer  to  the  winter  campaign  of  19 14- 
15,  but  in  both  these  cases  there  was  no  analogy  with  the  ap- 
proaching campaign  of  1917. 

The  operations  in  February  and  March  of  191 6  afforded 
a  sufficient  proof.  It  was  not  less  necessary  to  take  into 
consideration  the  decision  of  the  Allies'  military  Conference 
as  to  the  possible  preparation  for  active  operations  during 
the  month  of  January  or  February.  As  to  the  spring  of 
19 1 7  and  the  summer,  it  was  necessary  to  be  quite  ready  for 
the  developing  of  the  increasing  material  means  which  were 
received  from  our  own  country  and  coming  from  our  Allies. 
Busy,  too,  with  the  work  of  preparation  was  the  Staff  of 
the  Headquarters,  in  preparing  the  material  which  had  to 
be  inspected  during  the  conference  of  the  Commanders-in- 
Chief  of  all  the  fronts.  Such  conferences  under  the  presi- 
dency of  the  Generalissimo  took  place  a  few  times  a  year, 
but  all  the  Commanders-in-Chief  could  be  called  only  during 
the  winter  period  of  the  campaign.  Such  a  conference  was 
to  be  called  at  the  end  of  December  19 16  just  as  it  had 
taken  place  in  December  19 15. 


CHAPTER  XX 

FREE    POLAND THE    RAILWAY    PROBLEM 

Although  the  Roumanian  question  was  not  quite  decided 
in  the  beginning  of  December,  the  means  by  which  we  were 
arriving  at  a  possible  good  solution  were  noted.  St. 
George's  Day  on  December  9th  was  approaching,  and  the 
personnel  of  the  Tsar's  suite  turned  to  me  with  the 
question :  Did  I  know  where  the  Tsar  intended  to  pass  the 
day?  Would  he  remain  at  the  General  Staff  Headquarters 
or  go  to  one  of  the  fronts  to  be  near  his  troops,  on  the  fete 
day;  or  would  he  go  to  Petrograd  with  the  Empress  and 
his  daughters,  whose  early  departure  from  Mohileff  had  ap- 
parently been  decided  on? 

During  the  first  report  I  touched  upon  this  question  and 
learnt  that  the  Tsar  intended  not  to  make  it  a  solemn  day 
this  year,  but  would  spend  the  day  on  the  way  between 
Mohileff  and  Tsarskoe  Selo.  The  departure  of  the  Tsar 
from  the  General  Headquarters  took  place  as  arranged. 
Before  the  departure  of  the  Tsar,  I  decided  in  the  first 
audience  to  touch  upon  the  Polish  question,  which,  in  my 
opinion,  had  not  till  now  received  a  sufiiciently  definite  solu- 
tion. I  had  the  opportunity  of  giving  General  Alexeieff 
my  views  on  it  before  his  departure,  and  I  was  quite  con- 
vinced that  we  did  not  really  differ  in  anything  essential. 
I  was  certain  that  in  the  case  of  his  returning  to  the  post 
of  Chief  of  Staff,  my  work  would  be  continued  in  the  same 
spirit. 

The  first  move  in  the  decision  of  the  Polish  question  was 

245 


246  FREE  POLAND  [ch.  xx 

taken  by  the  Grand  Duke  Nicolai,  who,  at  the  very  beginning 
of  the  war,  turned  to  the  Polish  nation  with  a  solemn  call, 
asking  them  to  fight  with  Russia  hand  in  hand  promising 
them  that  a  victorious  war  would  give  to  all  the  Polish 
nation  full  autonomy  under  the  sceptre  of  Russian  Tsars. 
The  Grand  Duke  then  acted  with  the  right  of  a  Commander- 
in-Chief;  what  kind  of  instructions  he  received  from  the 
head  of  the  Empire,  what  role  in  this  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment played  —  neither  the  Russian  nation  nor  our  Allies, 
nor  the  enemies,  could  know.  In  order  to  keep  the  matter 
alive  during  a  session  of  the  Imperial  Duma,  the  Prime 
Minister  at  the  time,  J,  L.  Goremykin,  In  his  speech  to  the 
Imperial  Duma,  declared,  for  general  Information,  that  one 
of  the  alms  of  the  war  with  the  Germans  was  the  uniting 
of  the  different  provinces  of  the  former  Polish  Kingdom 
into  one,  with  the  idea  of  giving  Poland  full  autonomy  in 
the  Russian  Empire.  The  German  Government,  seeing 
with  how  much  interest  the  Polish  nation  received  this  an- 
nouncement on  the  part  of  Russia,  and  finding  that  they  met 
with  considerable  difficulties  in  administrating  the  Polish 
Kingdom,  and  especially  In  attempts  to  form  a  Polish  Army 
from  the  Russian  Poles,  found  It  necessary  at  the  end  of 
19 1 6  to  declare  the  foundation  of  a  future  independent 
Polish  Kingdom. 

This  declaration  did  not  at  once  receive  an  answer  from 
the  Russian  Government.  But,  of  course,  the  future  Polish 
Kingdom,  as  given  by  Germany,  would  only  have  the 
semblance  of  Independence.  The  German  Government 
only  spoke  about  the  Russian  part  of  the  former  Polish 
Kingdom,  leaving  quite  open  the  question  of  the  fate  of  the 
other  two-thirds  of  Poland,  which  remained  in  the  posses- 
sion of  Germany  and  Austria.  Intending  to  touch  upon  the 
Polish  question  In  the  report  to  the  Tsar,  I  desired  to  con- 


I9i6]  FREE  POLAND  247 

vince  him  that  it  was  time  for  the  whole  Polish  nation  to 
hear  directly  from  him  in  what  manner  the  head  of  the  Rus- 
sian Empire  considered  it  necessary  to  decide  the  Polish 
question.  On  the  other  side  I  intended  to  show  the  Tsar 
that  the  time  for  half-measures  had  passed,  that  the  Polish 
question  needed  a  definite  decision;  that  only  such  a  deci- 
sion would  cut  the  gordian  knot  which  for  more  than  two 
centuries  had  bound  the  two  Slav  nations,  and  better  the 
position  of  the  Polish  nation,  who  were  Russian  subjects 
as  well  as  the  subjects  of  our  enemies. 

In  a  few  words,  I  desired  that  in  future  the  Polish  ques- 
tion should  be  decided  in  this  way:  that  Russia  and  Poland 
should  only  have  one  thing  in  common,  a  common  frontier 
dividing  these  two  independent  countries.  The  other  re- 
maining questions  which  could  only  concern  the  Polish  na- 
tion should  be  independently  decided  by  the  Polish  nation 
itself  without  any  foreign  interference.  In  reality  it  was 
the  principle  that  was  in  time  proclaimed  by  the  Russian 
Revolution,  but  received  quite  a  wrong  realisation  —  the 
principle  of  the  free  nations. 

Such  a  settlement  of  the  Polish  question  was  in  my  opinion 
the  best  means  of  satisfying  the  interests  not  only  of  the 
Polish  nation,  but  also  of  Russia,  especially  in  the  near  and 
even  in  the  far  future.  Twice  during  the  report  to  the  Tsar 
I  analysed  in  detail  the  Polish  problem,  discussing  all  the 
good  and  bad  points  of  such  a  radical  decision.  The  enum- 
eration here  of  all  the  arguments  I  used  would  take  too 
much  space.  Sufficient  to  say  that  my  reports  to  the  Tsar 
each  time  took  more  than  an  hour.  Being  convinced  my- 
self that  the  Tsar  agreed  with  my  arguments,  I  had  to  take 
advantage  of  the  first  opportunity  in  order  to  enforce  this 
by  an  act  of  the  supreme  will  which  would  be  announced 
for  general  information. 


248  FREE  POLAND  [ch.  xx 

The  speech  of  the  Emperor  William,  made  at  the  begin- 
ning of  December  191 6,  in  which  he  made  to  the  Alhes 
quite  clear  proposals  for  peace,  gave  a  good  opportunity  for 
It.  In  one  form  or  another  it  was  necessary  to  tell  our 
enemies  the  undoubted  truth  that  if  for  the  declaration  of 
war  one  nation  was  sufficient,  so  for  making  peace  there 
must  be  at  least  two.  It  is  true  that  in  the  month  of  Febru- 
ary 19 1 8  Russian  Maximalists,  according  to  M.  Trotzky, 
wanted  to  prove  the  contrary  by  declaring  to  Germany  that 
if  she  wanted  to  continue  the  war  with  Russia  the  Bolsheviks, 
of  which  he  was  representative,  would  not  fight  Germany 
any  more,  and  that  therefore  they  considered  the  war  be- 
tween Germany  and  Russia  at  an  end. 

Many  may  say  that  such  conduct  of  the  Russian 
Maximalists  violated  the  truth  which  had  been  established 
long  ago,  that  there  is  nothing  new  under  the  sun.  But 
this  is  only  a  long-forgotten  way  of  doing  things.  It  would 
be  different  if  such  a  decision  had  been  taken  by  the  people 
who  inhabited  Central  America  when,  in  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury, as  it  seemed  to  them,  an  uncivilised  conqueror  had  come 
in  the  person  of  Ferdinand  Cortez,  with  some  thousands 
of  followers.  Of  the  "  Aztecs  "  and  "  Incas  "  most  of  us 
have  only  a  vague  knowledge.  One  must  believe  that  the 
Governors  of  this  highly  civilised  but  effeminate  nation  had 
full  solidarity  with  their  own  people.  But,  fortunately,  all 
that  happens  now  in  Russia  shows  that  not  only  Trotzky, 
but  those  who  are  deceived  by  him  and  his  kind,  have  noth- 
ing in  common  with  the  wholesome  elements  of  Russian 
people  and  Russian  society,  although  for  the  mom.ent  it  does 
not  manifest  itself. 

On  the  eve  of  December  19th  His  Majesty,  after  almost 
ten  days'  absence,  returned  from  Tsarskoe  Selo  to  the 
Stafka.     His   family,    except  the  Tsarevitch,   remained   in 


I9i6]  FREE  POLAND  249 

Tsarskoe  Selo.  During  one  of  my  first  audiences  I  asked 
the  Tsar  If  he  did  not  consider  it  desirable,  instead  of  issuing 
the  ordinary  New  Year  order  to  the  Army  and  Fleet,  to 
give  it  at  once,  and  to  give  in  this  Ukaze  the  answer  to  the 
words  of  the  Kaiser,  who  apparently  was  of  the  opinion 
that  as  the  beginning  of  the  European  War  depended  upon 
him  at  a  moment  convenient  to  him,  so  upon  him  depended 
the  time  for  the  stopping  of  the  war,  consistently  with  the 
interests  of  Germany.  The  Tsar  accepted  this  suggestion 
and  only  asked  who  would  write  it.  On  December  25th, 
during  the  ordinary  audience  I  presented  to  the  Tsar  a  pro- 
ject for  an  Ukaze,  asking  him  not  to  sign  it  at  once,  but  to 
take  it  with  him  and  to  return  it  to  me  on  the  next  day.  In 
addition  to  this  I  asked  the  Tsar  to  pay  special  attention 
to  this  —  that  in  the  order  in  which  were  stated  the  rea- 
sons why  Russia  found  it  necessary  to  continue  the  war,  it 
was  said  that  the  vital  interests  of  Russia  were  bound  up 
with  the  establishment  of  free  navigation  through  the  Straits 
of  Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles,  and  with  the  inten- 
tion of  Russia  to  create  a  free  Poland  from  her  three 
divided  provinces.  I  drew  the  attention  of  the  Tsar  to  the 
fact  that  the  words  "  free  Poland  "  did  not  comprise  the 
definition  of  autonomy,  but  meant  something  much  greater 
and  much  more  definite;  that  in  declaring  such  a  Ukaze  the 
Tsar  would  take  upon  himself  a  certain  responsibility  from 
which  it  would  be  impossible  to  withdraw.  On  the  same 
evening  the  Tsar  returned  the  Ukaze  to  me,  having  only 
made  one  addition.  To  the  text  where  the  Tsar  addressed 
his  troops  saying  "  My  Army,"  the  Tsar  added  the  words 
"  And  my  Fleet."  Undoubtedly  an  unpardonable  omission 
on  my  part.  On  the  margin  of  the  draft  of  the  Ukaze  was 
the  inscription:  "To  be  presented  to-morrow  for  signa- 
ture. 


250  FREE  POLAND  [ch.  xx 

On  the  next  day,  on  December  26th,  the  Tsar,  signing 
the  Ukaze,  said:  "I  will  sign  it  December  25th  (12th 
Old  Style),  because  I  confirmed  it  yesterday,  and  yesterday 
was  '  Saint  Spirodony  Revolving.'  God  grant  that  this 
Ukaze  may  be  a  turning  point  to  the  bettering  of  our 
military  actions."  Saint  Spirodony  is  called  by  the  Russian 
people  "  Revolving,"  as  on  this  day,  on  December  25th, 
the  sun  is  revolving  from  winter  to  summer.  This  re- 
volvency  had  not  been  waiting  for  long  —  but  in  another 
form,  and  also  In  another  direction.  On  the  same  day  the 
Ukaze  was  sent  to  the  troops.  But  it  was  desired  also  that 
our  Allies  and  our  enemies  should  be  informed  of  it  at  the 
same  time.  Translated  Into  the  French  language  the  Ukaze 
was  sent  the  next  day  to  Paris  by  wireless  telegraphy.  For 
this  purpose  it  was  necessary  to  make  a  correct  and  also  a 
literal  translation.  Having  no  time  to  occupy  myself  with 
this,  I  invited  to  my  quarters  the  head  of  the  French 
Mission,  General  Janin.  His  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
Russian  language  guaranteed  a  good  translation.  Having 
done  the  translation  he  sent  it  to  me.  With  some  insignifi- 
cant alteration,  the  Ukaze  was  made  known  by  wireless  to 
our  Allies  and  to  our  enemies.  By  chance  I  kept  the  copy 
of  the  telegram  of  December  28th,  numbered  144,  which 
was  sent  from  London  by  our  Ambassador,  Count  Bencken- 
dorff,  who  said:  "  I  am  happy  to  declare  that  the  whole 
English  press  speaks  fervently  and  unanimously  of  the 
Ukaze  given  by  our  Tsar.  The  impression  Is  unusually 
deep  and  beneficial,  and  nothing  could  be  more  fully  and 
better  expressed.  Confidentially,  I  had  the  honour  of  being 
received  by  the  King,  who  expressed  to  me  his  fervent  and 
deep  satisfaction."  Signed:  "  Benckendorff."  But  the 
deepest  Impression,  as  far  as  I  know,  which  the  Ukaze  pro- 
duced  was   on   the   Polish  circles  in   Russia.     The   Poles 


I9i6]  FREE  POLAND  251 

abroad  as  well  as  in  Russia  saw  in  the  words  of  such  an 
Ukaze  the  decision  of  the  Head  of  the  Russian  Empire, 
which  could  not  be  withdrawn,  in  regard  to  the  Polish  ques- 
tion, thoroughly  dealt  with,  and  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
Poles.  And,  moreover,  it  was  in  a  form  to  which  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  would  never  have  agreed  of  their  own  accord. 
As  a  result,  some  Polish  people  told  me  that  in  several 
Polish  houses  the  text  of  the  Highest  Ukaze  was  put  under 
glass  in  a  frame  and  was  hung  on  the  wall.  Many  Poles 
saw  in  it  a  new  era  for  the  Polish  people.  However,  events 
did  not  yet  make  it  possible  for  the  Polish  desire  to  be 
realised. 

The  imperative  necessity  of  initiating  measures  which 
would  lead  to  the  increase  of  our  forces,  in  order  to 
lengthen  the  Russian  front,  from  1,300  to  1,700  kilometres, 
involved  the  calling  of  a  conference  of  the  Commanders- 
in-Chief  to  the  General  Headquarters,  as  on  some  ques- 
tions it  was  important  to  hear  their  opinions  and  to  learn 
from  them  when  and  to  what  extent  these  measures  could 
be  practically  adopted.  An  exchange  of  opinions  was  also 
necessary,  and  information  had  to  be  obtained  which  could 
make  it  possible  in  the  near  future  for  the  High  Command 
to  decide  the  questions  as  to  when,  where,  and  in  what 
measure  the  advance  operations  would  be  planned  and  car- 
ried out.  The  latter  had  to  agree  with  the  desires  and  pos- 
sibihties  of  our  Allies.  Now  came  the  hour  for  calling  the 
second  conference,  i.e.  for  the  question  of  the  supplies  and 
feeding  of  the  Army.  In  this  conference  had  to  take  part, 
not  only  the  officers  of  the  military  base,  but  the  representa- 
tives of  different  ministries,  especially  of  Agriculture,  and  of 
Wavs  and  Communications.  As  military  operations  were 
largely  dependent  upon  the  means  provided  for  their  execu- 
tion,  so  this  latter  conference  was  to  be  held  before  the 


252  FREE  P'OLAND  [ch.  xx 

military  conference.  Someone  from  the  Tsar's  suite  told 
me  that  about  the  end  of  December  the  Tsar  would  like  to 
go  to  Tsarskoe  Selo  again.  However,  when  I  informed  the 
Tsar  of  the  necessity  of  putting  off  the  conference  of  Com- 
manders in  order  to  begin  first  with  the  military  administra- 
tive conference,  the  Tsar  did  not  say  a  word  to  lead  me  to 
understand  that  it  upset  his  plans.  The  economic  confer- 
ence I  had  arranged  for  December  27th;  it  was  very  large, 
as  it  was  necessary  to  invite  not  only  the  representatives 
of  all  the  fronts  and  branches,  but  the  representatives  of 
the  ministries  and  institutions  which  were  occupied  in  supply- 
ing the  Army  with  everything  necessary.  It  v/as  impossible, 
on  account  of  other  affairs,  for  me  to  preside  over  this  As- 
sembly from  the  beginning  to  the  end,  and  I  had  to  confine 
myself  to  opening  the  session  and  arranging  the  day  and 
the  questions  v/hich  were  to  be  discussed,  and  after  this  I 
had  to  give  over  the  presidency  to  the  Quartermaster-Gen- 
eral at  Headquarters,  General  Egorievsky.  Towards  the 
end  of  the  session,  he  gave  me  information  as  to  the  results 
of  the  conference,  and  again  I  presided  over  its  close.  The 
conference  had  settled  the  foundations  for  the  future  agreed 
action  of  all  the  departments  interested.  The  most  difficult 
question  calling  for  decision  was  the  agreement  as  to  the 
necessities  of  the  Army  and  the  possibility  of  gradually  sup- 
plying them.  The  exigencies  of  the  troops  consisted  in  sup- 
plying all  provisions  without  buying  any  food  products  in 
the  military  zone.  In  addition,  the  military  stores,  almost 
exhausted  during  the  autumn,  needed  to  be  replenished  be- 
fore the  beginning  of  approaching  operations.  As  for  the 
satisfying  of  10,000,000  mouths,  the  figures  received  were 
so  colossal  that  the  railways  would  have  been  unable  to  cope 
with  the  problem.  In  spite  of  this  it  was  necessary  to  de- 
cide the  question  in  another  way,  previously  having  calcu- 


I9i6]  THE  RAILWAY  PROBLEM  253 

lated  what  facilities  the  railways  actually  offered  for  trans- 
port. 

It  is  necessary  to  explain  why  the  Intendancy  had  to  pro- 
vide for  the  feeding  of  10,000,000  people  in  the  military 
zone,  without  counting  the  reserves.  The  fact  was  that  in 
these  figures  were  not  only  included  the  troops  and  their 
bases,  but  the  greater  number  of  other  organisations  which 
were  staffed  by  voluntary  workers,  and  partly  the  inhabitants 
in  the  military  zone,  as  well  as  the  refugees  living  in  this 
region.  And  lastly,  another  circumstance  Vv^hich  made  the 
number  of  10,000,000  seem  a  little  exaggerated  was  that 
the  Chief  of  the  Administration  did  not  consider  the  actual 
number,  but  the  official  numbers;  that  is,  those  coming  under 
laws  and  orders.  If  it  were  not  for  this  slight  exaggeration 
of  the  number,  and  also  the  possibility  for  the  troops  to  re- 
ceive many  products  in  the  region  which  adjoined  the 
military  zone,  there  would  be  no  reason  to  expect  that  in 
spring  the  necessary  base  store-houses  would  not  be  estab- 
lished, and  that  it  would  be  possible  to  satisfy  the  needs 
of  the  Army.  Results  which  were  obtained  by  the  exchange 
of  the  opinions  of  all  who  came  to  the  conference  gave  the 
hope  that  the  real  needs  of  the  troops  would  be  satisfied 
in  the  course  of  time,  and  that  the  arrivals  of  all  necessities 
for  the  Army  would  gradually  increase.  It  was  also  ex- 
plained that  it  was  essential  that  unity  and  agreement  should 
be  arrived  at  in  the  activities  of  the  three  Ministers  upon 
v/hich  the  supply  of  the  troops  depended  —  the  Ministry 
of  Agriculture,  which  proposed  and  obtained  the  products; 
the  Board  of  Trade,  which  regulated  the  supply  and  manu- 
facture of  some  products  and  above  all  of  coal;  and  lastly, 
the  Ministry  of  Ways  and  Communications,  whose  work  de- 
pended upon  the  action  of  the  second,  and  with  regard  to 
the  supply  of  the  Army,  upon  the  first  Ministry, 


254  THE  RAILWAY  PROBLEM  [ch.  xx 

To  agree  by  post  In  a  short  time  with  these  Ministries 
would  lead  to  nothing,  and  the  presence  at  one  time  at  the 
General  Headquarters  of  the  directors  of  these  three  Min- 
istries could  not  be  hoped  for.  The  only  thing  possible  was 
that  at  the  first  opportunity  I  should  go  to  Petrograd,  and 
there  in  a  personal  interview  arrange  affairs.  For  this  I 
should  have  to  leave  the  General  Headquarters  for  some 
days,  and  the  question  arose  as  to  who  should  be  entrusted 
with  the  direction  of  affairs.  The  first  necessity  was  to  ap- 
point the  right  man  as  assistant  to  the  Chief  of  Staff,  one 
who  could  be  trusted,  and  who  would  have  sufl[icient  knowl- 
edge of  affairs.  It  has  been  already  said  that  after  my  ar- 
rival at  the  General  Headquarters  the  question  of  establish- 
ing a  post  of  assistant  to  the  Chief  of  the  General  Head- 
quarters had  been  decided  and  sanctioned  by  the  Tsar.  My 
choice  fell  on  General  Klembovsky,  at  this  time  Commander 
of  the  iith  Army.  General  Alexeieff  approved,  which  was 
essential  for  me.  General  Klembovsky  arrived  at  Mohileff 
on  December  28th,  on  the  eve  of  the  day  appointed  for  the 
opening  of  the  conference  with  the  Commanders  of  the 
fronts.  On  the  29th,  in  the  morning  after  the  usual  report, 
I  presented  him  to  the  Tsar,  and  after  lunch  he  had  to 
take  part  in  the  conference.  The  past  work  of  General 
Klembovsky  gave  him  a  thorough  preparation  for  the  new 
position.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  for  more  than  a  year 
he  was  the  Chief  of  the  Staff  at  the  front  with  General 
Brussiloff,  and  during  the  successful  advance  of  Brussiloff 
in  the  summer  of  19 16.  Before  this  he  had  commanded  a 
corps;  and  during  the  last  months  he  commanded  the  nth 
Army.  On  the  arrival  of  Klembovsky,  I  could  hand  over 
to  him  many  matters  which  were  not  of  great  importance, 
but  required  much  time  for  their  decision.  That  made  it 
possible  for  me  not  only  to  devote  more  time  to  more  im- 


1916-17]  THE  RAILWAY  PROBLEM  255 

portant  questions,  but  also  gave  me  some  rest  and  enabled 
me  to  ride  in  the  environs  of  Mohileff.  No  less  a  relief 
to  my  work  was  the  taking  of  the  post  of  the  Quarter- 
master-General by  General  Loukomsky.  I  made  this  choice 
also  in  agreement  with  General  Alexeieff. 

The  past  service  of  General  Loukomsky  ensured  that  he 
would  be,  according  to  the  English  saying,  "  The  right  man 
in  the  right  place."  Before  the  war  he  especially  occupied 
himself  in  preparing  the  mobilisation  of  the  Russian  Army, 
which  under  his  direction  was  splendidly  carried  out.  On 
the  appointment  of  General  Shouvaeff  as  Minister  of  War, 
General  Loukomsky  received  and  successfully  commanded 
a  division  of  infantry  during  the  war.  In  his  last  months 
he  occupied  the  post  of  Chief  of  Staff  of  an  Army.  That 
the  choice  of  these  two  persons  —  General  Klembovsky  and 
General  Loukomsky  —  was  justified  was  shown  by  the  fact 
that  the  Provisional  Government  appointed  them  to  high 
positions.  They  finished  their  military  activity  after  the  un- 
successful attempt  of  Korniloff  to  effect  a  partial  coup  d'etat; 
Klembovsky  in  the  post  of  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
northern  front;  Loukomsky  as  Chief  of  the  General  Staff 
under  Korniloff. 

As  an  illustration  of  the  difficulties  encountered  in  carry- 
ing out  measures  for  obtaining  provisions,  and  for  their 
supply  to  the  Army,  let  me  mention  the  following  character- 
istic examples. 

The  important  products,  which  are  the  first  essential  for 
the  soldier,  are  bread  and  meat.  The  difl^iculty  in  buying 
corn  arose  from  this,  that  the  low  fixed  prices  deprived 
the  principal  producer,  the  peasantry,  of  any  profit  in  sup- 
plying the  corn  for  sale.  No  less  a  difficulty  was  the  trans- 
port of  corn  from  the  millons  of  owners  to  the  railway  sta- 
tions, the  more  so  because  of  the  condition  of  labour,  the 


256  THE  RAILWAY  PROBLEM  [ch.  xx 

decrease  in  the  number  of  horses,  and  the  condition  of  com- 
munication, which  only  allowed  the  supply  of  provisions 
in  the  winter  months  by  sledges. 

The  winter  months  are  considered  the  best  for  it,  but 
nature,  as  if  in  mockery  of  the  calculations  of  man,  did 
not  give  the  conditions  that  might  enable  these  institutions 
to  be  realised.  The  winter  of  191 6  and  19 17  in  two  ways 
spoilt  our  plans.  First  the  frost,  especially  in  the  corn- 
producing  provinces  in  December  and  January,  was  so  hard 
that  the  female  population  —  which,  in  the  greater  part, 
was  doing  the  usual  work  of  the  peasants  —  refused  to 
travel  with  the  loaded  carts  from  the  villages  to  the  rail- 
way stations,  as  many  of  these  journeys  required  not  hours, 
but  whole  days.  In  addition,  in  January  and  February  came 
snow-storms  and  snow-drifts  which  prevented,  not  only  the 
transport  of  the  corn  to  the  station,  but  the  systematic  work 
of  the  railways.  The  frost  reached  30°  and  35°  Centi- 
grade. On  account  of  the  bad  quality  of  mineral  fuel  the 
locomotives  were  prevented  from  developing  the  required 
power  of  steam  to  draw  the  loaded  trucks.  These  locomo- 
tives stopped  for  hours  between  two  stations  to  get  up  suffi- 
cient steam  to  continue  their  way. 

As  an  illustration  of  the  degree  of  difficulty  in  introduc- 
ing economical  measures,  the  following  may  serve.  By 
force  of  circumstances  the  meat  was  supplied  to  the  Army, 
especially  in  the  form  of  live  cattle,  even  in  the  beginning 
of  the  campaign,  from  the  farther  districts  of  Siberia.  Also 
the  waggons,  with  a  capacity  of  about  16  tons,  carried  not 
more  than  12—14  head  of  horned  cattle,  which  after  being 
killed  gave  not  more  than  2^  tons  of  meat.  That  will 
serve  to  show  how  the  work  on  the  railways  could  have 
been  improved  if  the  meat  could  have  been  sent  preserved 
in  tins  from  the  places  where  the  live  cattle  were  bought. 


1916-17]  THE  RAILWAY  PROBLEM  257 

Such  factories  existed  before  the  war,  but  their  output  for 
army  purposes  was  insignificant.  The  developing  of  such 
factories  or  the  construction  of  cold-storage  waggons  would 
have  lightened  the  work  of  the  railways.  The  difficulty 
lay  mostly  in  enlarging  the  existing  factories  which  were 
manufacturing  the  tins,  or  the  establishing  of  new  ones. 
The  construction  of  the  refrigerators  had  already  long  been 
decided,  but  was  retarded  by  the  delays  in  the  finishing  of 
the  construction  of  the  cold-storage  waggons.  Here  again 
the  slowness  of  our  manufacture  was  shown  in  the  lack  of 
machinery  for  the  refrigerators. 

During  this  military  administrative  conference  the  in- 
sufficiency and  mistakes  in  the  coal  production  were  glar- 
ingly demonstrated  and  the  influence  which  the  quantity  of 
extracted  coal  had  upon  the  works  of  railways,  and  manu- 
factures, and  consequently  upon  the  satisfying  of  all  the 
wants  of  the  Russian  Army.  During  the  war  the  use  of 
coal  in  the  country  had  greatly  increased,  the  supply  from 
abroad  had  considerably  decreased.  On  the  railways  the 
use  of  coal  especially  increased.  This  was  due  to  the  great 
work  of  the  railways,  as  well  as  to  the  increase  of  the 
network  of  the  lines,  during  these  two  and  a  half  years  of 
war.  The  following  figures  serve  to  confirm  this:  from 
the  beginning  of  the  war  until  January  19 17  the  extent  of 
new  railway  lines  in  the  zone  under  the  direction  of  military 
staffs  and  administrations,  viz.  in  the  meridian  of  Archangel, 
Rjeff,  Poltava,  more  than  equalled  6,000  kilometres.  The 
development  of  station  roads  on  the  important  junctions 
and  on  other  stations  needed  also  a  little  more  than  6,000 
kilometres  of  railroad.  During  twenty  years,  from  1890 
to  19 10,  35,000  kilometres  of  railways,  on  an  average 
in  a  year  1,750  kilometres,  were  constructed  in  Russia. 
From  i860  to  19 10,  68,000  kilometres  were  constructed,  an 


O 


2.58  THE  RAILWAY  PROBLEM  [ch.  xx 

average  of  1,360  kilometres  per  annum.  During  two 
years  of  war  from  January  19 15  to  January  19 17,  6,800 
kilometres  of  railways  were  constructed,  an  average  of 
3,400.  If  during  twenty  years  of  most  intensive  construc- 
tion Russia  had  built  such  a  number  of  railways  as  during 
the  war,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  she  would  have  had 
double  the  quantity  developed.  If  one  adds  to  this  the 
great  works  in  the  centre  of  Russia,  the  construction  of  a 
second  route  through  the  whole  of  Siberia  instead  of  the 
one-line  track  of  the  Siberian  Railway,  and  the  alteration 
of  the  narrow  track  between  Moscow-Archangel  to  a  normal 
gauge,  with  the  use  of  heavy  rails,  and  the  construction  of 
the  Murman  Railway  which  was  opened  in  December  1916, 
it  will  be  clear  what  a  colossal  programme  of  railway  con- 
stiaiction  was  accomplished  by  the  Ministry  of  Ways  and 
Communications  in  the  centre  of  Russia  and  under  the  di- 
rection of  the  head  administration  of  military  communica- 
tions at  the  General  Headquarters,  in  the  regions  of  the 
armies.  Great  help  in  construction  was  given  by  the  rail- 
way battalions  which  were  formed  according  to  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  General  Headquarters;  with  their  help  was  ac- 
complished the  exploitation  of  the  railways  on  the  terri- 
tory of  the  enemy.  They  also  reconstructed  the  ruined 
railway  lines  and  destroyed  those  which  might  fall  into  the 
hand  of  the  enemy.  They  were  also  sent  to  the  centre 
of  the  Empire  for  the  hurrying  on  of  the  construction  of 
the  new  lines,  or  for  the  management  of  new  ones  after 
being  opened.  In  spite  of  this  the  troops  and  public  opinion 
in  the  centre  of  Russia,  being  ignorant  of  the  difficulties 
of  work  on  the  old  lines  and  the  construction  of  the  new 
was  connected  and  with  those  obstacles  which  they  had  to 
overcome,  always  complained  of  the  work  of  the  railways. 
The  cause  of  it,  and  not  without  reason,  they  saw  in  the 


1916-17]  THE  RAILWAY  PROBLEM  259 

friction  which  arose  between  the  Minister  of  Ways  and 
Communications  and  the  Chief  of  the  Military  Communi- 
cation —  in  other  words,  with  the  General  Headquarters. 
As  the  complaints  against  the  institution  always  fall  on 
individuals,  there  existed  among  the  troops  the  conviction 
that  the  greater  part  of  the  blame  lay  on  the  Chief  of  the 
Military  Communications,  General  Ronjin.  General  Alex- 
eieff,  realising  how  unjust  these  complaints  were,  did  not 
want  to  deprive  himself  of  the  services  of  Ronjin  and  did 
not  see  sufficient  cause  for  dismissing  him. 

Having  acquainted  myself  with  the  position  of  affairs, 
and  seeing  that  the  relations  between  the  Ministry  of  Ways 
and  Communications  and  the  administration  of  Military 
Communications  became  strained,  and  that  from  this  the 
work  suffered,  I  came  to  the  conclusion  not  only  to  replace 
some  persons,  but  to  make  a  thorough  reform.  After  a  per- 
sonal interview  with  Trepoff  as  Minister  of  Ways  and 
Communications,  and  after  a  conference  with  his  Assistant 
Minister,  Voinovsky-Krigier,  who  soon  became  the  Minister 
of  Ways  and  Communications,  the  following  bases  for  the 
coming  reform  were  made.  A  new  post  was  created,  that 
of  Assistant  Minister  of  the  Ministry  of  Ways  and  Com- 
munications, with  residence  at  the  General  Headquarters. 
To  him  was  entrusted  the  administration  of  the  Military 
Communications.  All  his  activities  were  under  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  and  he  was  conse- 
quently under  his  direction.  The  Assistant  Minister  was 
to  be  selected  from  generals  who  had  become  well  acquainted 
with  the  work  of  the  railways  during  wartime,  and  Major- 
General  Kisliakoff  was  chosen.  His  talents,  energy,  and 
capabilities  had  been  shown  in  the  work  of  different  military 
administrative  posts  during  the  campaign,  and  they  served 
as  a  pledge  that  he  would  realise  the  previously-mentioned 


26o  THE  RAILWAY  PROBLEM  [ch.  xx 

English  saying.  Trepoff,  of  course,  wanted  to  make  the 
personal  acquaintance  of  General  Kisliakoff  and  to  confer 
with  him;  Voinovsky-Krigier  knew  him  because  they  had 
worked  together.  I  knew  him  well  by  the  reputation  of  his 
activity  with  the  troops  of  the  6th  Army  Corps  and  became 
acquainted  with  him  during  the  conference  on  December 
27th.  Having  conferred  with  General  Alexeieff  and  hav- 
ing received  his  approbation  for  the  reform,  and  the  ap- 
pointment of  Kisliakoff  —  not,  however,  without  some 
doubts  on  his  part  —  the  changes  were  made.  In  the 
month  of  January  I  took  General  Kisliakoff  to  Tsarskoe 
Selo.  In  my  presence  he  made  a  report  to  the  Tsar  of  the 
main  reasons  for  the  proposed  reform,  and  spoke  about 
the  nature  of  his  future  work.  Soon  after  this  the  order 
came  for  his  appointment.  As  is  known  to  me,  even  Gen- 
eral Alexeieff  was  satisfied  with  his  work,  he  who  always 
feared  that  the  absolute  power  over  the  work  of  the  roads 
at  the  front  would  slip  from  the  hands  of  the  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff.  Just  as  well  satisfied  were  all  the  next  Com- 
manders and  their  Chiefs  of  Staff,  who  came  after  the  up- 
heaval in  the  Empire. 

General  Kisliakoff,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment and  the  Councils,  became  implicated  in  the  August 
plot  of  Korniloff.  He  was  suspected  and  arrested.  His 
further  fate  is  not  known  to  me.  Did  he  succeed,  like  the 
other  generals  who  were  arrested  for  the  same  cause  with 
Korniloff,  in  escaping,  was  he  free  before  this,  or  is  he  still 
deprived  of  liberty  while  waiting  for  what  is  even  now  still 
called  the  "  tribunal  of  justice  "? 

On  January  28th  the  Military  Administrative  Confer- 
ence ended.  Some  measures  approved  by  the  Conference 
which  had  to  be  carried  out  I  intended  to  explain  to  the 
Commanders-in-Chief  in   case   of  some   objection   on  their 


I9i6]  THE  RAILWAY  PROBLEM  261 

side,  and  to  explain  the  motives  which  necessitated  their  ful- 
filment. Some  of  them  undoubtedly  were  detrimental  to  the 
interests  of  the  Army,  but  the  stern  necessity  and  the  avail- 
able means  helped  to  reconcile  them  to  this  disadvantage, 
and  to  take  measures  in  order  that  they  should  not  impair 
the  military  action  of  the  troops,  nor  prevent  the  accomplish- 
ment of  plans  which  had  as  their  aim  the  preparation  of  the 
intended  offensive  in  the  spring  on  all  fronts. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

PREPARATIONS    FOR    THE    OFFENSIVE    IN    I917  

THE    MURDER   OF    RASPUTIN 

I  FIXED  December  29th,  19 16,  for  the  conference  of  the 
Commanders-in-Chief,  and  this  was  confirmed  by  the  Em- 
peror. In  my  preliminary  reports  to  the  Emperor  I  placed 
before  him  questions  for  consideration  at  the  conference,  so 
that  their  adoption  in  time  should  not  meet  with  objections 
from  the  Commanders-in-Chief  responsible  for  their  fulfil- 
ment. Besides  which  I  placed  a  list  of  those  who  were 
to  take  part  in  the  conference  before  the  Emperor.  The 
Emperor  reminded  me  that  I  must  not  forget  to  invite  the 
late  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  south-western  front.  Gen- 
eral Ivanoff. 

The  conference  was  composed  of  the  following:  besides 
the  Emperor  and  myself,  as  the  Emperor's  Chief  of  Staff, 
were  invited  three  Commanders-in-Chief,  and,  as  General 
Saharoff  could  not  come,  his  representative  General  Belaieff, 
who  was  sent  in  August  to  the  Roumanian  King  as  repre- 
sentative for  the  Russian  Army;  Admiral  Roussin,  Chief  of 
the  Naval  Staff  at  headquarters;  General  Ivanoff;  the 
Minister  of  War,  Shouvaeff;  the  Grand  Duke  Serge  as  the 
person  at  the  head  of  supplies  and  the  new  formations  of 
artillery;  and,  finally.  General  Klembovsky,  who  had  just 
been  appointed  my  assistant.  The  Commanders-in-Chief 
were  accompanied  by  their  Chiefs  of  Staff. 

The  principal  question  to  be  discussed  at  the  conference 

262 


1916-17]       PREPARATIONS  FOR  OFFENSIVE  263 

was  that  of  the  forthcoming  offensive  operations.  It  was 
necessary  to  decide  when  the  operations  would  take  place, 
on  what  front,  and  what  forces  would  be  necessary  or  could 
be  used. 

News  had  already  been  received  from  France  that  our 
Allies,  wishing  to  keep  the  initiative  of  the  19 17  campaign 
in  their  hands,  thought  that  operations  should  be  commenced 
during  the  winter  of  19 16-17.  As  I  have  already  said, 
they  were  convinced  that  for  the  Russian  Army  this  was 
the  very  best  time  to  advance,  taking  the  climate  into  con- 
sideration. It  was  supposed  that  the  Italian  Army  by  this 
time  would  be  ready  for  an  advance.  Of  course,  active 
operations  ought  to  quieten  down  during  the  spring  thaws, 
so  that  in  summer  they  might  be  more  fully  developed. 

Weighty  considerations  impelled  us  to  acquiesce  in  the 
decision,  which  was  arrived  at  during  the  November  19 16 
conference  at  Chantilly  —  but  on  the  other  hand,  due  to  rea- 
sons already  mentioned  and  to  recent  examples,  a  winter 
campaign  under  conditions  of  our  climate  could  not  bring 
success  with  it. 

At  the  conference  the  following  compromise  was  adopted: 
If  the  Allies  did  actually  make  a  winter  advance  in  January 
or  February,  we  were  to  prepare  for  active  operations  on 
every  front,  but  comparatively  small  in  extent,  and  with 
small  forces.  The  obstacle  to  a  wide  development  of  the 
operations  at  this  time  was  that  we  had  not  sufficient  reserves 
and  the  fear  that  if  we  made  a  large  expenditure  of  shells 
the  stocks  would  be  depleted  for  our  chief  spring  operations. 
Without  doubt  the  main  question  for  the  conference  to  dis- 
cuss was  on  which  front  to  operate  and  what  forces  we  could 
have  for  the  summer  advance.  For  this  we  should  need  a 
sufficient  quantity  of  material  and  a  sufficient  number  of 
tactical   units   of   every   branch   of   Infantry   and   artillery. 


264  PREPARATIONS  FOR  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  xxi 

More  than  once  I  have  mentioned  that  the  extending  of 
our  front  about  400  kilometres  exhausted  nearly  all  the  re- 
serves of  all  the  three  fronts.  I  must  add  that  it  was 
fortunate  that  the  majority  of  the  reserves  had  been  con- 
centrated on  the  south-western  front  at  the  end  of  19 16, 
i.e.  comparatively  near  to  the  new  Roumanian  front.  It  is 
doubtful  whether  our  railways  could  have  carried  a  large 
number  of  army  corps  in  time  from  the  more  distant  fronts. 

It  was  also  proposed  to  the  Commanders-in-Chief  to  dis- 
cuss the  question  of  the  diminution  of  the  cavalry  on  our 
European  theatre  of  war  by  diminishing  the  number  of 
cavalry  attached  to  Army  Corps,  as  such  shrinkage  would 
also  in  some  degree  facilitate  the  work  of  the  Commissary 
of  Stores  in  supplying  the  forage. 

This  cavalry  could  have  been  used  with  greater  advantage 
in  the  other  theatre  of  war.  To  every  corps  was  attached 
either  one  separate  Cossack  regiment  or  "  sotnia  "  (com- 
posed of  about  two  hundred  men)  from  the  second  reserve. 
But  when  the  army  entered  into  positional  warfare,  these 
regiments  had  hardly  any  military  importance.  Their  serv- 
ice lay  especially  in  communication  and  military  administra- 
tion. It  was  intended  to  group  these  regiments  into  divi- 
sions, four  or  five  in  number,  and  to  send  them  to  the 
Caucasian  Army.  It  was  proposed  by  this  means  to 
strengthen  by  their  arrival  the  detachment  of  General 
Baratoff,  which  was  acting  in  Persia,  in  order  that  the  latter 
could  give  more  real  help  to  the  English  Army  which  was 
operating  in  Mesopotamia  in  the  direction  of  Bagdad. 
The  idea  of  giving  more  help  to  our  Ally,  England,  very 
much  pleased  the  Tsar,  and  he  was  interested  in  the  scheme 
with  regard  to  taking  advantage  of  these  divisions  in  the 
Persian  theatre  of  war.  During  the  winter  the  Cossack 
regiments  were  transferred  to  the  Province  of  the  Troops 


r9i6-i7]       PREPARATIONS  FOR  OFFENSIVE  265 

of  the  Don  and  partly  to  the  Caucasus  and  grouped  into  a 
division  of  24  "  sotnias  " ;  these  divisions  also  began  to  form 
infantry  battalions.  The  unexpected  outbreak  of  the  Rus- 
sian Revolution  prevented  the  realisation  of  this  plan. 

The  Commanders-in-Chief  were  given  the  following 
scheme  to  create  new  units,  e.g.  to  take  one  battalion  from 
each  of  the  eight  infantry  regiments  in  every  two  divisional 
army  corps;  add  to  these  eight  battalions  four  battalions, 
taking  from  the  old  regiments  whole  companies  instead  of 
these  companies,  to  form  new  ones  in  the  old  regiments. 
Out  of  the  twelve  battalions  was  to  be  formed  a  four-regi- 
ment division.  In  this  the  old  sixteen-battalion  division 
naturally  would  revert  to  twelve-battalion  divisions  made 
up  of  four  regiments  each.  In  this  way,  in  round  figures, 
sixty  Russian  army  corps,  composed  of  two  divisions  of 
thirty-two  battalions,  became  Army  Corps  of  three  divisions 
each,  totalling  thirty-six  battalions.  Further,  on  the 
northern  and  western  fronts  by  this  time  had  to  be  formed 
twelve  divisions  of  sixteen  battalions  each  by  bringing 
military  troops  into  their  composition.  Already  in  the 
spring  of  19 16  each  cavalry  division  had  attached  to  it  an  in- 
fantry battalion  composed  of  three  foot  squadrons. 

The  new  proposal  was  to  convert  these  battalions  into  a 
three-battalioned  rifle  regiment,  leaving  it  as  part  of  the 
composition  of  the  regular  cavalry  or  Cossack  division.  In 
order  to  get  the  complement  of  ofl'icers  and  men  simultane- 
ously, each  cavalry  regiment  was  to  revert  from  a  six-  to  a 
four-squadron  unit.  At  first  it  was  proposed  that  this 
measure  should  be  applied  to  the  Cossacks,  assuming  that 
the  regular  cavalry  would  be  able  to  spare  enough  officers 
and  men  from  the  reserve  regimental  ranks  to  form  these 
infantry  battalions,  without  the  intervention  of  this  new 
scheme.     However,  at  General  Brussiloff' s  motion,  the  con- 


266  PREPARATIONS  FOR  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  xxi 

ference  found  it  possible  to  apply  it  to  all  cavalry.  The 
plan  for  reforming  a  division  of  sixteen  battalions  into  one 
of  twelve  battalions  did  not  meet  with  opposition  from  the 
members  of  the  conference  and  was  confirmed  by  the 
Emperor.  The  time  it  would  take  to  execute  this  radical 
change  naturally  compelled  us  to  decide  the  main  advance 
for  the  beginning  of  the  summer  of  19 17. 

This  step  gave  the  Russian  Army,  in  round  figures,  about 
500  new  battalions,  or  sixty  new  divisions,  and  about  forty 
infantry  regiments  with  the  cavalry.  Such  an  army  increase 
involved  the  bringing  into  life  of  new  divisional  and  regi- 
mental staffs,  the  necessity  of  pouring  into  the  army 
enormous  reinforcements,  and  the  most  difficult  problem 
of  forming  new  troop  transports,  the  latter  partly  at  the  cost 
of  slightly  lessening  the  existing  regimental  and  divisional 
ones.  This  reform  was  actively  commenced  immediately, 
and  in  many  of  the  divisions  on  the  north-western  and  south- 
western fronts  —  notwithstanding  the  riotous  revolutionary 
times  of  March  —  they  were  little  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  old  divisions.  The  most  difficult  problem  was  on  the 
Roumanian  front,  where  the  Russian  troops  continued  fight- 
ing till  the  end  of  January  19 17,  and  the  reform  did  not 
commence  until  two  months  later. 

The  weak  point  was  the  impossibility  of  attaching  its  own 
artillery  to  the  new  divisions.  The  remedy  for  this  posi- 
tion we  had  to  search  for  in  this  way:  as  the  new  army  corps 
of  three  divisions  had  only  two  artillery  brigades,  it  was 
necessary  that  the  artillery  during  trench  warfare  should  re- 
main permanently  in  the  firing  line  —  which,  I  am  sorry  to 
say,  was  often  the  case  before.  Of  three  infantry  divisions, 
two  could  be  in  the  front  lines,  and  the  third  as  reserve  of 
the  army  corps.  The  periodical  changing  of  the  divisions 
gave  the  infantry  time  to  rest  from  trench  life  and  to  un- 


1916-17]       PREPARATIONS  FOR  OFFENSIVE  267 

dergo  a  much  more  regular  training.  This  position  of  af- 
fairs would  be  only  a  temporary  one. 

The  formation  of  new  artillery  brigades  and  separate 
artillery  battalions  of  field  and  mortar  artillery  had  to  be 
intensively  proceeded  with.  As  the  artillery  brigade  and 
separate  artillery  battalions  were  formed  they  were  added 
to  the  new  infantry  divisions,  because  the  chief  difficulty  in 
forming  batteries  was  not  so  much  the  shortage  in  guns  as 
of  all  the  rest  of  artillery  materials,  and  supply  by  horses. 
Therefore  the  Commanders-in-Chief  had  the  proposal 
placed  before  them  to  form  so-called  "  position  batteries," 
the  commands  and  guns  to  be  taken  from  the  rear,  the  bring- 
ing up  of  ammunition  and  everything  else  to  be  done  by  the 
artillery  commanders.  Such  batteries  it  was  proposed  to 
place  on  passive  areas,  i.e.  those  points  which  were  seldom 
attacked  by  the  enemy,  and  were  little  adapted  for  our  ad- 
vance. The  cavalry  divisions,  the  fighting  strength  of  which 
for  infantry  fighting  had  been  increased  almost  three  times, 
were  to  receive  mortar  battalions  of  eight  guns  in  the  near 
future.  These  guns  were  coming  from  England  and  were 
4.5  inch  howitzers. 

But  the  main  increase  in  our  artillery  for  future  opera- 
tions was  to  be  by  the  heavy  artillery,  of  calibres  of  6,  8, 
10,  II,  and  12  inches,  which  we  expected  to  receive  from 
our  Allies.  Their  arrival  at  the  front  was  expected  not 
earlier  than  May,  another  weighty  reason  why  our  main 
active  operations  should  not  commence  earlier  than  the  end 
of  May.  At  the  conference  all  the  reasons  for  and  against 
the  advance  on  this  or  that  front  were  discussed;  but  for 
the  final  decision  as  to  which  front  would  be  chosen  for  the 
main  operations  and  which  would  be  secondary,  it  was  de- 
cided that  the  Commanders-in-Chief  of  the  army  groups 
should  be  given  special  orders  not  later  than  towards  the 


268  PREPARATIONS  FOR  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  xxi 

end  of  January  from  the  Generalissimo  when  he  should 
have  all  details  in  hand,  and  would  be  in  a  position  to  make 
his  final  decision  on  the  various  alternatives  placed  before 
him. 

The  most  essential  questions  placed  before  the  conference 
were  decided  on  the  29th  in  two  meetings  with  a  break  for 
dinner.  On  the  30th,  when  the  usual  reports  to  the 
Emperor  were  made,  which  I  confided  to  General  Klem- 
bovsky  with  General  Loukomsky,  the  conference  assembled, 
with  myself  as  President,  to  discuss  various  secondary  ques- 
tions which  did  not  require  the  Emperor's  consent.  The 
Emperor  came  to  the  conference  after  he  had  received  the 
usual  reports.  After  an  interval  for  lunch  the  conference 
met  again.  It  was  quite  clear  the  day  before  that  the  work 
might  be  finished  next  day,  which  would  give  the  Emperor 
the  opportunity  of  leaving  that  day  for  Tsarskoe  Selo. 

During  the  interval,  before  going  to  the  palace  for  lunch, 
I  went  to  my  own  quarters  on  some  business  that  required 
haste,  and  here  my  adjutant,  Arngold,  informed  me  that 
there  were  rumours  in  Mohileff  that  Rasputin  had  been 
murdered,  but  so  many  false  reports  about  him  were  going 
round  that  I  attached  no  importance  to  this  communication. 
Before  sitting  down  to  table  the  Emperor  called  me  on  one 
side  to  agree  about  the  conference,  and  in  what  spirit  he 
would  address  the  closing  words.  To  what  he  told  me  I 
had  nothing  to  object.  The  conference  recomimenced  soon 
after  lunch  and  business  was  completed  about  three-quarters 
of  an  hour  before  the  Imperial  train  was  due  to  leave 
Mohileff.  In  full  conviction  that  the  Emperor  would  re- 
tire to  the  palace  where  the  Tsarevitch  would  be  waiting 
for  him,  I  went  to  the  Staff  to  sign  some  urgent  telegrams 
handed    me    by    Loukomsky.     He    repeated    to    me    the 


I9i6]  THE  MURDER  OF  RASPUTIN  269 

Mohileff  rumours  of  Rasputin's  murder.  Arriving  at  the 
station  some  twenty  minutes  before  the  train  was  leaving, 
I  found  the  Emperor  walking  up  and  down  with  General 
Voeikoff  on  the  platform.  The  day  was  frosty  and  windy, 
and  it  was  unpleasant  to  stand  still.  I  heard  afterwards 
that  Voeikoff  had  already  spoken  to  the  Emperor  about  the 
event,  which  was  to  have  such  tremendous  results  in  Russia's 
fate;  the  murder  of  Rasputin  in  Petrograd.  After  my  ar- 
rival on  the  platform,  the  Emperor  walked  up  and  down 
with  me  until  the  train  started.  I  proposed  going  to  Petro- 
grad in  the  near  future  for  the  purpose  of  regulating  various 
commissariat  questions,  as  also  questions  connected  with  the 
Inter-Ally  Conference  which  was  shortly  expected  in  Petro- 
grad. I  informed  the  Emperor  of  my  intention  and  re- 
ceived his  sanction.  I  told  him  that  General  Klembovsky 
would  undertake  my  duties  when  I  left,  and  I  asked  his 
permission,  in  case  of  urgency,  to  come  to  Tsarskoe  Selo 
from  Petrograd.  I  had  no  belief  in  this  Rasputin  murder, 
and  that  was  possibly  why  I  did  not  attempt  to  define  the 
state  of  the  spirit  of  the  Emperor.  All  the  same,  I  must  say 
I  noticed  nothing  different  in  the  Emperor's  manner,  either 
at  the  closing  of  the  conference  or  on  the  platform  — 
although  he  had  heard  the  news  at  the  time. 

During  my  four  months'  stay  as  Chief  of  Staff  there  were 
few  questions  in  Russian  public  life,  either  home  or  foreign, 
that  I  did  not  touch  on  with  the  Emperor.  The  only  ques- 
tion that  on  principle  I  did  not  wish  to  raise,  the  only  name 
I  always  refrained  from  mentioning  before  the  Emperor, 
was  that  of  the  so-called  monk  Rasputin.  And  a  sufficient 
reason  for  this  was  that  when  once  this  question  was  opened, 
I  should  have  to  fathom  it  to  the  bottom,  to  investigate 
fully  all  the  details  founded  on  absolute  facts  —  and  not  on 


270  THE  MURDER  OF  RASPUTIN  [ch.  xxi 

rumours.  I  could  not  speak  of  what  I  had  only  heard; 
the  stories  from  others  were  so  various,  so  contrary,  now 
and  then  so  absurd,  as  to  make  it  impossible  to  determine 
where  the  truth  began  and  where  invention  ended. 

Having  returned  to  Headquarters  from  the  station  where 
the  Commanders-in-Chief  were  meeting  under  General 
Klembovsky,  I  continued  the  gathering,  which  lasted  all  the 
evening,  after  which  all  the  Commanders-in-Chief  left  for 
their  respective  Headquarters. 

There  was  one  other  important  question  discussed,  and 
that  was  the  number  of  reinforcements  in  men  the  armies 
would  require  during  19 17.  The  forecast  as  drawn  up  at 
Headquarters  not  long  before  I  arrived,  and  the  communica- 
tion made  to  the  Minister  of  War  did  not  satisfy  me;  it 
astonished  me  by  its  excessiveness.  The  calculations  were 
made  on  a  loss  of  500,000  each  summer  month,  and  on 
150,000  during  the  six  months  of  comparative  quiet,  i.e.  a 
little  less  than  4,000,000  reinforcements  in  one  year.  At 
that  time  there  were  in  the  reserve  being  trained  just  under 
2,000,000,  and  in  the  early  spring  of  19 17  recruits  to  the 
extent  of  700,000  were  expected  —  this  would  give  about 
2,500,000.  On  this  basis  they  concluded  that  they  would 
have  to  call  some  1,500,000  from  the  population.  The 
Ministries  of  the  Interior,  Agriculture,  and  Trade,  having 
made  themselves  conversant  with  these  figures,  gave  notice 
that  such  a  new  conscription  of  recruits  would  fall  heavily 
on  all  the  country's  life,  on  its  trade  production  for  the 
Army,  and  they  counted  it  impossible  to  agree  with  such 
demands.  One  would  have  thought  that  the  three  cam- 
paigns, viz.  1914-1915  (we  had  no  winter  rest),  the 
summers  of  1915,  and  1916,  could  have  provided  figures 
to  work  out  the  yearly  loss  which  the  Russian  Army  was 
bearing.      Because  of  that  same  supposition  that  the  cam- 


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I9i6]  THE  MURDER  OF  RASPUTIN  271 

paign  would  be  a  short  one,  the  Ministry  of  War  had  made 
no  precise  calculations. 

We  had  to  decide  this  question  by  a  different  method,  and 
by  various  means.  In  round  figures  it  was  known  that  more 
than  14,000,000  had  been  called  to  the  colours  up  to  Decem- 
ber, 19 1 6,  whilst  the  Commissariat  was  supplying  something 
under  10,000,000.  The  difference  in  the  figures  constitute 
the  Army's  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners  and  miss- 
ing. A  partial  confirmation  of  these  figures  of  killed, 
wounded  and  prisoners  was  got  by  taking  lists  issued  by  the 
Minister  of  War  for  the  Emperor.  Other  calculations 
made  up,  however,  of  rough  figures  brought  the  figures 
practically  to  the  same,  viz.  4,500,000  losses  in  the  three 
campaigns.  Working  from  these  figures,  I  proposed  limit- 
ing ourselves  to  calling  up  new  recruits  of  nineteen  years  of 
age  in  the  spring  of  19 17  and  a  monthly  flow  of  healed  sick 
and  wounded,  counting  them  as  from.  50,000  to  60,000 
monthly.  I  must  say  that  rumours  were  circulating  obstin- 
ately amongst  the  Russian  general  public  and  in  Council 
circles  that  the  numbers  of  deserters  hiding  away  in  the 
villages  reached  the  enormous  figure  of  from  1,000,000  to 
2,000,000.  The  same  calculations  and  a  comparison  of  the 
number  taken  from  the  population  with  those  actually  serv- 
ing showed  that  this  figure  was  in  any  case  exaggerated. 
Of  course  the  number  of  soldiers  arriving  from  the  armies, 
and  living  in  the  interior  or  travelling  by  railway,  was 
temporarily  enormous;  from  19 15,  leave  was  granted  to 
men  fluctuating  between  2  per  cent,  to  5  per  cent,  of  the 
composing  bodies.  Consequently  there  were  times  when 
500,000  men  were  on  leave.  Adding  these  to  the  wounded 
who  had  received  permission  to  go  to  their  villages  before 
joining  up,  the  various  men  that  were  sent  on  business  to  the 
interior,   and  you  have  such  colossal  figures  of  men  tcm- 


272  THE  MURDER  OF  RASPUTIN  [ch.  xxi 

porarily  living  at  home  or  moving  by  railway,  that  it  is  not 
astonishing  that  legends  about  the  number  of  desertions  had 
got  round. 

Concerning  proposed  activities  for  19 17  In  agreement 
with  our  Allies,  it  was  decided  that  if  the  Allies  made  an 
advance  in  the  second  half  of  the  winter,  we  should  prepare 
earlier  for,  and  undertake,  active  operations  on  every  front 
on  a  comparatively  small  sector  of  fifteen  to  twenty  kilo- 
metres, not  intending  to  penetrate  the  enemy's  positions  very 
deeply.  The  idea  of  such  operations  was  to  hold  the 
Austro-German  troops  whose  positions  were  on  their  east 
front.  When  our  Allies  made  their  spring  advance,  we 
were  to  prepare  for  an  advance,  using  the  largest  possible 
quantity  of  materials  and  putting  into  the  operations  the 
largest  possible  number  of  army  corps.  Such  operations 
were  to  be  conducted  on  all  four  fronts;  the  final  choice 
of  the  front  for  our  main  blow  would  be  given  somewhat 
later,  so  as  to  preclude  the  news,  either  by  spying  or  patrols, 
as  much  as  possible  from  being  known  or  guessed  at  by  our 
enemies.  Not  less  than  three-quarters  of  all  the  heavy 
artillery  already  formed  or  going  to  be  formed  during  the 
winter  of  19 16-17  was  to  be  sent  to  the  front  where  the 
main  blow  was  to  be  delivered.  Soon  the  48th  Army  Corps 
was  formed  of  this  artillery  and  placed  under  the  command 
of  General  Sheideman,  whom  I  mentioned  in  connection  with 
the  active  operations  around  Dvinsk.  The  speciality  of  this 
new  army  corps  consisted  of  Its  fighting  ranks  being  com- 
posed entirely  of  artillery;  otherwise  It  approximated  to  the 
ordinary  army  corps. 

On  the  next  day,  December  31st,  the  final  confirmation 
of  the  news  of  Rasputin's  murder  was  received.  I  can  cer- 
tainly say  that  this  news  convinced  everybody  that  the  politi- 
cal   atmosphere    would   be    considerably    cleared.     People 


I9i6]  THE  MURDER  OF  RASPUTIN  273 

thought  that  this  murder  would  remove  one  of  the  main 
causes  which  gave  rise  to  every  possible  kind  of  absurd 
rumour  that  was  agitating  the  nation.  What  happened  was 
rather  the  reverse.  This  murder,  in  fact,  gave  an  impetus 
to  the  larger  internal  disturbances,  and  to  the  yet  wider  cir- 
culation of  every  kind  of  absurd  rumour  attaching  to  this 
name.  The  murder  of  Rasputin  was  such  a  serious  event 
that  I  had  to  put  off  my  journey  to  Petrograd,  the  more 
so  as,  for  reasons  not  influenced  by  us,  the  Inter-Ally  Con- 
ference was  put  off  till  the  middle  of  January  19 17. 

My  ideas  were  these:  My  journey  to  the  capital  would 
be  the  first  one  that  any  Chief  of  Staff  had  made  from  the 
outset  of  the  campaign,  as  the  Headquarters  Chief  of  Staff, 
not  having  an  assistant  familiar  with  all  the  business,  could 
not  possibly  be  absent  from  the  Headquarters  even  for  a 
few  days.  Even  a  direct  telephone  line,  that  was  only  put 
up  in  November  19 16,  would  not  be  sufficient.  I  was  afraid 
that  my  arrival  in  Petrograd  might  be  associated  with  Ras- 
putin's murder.  And  if  for  some  reason  or  other,  during 
my  short  stay  in  Petrograd,  I  had  not  been  able  to  see  the 
Emperor  —  and  just  then  there  were  no  special  military 
reasons  why  I  should  —  then  this  might  be  misinterpreted 
as  a  breach  in  the  normal  relations  beween  the  Chief  of  Staff 
and  the  Generalissimo.  Such  an  idea  might  have  very  much 
worse  consequences  if  in  course  of  time  it  was  circulated 
amongst  the  troops.  I  had  to  put  off  my  journey  till  the 
New  Year  (old  style),  when  I  left  for  Petrograd. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

POLITICAL    CHANGES    IN    PETROGRAD 

Soon  after  the  Emperor  arrived  in  Tsarskoe  Selo  several 
incidents  took  place  which  had  a  serious  significance  in  home 
politics.  The  President  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  A.  F, 
Trepoff,  asked  for  the  second  time  to  be  relieved  of  his 
post.  On  this  occasion  his  resignation  was  accepted.  The 
chief  motive  for  his  resignation  he  gave  was  the  awkward 
position  he  was  placed  in  before  the  Imperial  Duma,  hav- 
ing promised  many  of  its  members  —  and  not  succeeded  — 
to  change  several  Ministers,  amongst  whom  was  the  Min- 
ister of  the  Interior,  Protopopoff. 

After  the  November  session  of  the  Imperial  Duma  was 
opened,  it  was  clear  that  co-operative  work  between  the 
Imperial  Duma  and  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  Protopo- 
poff, was  out  of  the  question.  It  is  enough  to  say  that  not 
once  did  Protopopoff  dare  mount  the  tribune  in  the  Duma. 
He  avoided  coming  within  the  walls.  A.  F.  Trepoff  was 
succeeded  by  Prince  Golitzin,  and  then  the  session  was  ended 
and  a  new  session  was  appointed  for  the  end  of  February. 
The  cessation  of  the  Duma  could  be  explained  by  the  cir- 
cumstance that  the  new  President  of  the  Council  of  Min- 
isters, Prince  Golitzin,  before  he  made  his  opening  speech, 
and  before  he  investigated  the  projected  legislation,  de- 
sired to  make  himself  acquainted  with  current  business. 
Prince  Golitzin's  nomination  was  not  expected  either  by 
the  circles  of  the  Russian  Government  or  by  the  politicians. 
Prince  Golitzin  had  previously  been  a  most  ordinary  Gov- 

274 


1916-17]     POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD      275 

ernor  of  Archangel  and  Tver,  before  the  first  Revolution 
in  1905.  From  the  time  he  became  a  Senator  he  took  no 
active  part  in  the  political  life  of  the  country.  Naturally 
in  Petrograd  there  was  much  talk  as  to  the  reason  why  the 
Emperor  had  chosen  Prince  Golitzin.  The  majority  were 
inclined  to  attribute  it  to  the  fact  that  he  was  known  to  the 
Empress,  as  a  member  of  the  so-called  Tatiana  Committee 
and  of  the  committee  for  helping  the  Russian  prisoners  in 
Germany.  The  first  of  these  committees,  formed  to  look 
after  the  fate  of  the  families  of  persons  who  had  suffered 
from  the  war,  was  presided  over  by  the  Grand  Duchess 
Tatiana,  the  Empress's  favourite  daughter;  the  second  was 
presided  over  by  the  Empress  herself. 

Public  opinion  expressed  astonishment  that  such  an  im- 
portant post  should  be  given  to  a  man  with  little  experi- 
ence, who  had  never  had  any  connection  with  the  Duma 
circles,  having  abandoned  administrative  work;  all  the  same 
it  was  acknowledged  that  he  had  the  advantage  of  an 
honest,  orderly,  well-meaning  character,  combined  with  a 
passionate  patriotism,  all  splendid  qualities  in  a  citizen. 
Many  were  pleased  that  Protopopoff  had  not  been  nomi- 
nated to  the  post  of  Prime  Minister.  Soon  after  his  nomi- 
nation it  was  said  of  Golitzin  that  he  intended  to  use  all  his 
influence  to  have  Protopopoff  replaced  by  some  other  per- 
son. In  this  he  reckoned  on  being  able  to  influence  the 
Empress,  as  he  saw  her  not  only  as  Prime  Minister,  but 
was  a  member  of  the  above-mentioned  committees.  This 
intention  he  told  me,  and  I  have  no  reason  to  suppose  that 
actually  he  did  not  intend  to  carry  it  out. 

The  other  incident  full  of  significance  was  the  appoint- 
ment of  General  Belaieff  as  Minister  of  War  instead  of 
Shouvaeff.  Since  August  19 16  General  Belaieff  had  been 
representing    the    Russian    Army    at    King    Ferdinand    of 


276     POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD     [ch.  xxii 

Roumania's  Headquarters.  When  General  Saharoff  was 
given  a  post  as  King  Ferdinand's  assistant,  General 
Belaieff's  position  was  done  away  with.  The  last  business 
Belaieff  had  at  this  point  was  when  he  came  as  representa- 
tive of  General  Saharoff  to  the  conference  of  Commanders- 
in-Chief  at  Headquarters  in  December  191 6.  Before  the 
war  and  during  mobilisation  he  was  one  of  the  assistant 
chiefs  of  the  General  Staff,  and  had  something  to  do  with 
making  out  the  so-called  small  and  large  programmes  for 
increasing  the  armies.  The  splendid  results  of  the  mobili- 
sation gained  him  the  reputation  of  being  a  talented  desk 
worker.  On  this  foundation,  even  in  November  19 15, 
stubborn  rumours  circulated  that  in  case  General  Polivanoff 
left  the  post  of  Minister  of  War  the  choice  of  his  successor 
would  fall  on  Belaieff,  and  that  the  Prime  Minister,  J.  L. 
Goremykin,  naturally  favoured  this  idea. 

Quite  accidentally  I  arrived  in  Petrograd  about  the  end 
of  November  19 15,  for  two  days'  stay,  the  only  time 
throughout  the  war  until  December  19 16.  Being  personally 
well  acquainted  with  J.  L.  Goremykin,  I  thought  it  neces- 
sary to  visit  him  and  enlighten  him  as  to  what  General 
Belaieff  had  done  as  a  soldier  and  administrator.  I  re- 
member that  having  given  General  Belaieff  the  praise  due 
to  him  for  his  conscientious  work  connected  with  the  mobili- 
sation I  compared  his  appointment  to  the  Ministry  of  War 
with  the  appointment  to  the  post  of  Minister  of  Finance 
of  a  very  expert  bookkeeper,  knowing  the  routine  of  ac- 
count keeping,  but  completely  ignorant  of  financial  science. 
I  could  not  but  give  the  requisite  appreciation  of  the  con- 
scientiousness and  orderliness  of  the  extraordinarily  meth- 
odical workmanship  of  General  Belaieff  and  his  knowledge 
of  the  routine  of  Cabinet  Administration  work.  At  the 
same  time  I  pointed  out  the  evidence  of  many  deficiencies 


I9i6]      POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD  277 

for  a  man  holding  a  high  post.  Besides  that  he  had  no 
authority  among  the  commanders  of  troops.  During  his 
visit  to  Headquarters  in  December  19 16,  the  matter  of  his 
further  service  came  up.  He  himself  asked  to  be  given 
active  service,  reckoning  that  he  would  be  given  the  com- 
mand of  an  army  corps.  As  he  had  had  no  experience  of 
serious  fighting  in  fighting  commands,  I  thought  that  it 
would  be  quite  sufficient  if  he  was  appointed  to  the  command 
of  an  infantry  division.  In  this  strain  I  spoke  of  him  to 
the  Emperor,  who,  on  saying  good-bye  to  General  Belaiefif 
when  he  was  leaving  with  a  report  of  the  conference  at 
Headquarters  for  General  Saharoff,  told  him  of  his  decision 
to  give  him  the  command  of  a  division.  Soon  after  the 
Emperor  left  Mohileff,  about  January  2nd,  I  received  a 
telegram  from  him  in  accordance  with  which  General 
Belaieff  was  immediately  to  proceed  to  Petrograd  and  ap- 
pear before  the  Emperor.  At  first  I  did  not  attach  any 
significance  to  this  telegram,  and  it  was  only  after  some 
time  had  passed  that  the  thought  struck  me  that  Belaieff 
was  being  called  to  take  up  some  administrative  post.  But 
it  never  entered  my  brain  that  he  was  to  be  appointed 
Minister  of  War  in  Petrograd.  In  this  the  Empress's 
influence  was  obvious,  for  she  had  known  Belaieff  through 
the  same  committees  through  which  she  knew  Prince  Go- 
litzin. 

No  less  wonderment  was  caused  amongst  the  Petrograd 
Government  and  public  by  the  cessation  of  the  Duma's 
activities.  This  fact  might  have  been  considered  perfectly 
natural,  in  view  of  the  changes  amongst  the  Government 
heads,  if  stubborn  rumours  had  not  been  circulating  as  to 
the  further  work  of  the  law-giving  institutions,  as  to  its 
relations  with  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  Protopopoff, 
who,  in  fact,  was  aiming  finally  at  the  administration  of  the 


278     POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD     [ch.  xxii 

country  without  the  aid  of  the  Duma  or  Imperial  Council. 
Having  received  telegraphic  permission  from  the  Emperor 
for  my  journey  to  Petrograd,  on  my  arrival  I  first  of  all 
tried  to  arrange  a  meeting  with  such  persons  as  Prince  Go- 
litzin,  the  new  Minister  of  Ways  and  Communications, 
Voinovsky-Krigier,  the  Minister  of  Agriculture,  Rittich,  and 
the  War  Minister,  Belaieff.  I  considered  it  valueless  to 
waste  time  in  conversing  with  the  Minister  Protopopoff,  so 
I  merely  called  and  left  my  card.  What  I  wanted  most 
was  a  long,  confidential  talk  with  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  N.  N.  Pokrovsky,  on  the  coming  Inter-Ally  Con- 
ference. Trepoff  was  to  have  been  President  of  this  Con- 
ference whilst  holding  the  post  of  Prime  Minister. 
Evidently  the  Emperor  was  to  hand  this  duty  over  to  Prince 
Golitzin.  In  any  case  Prince  Golitzin  himself  told  me  that 
when  he  tried  to  dissuade  the  Emperor  from  appointing  him 
Prime  Minister,  one  of  the  arguments  he  used  was  the  difli- 
culties  entailed  for  him  in  presiding  ov^er  the  Inter-Ally 
Conference.  After  mentioning  the  subject  to  me.  Prince 
Golitzin  willingly  agreed  to  Pokrovsky,  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  being  appointed  President  of  this  Con- 
ference. We  agreed  that  I  should  make  my  report  to 
the  Emperor  to  this  effect.  During  the  interview  Prince 
Golitzin  explained  that  he  fully  understood  the  danger,  not 
only  if  the  Imperial  Duma  was  dismissed,  but  even  if  the 
session  should  be  suspended  and  especially  if  for  an  in- 
definite time. 

On  my  arrival  in  the  capital  I  shortly  met  with  Pokrovsky. 
At  our  lengthy  conversation  we  agreed  as  to  the  prepara- 
tory work  for  the  conference,  of  his  willingness  to  be  Presi- 
dent, and  the  calling  of  a  preliminary  meeting  to  fix  a 
programme  of  work  for  the  Inter-Ally  Conference.  At 
this  meeting  it  was  agreed  that  the  opening  welcome  to 


1916-17]     POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD      279 

the  members  of  the  Conference  was  to  be  spoken  by  Pokrov- 
sky.  Afterwards  I  was  to  address  the  members  of  the  Con- 
ference on  the  reasons  for  it  and  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples on  which  its  activities  must  be  followed.  I  had 
further  to  point  out  to  them  the  necessity  of  bringing  a 
stricter  application  to  business  of  the  principle  fixed  at  the 
Paris  Conference  in  19 16.  I  had  to  speak  of  the  unity  of 
the  common  interests  and  of  more  equable  distribution  of 
the  material  means  which  the  Allies  had  at  their  disposal 
for  the  purpose  of  attaining  the  common  purpose. 

I  took  advantage  of  my  conversation  with  Pokrovsky 
to  open  up  the  subject  of  the  Poles  and  the  Slavonic  nations 
generally,  the  more  so  because  Prince  Golitzin  had  in- 
formed me  that  the  Emperor  had  expressed  a  wish  to  him 
that  a  meeting  of  some  of  the  high  political  officials  and 
civil  authorities  should  be  called  under  his  presidency  to 
arrive  at  a  common  agreement  on  a  final  decision  of  the 
Polish  question. 

Not  less  important  for  the  Slavonic  question  was  the 
correct  attitude  on  the  Czech  question,  which  I  am  sorry 
to  say  did  not  get  a  decision  in  accordance  with  the  wishes 
of  the  Czech  National  Council.  With  one  of  its  members, 
M.  R.  Stefanic,  I  had  already  had  a  detailed  conversation, 
and  agreed  on  the  fundamental  issues  of  the  Czech  problem, 
especially  of  the  first  concrete  steps,  viz.  the  formation  of 
volunteer  Czech  troops.  Not  less  satisfactory  were  my 
interviews  with  the  Ministers  of  Agriculture  and  Ways  and 
Communications;  with  the  latter  we  determined  the  main 
activities  of  General  Kisliakoff,  the  object  of  which  was 
before  anything  else  the  co-ordination  of  the  interior  rail- 
way lines  and  the  lines  at  the  fronts.  From  the  Minister 
of  Agriculture  I  learnt  the  results  of  his  journeys  through- 
out Russia,  the  success  of  the  measures  taken  to  increase 


28o     POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD     [ch.  xxii 

the  quantities  of  grain  brought  to  the  railway  stations,  and 
especially  to  the  river  wharfs.  All  the  Government  Zem- 
stvos  of  the  grain-growing  Governments  wherever  he  went 
were  fully  ready  to  assist  him.  The  collection  of  grain  at 
the  river  wharfs  secured  the  food  supplies  for  the  Army, 
the  capitals  and  the  munition  works  centres  for  the  whole  of 
the  spring  thaw  and  the  spring  field  work,  the  period  when 
the  peasants  stopped  delivery  of  grain  to  the  railway  sta- 
tions. From  the  Minister's  words,  it  appeared  that  the 
transport  of  grain  to  several  stations  had  been  so  large 
that  those  holding  powers  of  attorney  from  the  Ministry 
of  Agriculture  had  been  obliged  to  stop  the  peasants  send- 
ing the  grain  as  there  was  not  sufficient  closed  storage,  and 
on  account  of  the  shortage  in  railway  trucks  to  transport 
the  grain  from  the  station  to  the  army  warehouses.  In 
general  the  grain-purchase  picture  seemed  a  very  satisfac- 
tory one. 

But  in  the  next  months  this  position  of  affairs  was  con- 
siderably altered,  the  reasons  being  purely  due  to  nature. 
Extraordinarily  heavy  frosts  were  experienced  in  January 
by  the  members  of  the  Inter-Ally  Conference,  both  during 
their  stay  in  Petrograd  and  whilst  they  were  visiting  the 
fronts.  In  February  blizzards  were  added  to  the  frost,  and 
snow  drifts  stopped  movements  on  whole  railway  lines  and 
in  the  grain-growing  districts. 

The  day  after  I  had  left  my  card  for  Protopopoff,  my 
adjutant  Arngold  reported  to  me  that  a  message  had  been 
received  by  telephone  in  Protopopoff's  name,  asking  when  I 
could  receive  him.  Not  only  had  I  no  reason  to  refuse 
such  a  meeting,  but  I  was  interested  to  know  why  Protopo- 
poff had  to  change  his  attitude  to  me,  and  now  wished  to 
have  what  I  had  to  think  was  a  business  talk  with  me.     Our 


1916-17]     POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD      281 

meeting  took,  place  next  day  in  my  apartment  at  the  Hotel 
Astoria,  where  I  was  staying  this  time.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  war  various  rumours  were  circulating  about  this 
hotel,  which  is  built  on  the  Isaac  Square,  opposite  to  the 
German  Embassy.  It  was  found  that  it  had  been  built 
with  German  capital  and  was  managed  by  German  agents 
and  possible  spies.  An  opinion  existed  that  every  German 
subject  and  German  agent  when  abroad  is  obliged  to  help 
the  German  General  Staff  in  discovering  all  that  is  passing 
in  neighbouring  countries,  whether  occupied  by  friends,  allies, 
or  possible  enemies.  As  a  consequence  of  this  the  hotel 
was  requisitioned,  and  its  administration  was  taken  over  by 
officers  of  the  Reserve.  It  was  specially  meant  for  military 
people  arriving  from  the  armies  on  service  work,  or  for 
short  leave.  The  majority  of  those  staying  there  were 
from  the  armies  or  from  abroad,  in  addition  to  diplomats 
in  Petrograd. 

In  receiving  Protopopoff  my  idea  was  to  give  him  an 
opportunity  to  say  all  he  wished.  There  was  no  difficulty 
in  this,  as  during  our  two-hour  conversation  he  almost  ex- 
clusively held  the  floor.  Not  very  long  before  our  inter- 
view someone  told  me  that  he  had  said  he  had  hopes  of 
gaining  me  to  his  side  without  much  trouble,  and  maybe 
as  one  of  his  own  people.  What  he  meant  by  this  they 
could  not  tell  me,  but  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose,  if  his 
words  were  repeated  to  me  correctly,  that  they  meant  he 
hoped  to  persuade  me  into  agreeing  with  the  rectitude  of 
his  home  politics  and  possibly  of  foreign  politics.  In  the 
course  of  our  two-hour  conversation,  however,  he  did  not 
touch  on  military  or  foreign  policy.  I  must  mention  that 
he  was  not  a  member  of  the  Inter-Ally  Conference.  If  these 
questions  closely  interested  him,  he  could  without  much  diffi- 


282     POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD     [ch.  xxii 

culty  have  asked  the  Emperor  to  appoint  him  one  of  the 
conference  members.  As  far  as  I  know,  he  never  made  any 
attempts  in  this  direction. 

Shortly,  his  future  political  programme  was  this:  The 
Government,  as  he  expressed  it,  must  hinge  their  interior 
policy  on  the  industrial  centres,  but  not  on  those  that  "  earn 
rouble  for  rouble,"  but  only  those  that  "  earn  copeck  for 
copeck."  I  added  to  this,  "shop-keepers!"  He  foresaw 
in  the  early  future  that  the  Imperial  Duma  would  not  be 
satisfied  with  his  home  politics,  and  all  that  remained  to 
be  done  would  be  to  prorogue  its  Sessions.  Protopopoff 
thought  nevertheless  that  it  would  be  necessary  for  a  date 
to  be  given,  owing  to  the  Imperial  Edict  for  opening  the 
Duma.  Further  he  foresaw  that  it  would  be  necessary  to 
close  the  Duma  and  to  announce  new  elections,  which,  in  his 
opinion,  would  take  not  less  than  six  months. 

Having  listened  to  his  radical  programme,  I  answered 
him  somewhat  hotly.  I  said  that  this  meant  his  playing  a 
game  of  "  va  hanqiie,"  and  asked  from  whom  he  had  re- 
ceived the  authority  to  play  such  a  game,  who  guaranteed 
him  that  the  country  would  passively  wait  for  new  elections 
or  for  the  reopening  of  the  Duma.  Evidently  my  remarks 
took  him  quite  by  surprise,  for,  without  allowing  me  to 
finish  what  I  had  to  say,  Protopopoff  interrupted,  agreeing 
with  me  that  it  certainly  was  a  game  of  "  va  banqiie,"  of 
"  breaking  the  bank."  To  my  question  whether  he  ac- 
knowledged what  sort  of  stake  he  put  in  for  his  game,  he 
drew  in  and,  evidently  understanding  that  he  had  gone  too 
far,  interrupted  me,  "Yes,  well;  I  must  think  over  this 
carefully  again."  In  parting,  amongst  other  amiabilities, 
of  which  he  was  not  at  all  sparing,  he  expressed  the  hope 
that  our  conversation  would  not  be  the  last  one;  remind- 
ing me  that  we  had  met  in  our  early  youth,  and  that  we 


I9i6]      POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD  283 

should  understand  each  other  as  time  went  on.  Actually 
this  long  conversation  was  our  first  and  last.  On  my  next 
visits  to  the  capital  he  never  sought  a  conversation  with  me. 
His  idea  of  the  methods  for  home  politics  was  sufficiently 
decisive,  but  at  the  same  time  too  risky,  as  he  evidently  ac- 
knowledged to  himself.  And  to  me  they  seemed  so  sig- 
nificant that  I  thought  it  my  duty  at  my  first  interview  to  tell 
the  Emperor  as  nearly  as  possible  the  full  conversation  I 
had  had  with  Protopopoff,  adding  that  Protopopoff  must 
realise  that,  having  decided  on  this  game  of  "  va  banque," 
as  a  stake  to  it  he  was  using  the  interests  of  the  Crown,  the 
dynasty,  and  the  very  existence  of  Russia;  that  there  might 
be  various  opinions  as  to  Protopopoff's  moral  qualities,  but 
It  was  impossible  for  there  to  be  two  opinions  as  to  the  ex- 
tent of  his  lightness  of  mind,  when  he  thought  It  right  to 
gamble  in  government  business.  Evidently  the  Emperor 
was  very  much  astonished  at  what  I  had  told  him,  but  ex- 
pressed no  doubt  as  to  the  correctness  of  my  transmission 
to  him  of  this  conversation,  and  did  not  think  it  necessary 
to  Invite  Protopopoff  to  come  and.  In  his  presence,  prove 
the  correctness  of  what  I  had  told  him. 

Having  finished  my  business  in  Petrograd,  I  hurried  to 
return  to  Headquarters,  having  previously  gone  to  Tsarskoe 
Selo  to  see  the  Emperor  and  report.  Here  I  found  that  the 
Tsarevltch  was  obliged  to  stay  in  bed  owing  to  his  health, 
and  in  consequence  the  return  to  Headquarters  was  put  off. 
In  our  conversation  the  Emperor  asked  if  It  was  absolutely 
necessary  for  him  to  return  to  Headquarters.  Receiving 
my  reply  that  he  had  already  confirmed  the  work  for  the 
winter,  and  that  there  was  no  reason  for  foreseeing  any 
serious  war  operations,  the  Emperor  said,  "  If  my  presence 
at  Headquarters  is  necessary,  inform  me."  Then  the  Em- 
peror said,  "  If  I  do  not  come  to  Headquarters,  in  any  case 


284     POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD     [ch.  xxii 

I  can  count  on  seeing  you  when  you  come  to  Petrograd  for 
the  Inter-Ally  Conference." 

Soon  after  returning  to  Mohileff  I  received  a  telegram 
from  General  Russky,  that  he  had  authorised  General  Ratko- 
Dmitrieff,  the  Commander  of  the  12th  Army,  to  begin  a 
local  advance  to  the  south  of  the  Lake  Pabith.  Such  a 
telegram  very  much  astonished  me.  Generals  Klembovsky 
and  Loukomsky  and  I  examined  the  protocols  made  at  the 
conference  of  Commanders-in-Chief.  They  came  to  this, 
that  local  advances  on  our  various  fronts  would  only  be 
undertaken  in  the  event  of  our  Allies  on  their  side  opening 
up  active  war  operations  during  January  or  February;  and 
that  such  operations  should  be  held  back  by  us  as  much  as 
possible.  Consequently  the  independent  advance  of  the 
1 2th  Army  was  entirely  out  of  plan.  Seemingly  it  would 
have  been  natural  to  remind  General  Russky  of  the  decisions 
made  at  the  conference,  and  to  order  him  to  cancel  this 
advance,  which,  as  yet,  evidently  had  not  commenced.  But 
I  had  to  take  into  consideration  a  combination  of  quite  an- 
other order.  During  the  past  ten  months  on  the  boundaries 
of  the  northern  front  at  several  points  preparations  had  been 
made  for  advances,  and  with  the  exception  of  one  of  them 
they  had  been  countermanded.  There  was  no  doubt,  then, 
that  a  new  counter-order  would  have  a  very  bad  effect  on 
all  the  troops  on  the  northern  front,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
all  data  to  hand  gave  strong  hopes  that  this  proposed  ad- 
vance on  the  Riga  salient  would  be  successful.  Of  course 
we  could  have  postponed  it  until  such  time  as  the  Allies  in- 
tended advancing.  But  then  we  should  have  had  to  take 
into  consideration  that  such  an  advance,  postponed  and 
then  reordered,  would  have  become  known  to  the  Germans, 
whereas  General  Ratko-Dmitrieff's  chief  hopes  for  its  suc- 
cess was  in  its  being  a   surprise.     That  was  why  the   in- 


I9i6]      POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD         285 

formation  of  this  proposed  operation  had  only  been  re- 
ceived from  General  Russky  on  the  eve  of  the  actual  ad- 
vance being  made.  It  would  have  been  useful  to  have 
asked  General  Russky  the  reasons  of  this  order,  evidently 
contrary  to  the  decisions  of  the  conference.  This  latter 
might  have  become  known,  if  only  to  the  senior  executors  of 
the  advance  of  the  12th  Army,  and  might  have  been  under- 
stood by  them  to  mean  that  Headquarters  were  against  any 
decisions  to  undertake  winter  advances.  This  in  its  turn 
might  have  had  a  bad  moral  influence  on  the  senior  chiefs, 
and  through  them  have  affected  the  activities  of  their  juniors 
and  troops. 

I  have  gone  into  the  details  of  this  episode  because  I 
wished  to  show  what  complicated  reasons  have  to  be  taken 
into  consideration  in  giving  battle  instruction.  Especially 
is  this  the  case  in  those  circumstances  when  such  instruction 
will  not  only  affect  the  activities  of  the  troops,  but  also 
react  on  the  psychology  of  the  Chiefs,  who  in  their  turn 
unknowingly,  we  may  call  it  mechanically,  pass  it  on  to  the 
troops  under  them.  This  at  all  times  has  had,  and  will  have 
in  the  future,  the  greatest  importance  in  military  matters. 
No  perfecting  of  mechanical  contrivances  used  by  nations 
for  mutual  destruction  does  away  with  the  moral  element 
in  troops  and  its  influence  on  their  fighting  capabilities. 
One  must  not  forget  that  all  mechanical  fighting  and  de- 
stroying appliances  are  brought  into  action  by  men  exposed 
to  moral  influences.  In  the  near  future  I  had  no  occasion 
to  see  General  Russky,  and  to  this  day  I  do  not  know  under 
what  pretext  (or  only  misunderstanding  perhaps)  he  au- 
thorised General  Ratko-Dmitrieff  to  make  his  advance  at 
the  beginning  of  January.  This  advance,  coming  as  a  com- 
plete surprise  to  the  Germans,  produced  good  results  at 
the    outset.     Enemy    positions,    prisoners,    machine    guns, 


286     POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD     [ch.  xxii 

whole  batteries  of  light  and  heavy  artillery  were  captured. 
The  tactical  defensive  position  of  the  Riga  salient  was  bet- 
tered by  the  capture  of  the  near  bend  of  the  German  de- 
fensive lines,  which  were  deep  within  our  positions  to  the 
south  of  Lake  Babith  on  the  left  shore  of  the  River  Aa. 
But  several  days  later  our  successes  were  stopped,  and  in 
places  our  units  gave  up  the  captured  German  third-line 
positions.  This  is  quite  explicable,  and  for  the  following 
reasons.  Firstly,  the  frozen  earth  heavily  hampered  our 
troops  in  digging  in  or  in  making  the  captured  German 
positions  suitable  for  defence.  And  then  the  frozen  earth 
makes  it  more  difficult  to  destroy  the  German  works.  Con- 
sequently, by  a  successful  counter-attack  the  enemy  gains 
well-fortified  trenches  suitable  to  beat  off  our  next  attacks. 
The  other  reason  that  made  the  12th  Army  struggle  difficult 
was  that  everything  was  quiet  on  all  the  European  fronts. 
This  made  it  possible  for  the  Germans  to  bring  up  as  many 
reserves  as  they  wished  to  the  Riga  front,  being  in  no  danger 
of  weakening  the  other  front  reserves.  If  this  advance  had 
been  undertaken  simultaneously  with  advances  made  on  all 
the  other  Russian  fronts,  and  our  Allies'  fronts,  there  were 
great  chances  of  these  preliminary  successes  being  developed 
farther.  The  above-mentioned  reasons  were  not  sufficiently 
known,  or  not  sufficiently  appreciated  by  the  reading  public, 
amongst  whom  were  those  who  formed  public  opinion  in 
Petrograd.  Rumours  in  town,  stated  as  coming  from  the 
wounded  from  the  Riga  front,  alleged  that  at  one  time  our 
troops  had  taken  Mitau,  but  that  for  reasons  unknown  they 
had  been  ordered  to  retire  from  there.  When,  subsequently, 
it  was  substantiated  that  we  had  only  moved  forward  sev- 
eral kilometres,  and  had  not  reached  Mitau  by  a  long  way, 
explanations  were  sought  as  to  why  our  successes  had  not 
had    the     required    development.      In    Petrograd    absurd 


I9i6]      POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD  287 

rumours  were  circulated  that  the  Empress  Alexandra  per- 
sonally telegraphed,  without  Headquarters  or  General 
Russky  knowing,  for  the  advance  of  the  Russian  troops  in 
the  Mitau  direction  to  be  stopped.  One  must  be  entirely 
ignorant  of  either  Russian  morals,  of  army  rules,  or  even  of 
the  formalities  observed  by  the  Empress  in  talking  to  any 
persons  outside  her  immediate  suite,  to  allow  even  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  proceeding  of  this  sort  coming  from  her. 

This  showed  how  public  opinion  was  inclined  to  regard  ^' 
the  Empress  capable  of  doing  anything  which  might  be 
harmful  to  the  success  of  our  military  operations.  Here, 
however,  it  is  possible  to  believe  in  an  evil  motive,  in  cir- 
culating false  rumours  with  intent.  In  this  sense  I  remember 
the  following  incident.  Someone  knowing  that  the  Empress 
Alexandra  was  at  the  head  of  such-and-such  a  committee, 
helping  such-and-such  prisoners,  made  a  direct  petition,  ask- 
ing her  to  turn  her  attention  to  the  heavy  conditions  under 
which  German  prisoners  in  several  cases  lived  and  worked. 
If  I  am  not  mistaken  this  applied  to  German  prisoners 
working  on  the  building  and  upkeep  of  the  Murman  Rail- 
way. Having  grasped  the  contents  of  this  application  with 
the  help  of  her  private  secretary.  Count  Rostovtseff,  the 
Empress  was  convinced  that  this  in  no  way  concerned  her, 
as  she  was  the  head  of  a  committee  that  only  dealt  with  Rus- 
sian prisoners  in  Germany,  and  she  ordered  Rostovtseff  to 
send  this  application  on  to  the  department  in  the  General 
Staff  administration  dealing  with  war  prisoners  subjects 
of  nations  at  war  with  us. 

Soon  after  came  officious  remarks  in  the  newspapers, 
reminding  people  of  this  interference  in  favour  of  German 
prisoners,  and  further  announcing  that  this  note  was  re- 
ceived from  the  Empress's  secretary.  The  remarks  con- 
veyed the  impression  that  the  Empress  was  interested  in 


288     POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD     [ch.  xxii 

the  fate  of  the  German  prisoners,  and  had  even  used  her 
influence  to  stand  up  for  them.  Soon  after  this  there  were 
explanations  and  refutations  in  the  newspapers,  but  their 
fate  was  the  same  as  that  which  the  majority  of  such  refuta- 
tions get.  Few  people  in  general  read  them,  and  still  less 
those  who  at  the  time  have  read  the  matter  which  was  be- 
ing refuted  or  altogether  denied.  The  matter  was  followed 
up,  but  it  was  not  made  plain  whether  the  remarks  had 
been  made  under  a  misunderstanding,  or  with  intent  to  undo 
still  further  the  Emperor's  Consort's  prestige.  But  volun- 
tarily or  involuntarily  this  and  other  remarks  had  their  con- 
sequences. Throughout  the  whole  of  the  world  persistent 
rumours  were  circulated  that  the  Empress  had  German 
sympathies,  and  proofs  were  given  of  this.  Knowing  that 
in  my  conversation  with  the  Emperor  I  often  touched  on 
home  politics,  many  people,  amongst  others  Count  Freder- 
iks,  Minister  of  the  Court,  advised  me  to  have  a  personal 
interview  with  the  Empress,  and  through  her  to  have  cer- 
tain decisions  accepted.  I  knew  that  several  people  already, 
amongst  them  those  intimate  with  her,  had  tried  to  have 
conversations  with  her  on  politics,  but  without  success.  It 
would  have  been  a  presumption  on  my  part  for  me  to 
reckon  that  I,  a  person  completely  unknown  to  her  person- 
ally, should  be  able  to  obtain  that  which  had  not  been  at- 
tained by  people  whose  relations  with  her  would  place  them 
without  the  pale  of  her  doubts.  Further,  this  would  have 
required  several  lengthy  personal  interviews.  I  could  not 
foresee  any  conclusive  results  from  such  conversations,  and 
a  negative  result  might  easily  be  the  outcome,  if,  as  was 
probable,  they  had  become  known.  Not  seeing  any  kind  of 
fundamental  change  in  home  politics,  naturally  the  town 
would  talk  and  would  interpret  my  constant  visits  to  the 
Empress  in  no  other  way  except  as  a  desire  on  her  part 


I9i6]      POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD  289 

to  exercise  influence  on  the  war  operations,  or  perhaps  even 
my  wish  to  bring  her  into  the  active  circles  of  the  higher 
military  command.  Such  rumours  would,  without  doubt, 
penetrate  to  the  troops  in  the  active  army,  and  the  conse- 
quences of  such  rumours,  to  refute  which  would  have  been 
impossible,  might  be  very  harmful.  I  had  to  protect,  not 
my  personal  prestige  and  not  my  personal  reputation  as  a 
private  individual,  but  my  prestige  as  a  person  of  authority, 
although  only  temporarily  holding  the  post  of  Chief  of 
Staff  at  Headquarters.  Truly  such  rumours  would  have 
been  directly  opposite  to  the  absurd  tales  with  many  varia- 
tions which  with  one  accord  were  being  repeated  in  the 
Petrograd  drawing-rooms,  as  possibly  also  in  the  servants' 
rooms.  It  was  said  that  at  the  time  I  was  reporting  to 
the  Emperor  in  his  cabinet  the  Empress  came  in  and  in 
consequence  I  stopped  my  report.  On  the  Emperor  saying 
that  he  had  no  secrets  from  the  Empress,  I  was  reported  to 
have  replied  that  I,  on  the  contrary,  had.  There  was  not 
even  any  "  smoke  "  or  fire  in  this  report,  as,  during  all  the 
time  I  was  Chief  of  Staff  the  Empress  never  entered  the 
room  while  I  was  reporting  to  the  Tsar,  not  counting  the 
conversations  at  table.  I  had  only  one  interview,  only  one 
personal  talk  with  the  Empress.  This  was  on  the  day  of  the 
dinner  which  the  Emperor  gave  in  Tsarskoe  Selo  to  the 
members  of  the  Inter-Ally  Delegation.  Outside  of  the 
banal  topics  of  conversation,  I  had  to  go  at  some  length 
of  detail  in  placing  before  her  the  following  thesis  as  to 
definite  requests  made  to  the  Empress.  In  the  majority  of 
cases  those  requests  would  be  such  that  the  fulfilment  of 
them  by  the  Empress  might  be  against  the  law  or,  what  is 
worse,  might  be  harmful  to  the  interests  of  other  persons, 
or,  as  often  happens,  to  a  whole  group  of  people.  In  this 
way  the   granting  of   such    favours,   while    satisfying   one 


290     POLITICAL  CHANGES  IN  PETROGRAD     [ch.  xxii 

person,  either  makes  a  precedent  for  violating  existing  laws 
or  violates  the  Interests  of  a  large  number  of  outside  people. 
The  person  whose  request  has  been  fulfilled  sometimes  feels 
himself  well  treated;  sometimes  he  regards  the  benefit  re- 
ceived as  only  an  act  of  justice;  or  quickly  forgets  It,  seldom 
speaks  about  It,  even  sometimes  hiding  the  fact  of  the  gift, 
and  by  whom  It  was  given.  On  the  contrary  a  person  whose 
Interests  have  been  set  aside  In  favour  of  someone  else  will 
remember  this  a  long  time,  and  maybe  keep  It  In  mind  un- 
til he  dies. 

Further,  these  people  do  not  hesitate  to  disclose  the  name 
of  the  person  by  whom  these  Interests  were  set  aside.  I 
remember  that  I  even  said  that  such  persons  would  be 
more  inclined  to  order  their  children  and  grandchildren 
not  to  forget  the  person  who  did  them  this  or  that  in- 
justice. In  this  way  at  the  price  of  one  benefited  person 
is  formed  a  complete  group  of  dissatisfied  people.  Of 
course  It  is  always  more  agreeable  to  fulfil  a  request  than 
to  deny  It,  but  one  must  never  lose  sight  of  the  consequences, 
however  slight  the  irregularity  may  be.  On  the  present 
occasion  I  was  able  to  convince  the  Empress  and  make  her 
see  that  while  on  the  one  side  she  might  benefit  someone, 
on  the  other  a  request  should  not  be  granted  if  against 
the  law. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

THE    INTER-ALLY    CONFERENCE 

The  Inter-Ally  Conference,  after  being  put  off  several 
times,  was  at  last  fixed  for  the  end  of  January  19 17.  By 
the  calling  of  this  Conference  in  Petrograd,  a  new  attempt 
was  made  to  determine  the  common  interests  and  the  unity 
of  military  command  on  all  the  Allied  fronts.  But  re- 
membering past  events,  one  must,  in  justice  to  the  Russian 
High  Command,  recall  that  it,  not  only  in  words,  but  also 
by  deeds,  at  the  needs  of  the  minute,  realised  this  ideal. 

When  France  asked  the  Grand  Duke  Nicolal  to  put  a 
pressure  on  Germany  and  so  help  the  French  troops  to  stop 
the  German  advance,  he  not  only  sanctioned  the  farther 
advance  of  Rennenkampf's  Army  Corps  into  East  Prussia 
in  August  19 14,  but,  besides,  ordered  the  hurrying  of  Sam- 
sonoff's  Army's  advance,  though  acknowledging  to  what 
extent  our  troops  were  short  of  the  necessary  supplies  for 
a  continuous  advance. 

The  same  idea  inspired  the  Russian  Commander-in-Chief, 
when  the  Emperor  in  May  19 16  gave  Brussiloff  the  In- 
structions to  commence  an  invasion  of  Austria,  so  as  to  give 
help  and  to  draw  the  Austrian  troops  off  the  Italians.  This 
invasion  destroyed  our  chance  of  delivering  the  main  blow 
on  the  western  front,  where  our  object  was  to  drive  the 
Germans  out  of  Russian  territory.  These  operations  were 
realised,  notwithstanding  that  during  the  whole  of  the  sum- 
mer of    19 1 5,   when  the   Russian  troops  were   feeling  the 

291 


292  ^      THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE     [ch.  xxiii 

shortage  of  every  kind  of  material  supply,  the  Allies  could 
not  assist  them  in  any  way  by  an  advance  on  their  front. 

The  reason  why  active  operations  on  our  Allies'  front 
were  delayed  was  that  the  French  Army  was  not  yet  sup- 
plied with  heavy  artillery,  and  the  English  Army  had  not 
completed  its  formation  and  organisation.  The  forces  of 
the  English  regular  army  had  already  dwindled  away. 
This  army  gave  all  it  could  give  in  proportion  to  its  num- 
bers and  its  strength  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign. 
Finally,  when  the  Germans  were  making  their  violent  as- 
saults to  break  down  the  obstinacy  of  the  Verdun  defenders 
in  March  191 6,  the  Russian  Army  was  to  undertake  active 
operations,  although  its  chiefs  fully  acknowledged  how 
slight  were  the  chances  of  any  successes  being  gained. 

Whether  these  operations  of  March  19 16  gave  any  kind 
of  help  to  France,  we  shall  only  know  in  the  future  if  the 
Germans  write  a  true  history  of  the  war,  but,  in  any  case, 
we  did  all  that  was  incumbent  upon  us.  Therefore  the 
intention  expressed  by  our  Allies  to  make  the  principle  of 
unity  in  the  command  a  stronger  one  could  only  be  accepted 
by  us  with  satisfaction. 

There  were  reasons  to  believe  that  the  summer  cam- 
paign of  1917  would  determine  this  unity  both  in  theory  and 
practice. 

The  members  of  the  Conference  were  to  arrive  at  Port 
Romanovsky,  on  the  Murman,  and  go  thence  on  the  lately 
completed  railway  which  connected  the  capital  with  the  un- 
frozen part  of  the  White  Sea,  by  special  train  to  Petrograd. 
General  Count  Nostitz  was  sent  to  the  Murman  coast  to 
meet  them;  he  was  our  late  military  attache  in  Paris.  This 
was  the  first  time  that  the  Inter-Ally  Conference  had  gath- 
ered in  Petrograd.     The  journey  to  Russia  of  the  mem- 


I9I7]  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE  293 

bers  of  the  Conference  was  kept  secret  on  account  of  the 
danger  of  an  attack  by  German  submarines. 

Still  fresh  in  memory  was  the  disaster  that  befell  the 
founder  of  the  English  Army,  Lord  Kitchener,  when  he 
was  on  his  way  on  a  war  ship.  Every  measure  was  used  to 
prevent  our  enemies  having  the  pleasure  of  sinking  the  ship 
conveying  all  the  members  of  the  Inter-Ally  Conference. 
Judging  by  the  report  I  received  at  Headquarters  of  the 
Conference  in  Chantilly,  one  was  impressed  with  the  belief 
that  our  Allies,  either  in  the  person  of  their  Governments 
or  In  the  person  of  the  Higher  Command,  had  a  very  vague 
idea  of  the  conditions  under  which  the  advance  operations 
on  the  Russian  front  were  carried  out.  And  evidently  each 
of  them  applied  their  standpoint  to  us.  Insufficiently  did 
they  understand  the  differences  in  the  conditions  under  which 
we  and  our  Allies  stood;  insufficiently  did  they  calculate  the 
vast  extent  of  our  operations,  and  besides  that  what  a  dif- 
ference there  was  between  such  operations  and  the  means 
we  had  to  undertake  them,  and  towards  which  the  Allies 
had  done  practically  little  or  nothing  for  us,  if  not  in  ab- 
solute, at  any  rate  in  relative  proportion. 

After  the  start  of  the  war  for  a  long  time  our  Allies  only 
let  us  have  what  surplus  they  had  over  their  own  require- 
ments, but  they  expected  from  us  what  was  almost  superior 
to  their  own  strength,  whereas  the  Conference  in  Chantilly 
had  determined  the  principle  of  a  united  front,  unity  in 
interests  and  unity  in  means  in  working  them  out  and  using 
them.  The  last  conditions  I  understood  more  as  being 
platonic,  a  wish  rather  than  a  law  of  existence.  Neverthe- 
less we  should  have  taken  advantage  of  these  principles  so 
as  to  show  the  Allies  to  what  extent  this  law  had  not  been 
applied,  and  to  what  degree  it  would  remain  a  dead-letter 
in  the  future.     All  the  same  I  hoped  that  on  the  basis  of 


294  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE     [ch.  xxiii 

this  principle  we  might  receive  from  our  Allies  the  largest 
possible  amount  of  war  materials  of  the  very  best  quality. 

For  a  better  view  of  the  comparison  of  forces  and  means 
on  the  various  fronts  with  those  of  our  enemies  I  ordered 
General  Loukomsky,  under  my  directions,  to  prepare  plans 
and  diagrams  to  show  these  comparisons.  The  lengths  of 
the  various  fronts  with  absolute  and  relative  strengths  held 
by  the  Allies,  and  those  of  the  enemy  facing  them:  the 
quantities  of  material  means,  heavy  and  light  guns,  ma- 
chine guns,  in  the  same  way  in  absolute  and  relative  figures, 
and  the  comparison  with  the  Austro-German.  These  dia- 
grams were  made  up  of  figures  given  to  the  members  of  the 
Conference  at  Chantilly,  and  unfolded  a  comprehensive 
idea  of  the  extent  of  our  Allies'  fronts  in  all  its  bearings,  and 
in  what  measure  they  were  superior  in  strength  of  materials 
to  the  enemy  fronts  which  were  opposed  to  them;  to  what 
extent  our  Allies'  fronts  were  better  provided  than  ours;  and 
also  to  what  extent  the  Russian  front  in  all  respects  was 
weaker  than  the  Austro-German,  excluding  the  number  of 
battalions.  We  may  add  to  this  that  our  Allies  and  enemies 
could  take  advantage  of  all  their  artillery  to  their  fullest 
capacity,  whilst  we,  on  the  contrary,  were  still  tied  down 
because  shells  and  cartridges  did  not  flow  in  freely. 

While  I  was  at  Headquarters,  before  my  second  journey 
to  Petrograd,  the  head  of  the  Roumanian  Government, 
M.  Bratlano,  arrived.  The  position  on  the  Roumanian 
front  had  at  that  time  been  strengthened,  which  was  proved 
because  at  this  point  the  Austro-Germans  had  not  been  able 
to  move  forward.  But  the  organisation  at  the  rear  of 
both  armies  was  far  from  being  accomplished:  the  dlfl^cul- 
tles  brought  about  by  the  evacuation  of  half  of  the  Rouman- 
ian Government  from  Bukarest  at  first  to  Burlat,  and  then 
to  Jassi,  had  not  been  overcome.     In  any  case  it  ought  to 


191 7]  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE  295 

have  been  foreseen,  and  a  decision  made,  as  to  where,  in 
case  the  necessity  arose,  the  Roumanian  Government  and 
the  administrative  institutions  were  to  be  transferred,  where 
the  Roumanian  High  Command  and  the  Royal  Family  were 
to  be  placed  and  have  their  headquarters.  The  Emperor 
took  upon  himself  the  trouble  of  finding  a  place  for  the  lat- 
ter, wishing  to  give  them  a  house  either  in  the  Winter 
Palace  in  Petrograd,  or  In  Livadia  on  the  southern  shores 
of  the  Crimea.  Understanding  what  a  trying  period  the 
Roumanian  people  and  especially  their  rulers  who  took  upon 
themselves  the  moral  responsibility  were  living  through,  on 
account  of  their  participation  in  the  world  war,  I  wished 
to  give  the  head  of  the  Government  every  possible  help, 
within  bounds  of  possibility,  and  in  this  way  to  lighten  the 
heavy  burden  which  the  people,  army,  and  ruling  circles 
were  bearing.  The  most  difficult  problem  was  the  provi- 
sion of  housing  for  the  contingents  of  which  the  Roumanian 
Army  was  to  be  formed,  to  fit  them  out  and  to  feed  them; 
their  training  was  given  over  to  French  officers  with  Gen- 
eral Berthelot  at  their  head  and  the  evacuation  of  all  that 
had  accumulated  on  Roumanian  territory  In  Roumanian 
towns  and  on  the  Roumanian  railways. 

Judging  by  what  he  said,  Bratlano  was  satisfied  with  our 
talks,  a  continuation  of  which  we  deferred  till  we  met  In 
Petrograd.  From  our  conversation,  I  saw  he  was  worried 
as  to  whether  he  would  have  the  chance  to  take  part  In  the 
Inter-Ally  Conference  In  Petrograd  and  the  opportunity  of 
personally  explaining  the  position  of  his  country  and  the 
steps  possible  to  protect  its  Interests.  I  personally  being 
against  all  routine  In  every  business,  and  never  fearing 
precedents,  because  a  precedent  never  serves  as  a  weighty 
argument  In  my  mind,  was  inclined  to  insist  on  Bratlano 
being  admitted  to  all  the  meetings  of  the  Conference  which 


296  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE     [ch.  xxiii 

might  Involve  Roumanla.  I  reckoned  that  the  Allies  in  this 
way  would  raise  Bratiano's  prestige  in  his  country  —  this 
was  what  he  especially  insisted  on.  It  was  In  the  Allies' 
interest  that  Bratlano  should  remain  the  head  of  the  Rou- 
manian Government.  One  must  remember  that  after 
Roumanla  had  been  defeated,  the  Germanophlle  Party 
raised  Its  head  and  grew  stronger.  It  was  no  secret  that 
the  Idea  of  this  party  was  to  transfer  Roumanla  to  the  side 
of  our  adversaries.  What  this  party  could  do  is  shown  in 
General  Stroudza's  case,  which  I  have  mentioned  later  on. 
Bratlano,  maybe,  was  the  only  statesman  in  Roumanla  who 
finally  burnt  his  boats.  His  political  path  was  finally  marked 
out,  and  there  was  no  turning  back.  Others  might  say  that 
Roumanla  had  made  a  mistake  and  might  try  to  persuade 
the  Roumanian  people  to  change  their  political  views  In  a 
radical  fashion,  but  they  would  not  expect  the  man  who 
himself  had  put  Roumanla  on  that  present  path  to  say 
that.  Current  events  showed  the  justice  of  this  supposition. 
When,  In  February  191 8,  Roumanla  by  force  of  circum- 
stances was  obliged  to  have  pour-parlers  with  her  enemies, 
Bratlano  had  to  leave  the  political  arena. 

On  my  arrival  in  Petrograd  we  had  a  private  meeting 
under  the  presidency  of  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
Pokrovsky.  Here  were  marked  Into  what  departments  the 
Conference  would  be  divided,  who  would  preside  at  the 
various  sub-meetings  or  commissions,  and  so  on.  It  was 
clear  that  those  members  of  the  Conference  who  came  from 
abroad  would  be  In  a  hurry  to  get  back  again.  Part  of 
them  would  be  anxious  to  visit  the  fronts.  Consequently 
the  business  of  the  Conference  must  be  done  at  the  highest 
possible  pressure.  Taking  all  these  things  Into  considera- 
tion, arrangements  were  based  on  them.  The  first  meet- 
ing of  the  Conference,  that  is,  its  opening,  with  all  the 


1917]  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE  297 

members,  was  to  take  place  at  the  so-called  Round  Hall  of 
the  Mary  Palace,  the  room  where  private  meetings  of  the 
Lnperlal  Council  took  place.  This  meeting  was  confined 
to  Pokrovsky's  reception  speech  and  my  speech,  which 
dealt  chiefly  with  the  programme  in  front  of  us.  After 
this  the  members  of  the  Conference  were  distributed  into 
various  commissions,  each  one  to  his  own  speciality.  The 
commission  the  widest  in  scope  demanding  the  most  con- 
tinuous work  was  the  Munitions  Committee.  It,  in  its 
turn,  was  divided  into  many  sub-committees,  each  one  to 
its  own  branch  of  munitions.  Its  task  was  to  determine  the 
actual  material  needs  of  the  Russian  Army;  the  time  when 
delivery  could  be  promised  by  our  Allies  as  a  whole,  and  by 
which  of  them  partially;  and  what  our  means  were  for  de- 
livering the  goods  from  the  ports  to  our  fronts.  The  Min- 
ister of  War,  General  Belaieff,  presided  at  this  Commission, 
and  the  Grand  Duke  Serge  was  there  as  the  representative 
of  Headquarters.  I,  personally,  only  called  a  final  meeting 
of  this  Conference  and  with  it  the  so-called  Strategic  Com- 
mission, so  that  I  might  hear  their  decisions,  perhaps  add 
some  corrections,  and  touch  upon  questions  of  principle 
connected  with  supply  and  delivery  of  goods  from  the  Rus- 
sian ports,  etc.  A  special  Commission  was  created  under 
the  presidency  of  the  Russian  Ministry  of  Finance,  N,  N. 
Bark.  Truly  speaking,  all  the  preparatory  work  of  this 
Commission  was  discussed  by  Minister  Bark  with  one  of 
the  English  members  of  the  Conference,  Lord  Revelstoke, 
who  had  specially  come  to  discuss  financial  questions.  It 
was  only  at  the  end  of  the  Conference  that  this  Commission 
met  and  invited  to  the  meeting  all  the  senior  representatives 
of  the  interested  Governments. 

Under  my  presidency  a   Commission  was  to  work,   the 
members  of  which  besides  myself  were  three  senior  military 


298  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE     [ch.  xxiii 

Ally  representatives,  viz.  Generals  Castelnau,  Sir  Henry 
Wilson,  and  Count  Rudgierl.  Finally,  the  Chief  Commis- 
sion called  to  discuss  political  questions  was  presided  over 
by  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Pokrovsky;  its  mem- 
bers were:  the  representatives  of  Allied  Governments,  Lord 
Milner  and  Lord  Revelstoke  from  England,  Gaston 
Doumergue  from  France,  Shaloya  from  Italy.  The  Am- 
bassadors of  the  interested  Governments  were  also  mem- 
bers: Sir  G.  Buchanan,  Paleologue,  Marquis  CarlottI,  and 
Sazonoff,  our  late  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  who  had 
not  yet  left  for  London  to  take  up  his  duties  as  Ambassador. 
From  the  Russian  Government,  besides  the  President  and 
myself,  were  present  the  assistant  to  the  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs,  Neratoff,  and  the  Minister  of  Finance,  Bark. 
When  the  work  of  the  Strategic  Commission  was  ended,  the 
foreign  members  were  Invited  to  attend  one  of  the  Chief 
Commission's  meetings,  where  I,  in  general  terms,  omitting 
the  secret  part,  laid  before  them  those  decisions  and  deduc- 
tions which  the  Commission  under  my  presidency  had  come 
to.  The  Strategic  Commission  finished  its  work  first  In 
three  meetings,  and  Generals  Castelnau  and  Wilson  left  to 
visit  the  fronts. 

The  opinions  of  the  members  of  the  above  Commission 
did  not  differ  in  anything  essential.  Here  the  principle  of 
unity  in  action  of  the  Allies  was  confirmed  again,  under  the 
greatest  equity  possible,  at  any  rate  so  far  as  concerned  the 
supply  of  a  sufficiency  of  means  to  those  armies  whose  coun- 
try's industries  were  not  sufficiently  developed  to  satisfy 
their  needs. 

The  political  Commission  had  more  meetings. 

I  could  not  attend  one  of  these  meetings,  as  I  had  to  go 
to  Headquarters  for  some  time,  not  wishing  to  leave  for 
too  long  the  work  of  my  Staff.     The  matters  to  be  discussed 


Ij  o 

.2  ° 


o 
•7 


OS  c 


us; 


^O 


191 7]  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE  299 

were  opened  up  by  Minister  Pokrovsky;  they  not  only 
touched  on  the  business  of  the  Governments,  whose  repre- 
sentatives were  at  the  Conference,  but  some  questions  that 
affected  other  Allied  as  well  as  neutral  countries.  To  one 
of  these  meetings  Bratiano  was  invited.  This  was  the  meet- 
ing where  the  military  Allied  representatives  were  present. 
For  Bratiano's  presence  at  all  these  meetings  I  could  not 
get  the  consent  of  the  senior  Allied  Government  representa- 
tives. Their  arguments  were  that  this  would  be  a  precedent 
to  the  representatives  of  all  the  small  countries  that  were 
taking  part  in  the  war,  Belgium,  Portugal,  Serbia,  to  be  in- 
vited to  the  next  Conference,  and  to  this  the  Allied  repre- 
sentatives had  not  the  consent  of  their  Governments. 

I  must  say  that  the  main  hindrance  to  successful  work 
in  such  Inter-Ally  Commissions  is  that,  not  only  when  a 
decision  has  to  be  made,  but  also  even  when  some  kind  of 
serious  question  is  to  be  discussed,  those  taking  part  in  the 
Commission  announce  that  they  have  not  got  the  authority 
for  it.  The  effect  is  that  such  debates  revert  merely  to 
exchanges  of  opinions. 

Already  the  Minister  Pokrovsky  had  realised  that  it  would 
be  necessary  to  found  in  Paris  a  permanent  Inter-Ally  Con- 
ference or  meeting  for  the  discussion  and  decision  of  af- 
fairs involving  several  of  the  Allies.  But  for  the  reason  I 
have  stated,  i.e.  lack  of  authority,  no  decision  on  this  was 
come  to.  The  representative  of  the  Russian  Government 
in  making  this  proposal  acknowledged  that  Russia's  posi- 
tion at  such  a  Conference  would  be  less  valuable,  because 
our  Allies  would  be  able  to  include  the  heads  of  their  re- 
spective Governments  in  such  a  meeting,  persons  able  to 
both  discuss  and  decide.  Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  even  if 
she  sent  a  special  representative  holding  special  powers, 
would  either  have  to  give  him  the  right,  although  insulK- 


300  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE     [ch.  xxiii 

ciently  Informed,  to  decide  the  most  serious  matters,  or  to 
hold  back  a  definite  adhesion  and  ask  for  Instructions  from 
Petrograd.  There  are  no  questions  without  negative  sides. 
The  positive  sides  of  a  permanent  Inter-Allied  Conference 
were,  nevertheless,  superior  to  the  negative. 

During  these  days,  on  his  journey  from  Roumania  to 
England,  an  English  colonel  and  a  member  of  Parliament, 
Sir  John  Norton  Griffiths,  called  on  me.  He  had  been  to 
Roumania  on  a  special  mission  to  see  that  the  destruction 
of  all  oil-works  in  Roumania  was  complete.  The  majority 
were  working  on  English  capital  and  were  managed  by 
English  engineers.  The  proposal  for  the  destruction  of 
the  oil-wells  was  met  in  Roumania  with  a  good  deal  of 
hostility.  The  Roumanian  Government,  under  the  influ- 
ence of  public  opinion,  could  not  decide  to  give  the  neces- 
sary orders.  Arriving  on  the  ground  and  having  grasped 
the  position,  Norton  Griffiths  turned  for  help  to  those  Rus- 
sian troops,  and  especially  to  the  Russian  cavalry,  which 
having  got  in  advance  of  the  Infantry  were  already  In 
touch  with  the  enemy.  With  the  combined  efforts  of  the 
local  English  engineers  and  the  help  from  the  Russian 
troops,  Norton  Griffiths  successfully  fulfilled  the  object 
for  which  he  had  been  sent.  Before  war  operations  com- 
menced with  Roumania,  Germany  on  a  daily  average  re- 
ceived from  Roumania  more  than  200  tanks  of  naphtha 
products.  Much  time  should  pass,  counted  In  months, 
before  Germany  would  again  be  able  to  receive  such  quan- 
tities of  oil  and  lubricants. 

Notwithstanding  that  it  was  war-time,  and  notwithstand- 
ing the  fact  that  the  majority  of  the  Commission  members, 
especially  the  Russian  members,  were  greatly  overburdened 
with  work  —  the  Commission  to  them  was  over  and  above 
their  usual  tasks  —  notwithstanding  all  this,   the  meetings 


1917]  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE  301 

were  interspersed  by  official  dinners  at  the  Ministries  and 
at  the  Embassies.  I  must  say  that  this  bad  example  was 
not  initiated  by  us;  we  only  maintained  the  custom  that  was 
fixed  at  the  Inter-Ally  Conferences  held  before  in  other 
countries.  I  must  acknowledge,  however,  that  these  dinners 
have  a  good  side.  They  give  the  guests  between  the  courses 
an  opportunity  to  exchange  ideas,  to  get  better  acquainted, 
and  to  talk  over  things  which  would  not  be  always  suitable 
in  the  meetings. 

To  the  dinners  in  the  Embassies  were  only  invited  those 
members  of  the  Conference  and  those  accompanying  them 
who  came  from  the  countries  these  Ambassadors  repre- 
sented and  the  Russian  members  of  the  Conference.  To 
the  dinner  at  the  English  Embassy  Rodzianko  was  also  in- 
vited. Evidently  at  the  receptions  given  by  the  Russian 
governing  people  all  the  representatives  of  all  the  Gov- 
ernments were  collected,  a  much  greater  number  of  people. 
The  entertainment  given  by  Prince  Golitzin  as  head  of  the 
Russian  Government  was  the  most  crowded.  All  the  visit- 
ors, as  well  as  a  great  many  Russian  public  people,  mem- 
bers of  the  Imperial  Council  and  Duma,  were  invited  to 
this  entertainment.  I  was  not  there,  as  at  the  moment  I 
was  in  Mohileff. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  Conference  all  members  were 
received  by  the  Emperor,  who  invited  them  all  to  dinner. 
One  good  thing  was  that  at  this  dinner  there  were  no 
speeches.  The  members  of  the  Commissions  had  already 
had  enough  gatherings  for  exchange  of  opinions  and 
speeches.  Further  it  seemed  as  if  everything  must  by  now 
have  been  debated,  so  that  such  dinner  speeches  would  have 
involved  either  repetitions  of  old  matters  or  general  talk 
which  was  quite  unnecessary.  The  exception  to  this  was 
the  dinner  at  Tsarskoe  Selo,  where  the  Emperor  in  a  short 


302  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE     [ch.  xxiii 

speech  thanked  the  members  of  the  Commission,  and  ex- 
pressed his  certainty  that  what  they  had  accompHshed  would 
be  to  the  advantage  of  the  Alhes  and  would  ease  their  ef- 
forts to  gain  their  general  ends  and  intentions.  It  had  been 
decided  that  none  of  the  foreign  representatives  were  to 
reply.  Possibly  to  make  it  possible  for  the  seniors  of  the 
foreign  representatives  to  sit  closer  to  the  Emperor  and 
have  personal  conversation  with  him,  the  Empress  and  the 
ladies  of  her  suite  were  not  present.  As  a  rule,  after  din- 
ner all  the  guests  congregated  in  one  of  the  drawing-rooms 
and  formed  what  the  French  call  a  cercle.  During  this  time 
the  Chief  Marshal  of  the  Court,  Count  Benckendorff,  in- 
vited each  senior  civilian  and  military  representative  in  turn 
and  conducted  them  into  the  presence  of  the  Empress  Alex- 
andria. 

Immediately  after  retiring  to  the  drawing-room  I  ap- 
proached the  Emperor  and  asked  that  my  report  might  be 
put  off  for  two  days,  as  those  days  had  been  called  for  the 
Inter-Ally  Conference.  My  conversation  with  the  Emperor 
turned  to  other  subjects  and  was  prolonged.  However,  in 
about  a  quarter  of  an  hour  the  Emperor  said,  "  I  mustn't 
forget  that  I  am  host  here  and  must  be  amiable,"  and  then 
went  round  the  foreign  visitors,  speaking  to  each  one  and 
to  some  for  a  fairly  long  time.  He  gave  orders  to  tell  him 
when  the  Empress's  reception  was  over,  but  when  it  was 
finished  he  continued  going  the  round  of  his  visitors  until 
he  had  spoken  a  pleasant  word  to  each  of  them.  At  this 
time  Count  Frederiks  and  I  went  aside  and  had  that  con- 
versation about  the  Empress  Alexandra  of  which  I  wrote 
in  one  of  the  preceding  chapters.  This  day  the  cercle  was 
considerably  longer  than  usual.  Next  day,  from  early 
morning  on,  the  work  of  the  Conference  went  through  its 
usual  routine.      I  took  advantage  of  those  days  on  which 


igi7J  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE  303 

the  Commission  and  Sub-Commissions  did  not  meet,  for 
separate  consultations  with  the  seniors  of  the  foreign  dele- 
gates, explaining  and  discussing  those  matters  which  had 
not  been  in  the  category  of  questions  discussed  at  the  gen- 
eral or  private  meetings,  i.e.  relating  only  to  Russia  and 
to  one  of  our  Allies.  At  the  end  of  the  meeting,  a  financial 
consultation  gathered,  presided  over  by  the  Minister  Bark. 
Bark  had  agreed  with  Lord  Revelstoke  on  the  majority  of 
things.  There  only  remained  some  questions  of  principle 
to  be  dealt  with.  I  personally  thought  it  well  to  draw  at- 
tention to  the  fact  that  the  Russian  exchange  during  the  war 
was  going  lower  and  lower,  and  that  if  steps  were  not 
taken  to  stop  or  hold  this  process  as  much  as  possible,  we 
might  be  brought  face  to  face  with  a  position  in  which  the 
Russian  exchange  would  be  so  much  lower  than  our  Allies' 
exchange,  but  would  be  in  an  unaltered  position  in  regard  to 
the  German  exchange,  and  that  our  future  trade  connections 
would  be  easier  with  our  enemies  than  with  our  Allies. 
From  such  trade  connections  the  lion's  share  of  profits  would 
be  taken  by  our  present  enemies.  To  reckon  on  extraor- 
dinary patriotism  when  the  price  to  be  paid  is  very  high, 
is  not  advisable;  one  must  base  one's  calculations  on  real 
fact  and  real  profits.  Further,  a  quick  enrichment  of  Ger- 
many at  Russia's  expense  would  mean  a  new  enormous  back- 
ing to  the  German  militarism,  a  new  threat  to  the  European 
peace.  The  senior  representatives  of  England  and  France 
agreed  with  me  in  principle,  but  because  of  want  of  au- 
thority this  question  was  not  discussed  in  detail.  This  re- 
mained In  the  realms  of  good  wishes. 

The  day  for  the  departure  of  the  Conference  members 
was  already  drawing  near  —  this  date  had  as  far  as  pos- 
sible to  be  kept  secret,  and  for  this  reason  It  was  officially 
announced  that  the  members  were  off  to  visit  the  fronts. 


304  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE     [ch.  xxiii 

I  had  the  satisfaction  tefore  their  departure  of  handing 
the  senior  military  members,  in  the  Emperor's  name,  rib- 
bons for  Russian  Orders,  to  Generals  Castelnau,  Wilson, 
and  Count  Rudgieri.  I  had  to  do  this  at  the  very  last  min- 
ute, as  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  making  up  the 
lists  of  foreign  visitors  had  prepared  for  all,  without  ex- 
ception, "  Orders  without  swords."  But  I  thought  that  to 
generals  such  as  Castelnau  and  Wilson  Orders  were  handed 
not  merely  for  their  work  in  the  Conference,  but  also  for 
their  past  military  activities  and  fighting  services,  which 
were  of  the  best  and  foremost  rank.  Therefore  I  had  to 
send  my  adjutant  to  the  Orders  Department  to  change  those 
brought  for  "  Orders  with  swords,"  whilst  the  parchments 
signed  by  the  Emperor  I  sent  to  Tsarskoe  Selo  to  be 
changed.  Of  course  I  had  spoken  to  the  Emperor  first  and 
received  his  sanction.  The  Emperor  at  his  farewell  audi- 
ence had  personally  decorated  General  Castelnau  with  the 
Order  of  St.  George. 

After  the  members  of  the  Conference  had  departed  I 
had  time  to  decide  several  points  of  foreign  policy  and 
subjects  In  connection  with  supplies  for  our  armies.  In  the 
first  were  concluded  the  Polish  and  Czech  problems. 
In  the  second  the  degree  of  co-operation  between  the  Min- 
istries of  Agriculture,  Ways  and  Communications,  and  In- 
dustries. Concerning  the  Polish  question  I  had  to  speak 
with  the  Minister  Pokrovsky  and  he  also  had  to  deal  with 
the  Czech  question.  For  the  decision  of  the  Polish  ques- 
tion a  consultation  had  taken  place  before  the  Inter-Ally 
Conference  was  closed;  in  this  consultation  eleven  members 
took  part,  the  majority  of  whom  were  interested  Ministers, 
the  late  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Sazonoff,  who  in  his 
time  had  offered  a  scheme  for  the  autonomy  of  Poland,  the 
president  of  the  Imperial   Council,  Tsheglovltoff,  the  late 


19 1 7]  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE  305 

Minister  of  Justice,  and  the  President  of  the  Duma,  Rod- 
zianko,  and  also  the  late  Premier,  Goremykin.  This  was 
the  last  of  his  Government  work.  In  October  19 17,  while 
living  in  a  villa  on  the  Caucasian  sea  coast,  he  was  murdered 
by  anarchists. 

The  Czech  question  was  no  less  intricate.  The  Czech 
nation,  one  of  the  foremost  and  most  warlike,  in  a  political 
sense,  of  the  Slavonic  nations,  naturally  counted  upon  the 
war  closing  with  a  Peace  Conference  which  would  give  them 
a  chance  to  get  their  full  independence,  to  which  they  thought 
they  had  sufficient  right.  The  representatives  of  the  Czech 
people,  both  those  living  in  the  western  countries  and  those 
who  came  to  Russia,  strove  their  utmost  to  get  a  preliminary 
basis  to  found  with  time  their  own  independent  Kingdom. 
This  initial  step  was  to  include  the  formation  of  the  nucleus 
of  a  future  Czech  army.  For  this  the  Russian  Ministry 
for  Foreign  Affairs  demanded  the  affirmation  of  the  rule 
that  Czechs  enrolling  in  Czech  regiments  should  take  the 
oath  to  Russia,  whereas  they  would  be  called  on  to  fight  only 
in  the  name  of  the  future  Czech  Government.  No  less 
trouble  was  found  in  other  departments  which  had  used  the 
Czech  prisoners  of  war  for  labour  in  the  interior.  An- 
other difficulty  was  that  the  Czech  leaders  counted  them- 
selves as  Republicans,  and  this  was  objected  to  by  many 
Russian  statesmen  who  feared  that  such  a  step  in  favour  of 
the  Czechs  would  bear  fruit  in  the  other  Slavonic  nationali- 
ties. Further,  the  majority  of  the  Czech  leaders  understood 
that  the  nation  under  a  Republican  form  of  government 
might  be  the  arena  of  other  Powers'  disputes.  The  price 
paid  for  it  might  be  slightly  larger  than  the  freedom  gained 
in  internal  matters.  The  new  Republic  without  doubt  would 
lose  its  full  freedom  in  international  politics,  and  this  alone 
would  be  the  source  of  serious  interior  and  external  com- 


3o6  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE     [ch.  xxiii 

plications  for  the  young  nation.  In  any  case  one  would 
suppose  at  that  time  that  the  building  of  the  Czech  State 
would  be  decided  at  the  International  Conference  without 
consideration  of  this  or  that  kind  of  Czech  political  party. 
I  must  say  that  in  the  Russian  Army  were  already  included 
several  Czech  battalions,  but  later,  under  some  intricate 
political  influence,  they  were  broken  up  into  separate  com- 
panies and  distributed  among  the  various  armies  and  army 
corps. 

It  was  very  evident  that  such  half-decisions  could  not 
satisfy  the  Czech  politicians.  This  raised  passions  and  gave 
hopes,  but  the  question  was  not  settled.  The  inspiring 
spirit  in  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  this  Czech  ques- 
tion was  a  Czech,  Durlch.  However,  there  were  great 
suspicions  that  he  had  been  tampered  with  by  Austrian  agents 
and  cleverly  used,  not  so  much  as  a  provocateur,  but  as  a 
man  to  entangle  this  Czech  question,  and  to  compromise  it. 
I  personally  did  not  meet  him,  and  therefore  can  give  no 
personal  impression  of  him;  but  from  what  other  Czechs 
said,  who  were  trusted  both  by  their  own  people  and  by  our 
Allies,  I  could  only  come  to  one  conclusion,  and  that  was 
that  Durich's  abilities  would  not  assist  a  settlement.  On  the 
other  side  it  was  as  though  our  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
demanded  from  the  Czechs  Russian  patriotism.  My  point 
of  view  was  that  first  of  all  one  is  a  son  of  one's  own  father- 
land, and  after  that  a  sympathiser  and  helper  to  friendly 
nations.  A  bad  Czech  patriot  would  be  a  useless  friend 
for  Russia.  In  any  case  I  had  full  hope  that  the  question 
of  new  Czech  military  organisations  would  have  a  solution 
favourable  for  the  Czechs  and  profitable  for  us. 

To  put  the  question  of  supply  in  order,  I  invited  three 
Ministers  to  come  to  the  Hotel  d'Europe  —  where  I  re- 
sided —  to  be  under  the  same  roof  as  the  Conference  mem- 


1917]  THE  INTER-ALLY  CONFERENCE  307 

bers,  those  most  nearly  connected  with  supplies  for  the  Rus- 
sian Armies,  viz.  Minister  of  Agriculture  Rittich,  the  Min- 
ister of  Ways  and  Communications  Voinovsky-Krigier,  and 
the  Minister  of  Trade  and  Industries,  Prince  Shahovskoy. 
The  meeting,  lasting  three  hours,  yielded  important  results, 
much  greater  than  the  earlier  methods  of  correspondence, 
which  sometimes  was  continued  for  months.  Here  we  de- 
cided the  problem  of  obtaining  coal  from  the  mines;  this 
had  been  going  on  for  eighteen  months.  Prince  Shahov- 
skoy, who  was  just  leaving  for  the  Don  Basin  coal  region, 
formally  promised  us  to  act  on  the  lines  agreed  upon  at  this 
meeting.  This  meeting  incidentally  gave  me  the  idea  of 
creating  a  post,  and  appointing  to  it  a  proper  person  who 
would  sometimes  be  in  Petrograd  and  sometimes  at  Head- 
quarters in  close  touch  with  the  Chief  of  Staff  and  under 
the  direct  touch  with  the  Generalissimo,  the  Emperor,  that 
person  being  able  to  co-ordinate  and  direct  the  activities  of 
the  Ministries  and  Institutions  for  the  Army  supplies.  It 
would  be  necessary  to  formulate  rules  and  regulations,  by 
which  such  a  person  would  be  guided,  and  by  which  he  could 
be  legally  appointed  and  given  the  rights  and  powers.  But 
the  most  important  is  to  find  a  person  capable  of  fulfilling 
such  diflScult  duties.  When  General  Alexeieff  returned  I 
spoke  to  him  about  it,  and  when  making  my  last  report,  ex- 
plained the  idea  to  the  Emperor,  but  it  was  difficult  to  say, 
notwithstanding  the  Emperor's  sympathy,  as  also  Alexeieff's, 
whether  the  scheme  could  be  brought  into  being.  In  any 
case  the  Russian  Revolution  crushed  this  possibility,  as  it 
did  others. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

THE    POLISH    QUESTION    AND    FIRST   SIGNS    OF    REVOLUTION 

Whilst  in  Petrograd  I  met  the  head  of  the  Roumanian 
Government,  Bratiano,  several  times,  rooms  for  him  having 
also  been  taken  in  the  Hotel  d'Europe.  Guided  by  the  de- 
termination, within  the  limits  of  possibilities,  to  come  to 
the  aid  of  the  Roumanian  Army,  population,  and  rulers,  we 
had  to  agree  as  to  how  far  the  purely  military  demands  were 
in  line  with  the  demands  and  needs  of  the  Roumanians, 
The  business  was  complicated  by  the  cares  of  creating  a 
Roumanian  Army,  which,  even  if  not  so  large  as  that  which 
had  entered  the  war  in  August,  would  be  such  as  to  enable 
the  Roumanians  at  any  rate  to  hold  a  small  part  of  the  front. 
At  that  time  the  whole  Roumanian  Army  front  was  not  more 
than  thirty  kilometres,  of  which  a  considerable  portion  was 
held  by  the  Kalarash  Brigade  under  General  Stroudza. 

This  general  who  had  earned  for  himself  and  his  brigade 
the  best  reputation  amongst  the  Roumanian  generals,  was 
the  instigator  of  a  plot  which  might  have  had  serious  po- 
litical consequences.  King  Ferdinand,  by  the  invitation 
of  General  Stroudza,  visited  the  Kalarash  positions.  It 
was  perfectly  quiet  at  the  front,  and,  following  the  directions 
Stroudza  gave  him.  King  Ferdinand  got  closer  and  closer 
to  the  front  lines  where  General  Stroudza  said  his  brigade 
(Kalarashi)  was  holding  the  front  lines.  The  King  with 
his  suite  moved  forward,  but  on  the  way  no  Kalarashi  were 
met  with.  Suddenly  someone  of  the  suite  called  to  the 
King  that  the  Austrians  were  in  front  of  them.     Had  they 

308 


I9I7]  FIRST  SIGNS  OF  REVOLUTION  309 

gone  farther  forward,  they  must  have  all  got  into  the  Aus- 
trian troops'  positions.  The  King  and  his  suite  hastily  re- 
tired, and  it  was  only  by  luck  that  no  one  was  hit  by  the  fire 
which  the  Austrians  opened  at  that  minute.  This  episode 
naturally  roused  the  suspicions  of  those  round  the  King,  and 
steps  were  taken  the  same  day  for  elucidating  this  incident, 
which  greatly  compromised  General  Stroudza.  It  was  de- 
cided to  arrest  him.  But  evidently  General  Stroudza 
realised  the  danger  and  that  same  night  drove  off  accom- 
panied by  his  adjutant  in  a  motor-car.  They  left  the  motor- 
car on  the  way,  and  crossed  over  to  the  Austrians.  The 
King's  expedition  was  evidently  a  well-thought-out  and 
almost  successful  conspiracy.  For  its  realisation  Stroudza 
had  moved  away  his  Kalarash  Brigade  from  a  part  of  the 
line,  so  that  the  first  occupied  lines  the  King  came  across  on 
his  way  out  should  be  Austrian.  Evidently  the  Austrians 
had  not  been  careful  enough  on  their  side,  as  one  of  the 
King's  suite  was  able  to  discover  their  presence  and  warn 
the  King. 

Roumania's  entry  into  the  war  has  been,  and  still  is,  the 
centre  of  argument.  The  points  are  whether  Roumania 
entered  the  war  at  the  proper  time,  and  whether  it  would 
not  have  been  more  favourable  to  the  Allies  if  Roumania 
had  maintained  her  friendly  neutrality.  So  far  as  later 
events  enable  us  to  judge,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  Rou- 
mania's entry  would  have  been  more  profitable  to  her  and 
to  the  Allies  if  it  had  been  made  simultaneously  with  or  im- 
mediately following  Brussiloff's  advance  in  May  19 16.  As 
to  the  maintenance  of  neutrality,  probably  Roumania  was 
placed  in  a  position  necessitating  a  choice  between  an  entry 
on  this  or  that  side.  But  with  a  great  deal  of  confidence  it 
can  be  asserted  that  Roumania's  entry  and  her  unequal  fight 
during  the  first  half  of  the  winter  19 16-17  ^^"^^  ^^  great 


3IO  FIRST  SIGNS  OF  REVOLUTION       [ch.  xxiv 

service  to  the  Allies,  because  during  the  winter  months 
fighting  had  died  down  on  the  Russian  and  Anglo-French 
fronts.  The  Austro-Germans  always  strove  to  use  these 
months  for  increased  movements.  In  the  winter  19 14—15, 
taking  advantage  of  the  mild  weather  in  the  Polish  Kingdom 
districts,  they  attempted  to  take  Warsaw.  In  the  winter 
of  19 1 5-1 6  the  Austrians  finished  with  unhappy  Serbia,  and 
the  Germans  tried  to  capture  Verdun.  In  the  winter  of 
19 1 6-17,  if  the  Germans  had  not  been  compelled  to  throw 
about  thirty  divisions  into  Roumanian  territory,  to  finish  her 
and  to  stop  the  advance  we  were  making  to  help  Roumania, 
they  would  undoubtedly  have  chosen  some  other  sphere  for 
their  activity.  Such  operations  might  have  been  directed 
against  the  Salonika  salient  and  General  Sarrail's  Army. 
By  sending  to  Salonika  forces  considerably  less  than  were 
required  on  the  Roumanian  front,  and  using  much  shorter 
lines  of  communication,  when  compared  with  those  of  the 
Allies,  Germany's  success,  one  must  think,  would  have  been 
certain.  The  result  of  this  would  have  been  the  junction 
of  the  German  and  Greek  armies.  From  such  evidence,  as 
the  Press  was  allowed  to  publish,  we  know  that  the  Em- 
peror William  was  in  communication  with  his  sister  the 
Queen  of  Greece,  and  evidently  promised  her  speedy  help 
in  the  winter  of  19 16-17.  This  upheld  King  Constantine 
in  his  efforts  to  maintain  the  Greek  neutrality. 

When  the  Inter-Ally  Conference  was  concluded,  we  were 
able  to  call  the  Polish  Commission  together  more  frequently. 
When  the  President,  Prince  Golitzin,  opened  it,  he  explained 
to  those  present  why  the  Emperor  had  delegated  this  duty 
to  him.  However,  he  did  not  actually  explain  what  were 
the  Emperor's  intentions  and  proposals.  But,  knowing  that 
the  Commission  was  the  result  of  my  reports  to  the  Em- 
peror, he  turned  to  me  and  asked  me  to  make  it  clear  to  the 


1917]  FIRST  SIGNS  OF  REVOLUTION  311 

members  of  the  Commission  what  the  Emperor  meant  in 
his  Order  of  December  25th,  1916,  in  speaking  of  the  fu- 
ture unity  of  Poland,  called  it  "  Free  Poland." 

There  was  nothing  else  for  me  to  do  then,  but,  as  fully 
as  possible,  to  place  before  the  Commission  the  contents 
of  my  reports  to  the  Emperor  and  all  those  arguments 
which  made  me  feel  that  for  the  good  of  both  Slavonic 
nations,  Russian  and  Polish,  any  forcible  union  of  these  two 
people  in  one  Empire  should  be  put  aside,  and  that  Poland 
should  have  as  independent  a  life  as  Russia  had.  I  have 
already  pointed  out  that  among  the  members  of  the  Com- 
mission were  the  Presidents  of  both  our  Legislatures. 

The  exchange  of  opinions  was  started  with  M.  V.  Rodzi- 
anko  giving  notice  that  in  taking  part  in  the  Commission  he 
did  so  as  a  private  individual  and  not  In  his  official  capacity 
of  President  of  the  Duma.  Developing  this  idea  he  ex- 
plained that  he  spoke  for  himself  personally.  The  same 
point  was  expressed  by  the  President  of  the  Imperial  Coun- 
cil, Tsheglovitoff. 

When  I  placed  my  view  on  the  Polish  question  before 
the  Commission,  I  reckoned  that  Sazonoff  would  take  part 
in  the  discussion,  and  as  the  author  of  the  scheme  for  the 
Polish  autonomy  as  a  component  part  of  the  Russian  Em- 
pire, would  place  before  us  his  scheme,  and  the  motives 
which  prompted  him  to  such  a  solution  of  the  Polish  prob- 
lem. Actually  the  further  debates  were  for  considering  the 
justice  or  Injustice  of  the  arguments  that  I  put  before  them. 
Sazonoff,  who  had  only  recently  been  appointed  Ambassador 
to  Great  Britain  on  the  death  of  Count  Benckendorff,  a 
position  he  never  actually  took  up,  and  persons  inclined  to 
agree  with  his  opinion,  explained  how  they  understood  the 
future  building-up  of  Poland  and  her  role  as  a  component 
part  of  the  Russian  Empire.     Several  understood  this  au- 


312  FIRST  SIGNS  OF  REVOLUTION       [ch.  xxiv 

tonomy  as  a  condition  giving  Poland  the  right  to  have  her 
own  troops;  others  pictured  to  themselves  a  future  Dual 
Kingdom,  somewhat  like  that  of  Austria-Hungary.  What 
specially  frightened  the  majority  of  these  people  was  that 
Free  Poland  would  fall  under  Germany's  influence,  and  thus 
react  to  the  detriment  of  Russian  interest. 

After  three  meetings  Prince  Golitzin  took  the  votes  of 
the  members  —  those  who  were  of  my  opinion,  those  who 
were  against.  The  majority  was  one  against  me.  Amongst 
my  opponents  was  General  Belaieff,  who  admitted  he  had 
voted  against  me  because  of  his  own  views  of  strategy. 
Later,  in  a  private  conversation,  he  agreed  with  my  opinion, 
but  in  the  Commission  he  never  again  discussed  the  matter, 
so  that  I  was  not  clear  as  to  which  opinion  he  favoured. 
The  Minister  of  the  Interior,  Protopopoff,  should  have  been 
a  member  of  the  Commission.  Just  before  the  meeting  I 
saw  him  in  Prince  Golitzin's  cabinet,  where  the  table  was 
ready  for  the  meeting,  but  when  M.  V.  Rodzianko  entered 
the  room  Protopopoff  turned  round  sharply  and  left  the 
room  by  another  door.  At  the  first  meeting  his  place  was 
unoccupied  and  on  the  following  days  he  sent  one  of  his 
Assistant  Ministers  instead.  To  my  astonishment,  when 
the  votes  were  being  counted,  this  Assistant  Minister,  de- 
clared that  Protopopoff,  whom  he  represented,  agreed  with 
my  view.  At  the  following  meeting,  the  date  for  which  was 
not  fixed,  however,  several  of  the  foremost  Polish  poli- 
ticians were  to  be  invited  so  that  they  might  express  the 
ambitions  and  plans  of  the  Poles,  even  if  only  they  were 
the  opinions  of  those  whom  they  represented.  This  meet- 
ing took  place  about  March  2nd.  As  is  now  known,  two 
weeks  later  there  occurred  the  Revolution  which  radically 
changed  the  hopes  and  the  possible  future  of  Poland. 

All  the  business  for  which  I  had  come  to  Petrograd  was 


1917]  FIRST  SIGNS  OF  REVOLUTION  313 

ended;  there  remained  the  journey  with  my  last  report  to 
the  Emperor  and  the  return  to  Headquarters.  Just  then 
I  received  a  telegram  from  General  Alexeieff  from  Sevasto- 
pol saying  that  he  was  much  Improved  In  health,  and  that 
he  expected  to  arrive  in  Mohileff  some  days  earlier  than  the 
termination  of  his  leave.  It  was  necessary  that  I  should 
be  at  Headquarters  before  Alexeieff,  so  that  I  could  hand 
everything  over  to  him,  and  acquaint  him  of  all  that  had 
taken  place  during  his  absence  and  also  tell  him  what  had 
been  commenced  or  notified  but  was  not  yet  completed. 

On  February  26th,  the  Imperial  Duma  was  to  be  opened 
after  two  months'  cessation  of  work.  In  Duma  circles  up 
to  the  last  minute  hope  had  not  been  lost  that  on  the  day 
of  the  opening  there  would  be  a  change  In  the  composition 
of  the  Ministerial  Council,  and  they  specially  waited  and 
hoped  for  the  resignation  of  Protopopoff.  The  time  grew 
nearer,  and  the  awaited  Imperial  decree  did  not  appear. 
At  the  beginning  of  February,  before  the  Session  was 
opened,  Rodzianko  attempted  to  obtain  an  audience  with  the 
Emperor,  but  received  no  reply.  Several  days  prior  to  the 
opening  of  the  Session  he  again  petitioned  for  the  same 
thing,  but  for  two  days  did  not  receive  any  reply,  and  there- 
fore feared  he  would  be  unable  to  have  an  audience  of  the 
Emperor  and  that  he  would  not  have  the  opportunity  of 
communicating  his  fears  as  to  the  conditions  under  which 
the  work  of  the  Duma  would  be  conducted.  At  dinner  at 
the  English  embassy,  Rodzianko  explained  to  me  his  ap- 
prehensions on  the  matter.  I  promised  that  when  making 
my  report  to  the  Emperor  next  day  I  would  clear  it  up. 
On  the  following  day,  after  I  had  reported,  Rodzianko  re- 
ceived an  Invitation  to  come  to  the  palace.  But  Rodzianko 
was  not  satisfied  with  his  conversation  with  the  Emperor, 
as  he  was  unable  to  satisfy  himself  that  the  Emperor  was 


314  FIRST  SIGNS  OF  REVOLUTION       [ch.  xxiv 

Inclined  to  meet  the  wishes  of  the  Duma.  On  February 
24th,  In  the  evening,  knowing  that  next  day  I  had  again 
to  report  to  the  Emperor,  Rodzlanko  came  to  me  at  my 
hotel  and  our  conversation  continued  until  two  o'clock  In 
the  morning.  When  saying  "  good  night  "  I  promised  him 
to  speak  again  to  the  Emperor  and  to  ask  him  to  fulfil  the 
wishes  of  what  was  called  the  "  Bloc." 

The  meeting  of  the  leaders  of  the  party  and  the  more 
Important  and  Influential  members  of  the  Imperial  Duma 
and  the  Imperial  Council  was  called  the  "  Bloc."  Their 
actual  wishes  at  that  time  were  very  modest.  They  asked 
that  the  Emperor  would  Issue  a  decree  before  the  opening 
of  the  Session,  empowering  Alexander  Trepoff  to  fonn  a 
Cabinet  of  Ministers  of  his,  Trepoff's,  own  choice,  and 
further,  that  this  Cabinet  should  be  responsible,  not  to  the 
Duma,  but  to  the  Emperor.  There  was  still  sufl'icient  time. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  Session  this  decree  would  have  been 
known,  and  the  Duma  would  have  commenced  Its  sittings 
under  entirely  different  conditions.  That  I  was  not  a 
stranger  In  Duma  circles  the  Emperor  knew  quite  well.  He 
knew  this  by  what  outside  people  told  him,  and  also  from 
myself  personally  for  the  following  reason. 

Count  Frederlks,  first  through  a  third  person,  and  then 
Individually,  warned  me  that  there  were  people  who,  while 
talking  with  the  Emperor,  coupled  my  name  with  that  of 
A.  J.  Goutchkoff.  I  must  say  that  there  had  been  a  time 
In  the  years  following  the  Revolution  of  1905  when  the 
Emperor  delegated  authority  to  Goutchkoff  and  even  com- 
manded his  presence  and  consulted  with  him  on  various 
questions  of  Internal  politics,  but  from  19 10  there  were 
some  people  who  assured  the  Emperor  that  Goutchkoff  was 
the  most  dangerous  member  of  the  Duma  and  possibly  an 
enemy  to  the  Monarchy  and  Dynasty.     I  told  Count  Fred- 


I9I7]  FIRST  SIGNS  OF  REVOLUTION  315 

eriks  then  that  I  should  have  a  conversation  with  the  Em- 
peror on  the  point.  I  decided  on  this,  only  because  I 
thought  it  harmful  to  national  affairs  to  have  a  change  of 
Chief  of  Staff  just  then,  and  also  because  I  wished  at  any  rate 
to  keep  the  business  in  my  hands  until  such  time  as  Alexeieff 
had  quite  recovered  and  was  able  to  return  to  his  duties, 
which  was  not  far  off. 

The  people  who  connected  my  name  with  Goutchkoff's 
had  a  sufficient  reason  for  doing  so,  and  the  reason  was  this: 
At  the  opening  Session  of  the  Third  Duma  in  1907  and  at 
the  commencement  of  its  legislative  work,  there  was  formed 
what  was  called  a  Commission  of  State  Defence  made  up  of 
members  of  the  Centre  and  Right  wing  of  the  Duma.  The 
majority  of  these  people,  as  far  as  military  defence  was  con- 
cerned, had  very  vague  ideas.  The  elected  President  was 
A.  J.  Goutchkoff,  and  what  may  be  termed  his  alter  ego, 
A.  J.  Zviagintseff,  was  also  made  a  member.  Zviagintseft' 
was  a  former  officer  on  the  General  Staff.  Goutchkoff,  by 
his  intermediary,  made  me  an  offer;  I  was  to  gather  a  circle 
of  military  men  around  me,  people  of  my  own  choosing,  so 
as  to  help  the  Commission  to  look  through  and  discuss  all 
the  legislative  schemes  forwarded  to  the  Commission.  For 
discussing  the  schemes  the  more  influential  members  of  the 
Defence  Commission  were  to  be  included  in  my  circle  of 
experts.  Further,  Goutchkoff  asked  us  to  discuss  all  those 
radical  reforms  which  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  intro- 
duce into  the  War  Ministry  and  the  Army,  so  that  they 
might  recover  the  strength  which  had  been  shattered  at  the 
time  of  the  Manchurian  War,  Zviagintseff  warned  me  that 
in  case  I  refused  his  offer  he  would  have  no  option  but  to 
turn  for  help  to  those  people  whom  it  was  accustomed  to 
term  as  belonging  an  salon  des  refuses.  In  view  of  this  I 
did  not  think  I  had  the  right  to  reject  the  offer,  but  warned 


3i6  FIRST  SIGNS  OF  REVOLUTION       [ch.  xxiv 

•  • 

them  that  I  could  only  accept  it  if  I  reported  to  and  ob- 
tained the  consent  of  the  Minister  of  War,  at  that  time 
General  Rediger,  and  to  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff, 
then  General  Palitzin,  whose  duties  were  not  subject  to  the 
Minister  for  War,  while  I  was  immediately  under  his  juris- 
diction, 

I  did  this,  not  so  much  for  my  own  sake,  as  to  avoid  re- 
ceiving a  refusal  from  those  persons  whom  I  intended  to 
include  in  my  Circle  to  help  the  Imperial  Duma.  In  time 
I  obtained  the  consent  of  the  Minister  of  War  and  General 
Palitzin,  the  same  who  took  General  Gilinsky's  post  as 
representative  of  the  Russian  Army  at  the  French  Head- 
quarters in  19 1 6.  The  Circle's  work  continued  during  the 
time  that  Goutchkoff  was  President  of  the  Commission  more 
than  two  years.  To  form  this  Circle  I  did  my  best  to  select 
people  whom  I  knew  intimately,  not  so  much  for  my  knowl- 
edge of  them  as  for  their  breadth  of  view  on  military  mat- 
ters. It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  amongst  these  was  General 
Alexeieff,  later  Chief  of  Staff  at  Headquarters.  Of  the 
ten  to  twelve  men  that  took  part  in  the  Circle's  work,  the 
majority  of  them  occupied  important  military  posts  during 
the  war.  I  will  not  name  them,  as  I  do  not  think  it  would 
interest  those  who  may  read  these  lines. 

As  time  went  on  the  Circle's  work  became  known,  reports 
were  circulated  concerning  it,  and  some  people  christened 
us  "  Young  Turks."  But  if  the  War  Ministry  and  the  Rus- 
sian Government  had  carried  out  those  principles  which  were 
the  "  Corner  Stone  "  of  the  work  of  this  Circle,  and  even 
if  the  measures  had  been  accepted,  then  perhaps  Russia 
would  not  now  have  been  in  the  sorrowful  condition  in  which 
she  is.  The  basic  idea  was  the  creation  of  a  full  inde- 
pendence for  Russia  in  the  working  out  of  all  that  was 
necessary  for  the  carrying-on  of  the  European  War.      But 


1917]  FIRST  SIGNS  OF  REVOLUTION  317 

for  this,  enormous  expenditure  would  be  demanded,  and  the 
Russian  financial  policy  at  that  time  had  as  Its  chief  aim 
the  filling-up  of  the  cellars  with  gold  and  the  decreasing  of 
the  expenditure  In  connection  with  defence  as  much  as  pos- 
sible. When  I  told  the  Emperor  all  about  this,  he,  whilst 
I  was  placing  before  him  my  Ideas  on  the  desirability  of 
Russia  having  full  independence  In  war  Industries,  inter- 
rupted me  with  the  words  "  Yes,  that  is  exactly  what  I  have 
always  suggested."  To  this  I  had  to  reply  that  I  was  sorry 
to  say  his  ministers  had  not  only  disregarded  his  suggestion, 
but  had  no  intention  of  carrying  It  out. 

Having  placed  all  this  before  the  Emperor,  I  added,  as 
to  my  present  relations  with  Goutchkoff,  that  I  had  occasion 
to  meet  him  at  the  front  in  19 15  In  his  capacity  as  Chief  of 
the  Red  Cross. 

But  at  this  visit  to  Petrograd  evidently  Goutchkoff  him- 
self, understanding  that  his  name  was  being  connected  with 
a  clear  opposition  to  the  Government,  had  not  thought  it 
necessary  to  invite  me  to  his  house,  nor  had  he  even  visited 
me.  During  all  the  time  I  had  been  here  I  had  seen  him 
but  once,  and  then  on  neutral  ground,  In  a  private  house. 
Although  I  did  not  mention  to  the  Emperor  the  names  of 
those  who  were  In  the  Circle  with  me,  still  it  seemed  to  me 
as  If  the  Emperor  had  had  his  thoughts  and  suspicions  of 
me  dispelled.  At  the  commencement  of  our  conversation 
the  Emperor  confirmed  the  fact  that  people  had  actually 
spoken  to  him  about  me  connecting  my  name  with  Goutch- 
koff. On  February  25th,  having  finished  my  report,  I 
touched  upon  the  question  of  the  united  work  of  Protopopoff 
and  the  Duma.  I  did  my  best  to  persuade  the  Emperor 
that  an  entire  change  of  Ministry  was  at  times  unavoidable, 
if  its  labours  were  not  in  line  with  his  views.  But  in  case 
the  ministers  are  chosen  quite  at  haphazard  the  decisions  of 


3i8  FIRST  SIGNS  OF  REVOLUTION       [ch.  xxiv 

Imperial  questions  are  subject  to  the  accidental  presence  at 
meetings  of  the  Ministerial  Council  of  this  or  that  Min- 
ister or  his  assistants  or  to  the  absence  of  others.  Under 
such  conditions  the  Imperial  ship  could  not  keep  on  the  one 
course,  but  would  be  like  a  ship  without  a  rudder,  left  to  the 
mercy  of  wind  and  waves.  And  if  I  referred  to  Trepoff's 
name  and  not  to  another,  it  was  only  because  the  Emperor 
was  evidently  satisfied  with  Trepoff,  and  in  him  we  had  a 
person  with  the  greatest  influence  amongst  all  the  members 
of  the  Duma  and  Council.  The  Emperor  listened  to  me  at- 
tentively to  the  end,  and  at  different  aspects  agreed  with 
me,  but  actually  gave  me  no  reply. 

Succeeding  days  showed  that  the  influence  of  Protopopoff 
and  others  had  been  the  stronger.  The  Duma  Session  com- 
menced, but  the  Government  made  no  programme  speech. 
Protopopoff  did  not  go  to  the  meetings.  The  Duma  atmos- 
phere became  still  more  threatening.  To  clear  this  atmos- 
phere the  Government  sent  the  Minister  of  Agriculture, 
Rittich,  to  the  Duma.  He  drew  up  a  plan  of  the  united 
work  of  the  Government  organisations  and  the  public  in- 
stitutions, work  which  was  in  full  progress  and  from  all 
points  of  view  gave  hope  of  satisfying  the  food  demands  of 
the  Army,  the  capitals,  the  workpeople,  those  engaged  on 
defence  work.  Generally  Rittich  was  met  by  the  Duma 
with  a  favourable  feeling.  All  the  same  this  did  not  dis- 
solve the  conflict  between  the  Duma  and  the  Government. 
Whilst  in  Petrograd  in  my  spare  time  I  strove  to  become 
acquainted  with  the  current  of  thought  amongst  the  public, 
and  partly  also  with  the  ideas  of  the  leaders  of  the  Duma 
and  Council.  It  was  partly  for  this  purpose  that  my  elder 
brother,  a  member  of  the  Imperial  Council  and  also  of  the 
Inter-Parliamentary  "  Bloc,"  invited  the  foremost  people 
of  the  "  Bloc  "  and  Defence  Commission  to  dinner.     My 


1917]  FIRST  SIGNS  OF  REVOLUTION  319 

brother  was  also  a  member  of  the  Defence  Commission, 
which  was  presided  over  by  the  War  Minister.  It  was  the 
same  Defence  Commission  whose  activities  seemed  to  be 
too  much  encouraged  in  19 15  by  its  then  President,  the 
Minister  of  War,  General  PoHvanoff.  On  this  account  he 
was  represented  to  the  Emperor  in  a  bad  light,  which  re- 
sulted in  his  resigning  his  Ministerial  duties  not  long  after. 
I  must  say  that  the  harmful  work  Polivanoff  accomplished 
as  president  of  a  military  commission  that  elaborated  the 
so-called  "  rights  of  the  military  men  "  after  the  Revolution 
showed  that  the  Emperor  was  right.  Amongst  those  in- 
vited to  dinner  was  Goutchkoff,  the  President  of  the  War 
Industrial  Committee,  and  Shingareff,  at  one  time  Minister 
of  Agriculture  to  the  Temporary  Government,  later  mur- 
dered by  the  Bolsheviks,  after  arrest,  in  the  Fortress  of 
Peter  and  Paul.  There  was  also  Maklakoff,  the  last  Am- 
bassador sent  by  the  Temporary  Government  to  France. 

Members  of  the  other  parties  were  also  invited,  amongst 
them  being  Prince  Lobanoff,  known  to  London  and  Paris 
as  a  member  of  the  Legislative  Delegation  which  visited 
Allied  countries'  capitals  in  19 15.  There  was  also  the 
Duma  member  Shoulgin,  the  only  one  at  the  Moscow  meet- 
ing in  August  19 17,  among  the  speakers  who  had  the 
courage  to  testify  that  he  had  been,  and  remained,  a  Mon- 
archist. 

There  was  no  doubt  that  the  public  in  the  capital  was 
both  troubled  and  dissatisfied  with  the  Government  work 
in  the  interior.  This  in  its  turn  had  affected  the  proper 
supplying  of  the  Army,  and  threatened  that  this  supply 
would  not  fully  satisfy  the  needs  of  the  Army  and  the 
population.  Especially  threatening  was  the  work  of  the 
railways,  which  was  considerably  complicated  by  the  dif- 
ficulties of  upkeep   and  continuous  breaking-down   of   the 


320  FIRST  SIGNS  OF  REVOLUTION       [ch.  xxiv 

rolling-stock.  If  this  was  not  remedied  it  was  feared  that 
the  railways  would  not  be  strong  enough  to  fulfil  the  mini- 
mum demanded  by  the  country  and  Army.  Many  foresaw 
a  Revolution  when  the  war  finished  If  the  Government  con- 
tinued as  It  was.  But,  of  course,  even  at  that  time  nobody 
had  any  idea  that  the  Revolution  would  turn  out  as  it  ac- 
tually did.  The  fear  was  that  when  demobilisation  took 
place  there  would  be  riots  in  agricultural  centres,  and  in 
towns,  when  the  return  of  workmen  would  upset  the  equi- 
librium between  the  demand  and  supply  of  labour  in  the  in- 
dustrial centres.  To  those  people  with  whom  I  held  any 
discussion,  possibly  nothing  was  known  of  what  was  hap- 
pening In  the  industrial  centres,  and  what  kind  of  propa- 
ganda was  circulating  In  workmen's  circles.  Neither  was 
I  aware  of  what  took  place  there,  but  it  may  be  supposed 
that  everything  was  not  quiet,  because  it  was  at  this  time 
that,  by  orders  from  Protopopoff,  the  Petrograd  police,  as 
we  learnt  after  the  Revolution,  were  being  trained  in  the 
use  of  machine  guns.  Clearly  the  Government  could  not 
reckon  on  the  Petrograd  garrison's  loyalty,  though  this  gar- 
rison had  reached  the  unusual  number  of  160,000.  In 
peace  time  the  garrison  In  the  capital  never  even  reached 
40,000.  Evidently  at  Protopopoflf's  request,  the  Emperor 
once  Instructed  me  to  send  to  Petrograd,  for  a  rest,  two 
cavalry  divisions  which  were  to  include  one  Guards  division 
from  the  Special  Army.  From  inquiries  I  made  of  Gen- 
eral Habaloff,  the  commandant  of  the  district  troops,  I 
ascertained  that  there  was  no  place  In  which  a  regiment 
could  be  quartered,  much  less  a  division.  Then  the  Em- 
peror confined  himself  to  sending  for  a  Naval  Marine 
Guards  detachment  from  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea  and 
quartering  them  in  the  villages  around  Tsarskoe  Selo. 
I  do  not  know  on  whose  initiative,  but  by  the  Emperor's 


1917]  FIRST  SIGNS  OF  REVOLUTION  321 

personal  instructions  to  the  Minister  of  War  was  formulated 
a  scheme  for  detaching  Petrograd  and  its  suburbs  from  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  northern 
front,  General  Russky,  and  bringing  it  under  the  jurisdiction 
of  a  new  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Petrograd  District 
who  was  directly  responsible  to  the  Minister  of  War. 
There  was  nothing  harmful  in  this  from  a  military  stand- 
point; on  the  contrary  it  even  eased  General  Russky's  re- 
sponsibilities. Consequently  from  my  side  there  could  be 
no  objection  to  this  change,  the  more  so  as  the  interests  of 
the  northern  front  rear  would  be  watched  in  agreement  with 
General  Russky's  wishes. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

THE    REVOLUTION ABDICATION    OF    THE    EMPEROR 

On  the  eve  of  my  departure  I  journeyed  down  for  the 
last  time  to  report  to  the  Emperor,  and  at  this  visit  I 
found  when  he  intended  coming  to  Headquarters.  I  in- 
formed him  of  the  telegram  I  had  received  from  General 
Alexeieff  that  he  expected  to  arrive  in  Mohileff  about  March 
5th.  The  Emperor  had  not  been  informed  as  to  how 
Alexeiefif's  illness  had  been  progressing  and  he  expressed 
astonishment  and  a  doubt  whether  the  General  would  be 
sufficiently  recovered  to  undertake  the  strenuous  labours 
which  had  broken  down  his  health.  I  was  able  to  allay 
the  Emperor's  fear,  as  some  time  before  I  had  received  de- 
tailed information  of  the  state  of  General  Alexeieff' s  health. 
Learning  from  the  Emperor  that  he  proposed  to  arrive 
at  Headquarters  about  March  7th,  I  told  him  that  possibly 
he  would  still  find  me  there,  as  I  should  require  some  days 
to  hand  over  to  General  Alexeieff  and  go  into  matters  with 
him.  I  think,  however,  that  the  Emperor  was  not  certain 
of  being  able  to  leave  Tsarskoe  Selo  on  that  day,  as  on  say- 
ing good-bye  he  thanked  me  for  the  work  we  had  done 
together.  Leaving  Petrograd  it  never  entered  my  head  ,  y 
that  two  weeks  would  not  pass  before  the  city  would  be  the  ' 
scene  of  events  which  would  bear  world-wide  significance.  ' 
On  the  day  of  my  arrival.  General  Alexeieff  returned  to 
Mohileff.  Very  much  tanned  by  the  Southern  sun,  he  did 
not  give  the  impression  of  a  man  who  had  been  within  a 

322 


I9I7]  THE  REVOLUTION  323 

hair's  breadth  of  death  some  months  earlier.  Although  an 
official  welcome  had  been  cancelled,  nevertheless  the  plat- 
form of  the  railway  station  was  crowded  with  his  colleagues 
and  subordinates  who  had  come  to  welcome  him.  In  this 
one  could  see  how  he  was  loved  and  respected  by  all  those 
surrounding  him.  I  knew  that  whilst  he  was  In  the  Crimea 
there  were  people  who  alleged  that  in  several  of  my  actions 
I  indicated  a  desire  to  undermine  his  authority,  and  to  get 
my  temporary  post  confirmed.  These  people  tried  to  cre- 
ate distrust  and  estrangement  by  asserting  that  I  took  his 
opinions  into  account  insufficiently,  and  that  I  was  doing 
everything  from  my  own  personal  standpoint.  As  proof 
they  brought  forward  the  Incident  that  when  Alexeleff  asked 
me  to  get  the  Emperor's  sanction  for  an  extension  of  leave 
for  two  weeks,  so  that  he  might  complete  the  cure  the  doc- 
tors had  ordered  him,  I  had  asked  the  Emperor  for  a  whole 
month.  Of  course  these  people  did  not  know  that,  simul- 
taneously, I  had  written  to  Alexeleff  that  this  would  not  pre- 
vent him,  health  permitting,  returning  to  Headquarters 
earlier  than  the  time  extended,  earlier  even  than  the  two 
weeks.  I  do  not  know  whether  all  this  made  any  impression 
on  Alexeleff,  but  in  any  case  It  was  sufficient  for  us  to  have 
a  short  conversation  In  order  to  eradicate  any  idea  that  he 
might  have  gained  from  such  rumours. 

In  the  course  of  two  days  I  had  laid  everything  before 
him  and  we  left  each  other  on  as  friendly  terms  as  we  had 
ever  been.  Immediately  afterwards  I  telegraphed  to  the 
Emperor  reporting  that  everything  had  been  given  over,  and 
asking  permission  to  leave  for  my  regular  post,  as  news 
had  been  received  that  the  day  for  the  Emperor's  departure 
had  not  been  fixed.  On  the  same  day  I  received  the  Em- 
peror's sanction  to  return  to  the  Special  Army.  Actually 
the  Emperor  arrived  at  Mohllefif  less  than  twenty-four  hours 


324  THE  REVOLUTION  [ch.  xxv 

after  my  departure.  At  my  last  interview  with  the  Em- 
peror I  asked  permission  for  three  weeks'  leave,  as  for  pri- 
vate reasons  I  wished  to  go  to  the  Northern  Caucasus. 
In  giving  me  the  permission  the  Emperor  supposed  that  I 
would  start  straight  away  from  Headquarters,  but  this  was 
not  my  intention.  I  preferred  to  return  to  my  army  for  two 
weeks,  to  see  how  all  the  instructions  I  had  given  at  the 
beginning  of  November  had  been  fulfilled,  and  to  give  new 
orders  before  starting  on  my  leave.  When  I  was  called  to 
Headquarters  from  Lutsk  I  was  almost  on  the  eve  of  leav- 
ing for  the  Caucasus.  I  journeyed  through  Kieff,  and  as  my 
train  stopped  there  I  thought  it  my  duty  to  drive  to  visit 
the  Dowager  Empress,  because  all  this  time  I  had  been  di- 
rectly associated  with  her  son.  I  was  informed  by  tele- 
phone that  Her  Majesty  would  receive  me  at  twelve  o'clock 
noon.  Maria  Feodorovna  continued  to  be  at  the  head  of 
the  Red  Cross  organisation,  interesting  herself  with  the 
duties  of  every  department,  and  personally  directing  the 
work.  Naturally  the  conversation  mainly  touched  on  these 
affairs.  The  malicious  matters  of  the  day,  problems  which 
were  troubling  all  Russia,  and  home  politics,  she  barely  re- 
ferred to,  and  I,  on  my  part,  preferred  not  to  mention  them. 
Later  I  paid  a  visit  to  Prince  Shervashidzy,  one  of  her 
suite,  with  whom  I  went  in  to  lunch  with  the  Empress. 
There  were  covers  for  four.  Evidently  Prince  Sherva- 
shidzy and  Princess  Koutouzoff,  the  demoiselle  d'honneiir 
of  the  Empress,  were  the  usual  companions  Her  Majesty 
had  at  dinner. 

Next  day  I  arrived  in  Lutsk  and  commenced  my  well- 
known  duties  on  the  same  day.  After  a  day  or  two  I  be- 
gan my  rounds  of  the  army  corps  and  positions,  so  that  in 
the  first  days  of  March  I  could  take  my  leave.  Fate  again 
intervened  and  altered  my  plans.     Events  brewing  in  Petro- 


1 


I9I7]  THE  REVOLUTION  325 

grad  compelled  me  to  abandon  the  thought  of  leaving,  even 
for  a  short  time. 

The  first  news  of  what  had  taken  place  in  Petrograd,  '  \^ 
the  riots  and  bloodshedding  in  the  streets,  came  to  me  in  a 
telegram  sent  me  by  General  Brussiloff.  This  message, 
however,  was  couched  in  such  indefinite  terms,  although  it 
mentioned  the  bloodshed,  that  Major-General  Alexeieff,  my 
Chief  of  Staff,  when  he  brought  the  telegram  straight  from 
the  wires,  persuaded  me  to  speak  to  General  Suchomlin,  the 
Chief  of  Staff  at  the  front,  by  wire,  asking  him  to  communi- 
cate with  General  Brussiloff  telling  him  not  to  publish  this 
information  amongst  the  people  until  the  position  was  cleared 
up,  as  it  would  create  trouble  amongst  the  troops,  but  to 
wait  until  some  definite  news  had  been  received.  I  agreed 
with  Alexeieff  that  in  such  cases  the  worst  thing  was  to  give 
food  for  suspicion.  In  my  communication  with  Suchomlin 
he  asked  if  I  should  still  retain  that  opinion  if  the  news 
were  very  much  more  disquieting.  I  answered  that  in  that 
case  they  should  be  informed,  as,  sooner  or  later,  truth  will 
come  out.  An  hour  later  instructions  came  for  the  wire  to 
be  held  back,  as  another  would  be  received  in  its  stead,  giv- 
ing definite  information  from  the  "  Stafka." 

This  telegram  was  brought  to  me  in  the  middle  of  the 
night;  it  was  certainly  quite  definite.  In  it  was  stated  that 
the  Emperor  had  abdicated  for  himself  and  his  son,  and 
that  the  right  to  the  throne  had  gone  in  favour  of  his  brother 
Michael.  However  alarming  the  rumours  were,  in  private 
conversations  between  the  Army  Staff  and  the  Staff  at  the 
front,  there  was  no  reason  to  presume  such  a  radical  up- 
heaval. I  immediately  gave  orders  that  all  the  command- 
ers of  army  corps  were  to  be  invited  to  come  to  me  in  the 
morning.  By  noon  they  had  all  arrived,  and  I  instructed 
them  in  the  manner  they  were  to  impart  the  news  to  the 


326  THE  REVOLUTION  [ch.  xxv 

men  before  they  could  learn  It  from  private  sources.  We 
had  to  ensure  that  the  news  was  given  to  the  troops  direct 
by  their  chiefs,  who  were  to  explain  that  abdication  is  the 
Will  of  the  Monarch,  and  that  we  were  bound  by  the  oath 
we  had  taken  to  fulfil  his  will.  But  just  before  the  com- 
manders arrived,  a  telegram  came,  asking  us  to  withhold 
the  public  announcement  of  the  Tsar's  abdication  manifesto. 
Hopes  were  at  once  aroused  that  perhaps  events  had  taken 
another  direction.  But  the  commanders  were  still  sitting 
with  me  when  telegraph  ribbons  in  pieces  were  brought  to 
me  from  which  we  learnt  that  events  were  certainly  moving, 
but  not  exactly  as  we  had  hoped.  The  next  wire  informed 
us  of  the  Grand  Duke  Michael's  refusal  to  be  his  brother's 
successor,  before  the  will  of  the  People  could  be  expressed 
at  the  Constitutional  Assembly.  The  telegram  spoke  of 
the  arrival  in  a  short  time  of  the  Oath  of  Allegiance  to  the 
Russian  State  and  the  Temporary  Government. 

Having  added  my  instructions,  I  let  the  commanders  go, 
so  that  they  might  gather  their  subordinates  together  the 
same  day  and  be  ready  to  go  to  any  regiment  in  which  mis- 
understanding might  arise.  For  the  Oath  itself  we  had  to 
wait  for  the  text. 

Thanks  to  the  precautionary  measures  and  to  the  fact  that 
all  officers,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  took  a  lively 
part  In  explaining  to  their  people  what  had  taken  place,  the 
unexpected  news  and  the  Oath  were  received  throughout  the 
whole  Army  without  any  disturbances  and  called  forth  no 
excesses.  The  exceptions  were  one  field  and  one  Guards 
regiment,  where  it  was  more  troublesome  to  explain  matters 
to  the  soldiers.  An  agitator  explained  to  them  that  they 
should  not  take  the  Oath  under  the  shade  of  the  Standard 
on  which  remained  the  Initials  of  the  abdicated  Monarch, 
and  speak  the  words  of  the  Oath  in  which  occurred  the  word 


I9I7]  THE  REVOLUTION  327 

State,  a  word  having  connection  with  the  word  Monarch 
or  Tsar.  (In  Russian  the  word  State,  "  gosudarstvo,"  and 
Monarch,  "  gosudar,"  is  of  the  same  derivation.)  This 
only  shows  to  what  extent,  historically,  in  the  conception  of 
Russian  people,  the  meaning  of  State  and  Monarchy  is 
connected.  From  the  most  ancient  times  the  Russian  peo- 
ple had  no  thought  of  their  country  e>xept  as  a  State  at 
the  head  of  which  stands  the  Monarch.  But  the  men  were 
told  that,  even  now.  Republican  France  retains  the  name  of 
state  ("Gosudarstvo"). 

Another  case  was  exactly  the  opposite.  In  one  of  the 
Guards  infantry  regiments  the  men  refused  to  take  off 
Nicolai  IPs  initials  from  their  shoulder-straps.  In  each 
case  I  ordered  that  those  who  did  not  wish  to  take  the  Oath 
should  be  allowed  to  remain  outside  the  Oath;  let  those  who 
wished  to  retain  the  initials  do  so.  The  result  was  that 
the  men,  seeing  there  was  nothing  especially  important, 
took  the  Oath.  In  the  other  case  they  gradually  stopped 
using  the  initials.  By  this  time  the  Grand  Duke  Michael's 
Manifesto  had  been  received  in  which  he  gave  his  reason 
for  refusing  the  throne.  It  was  necessary  to  publish  both 
manifestos  to  the  troops  and  population.  Publishing  these 
for  general  information,  I  used  printed  bills  which  were  put 
up  at  all  frequented  points.  I  commended  my  order  to 
the  troops  "  Fulfilling  the  Holy  Will  of  God's  Anointed 
Monarch,"  etc.,  etc.,  and  in  the  order  I  invited  them  to 
take  example  from  the  Emperor,  who  had  preferred  to 
abdicate  from  the  throne  rather  than  permit,  at  a  time  when 
the  Empire  should  gather  all  its  strength  for  the  fight 
with  the  external  enemy,  the  arising  of  an  internecine  strug- 
gle, and  the  inevitable  shedding  of  a  brother's  blood.  Fur- 
ther I  told  them  to  take  the  Oath  and  serve  their  Fatherland 
as  faithfully  as  they  had  served  under  the  guidance  of  th? 


328  THE  REVOLUTION  [ch.  xxv 

Oath  they  had  taken  to  the  Tsar  who  had  just  abdicated. 
Up  to  now  everything  was  going  smoothly  amongst  the 
troops.  No  special  disturbances  took  place  when  the  fa- 
mous order  number  one  was  received,  the  order  that  was 
written  and  published  by  the  Petrograd  Soviet  of  Workmen 
and  Soldiers'  Deputies.  Later  was  received  the  explana- 
tion from  the  new  Minister  of  War,  A.  J.  Goutchkoff, 
wherein  he  stated  that  this  order  appertained  only  to  the 
Petrograd  garrison.  But  as  time  went  on  agitators  were 
found  amongst  the  troops  who  explained  the  injustice  of 
such  a  partially  distributed  order  to  the  soldiers  —  an  order 
which  not  only  affected  the  soldiers  who  had  never  smelt 
powder  and  lived  quietly  in  the  capital.  The  simultaneous 
publication,  by  both  the  Temporary  Government  and  the 
Petrograd  Soviets,  of  the  gift  to  the  whole  of  Russia  of 
every  possible  freedom  also  produced  its  active  effect.  I 
had  to  reckon  with  an  accomplished  fact  and  strive  to  keep 
the  initiative  in  my  hands.  Amongst  the  Lutsk  garrison, 
composed  mainly  of  rear  organisations,  meetings  began  to 
be  called  by  people  chosen  for  this  purpose  from  amongst 
these  organisations.  Gradually  these  were  added  to  by 
those  chosen  from  the  neighbouring  fighting  units.  It  re- 
mained for  us  to  send  soldiers  and  officers  to  take  part  so 
as  to  lead  the  meetings  on  a  straight  course,  and,  so  far  as 
possible,  to  endeavour  to  manoeuvre  some  clever  and  modest 
people  into  the  circle  of  those  who  would  be  authorised  to 
prepare  the  rules  by  which  such  meetings  would  be  directed. 
Personally  I  proposed  to  attend  only  when  an  emergency 
required  it,  although  I  had  already  had  occasion  to  speak  to 
the  crowd  from  the  steps  of  the  town  cathedral,  where  I 
had  gone  to  attend  a  memorial  service  for  those  killed  in 
the  first  days  of  the  Revolution.  The  crowd  consisted 
mostly  of  soldiers  from  non-combatant  units.     I  already 


I9I7]  THE  REVOLUTION  329 

found  an  organised  meeting.  One  of  the  speakers  men- 
tioned my  name,  though,  in  a  way  flattering  to  me,  and  this 
compelled  me  to  break  in  and  address  the  crowd. 

To  the  first  meetings  of  those  chosen  by  the  Lutsk  gar- 
rison I  was  fully  able  to  give  audience.  A  scheme  for  a 
statute  for  such  meetings  was  placed  before  me,  together 
with  the  rules  for  the  election  of  members,  and  it  was 
slightly  altered  by  me.  But  I  already  found  a  point  in  it 
according  to  which  this  project  only  came  into  force  if  con- 
firmed by  me,  and  that  no  determination  of  a  meeting  of 
men  belonging  to  the  Army  would  have  legal  force  other 
than  by  my  confirmation.  When  this  was  accepted  it  was 
sent,  signed  by  me,  with  "  Confirmed  "  written  on  the  mar- 
gin. According  to  this  statute  two  weeks  later  was  gath- 
ered the  first  conference  of  Officer  and  Soldier  Deputies. 
I,  however,  had  already  left  Lutsk  for  Minsk  to  take  up  the 
command  of  the  troops  on  the  western  front.  The  statute 
finally  accepted  at  this  meeting  was  confirmed  by  General 
Baloueff,  who  took  my  place.  It  was  characteristic  that 
when  the  chosen  civilians  from  various  public  organisations 
came  to  the  first  meeting  (they  were  working  for  the  troops) , 
they  were  informed  that  their  presence  at  the  meeting  was 
not  desirable,  and  they  had  to  leave.  One  of  the  first  acts 
of  the  Lutsk  meeting  —  this  was  while  I  was  yet  there  — 
was  to  choose  Deputies  who  were  to  be  sent  to  Petrograd 
to  demand  from  the  Soviet  (Workmen's  and  Soldiers' 
Deputies)  that  they  were  not  to  interfere  in  the  domain 
of  the  policy  of  the  Temporary  Government,  to  which  the 
Army  had  taken  the  Oath,  and  whom  they  trusted.  Later, 
more  cautious  opinions  triumphed  and  the  delegates  were 
authorised  to  ascertain  whether  the  Soviets  were  actually 
interfering  with  the  Government  activity  or  whether  this 
was  only  rumour.      Besides  this  they  were  authorised  to  ask 


330  THE  REVOLUTION  [ch.  xxv 

the  Soviets  several  questions  —  for  instance,  "  Was  it  true 
that  the  Petrograd  garrison  up  to  now  had  not  taken  the 
Oath  of  Allegiance  to  the  Temporary  Government?  "  It  is 
quite  clear  that  immediately  after  the  Revolution,  and  for 
some  time  afterwards,  in  the  Army  the  authority  of  the  Tem- 
porary Government  was  regarded  as  superior  to  the  au- 
thority of  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Councils.  It  was 
much  later  than  this  that  the  official  Ambassadors  from  our 
Allies,  in  the  persons  of  Albert  Thomas,  who  had  been  in 
Russia  before  as  a  Minister  of  France  during  the  time  of 
the  former  Government,  Arthur  Henderson  from  England, 
M.  Vandervelde  from  Belgium,  and  Senator  Root  from 
America,  amongst  other  things  announced  that  they  had 
come  mainly  to  welcome  the  Soviets.  It  was  only  after 
this  that  the  authority  of  the  Chosen  Councils  was  gradu- 
ally raised  and,  parallel  with  this,  the  authority  of  the  Tem- 
porary Government  fell.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
from  the  very  beginning  of  the  Revolution  there  was  a 
smothered  struggle  between  these  two  institutions  of  which 
we  heard  only  rumours.  Later  came  rivalry  and  then  open 
enmity,  in  other  words  a  fight  for  power.  And  then  the 
Soviets  resorted  to  force,  disorganised  force,  but  one  that 
they  still  held  in  their  hands.  The  Temporary  Government 
also  resorted  to  force,  a  more  real  one,  the  Army,  but  this 
force  could  give  them  no  assistance  on  the  spot.  Perhaps 
the  main  error  of  the  Temporary  Government  consisted  in 
that  it  did  not  change  its  place  of  residence  and  go  where 
it  would  not  have  been  under  the  pressure  of  the  workmen 
and  soldiers'  mobs. 

It  was  only  considerably  later  that  we  received  details 
of  the  way  in  which  the  Revolution  had  been  carried  out, 
I  can  describe  briefly  its  main  phases.  The  first  disturbance 
arose  in  Petrograd,  not  so  much  in  consequence  of  the  an- 


I9I7]  THE  REVOLUTION  33i 

nouncement  of  the  closing  of  the  Duma,  as  to  the  circula- 
tion of  rumours  that  famine  threatened  Petrograd  on  ac- 
count of  an  insufficiency  of  flour  in  the  warehouses.  As  a 
fact,  owing  to  the  snowdrifts  in  the  South  of  Russia,  several 
trainloads  of  flour  were  held  up,  and  in  Petrograd  there 
was  some  kind  of  delay  in  the  flour  being  given  out  to  the 
bakeries.  Later  it  was  ascertained  that  in  the  town  there 
was  no  special  shortage  in  flour.  However,  in  these  cases 
it  is  not  so  important  what  actually  is,  or  is  not,  as  what 
people  imagine.  Working  on  these  suppositions,  agitators 
called  the  people  out  into  the  streets  and  organised  demon- 
strations. The  local  authorities  did  not  dare  to  crush  the 
disturbances  by  force  of  arms.  Nevertheless,  part  of  the 
garrison  was  brought  into  the  streets  only  to  frighten  the 
mobs,  but  not  to  use  arms.  This  did  not  prevent  the 
agitators  —  bribed  by  money,  whence  obtained  is  not  ex- 
actly known  to  this  day —  from  carrying  out  their  nefarious 
work.  Probably  various  forces  having  different  ends  in 
view,  but  without  agreement,  were  working  in  the  one  di- 
rection. Only  some  future  historian  will  discover  those 
actually  guilty  of  these  first  disturbances. 

On  March  nth  a  detachment  of  the  Volynsky  Guards 
Regiment  was  sent  into  the  streets  to  quell  the  mobs.  With- 
out having  used  its  arms,  it  returned  in  the  evening  to  the 
barracks,  where  continuous  meetings  were  being  held. 
When  entering  the  barracks  it  got  a  hostile  reception,  and 
in  the  ensuing  fight  the  officer  commanding  the  detachment 
was  killed.  This  came  to  the  ears  of  the  secret  leaders  of 
the  movement,  and  that  night  Kerensky  and  Tchheidze  went 
to  the  Volynsky  Barracks.  Both  members  of  the  Imperial 
Duma  in  fiery  speeches  explained  to  the  soldiers  that  there 
was  no  drawing  back  for  them;  by  remaining  faithful  to  the 
Tsarist  regime  they  were  answerable  for  the  officer's  death. 


332  THE  REVOLUTION  [ch.  xxv 

« 

for  which  in  war-time  the  penalty  was  death,  but  if  they 
passed  over  to  the  Revokition  they  were  guaranteed  im- 
munity for  the  murder.  Next  day  the  Volynsky  Regiment, 
without  officers,  were  the  first  to  arrive  at  the  Imperial 
Duma  and  put  themselves  under  the  orders  of  people  de- 
sirous of  upsetting  the  Government.  In  Mohileff  on  March 
nth  news  had  already  been  received  of  the  disturbances 
commencing  in  Petrograd,  and  next  day  the  Emperor  left 
for  Tsarskoe  Selo,  where  his  family  and  the  Heir  Ap- 
parent (Naslednik)  were. 

It  is  possible  that  this  move  was  the  greatest  consequence 
of  what  followed.  The  Emperor's  journey,  instead  of  tak- 
ing one  night,  was  one  of  two  days.  For  two  days  he  was 
cut  off  from  Russia  and  was  prevented  from  having  any 
communication  with  either  the  governing  circles  or  with  the 
Army.  Evidently  the  railway  servants  were  in  close  touch 
with  the  initiators  of  the  Revolution  and  had  received  in- 
structions not  to  permit  the  Imperial  train  to  get  to  Petro- 
grad. Attempts  were  made  to  get  the  train  to  Petrograd 
by  way  of  several  lines,  but  at  all  points  it  was  stated  that 
the  line  was  not  clear.  After  being  stopped  at  Bologoi  on 
the  Nicolai  Railway,  the  Imperial  train  arrived,  on  March 
14th,  at  Pskoff,  where  General  Russky's  Staff  was  quartered. 
Getting  through  by  direct  lines  to  the  President  of  the 
Duma,  Rodzianko,  General  Russky  informed  him  that  the 
Emperor  was  issuing  a  Manifesto  in  which  he  was  instituting 
a  Ministry  responsible  to  the  legislative  institutions.  The 
answer  received  was  that  this  act  would  have  been  sufficient 
one  or  two  days  earlier;  that  events  had  moved  so  far,  that 
only  the  Emperor's  abdication  would  tranquillise  the  country. 
Next  day  Goutchkoff,  member  of  the  Imperial  Council,  and 
Shoulgin,  a  member  of  the  Duma,  arrived  in  Pskoff  from 


1917]  THE  REVOLUTION  333 

the  Duma  to  see  the  Emperor.     I  have  mentioned  these 
people  in  earlier  chapters. 

Knowing  for  what  purpose  they  had  come,  the  Emperor 
met  them  with  a  Manifesto  of  Abdication,  ready  prepared; 
in  this,  however,  it  did  not  state  that  the  abdication  included 
his  son.  The  Emperor  asked  the  delegates  whether  they 
could  answer  for  the  tranquillity  of  the  country  if  he  abdi- 
cated, and  would  undertake  that  affairs  would  go  on  better 
than  they  had  done  before.  A.  J.  Goutchkoff  gave  the 
Emperor  an  affirmatory  answer.  During  the  conversation 
the  Emperor  became  aware  that  to  abdicate  in  favour  of  his 
son  would  deprive  him  of  the  company  of  his  son,  and  he 
consequently  altered  his  decision  and  went  to  his  room. 
Returning  he  handed  Goutchkoff  the  altered  Manifesto  with 
changed  text,  in  which  he  abdicated  in  favour  of  his  brother 
Michael.  Such  a  turn  was  a  surprise  to  Goutchkoff  and 
Shoulgin,  but  they  admitted  that  all  that  was  left  for  them 
to  do  was  to  take  the  Manifesto,  and  return  with  it  to  the 
capital.  During  this  time  telegrams  were  being  exchanged 
between  General  Russky  and  General  Alexeieff  and  all  the 
other  Commanders-in-Chief.  General  Brussiloff,  true  to'\ 
his  opportunism,  took  it  without  objection  as  an  accomplished 
fact,  and  it  was  as  if  he  favoured  it.  General  Evert  de- 
clared, although  feebly,  against  the  abdication.  General 
Saharoff  commenced  his  telegram  with  expressions  of  loyalty, 
but  finished  by  stating  the  abdication  as  a  fact.  The  Grand 
Duke  Nicolai  acknowledged  that  this  was  the  Will  of  the 
Almighty,  and  asked  the  Tsar  to  accept  it  as  the  working 
of  Providence.  General  Russky  being  in  Pskoff  with  the 
Emperor,  as  far  as  is  known,  encouraged  him  in  his  decision 
to  abdicate.  Later  it  was  said  that  when  all  this  was  told 
to  the  Empress  Alexandra  Feodorovna  she  refused  to  be- 


334  THE  REVOLUTION  [ch.  xxv 

lieve  such  a  thing  could  be  possible.  After  having  abdi- 
cated, in  his  talk  with  Goutchkoff  and  Shoulgin,  the  Em- 
peror asked  them  if  they  could  guarantee  the  safety  of  him- 
self and  his  family,  and  whether  they  would  guarantee  him 
the  right  in  the  near  future,  and  before  the  close  of  the 
war,  to  leave  Russia  for  one  of  the  neutral  kingdoms.  To 
both  these  questions  the  Emperor  received  an  affirmative 
reply,  later  confirmed  by  the  Temporary  Government.  But 
as  is  now  known,  some  members  of  the  Workmen's  and 
Soldiers'  Soviets  —  the  names  are  not  known  —  declared 
themselves  not  bound  by  these  promises.  The  same  day  the 
Emperor  returned  to  Headquarters  in  his  own  train,  and 
received  the  usual  Army  reports  from  General  Alexeieff 
while  waiting  the  arrival  of  the  appointed  Generalissimo, 
the  Grand  Duke  Nicolai.  On  the  next  day  General  Al- 
exeieff was  obliged  to  ask  the  Emperor  not  to  receive  the 
reports.  The  Emperor  wished  to  go  the  rounds  of  the 
Staff,  and  take  leave  of  the  officers  who  had  helped  him 
in  his  work  as  Commander-in-Chief.  All  were  astonished 
at  the  calm  and  self-control  displayed  by  the  Emperor. 
One  might  have  thought  that  he  was  saying  good-bye,  not 
as  having  abdicated  from  the  throne,  but  only  at  the  natural 
close  of  their  united  work.  On  the  contrary  it  involuntarily 
caused  emotion  to  all  those  who  were  present  in  these  his- 
torical hours.  If  the  Emperor  had  occasion  to  speak  to 
those  serving  at  Headquarters  each  time  he  said  to  them 
that  they  were  to  serve  Russia  just  as  faithfully  as  they  had 
done  under  him.  The  Dowager  Empress  arrived  in  Mo- 
hileff  from  Kieff  to  bid  the  Emperor  farewell.  Witnesses 
of  their  interview,  of  course,  there  were  none,  but  standing 
even  in  front  of  their  nearest  friends  it  could  not  be  said 
that  their  meeting  appeared  to  have  been  under  conditions 
so  exceptional  and  so  sorrowful. 


I9I7]  THE  REVOLUTION  335 

All  this  time  the  waves  of  revolution  in  Petrograd  were 
rising  higher  and  higher.  The  hopes  of  those  people  who 
belonged  to  the  Duma,  and  who  had  hurriedly  organised 
what  was  called  the  Committee  of  Execution  of  the  Im- 
perial Duma  under  Rodzianko's  presidency,  had  made  a 
mistake  in  their  calculation  that  the  Emperor's  abdication 
would  quiet  affairs.  The  small  amount  of  bloodshed  had 
made  them  confident,  whereas  only  bloodshed  could  give  an 
outlet  for  the  awakened  passions.  The  repressed  passions 
of  the  population  tried  to  find  another  outlet.  But  the 
watchword  of  those  directing  the  upheaval  was  the  same  as 
ever.  "  The  Revolution  continues."  This  watchword  re- 
mained even  when  it  seemed  that  the  Revolution  had  at- 
tained all  it  possibly  could.  Neither  public  opinion  nor 
the  Press  nor  the  Governments  of  our  Allies  understood 
the  danger  which  threatened  the  retention  by  the  Russian 
Armies  of  their  fighting  capabilities  under  conditions  of  an 
internal  revolutionary  movement.  All  were  hypnotised, 
and  compared  the  Russian  Revolution  with  the  great  French  , 
Revolution.  Special  attention  was  given  to  the  successes  / 
of  the  French  arms  after  the  Revolution.  Such  a  com-  ^ 
parison  was  pardonable  for  the  crowd,  which  was  either  not 
acquainted  with,  or  had  not  taken  the  trouble  to  study, 
the  question  more  fundamentally.  They  had  forgotten 
that  in  France  the  wars  after  the  Revolution  were  the 
results  of  the  French  Revolution.  The  wars  were  under- 
taken to  protect  the  Revolution,  against  attempts  made  by 
the  neighbouring  powers.  In  Russia  the  reverse  was  the 
case,  as  the  Revolution  was  apparently  called  forth  by  the 
war.  Various  agitators,  partly  from  conscientious  motives, 
partly  for  money  paid  by  our  enemies,  explained  to  the 
soldiers  that  the  war  had  given  them  all  that  they  could 
expect.     The  main  idea  was  to  stop  the  war,  so  that  they 


336  THE  REVOLUTION  [ch.  xxv 

might  the  sooner  benefit  by  the  fruits  of  the  Revolution. 
If  the  French  Revolutionary  troops  were  victorious  over 
the  armies  of  the  Western  Powers  on  the  fields  of  Valmy 
and  Jemappes,  it  was  only  because  France's  western  neigh- 
bours gave  her  two  full  years  to  get  the  army  into  gradual 
order  in  organisation  and  military  training. 

One  must  admit  that  in  the  first  days  of  the  Russian 
Revolution  all  classes  of  the  Russian  public  received  it  with 
great  relief.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  coup  d'etat  had 
almost  been  bloodless  —  in  Moscow  not  one  drop  of  blood 
was  spilt  —  they  assumed  that  the  new  order  would  be 
introduced  without  trouble.  Everybody  believed  in  the 
healthy  mind  of  the  Russian  nation.  This  contentment  can 
easily  be  explained,  in  that  it  mainly  concerned  the  change  of 
order  in  the  Interior  policy.  The  same  joyfulness  was  ex- 
pressed by  the  Press  of  all  our  Allies.  The  reason  I  could 
not  quite  understand.  Several  days  after  the  upheaval  the 
Allies'  Press  must  have  become  acquainted  with  our  ene- 
mies' Press,  which,  also,  was  full  of  joy.  One  or  the  other 
of  them  evidently  was  mistaken. 

Petrograd  news  reached  us  a  day,  and  sometimes  two 
days  late.  But  the  papers  we  received  on  March  15th 
brought  the  information  that  rioting  crowds  were  bursting 
into  the  homes  of  all  the  more  or  less  well-known  statesmen 
of  the  old  regime,  and  were  confining  them  within  the  walls 
of  the  Peter  and  Paul  Fortress.  Amongst  these  so  made 
prisoners  were  some  I  knew  very  well  indeed,  who  had  no 
slur  on  their  good  name,  people  well  advanced  in  years. 
My  wife  had  arrived  in  Lutsk  with  the  intention  of  accom- 
panying me  on  my  holiday  to  the  Caucasus.  She  had  taken 
leave  from  her  work  in  the  front  first-aid  detachment  in 
General  Korniloff's  Army  Corps.  From  her  came  the  first 
idea  of  writing  to  the  Emperor  asking  him  to  use  his  influ- 


1917]  THE  REVOLUTION  337 

ence  for  the  people  confined  in  the  Fortress,  and  who  now 
faced  the  risk  of  becoming  the  victims  of  irresponsible 
crowds.  I  agreed  with  her,  and  by  March  17th  I  dispatched 
by  an  officer  a  letter  to  General  Alexeieff.  Three  days  later 
he  returned  with  a  letter  from  General  Alexeieff  in  answer 
to  mine.  In  this  latter  General  Alexeieff  wrote  me  that 
he  was  sorry  to  say  he  could  do  nothing  to  lighten  the  bur- 
den of  those  confined  in  the  fortresses.  Earlier  than  this  I 
had  received  a  telegram  from  the  Emperor  "  My  heart  is 
touched;  thank  you."     See  Appendix  II. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

THE    FIRST    EFFECTS    OF    THE    REVOLUTION 

Events  had  developed  with  unusual  rapidity  in  Petrograd 
between  March  12th  and  23rd.  Before  I  received  Gen- 
eral Alexeieff's  answer  and  the  telegram  from  the  Tsar,  it 
had  become  clear  to  me  that  the  Tsar  was  helpless  to  influ- 
ence the  Provisional  Government,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
the  President  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  was  Prince  Lvoff, 
who  had  been  appointed  to  this  post  by  the  Tsar. 

Soon  after  came  the  news  that  three  members  of  the 
Duma,  from  the  extreme  Left  Wing,  had  arrived  in  Mo- 
hileff  in  order  to  accompany  the  Tsar  to  Tsarskoe  Selo. 
Following  this  the  arrival  of  Grand  Duke  Nicolai,  who  had 
been  appointed  by  the  Tsar  as  his  successor  in  the  post  of 
Commander-in-Chief,  was  expected  at  General  Headquar- 
ters. It  was  thought  he  would  be  there  by  March  23rd, 
but  two  days  before  that,  at  the  request  of  the  leaders  of  the 
Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates,  the  head  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  Prince  Lvoff,  sent  a  special  officer  to 
meet  the  Grand  Duke  with  a  letter  in  which  he  informed  him 
of  the  decision  of  the  Provisional  Government.  The  latter 
did  not  agree  to  leave  him  at  the  head  of  the  Army  post, 
because  he  was  a  member  of  the  house  of  Romanoff,  and 
secondly  because  his  appointment  had  been  made  by  the 
Tsar.  It  was  an  irony  of  fate  that  obliged  Prince  Lvoff, 
who  was  himself  appointed  by  the  last  Ukaze  of  the  abdi- 
cating Tsar,  to  sign  this  very  letter.     The  officer  who  was 

338 


1917]  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION  339 

sent  missed  the  train  of  the  Grand  Duke,  and  arrived  at 
Mohileff  a  day  later. 

During  his  stay  at  the  General  Headquarters  the  Grand 
Duke  had  time  to  confirm  the  choice  of  General  Alexeieff  in 
making  me  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  western  front 
in  the  place  of  General  Evert,  whom  the  new  Minister  of 
War,  Goutchkoff,  proposed  to  dismiss  from  his  post.  This 
order  had  been  given  in  consequence  of  the  hostile  attitude 
of  General  Evert  towards  the  events  which  had  occurred, 
and  to  the  way  in  which  he  dealt  with  the  first  instructions 
of  the  Provisional  Government,  and  also  perhaps  because  of 
his  reputation  as  a  Military  Chief.  Rumours  had  already 
reached  us  that  the  Provisional  Government  intended,  as 
they  said,  to  rejuvenate  the  Army,  i.e.  to  change  all  the 
Chiefs  whom  they  considered  unsuitable  for  the  posts  then 
occupied  by  them.  But  the  question  was  what  criterion 
should  the  Provisional  Government  adopt  to  define  the 
ability  of  the  Chiefs,  as  it  had  no  direct  acquaintance  with 
their  respective  abilities.  There  could  be  only  one  criterion 
—  the  voice  of  the  people.  But  even  so,  how  were  the  peo- 
ple to  judge  of  the  capacity  even  of  the  superior  Military 
Chiefs,  when,  in  accordance  with  the  conditions  of  the 
military  censorship,  the  names  of  these  Military  Chiefs, 
with  rare  exceptions,  had  not  appeared  in  print? 

Having  received  the  telegram  notifying  my  appointment 
by  order  of  the  Grand  Duke  to  the  post  of  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  western  front,  I  had  not  had  time  to  give 
necessary  instructions  before  I  heard  that  the  Grand  Duke 
had  handed  over  his  own  post  to  General  Alexeieff,  and  had 
gone  to  the  South  of  the  Crimea.  I  noticed  that  the  date 
of  my  appointment  was  subsequent  to  that  of  the  letter  from 
Prince  Lvoff  in  which  the  Grand  Duke  was  called  upon  to 
resign.      I  replied  to  Alexeieff  that  I  did  not  consider  that 


340  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION       [ch.  xxvi 

I  could  accept  unless  I  had  the  confirmation  from  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  and  that,  until  such  time,  I  would  not 
come  to  Minsk.  The  Provisional  Government  wanted  nine 
days  for  the  decision,  and  that  is  why  I  arrived  at  Minsk 
only  about  April  2nd.  Such  a  delay,  during  days  when 
events  passed  with  awful  rapidity,  could  not  but  have  certain 
consequences.  When  I  was  leaving  the  Special  Army  the 
Acting  Committee  of  the  Army  Committee  asked  to  pre- 
sent to  me  an  address,  in  which  the  Army  Committee 
thanked  me  for  having  contributed  to  a  quiet  change  which 
had  converted  the  old  regime  of  the  Army  into  its  new 
state.  This  at  the  time  when  at  every  corner  of  the  streets 
in  Lutsk  were  posted  coloured  placards  in  which  I  spoke 
of  the  strict  execution  of  the  Holy  Will  of  the  Anointed 
Sovereign.  I  found  quite  another  picture  in  Minsk.  Gen- 
eral Evert  had  left  Minsk  about  two  weeks  before  and  the 
command  was  left  in  the  hands  of  a  temporary  substitute, 
who,  of  course,  had  not  the  authority  of  a  permanent  chief 
even  in  ordinary  times.  Still  less  was  it  so  during  the  first 
days  of  the  Revolution.  It  may  be  said  that  in  Minsk 
events  directed  the  actions  of  the  Chiefs,  and  were  not  dic- 
tated by  the  Chiefs,  nor  controlled  by  them.  In  the  town 
of  Minsk  there  was  already  established  a  Council  of  Work- 
men and  of  Soldiers'  Deputies  of  the  garrison  and  the  town 
itself.  Its  sittings  took  place  in  the  theatre,  and  were  at- 
tended by  400  members.  This  Council  was  presided  over 
by  one  Posner,  an  insignificant  local  authority  of  undefinable 
nationality,  who  described  himself  as  a  Social  Revolution- 
ary, and  who  later  was  consequently  chosen  for  the  Petro- 
grad  Soviet.  He  then  became  a  Bolshevik  of  extreme  con- 
victions. 

On  the  day  after  my  arrival  I  was  informed  that  the 
commander  of  one  of  the  fighting  corps  had  been  obliged 


191 7]  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION  341 

to  leave  it,  because  at  one  of  the  meetings  the  soldiers  ex-^ 
pressed  their  distrust  of  him.  A  real  desire  was  shown  to 
have  the  right  to  choose  the  superior  Chiefs.  This  right, 
which  had  been  given  to  the  Army  by  the  splendid  Ukaze 
No.  I  issued  by  the  Petrograd  Soviet,  previously  mentioned. 
But  by  the  instruction  of  the  Provisional  Government  it  was 
only  destined  for  the  troops  of  the  Petrograd  garrison.  I 
was  also  informed  of  other  instances  which  showed  that  in 
some  places  the  troops  had  not  grasped  what  had  been 
allowed  and  what  had  not  been  allowed,  what  was  lawful 
and  what  was  unlawful,  what  was  possible  to  permit  during 
war-time  and  what  was  not.  I  had  to  issue  an  order  at 
once  by  which  I  gave  amnesty  for  all  that  had  happened 
during  the  first  days  of  the  Revolution,  and  to  promise  not 
to  prosecute  all  the  guilty  who  had  broken  the  law.  On 
the  other  hand  I  declared  that  from  that  moment  the  mili- 
tary law  must  again  be  applied  and  that  no  further  breaches 
of  it  would  go  unpunished.  Of  course  I  recognised  that  in 
a  great  measure  this  threat  would  be  of  little  value,  as  the 
Provisional  Government  had  given  orders  abolishing  capital 
punishment  in  all  cases,  even  in  the  cases  of  enemy  spies 
who  were  caught  on  the  spot.  Still,  such  an  order  was  not 
without  its  results.  The  Chiefs  received  a  basis  upon  which 
they  could  rely  in  the  struggle  with  the  disorganisation  of  the 
Army.  It  cannot  be  said  that  unlawful  acts  quite  ceased,  but 
concerning  every  infringement  of  the  law  which  occurred  in 
any  unit  of  the  Army  I  issued  an  Order  of  the  Day  in  which 
I  gave  instructions  that  the  guilty  soldier  should  be  tried  by 
court  martial,  the  procedure  for  which  had  not  been  changed. 
Such  an  order  could  not  but  have  a  good  influence  on  those 
who  were  unsettled. 

But   the   greatest  struggle   of  the   Military   Chiefs   was 
against  separate  agitators  who  appeared  at  various  parts 


342  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION       [ch.  xxvi 

of  the  front  and  who  Incited  the  mass  of  soldiers  at  the 
meetings  to  destroy  the  internal  order  of  their  units,  and 
called  upon  them  to  be  insubordinate  to  the  Chiefs.  But  all 
my  repeated  demands  to  the  Provisional  Government,  that 
the  superior  Chiefs  should  be  given  the  right  to  send  such 
persons  away  from  the  fighting  lines,  were  left  unanswered. 
Unwillingly  I  had  to  take  other  means.  Having  received 
Information  about  the  arrival  of  such  an  agitator,  a  subaltern 
officer  or  a  soldier,  I  telegraphed  instructions  ordering  him 
to  come  to  me  at  once  In  Minsk,  intimating  that  if  he  did 
not  come  I  would  hand  him  over  to  a  court  martial  for  not 
executing  my  order.  There  was  no  Instance  in  which  my 
order  was  not  at  once  executed.  It  was  necessary  to  take 
some  further  action  which  would  prevent  the  return  of  these 
agitators  to  the  ground  which  had  already  been  prepared  by 
them.  But  there  were  cases  with  which  It  was  extremely 
difficult  to  deal.  There  were  three  or  four  occasions  when 
the  whole  of  the  unit,  and  even  the  whole  division,  refused 
to  execute  at  once  the  military  order  of  the  Chief.  For  the 
greater  part  these  orders  concerned  the  replacing  of  one 
unit  by  another  In  the  front  lines.  In  general  the  excuse 
was  that  the  unit  which  had  to  replace  another  either  had 
not  sufficiently  rested  or  else  was  not  fully  equipped  with 
material  necessary  for  the  position,  such  as  machine  guns, 
trench  mortars,  etc.  It  is  quite  true  that  during  this  time 
such  materials  were  not  equally  distributed  to  the  regiments; 
all  of  them  had  not  received  the  required  quantity.  They 
were  supplied  with  them  as  they  were  manufactured.  The 
military  committees  thought  themselves  right  in  judging  as 
to  all  the  military  necessities  of  the  unit  to  which  they 
belonged.  In  cases  of  insubordination  It  was  almost  Im- 
possible to  find  the  real  culprits.  But  there  was  not  a  single 
case  In  which  the  orders  of  the  Chiefs,  which  had  been  con- 


I9I7]  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION  343 

firmed  by  me  for  execution,  were  not  carried  out  in  time. 
However,  such  a  condition  had  no  influence  on  the  march  of 
military  events  in  the  period  of  calm,  but  the  consequences 
of  it  would  be  naturally  felt  in  the  times  of  fighting,  when 
every  hour,  every  minute,  is  dear,  and  sometimes  unrecov- 
erable. 

Some  three  days  after  my  appearance  in  Minsk,  the  new 
Minister  of  War  of  the  Provisional  Government,  A.  J. 
Goutchkoff,  arrived.  Though  honest  in  motive,  and  a  sin- 
cere and  fervent  patriot,  he  had  to  deal  with  matters  of 
which  he  had  only  superficial  knowledge.  It  is  true  that 
during  his  life  he  had  smelt  powder,  for  he  had  been  a 
volunteer  in  the  Boer  War,  when  he  was  seriously  wounded. 
He  took  part  in  the  Manchurian  campaign  as  a  representa- 
tive of  the  Red  Cross.  He  had  many  acquaintances  in 
military  circles,  from  inferior  chiefs  to  junior  officers,  and  in 
his  association  with  the  Duma  became  thoroughly  acquainted 
with  the  legislative  and  administrative  work  of  the  Minister 
of  War.  All  this  gave  him  some  illusory  idea  of  how 
troops  lived,  and  of  military  conditions,  but  there  were  big 
gaps  in  his  knowledge,  which  he  probably  did  not  conceive, 
and  he  certainly  was  not  acquainted  with  the  psychology  of 
military  work,  the  psychology  of  the  Chief,  and  the  psy- 
chology of  the  troops.  As  his  first  aim  he  considered  it 
necessary  to  rejuvenate  the  Army,  i.e.  to  replace  all  those 
Chiefs  who,  according  to  such  information  as  he  had  gath- 
ered from  those  whom  he  trusted,  and  from  opinions  which 
were  circulating  about  them,  were  not  suitable  for  the  posts 
which  they  occupied.  This  list  of  these  persons  was  such 
a  big  one  that  it  would  have  meant  the  change  of  the  greater 
number  from  the  commanders  of  the  corps  to  the  lower 
ranks.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  change  of  every 
Chief  is  followed  by  a  change  of  the  whole  hierarchical 


344  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION       [ch.  xxvi 

ladder  up  to  the  commanders  of  companies,  because  all  are 
raised  a  step,  and  the  majority  of  them  often  change  their 
place  of  service.  According  to  that,  one  is  forced  to  the 
conclusion  that  all  the  good  derived  from  a  change  of  Chiefs 
is  foiled  by  this  change  in  mass,  which  follows  the  replace- 
ment of  one  Chief  by  another.  Besides  this,  in  their  places 
came  persons  of  quite  mediocre  ability,  sometimes  lower  in 
capacity  than  those  who  had  been  considered  unsuitable. 

Where  necessary,  I  never  stopped  at  the  change  of  a  com- 
mander, especially  when  it  was  intended  as  a  warning  or  an 
example.  For  instance,  I  changed  one  of  the  commanders 
of  an  army  after  the  unsuccessful  defence,  in  the  end  of 
March  1917,  of  the  so-called  Tchervishe  "  tete-de-pont " 
on  the  River  Stohod.  Having  inquired  into  this  affair,  I 
found  there  had  been  great  negligence  on  the  part  of  the 
superior  officers,  the  responsibility  for  which,  above  all,  lay 
on  the  commander  of  the  army.  For  this  it  was  my  duty 
to  show  to  the  troops,  who  did  not  quite  know  me,  that  I 
was  one  of  those  who  did  not  hesitate  to  adopt  the  harshest 
measures  when  circumstances  demanded  them.  This  occa- 
sion helped  me,  for  I  could  show  a  concrete  case  which  really 
demanded  it.  The  lack  of  success  at  Tchervishe  cost  us 
a  couple  of  thousand  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners.  We 
did  not  lose  any  guns,  but  that  was  only  because  they  were 
not  where  they  should  have  been.  Otherwise,  probably 
the  Germans  would  not  have  decided  to  take  the  Tchervishe 
"  tete-de-pont  "  by  direct  attack. 

The  new  Minister  of  War  arrived  at  Minsk  with  the  list 
already  marked  of  those  whom  it  was  intended  to  dismiss 
from  their  posts  or,  on  the  contrary,  to  promote.  Un- 
fortunately I  could  not  express  a  definite  opinion  on  the 
greater  part  of  them,  and  I  had  not  come  into  personal 
contact  with  them,  and  was  unable  to  defend  them  or  to 


191 7]  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION  345 

acquiesce  in  their  removal.  I  did,  however,  try  to  secure 
In  their  places  officers  whose  military  reputation  I  knew  very 
well.  But  my  demands  were  only  satisfied  to  a  small  degree, 
for  most  of  those  on  the  Ministers'  list  had  already  received 
high  appointments  on  the  other  fronts  which  Goutchkoff 
had  visited  before  he  came  to  Minsk.  Unwillingly  I  had  to 
be  directed  by  the  opinion  of  Goutchkoff,  and  also  by  the 
opinion  of  the  Chief  of  the  Staff  at  the  front.  General 
Kvietzinsky,  who  had  just  received  the  Command  of  an 
Army.  In  three  armies  that  were  on  my  front  I  had  to 
supersede  one  commander,  and  the  other  two  were  to  be 
replaced  by  order  of  the  Provisional  Government.  How 
blindly  Goutchkoff  believed  what  was  told  him  can  be  judged 
from  this  circumstance.  As  General  Kvietzinsky  was  ap- 
pointed to  a  higher  post,  I  chose  to  succeed  him  Major- 
General  Alexeieff,  well  known  to  me  as  Chief  of  the  Staff 
of  the  Special  Army.  In  spite  of  our  good  relations, 
Goutchkoff  categorically  refused  to  sanction  such  an  ap- 
pointment. It  must  be  confessed  that  he  was  partially  right, 
as  Major-General  Alexeieff  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
commanded  a  regiment  with  the  rank  of  colonel,  and  such 
an  appointment  would  have  been  a  big  jump  in  his  service. 
But  this  was  not  the  principal  reason.  The  reason  was 
that  Alexeieff  was  considered  unsuitable.  Surely  I,  who  had 
spent  two  years  of  campaigning  with  him,  was  the  better 
judge  of  that.  Those  who  trusted  me  by  making  me  Com- 
mander-in-Chief at  the  front  ought  to  have  shown  their 
trust  in  me  in  the  choice  of  my  closest  assistant,  the  more 
so  because  it  was  while  I  worked  with  him  as  my  assistant 
that  I  acquired  the  reputation  which  raised  me  to  that  post. 
I  could  have  raised  what  is  called  an  administrative  ques- 
tion, but  I  hoped  that  in  time  this  would  come  about  by 
itself,   and  meanwhile   I   offered  to   Alexeieff   the   post  of 


346  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION       [ch.  xxvi 

Quartermaster-General,  as  Kvietzinsky  had  taken  with  him 
the  Quartermaster-General  of  that  front  to  be  Chief  of 
Staff  of  the  Army.  I  hoped  that  later  Alexeieff  would  be- 
come Chief  of  Staff,  when  my  nominee  would  receive  a 
higher  appointment.  To  tell  the  truth  Major-General 
Alexeieff  almost  constantly  carried  out  the  duties  of  Chief 
of  Staff  of  the  front  until  the  end  of  the  month  of  August, 
almost  two  months  after  I  left  the  post  of  Commander-in- 
Chief. 

During  Goutchkoff's  stay  in  Minsk,  there  was  the  meet- 
ing of  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Committee  of  the  town 
and  its  outskirts,  and  there  were  present  representatives 
of  the  troops,  but  the  regular  representation  of  the  troops 
had  not  yet  been  organised.  Until  that  time  I  had  no 
occasion  to  visit  these  meetings.  Goutchkoff  wished  to  at- 
tend one  of  them,  and  was  rather  surprised  when  he  learnt 
from  me  that  I  would  take  advantage  of  his  presence  to 
go  there  with  him.  Having  finished  our  work  at  home, 
Goutchkoff  and  I  drove  in  the  evening  to  the  theatre  where 
the  meeting  was  being  held,  and  we  went  straight  on  to 
the  stage  on  which,  at  a  large  table,  were  sitting  the  members 
of  the  Council,  presided  over  by  Posner.  At  our  entrance, 
all  rose  in  their  places  and  greeted  us  with  applause.  After 
words  of  greeting  from  the  President  of  the  meeting, 
Goutchkoff  turned  to  the  assembly  and  made  a  patriotic 
speech.  After  him  my  turn  came.  It  was  the  first  occa- 
sion on  which  I  had  had  an  opportunity  of  addressing  such 
a  gathering.  The  first,  it  is  true,  but  far  from  the  last, 
for  in  the  course  of  time  there  broke  out  an  epidemic  of  all 
kinds  of  meetings  on  every  possible  pretext.  It  was  neces- 
sary to  appear  at  least  once  at  every  meeting  and  make  a 
speech.  All  kinds  of  speeches  were  as  a  rule  short,  but 
some  lasted  an  hour  and  a  half  at  least. 


1917]  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION  347 

And  what  meetings  they  were!  The  most  Important 
was,  of  course,  the  meeting  "  of  the  whole  front,"  with 
delegates  from  all  units,  about  1,500  altogether,  but  among 
them  were  workmen  of  the  town  of  Minsk.  Then  followed 
gatherings  of  doctors,  of  Sisters  of  Charity,  Red  Cross 
Societies,  elementary  teachers  of  the  Minsk  districts,  mili- 
tary priests,  a  Polish  meeting,  a  White  Russian  meeting, 
meetings  of  veterinarles  and  chemists.  At  last  it  became 
necessary  to  put  a  limit  to  them,  since  such  people  as 
chauffeurs,  hospital  attendants,  etc.,  also  wanted  to  hold 
one.  I  was  compelled  to  declare  that  such  gatherings  In 
the  town  of  Minsk  could  only  be  held  if  sanctioned  by 
me.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  up  to  now  all  classes 
of  people  wished  to  take  advantage  of  the  right  to  meet, 
and  It  was  only  by  relying  upon  my  personal  authority 
that  I  could  hope  to  regulate  something  which  was  not 
specifically  laid  down  by  the  instructions  of  the  new  Gov- 
ernment. 

Goutchkoff's  speech,  like  mine,  dealt  In  a  general  way 
with  the  importance  of  continuing  the  struggle  with  the 
enemy  with  all  our  strength  and  all  our  means.  It  was 
pointed  out  that  all  attempts  to  fraternise  with  Germans 
must  cease;  and  the  request  was  emphasised  that  those  who 
were  then  present  should  Influence  in  these  directions  the 
other  committees  of  which  they  were  members.  All  this  was 
rceived  by  the  assembly  not  only  with  sympathy,  but  with 
enthusiasm,  and  we  left  with  the  same  warmth  of  demon- 
stration with  which  we  had  been  greeted.  There  was  the 
fullest  hope  that  this  patriotic  enthusiasm  would  spread  to 
the  troops,  after  having  been  fortified  at  the  meeting.  It 
seemed  that  the  tottering  idea  of  the  Revolution  would 
pass;  that  measures  for  re-establishing  discipline  among  the 
troops  and  for  the  support  of  the  authority  of  the  Chiefs 


348  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION       [ch.  xxvi 

would  be  taken,  and  that  the  Army  would  attain  more 
strength  and  consequently  would  increase  its  fighting  cap- 
ability. Such  were  the  bright  hopes  of  the  month  of  March. 
It  seemed  as  if  the  troops  who  suffered  revolutionary  fer- 
mentations had  again  reverted  to  the  sense  of  orderly  ad- 
ministration and  government.  To  strengthen  it,  it  was 
necessary  to  apply  rational  measures  coming  from  the  Cen- 
tral Authority.  After  this  preparatory  meeting  was  con- 
cluded, on  rules  worked  out  by  this  meeting,  the  Conference 
of  the  whole  Front  was  prepared.  But  in  this  matter  I  was 
deprived  of  the  opportunity  of  directing  them.  I  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  if  I  applied  here  those  methods  which 
gave  satisfactory  results  in  the  Special  Army,  the  strain 
might  be  such  that  with  little  pressure  the  tightening  cord 
would  snap.  One  incident  might  be  enough  to  show  that 
behind  me  there  was  no  real  force,  and  then  my  authority, 
which  until  now  had  not  deserted  me,  would  very  soon 
diminish  until  it  ceased  to  exist.  The  work  confided  to  me 
was  too  serious  to  risk  this.  Moreover,  as  time  went  on, 
from  different  places  and  from  the  various  Military  Chiefs 
comforting  news  was  reported;  the  hope  that  the  revolu- 
tionary wave  would  gradually  decrease,  and  that  the  spirit 
of  the  Army  would  return  to  its  normal  state,  became 
strengthened. 

The  Meeting  of  the  Front  units  was  assembled  in  the 
middle  of  April.  The  Preparatory  Committee  had  devel- 
oped two  currents.  Left  and  Right.  One  section  invited 
the  President  of  the  Duma,  Rodzianko,  and  some  important 
member  as  of  the  Duma,  such  as  Roditcheff,  Maklakoff  and 
Maslennikoff.  The  other  section  asked  the  leaders  of 
Petrograd  Soviet,  Tchheidze,  Tzeretelli,  and  Skobeleff. 
The  last  named  was  the  same  man  who  in  October  1917 
was  preparing  to  go  to  Paris  as  the  delegate  of  the  Petro- 


1917]  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION  349 

grad  Soviets  to  take  part  In  the  International  Congress, 
which  was  not  held  after  all. 

On  the  appointed  day  the  opening  of  the  Conference 
of  the  Front  took  place.  For  the  opening  came,  from 
Petrograd,  Rodzianko  and  the  members  of  the  Duma, 
Roditcheff  and  Maslennikoff.  In  their  presence  the  meeting 
was  opened.  But  before  this  for  almost  a  whole  day  and 
night  there  had  been  conflicting  views  as  to  who  should  be 
chosen  as  the  President.  The  Workmen's  Party  with  the 
soldiers  belonging  to  this  party  wanted  as  President  this 
same  Posner  whom  I  have  mentioned;  the  representatives 
of  the  military  party  wanted  as  their  President  a  volunteer 
of  artillery  who  was  in  ordinary  life  an  attorney.  For 
the  sake  of  peace  the  latter  gave  in,  and  in  this  way  Posner 
became  President,  and  the  artillery  volunteer  Assistant 
President.  The  opening  speeches  Included  Rodzianko's, 
mine,  and  the  speeches  of  Roditcheff  and  Maslennikoff.  All 
these  speeches  were  full  of  patriotism,  with  a  call  to  fight 
with  the  enemy  outside,  for  the  conquest  of  the  enemy, 
and  for  the  strengthening  of  the  liberties  for  which  the 
Revolution  had  striven.  All  this  was  received  with 
unanimity,  enthusiasm,  and  noisy  applause.  Roditcheff  said 
that  for  a  month  every  morning  on  waking  he  had  con- 
gratulated himself  that  he  was  a  free  man.  It  was  only 
due  to  fortunate  circumstances,  and  to  the  fact  that  he  kept 
away  from  all  politics,  that  he  was  not  deprived  of  his  free- 
dom, and  did  not  suffer  detention  In  the  Peter  and  Paul 
fortress. 

On  the  third  day  of  the  meeting,  taking  advantage  of 
the  presence  of  the  Petrograd  guests,  was  arranged  an 
enthusiastic  procession  of  the  members  through  the  streets 
of  the  town.  With  a  band  at  the  head  they  marched  to 
the  public  square  of  the  town.     They  asked  me  to  take  a 


350  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION       [ch.  xxvi 

place  at  the  head  of  the  procession,  having  on  my  right 
Rodzianko,  and  on  my  left  the  President  of  the  meeting. 
In  the  square  had  been  erected  a  high  platform  from  which 
the  speeches  were  to  be  made  and  greetings  given  to  the 
crowd.  With  the  others  I  had  to  mount  the  platform.  I 
was  the  only  one  who  thought  fit  to  address  myself  to  the 
citizens,  male  and  female,  of  the  town  of  Minsk.  The 
male  half  of  the  population,  in  the  person  of  their  repre- 
sentatives, had  probably  forgotten  that  it  had  declared  the 
equality  of  all,  without  any  exception,  or  regard  to  sex. 
Fortunately  the  greetings  were  short,  for  the  big  square 
and  the  roofs  of  the  houses  were  all  crowded  by  the  garri- 
son and  population,  and  the  speeches  had  to  be  made  with 
voices  raised  as  high  as  possible,  and  every  word  articulated. 
At  the  end,  however,  there  was  some  confusion  not  with- 
out its  comical  side.  The  organisers  asked  those  who  were 
at  the  head  of  the  procession  to  take  their  places  for  the 
return.  Accordingly  I,  with  the  honoured  guests,  left  the 
platform  just  as  the  representative  of  the  Petrograd  Soviet, 
a  young  workman  who  had  probably  practised  at  the  pub- 
lic meetings,  was  finishing  his  speech.  But  those  around, 
noticing  that  the  procession  seemed  to  be  moving,  rushed 
away  and  ceased  to  be  interested  in  the  orator.  Offended 
by  such  conduct,  the  speaker  gesticulated  something,  waved 
his  hand,  and  then  left  the  platform  with  a  discontented 
air.  This  evidently  was  not  a  part  of  the  programme. 
The  organisers  were  annoyed,  but  they  could  not  restore 
the  broken  order. 

The  procession  returned  in  motor-cars.  In  the  places 
of  honour  on  the  first  car  which  followed  the  lorry,  occu- 
pied by  the  band,  Rodzianko  and  I  took  our  seats;  on  the 
front  seats  were  the  President  of  the  meeting,  Posner,  and 


1917]  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION  351 

the  member  of  the  Duma,  Roditcheff.  The  Presidents  of 
meetings  did  not  yet  consider  themselves  the  controllers 
of  the  fate  of  the  State,  as  the  first  of  the  first;  I  do  not 
say  first  of  equals.  The  ecstasy  of  the  crowd  filling  the 
streets  was  great.  For  the  greater  part  it  was  composed 
of  the  Jewish  population.  There  was  no  lack  of  red  flags 
and  red  ribbons.  Probably  I  was  the  only  one  who  did  not 
wear  these  red  emblems.  On  our  way  people  gave  us  many 
flowers,  but  in  the  town  it  was  difficult  to  find  flowers  of  the 
Revolutionary  colour.  In  a  bouquet  they  made  only  small 
red  spots.  I  do  not  know  whether  it  was  by  design  or  by 
chance  that  the  leaders  of  the  Petrograd  Workmen's  and 
Soldiers'  Council  came  to  the  meeting  rather  late.  At  that 
time  the  spirit  of  the  gathering  greatly  changed;  its  patriotic 
feeling  faded  away  greatly  as  some  of  these  men  spoke 
provocatively  about  the  necessity  of  the  struggle  of  the 
different  classes.  During  the  speeches  of  the  new  Petrograd 
guests  I  was  not  present,  but  from  those  who  were  there  I 
gathered  that  speeches,  in  general,  were  of  a  patriotic 
tone.  To  the  questions  that  were  asked  they  answered  in 
the  same  spirit.  Before  their  departure  all  three,  Tchheidze,  \  J 
Tzeretelli,  and  Skobeleff,  came  to  see  me.  Their  modest  j 
speeches  and  moderate  point  of  view,  the  political  opinions  * 
expressed  by  them  in  my  cabinet,  unwillingly  disposed  me 
In  their  favour.  When  the  conversation  turned  to  the  fu- 
ture Constitutional  Assembly,  Skobeleff  expressed  the  same 
thought  that  I  had,  and  declared  to  me  that  he  quite  under- 
stood that  it  was  impossible  to  cry  "  Hurrah  "  and  to  carry 
one's  card  to  the  ballot  box.  On  leaving,  one  of  them, 
Tzeretelli  I  think,  said  to  me,  "  But  we  could  easily  un- 
derstand each  other,  General,  if  we  knew  each  other  bet- 
ter." 


352  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION       [ch.  xxvi 

Before  the  close  I  considered  it  my  duty  once  more  to 
appear  within  the  walls  of  the  theatre.  In  my  farewell 
speech  I  especially  wanted  to  explain  to  the  members  who 
came  from  the  troops  in  what  measure  they  were  responsi- 
ble for  the  future  spirit  of  the  troops,  and  for  the  strengthen- 
ing of  the  sense  of  fighting  for  final  victory.  I  must  say 
that  I  noticed  no  difference  in  the  feeling  of  the  meeting 
towards  me  personally,  or  to  my  words.  There  was  the 
usual  greeting,  at  my  entrance,  the  same  enthusiasm  for 
the  patriotic  call.  The  meeting  was  over,  and  after  it 
the  Executive  Committee  remained,  but  not  under  the  Presi- 
dency of  Posner.  As  President  was  chosen  a  captain  of 
artillery.  Until  my  departure  the  members  of  this  com- 
mittee in  general  tried  to  render  assistance  when  there  was 
disorder  among  the  troops,  and  in  cases  where  men  at  the 
rear  of  the  Army  wanted  to  plunder,  or  were  disorderly 
during  a  railway  journey.  When  delegates  arrived  di- 
rectly from  the  junior  military  committees,  they  invariably 
brought  them  to  me,  in  order  to  receive  instructions  as  to 
the  manner  in  which  to  regulate  or  decide  this  or  that  ques- 
tion which  had  arisen.  I  cannot  but  say  that  it  was  a  diffi- 
cult time  for  the  Military  Chiefs;  on  the  one  hand,  the 
Higher  Command  ordered  them  to  begin  the  preparatory 
work  for  the  future  offensive  operations;  on  the  other 
hand,  the  greater  part  of  their  time  was  passed  in  settling 
odd  cases  arising  out  of  the  disturbance  of  the  normal  mili- 
tary life.  Let  me  add  that  only  those  Chiefs  who  spent  all 
their  time  amongst  their  men  could  successfully  continue 
their  work.  They  were  able  not  only  to  speak  to  the  men, 
but  were  not  at  a  loss  when  the  experienced  orators  at  the 
meetings  tried  to  put  them  in  an  awkward  position.  In  a 
word,  here  was  required  presence  of  mind  and  spirit.  From 
this  it  will  be  clear  how  difficult  was  the  position  of  those 


191 7]  EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION  353 

Chiefs  who  entered  upon  a  new  post  and  who  received  un- 
der their  command  units  which  they  did  not  know,  and 
which  did  not  know  the  new  Chief.  All  was  quite  new 
ground  for  them. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

THE    ATTEMPTED    REORGANISATION    OF    THE    ARMY 

A  CHARACTERISTIC  incident  happened  shortly  afterwards 
at  the  Congress  of  the  Red  Cross.  Those  participating  in 
this  reunion,  delegates  from  all  the  Red  Cross  institutions, 
about  200  persons  In  number,  were  doctors,  chemists,  as- 
sistant surgeons,  sanitarians,  stretcher-bearers,  and  Sisters 
of  Charity.  The  Central  Administration  of  the  Red  Cross 
Society  in  Petrograd,  informed  of  this  meeting,  sent  its  rep- 
resentative in  the  person  of  one  of  the  assistant  presidents 
of  the  Red  Cross  Society,  Count  Beniksen,  a  member  of 
the  Imperial  Duma. 

After  two  days  at  the  meeting,  he  came  to  me  in  great 
despair,  announcing  that  the  decisions  of  the  Congress 
were  inclined  to  establish  an  order  of  things  under  which 
the  work  of  the  Society  would  become  impossible,  especially 
in  war-time  conditions.  He  asked  me  if  I  could  not  come 
to  the  meeting  and  exercise  some  influence  on  the  side  of 
more  sensible  and  more  practical  decisions.  We  arranged 
between  us  that  at  the  next  morning  I  would  go  to  the  meet- 
ing which  was  being  held  in  the  same  theatre  of  the  town. 

The  democratisation  of  the  Army  had  certainly  advanced 
towards  the  beginning  of  May.  The  members  of  the 
Congress  did  not  consider  it  necessary  to  rise  when  I  ap- 
peared among  those  presiding,  or  to  salute,  in  my  person, 
the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  western  armies.  The  Con- 
gress was  not  presided  over  by  a  doctor,  as  one  would 
have  expected,  but  by  a  sanitarian  without  medical  educa- 

354 


I9I7]  REORGANISATION  OF  THE  ARMY  355 

tion.  My  speech,  addressed  to  the  Congress,  lasted  less 
than  half  an  hour.  When  I  had  finished  I  left  the  meeting 
at  once,  and  it  would  be  difficult  for  me  to  define  what 
impression  my  words  made  upon  the  assembly.  It  was  not 
until  late  in  the  evening,  after  the  closing  of  the  meeting, 
that  I  learned  from  Beniksen  that  immediately  after  my 
departure  an  extraordinary  tumult  arose,  the  result  of  which 
was  that  when  the  assembly  became  a  little  quieter  they  de- 
cided to  choose  a  new  President.  It  was  also  decided  to 
consider  the  two  days'  work  of  the  Congress  void,  and  to 
begin  the  work  afresh.  What  magical  words  could  have 
led  to  such  a  result?  I  suppose  it  came  about  by  the  argu- 
ment propounded  by  me,  which  was  that  the  Red  Cross  must 
exist  for  the  Army,  and  not  the  Army  for  the  Red  Cross.  I 
had  further  told  them  that  they  ought  to  consider  all  ques- 
tions first  from  a  scientific  and  medical  standpoint,  and  that 
if  they  ignored  these  things  I  could  do  without  the  help  of 
the  Red  Cross,  and  would  send  all  those  serving  in  it,  with- 
out exception,  into  the  trenches. 

An  agreeable  exception  to  all  these  gatherings,  as  well 
as  to  those  of  the  Army  and  local  population,  was  the  meet- 
ing of  Polish  delegates,  whose  first  object  was  to  ascertain 
how  the  discipline  ought  to  be  maintained.  A  patriotic 
note  was  struck  all  through  the  speeches  of  the  Congress. 
They  spoke,  first  of  all,  of  the  formation  of  efficient  troops, 
grounded  on  ordinary  discipline,  and  afterwards  of  the 
proposals  for  the  re-establishing  of  a  free  and  independent 
Poland.  The  assembly  had  enough  tact  not  to  mention  if 
the  soil  on  which  they  were  assembled  would  enter  into  the 
composition  of  the  future  Poland.  One  must  remember 
that  in  the  Government  of  Minsk  the  Poles  are  in  a  large 
minority,  but  their  intellectual  weight  is  certainly  consider- 
able, as  the  majority  of  the  big  land-owners  and  a  consider- 


356  REORGANISATION  OF  THE  ARMY     [ch.  xxvii 

able  part  of  the  town  population  are  of  Polish  nationality. 
The  peasantry,  the  most  numerous  class  of  the  population, 
is,  without  exception,  White-Russian  and  of  the  Orthodox 
religion. 

Visits  to  meetings  did  not  form  an  essential  part  of 
my  work  and  my  duty.  Hope  had  not  yet  died  that  the 
Revolutionary  tide  which  had  caught  the  Army  would  grad- 
ually ebb,  and  that,  with  the  aid  of  normal  military  discipline, 
order  among  the  troops  would  be  finally  re-established,  and 
with  it  the  efficiency  of  the  Army.  All  this,  taken  together, 
gave  a  good  ground  for  continuing  the  energetic  prepara- 
tions for  the  summer  offensive.  All  the  indications  were 
that  the  attacking  capacity  of  the  Germans  was  decreasing, 
as  otherwise  they  would  not  have  missed  an  opportunity  to 
attack  us  with  full  hope  of  success.  Our  future  offensive 
action,  already  sanctioned  by  the  Emperor  in  January,  was 
left  without  alteration,  i.e.  to  deal  the  principal  blow  on 
the  south-western  front,  with  a  secondary  attack  on  the 
other  fronts.  The  latter  was  to  be  done  with  the  aid  of 
not  less  than  twelve  or  fifteen  divisions.  There  was  no 
ground  for  believing  that  the  time  and  place  for  such  an 
attack  would  be  unexpected  to  the  Germans.  The  fra- 
ternising in  many  places  of  Russian  soldiers  with  the  Ger- 
mans, as  well  as  the  slow  work  in  the  preparations  of  the 
offensive,  helped  the  Germans,  so  the  more  assiduous  prep- 
arations were  needed,  and  the  introduction  of  as  great  a 
quantity  as  was  possible  of  material  forces  and  means.  The 
principal  preparatory  work  under  existing  conditions  con- 
sisted in  the  restoration  of  a  good  Army,  and  in  raising  Its 
moral  state.  The  unfortunate  idea  of  forming  storming 
battalions,  and  "  battalions  of  death,"  had  not  yet  been 
adopted.  We  tried  to  raise  to  the  usual  height  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  whole  unit,  and  of  all  units. 


191 7]  REORGANISATION  OF  THE  ARMY  357 

In  some  cases  it  was  entirely  successful;  for  instance  the 
1st  Siberian  Corps,  one  of  the  best  fighting  corps,  had  not 
shown   any   signs   of   disorganisation   nor   loss   of   martial 
spirit.     The  other  corps,  having  passed  through  a  period  of 
the  Revolutionary  ferment,  came  little  by  little  to  a  more 
normal  state.      Partly  for  the  control  of  the  work  of  the 
troops  and  Staffs,  partly  to  directly  influence  them,  I  had  to 
undertake  an  inspection  of  the  troops.    In  pre-Revolutionary 
times,  I  limited  my  review  to  those  on  the  front  lines  in  the 
trenches.     Of  the  reserves  I  visited  only  those  which  had 
newly  arrived  to  join  the  troops  under  me.      I  could  see  only 
an   insignificant   percentage    of   the   men   of   the   sector   in 
trenches,  but  the  fact  of  my  arrival  was  at  once  known  in 
all  the  sector,  and  it  contented  me.     The  other  sectors  and 
units  learnt  about  it  from  the  Army  Order,  which  was  dis- 
tributed among  the  troops  in  printed  form  three  or  four 
days  after  my  visit.      But  under  the  present  conditions  per- 
sonal communication  with  men  was  indispensable  to  me,  in 
order  that  I  might  have  a  direct  influence  upon  them.     That 
was  why  I  could  not  content  myself  with  visiting  only  the 
front  trenches,  and  I  had  to  give  more  time  for  seeing  the 
regiments  who  formed  the  corps  and  army  reserves,  where 
I  could  gather  whole  regiments  by  adding  to  them  some 
chosen  men  from  the  neighbouring  troops.     The  tour  of 
the  troops,  their  inspection,  the  conversations  with  separate 
men,  always  ended  with  an  address  to  the  whole  regiment. 
I   had   already   made   such   speeches    in   pre-Revolutionary 
times,  but  the  form  of  those  was  quite  different.     Besides 
this,  in  previous  times  I  always  gathered  together  the  offi- 
cers separately,  not  only  to  thank  them  for  their  services, 
but  also  to  show  them  all  that  was  faulty  and  had  been 
noticed  by  me.     And  I  then  often  seized  the  opportunity 
pjF  rertiinding  these  officers  about  spm?  fundamental  prin- 


358  REORGANISATION  OF  THE  ARMY     [ch.  xxvii 

ciples,  which  every  chief  desiring  to  make  easier  his  difficult 
mihtary  task  ought  to  follow.  I  adjured  officers  to  be 
strict  in  regard  to  themselves  and  to  their  own  duties,  for 
those  conditions  always  gave  the  right  to  be  exacting  to- 
wards their  subordinates.  It  meant  that  one  must  be  in  all 
one's  life  an  example  to  one's  inferiors,  not  in  the  sense 
that  in  the  moment  of  danger  one  should  put  oneself  at  the 
head  of  one's  men,  in  order  to  give  an  example  of  bravery, 
but  with  the  aim  that  one's  life,  private  as  well  as  public, 
should  be  worthy  of  imitation.  Under  these  conditions 
the  Chief  would  not  be  bound  to  show  during  the  battle  an 
example  that,  in  general,  is  paid  at  the  price  of  blood  or 
life.  Such  an  example  would  not  only  be  unnecessary,  but 
the  subordinates  would  even  try  to  prevent  the  Chief  from 
such  an  act  because  it  was  in  their  own  interests  not  to  lose 
such  a  Chief.  Further,  I  invariably  pointed  out  to  the 
officers  that  their  duty  and  their  own  interest  consisted  in 
putting  themselves  near  their  men,  to  learn  as  quickly  as 
possible  their  needs  and  satisfy  them;  that  they  ought  not 
to  fear  that  such  close  touch  would  diminish  their  dignity 
as  Chiefs;  but  this,  of  course,  ought  not  to  develop  into 
familiarity.  Such  counsels  in  time  of  peace  would  be  quite 
superfluous,  as  they  formed  the  rules  of  the  military  pro- 
fession; but  taking  into  consideration  the  quick  change  in 
the  officers'  staff  In  war-time,  and  the  mass  of  the  young 
men  who  had  not  any  life  experience,  it  was  indispensable. 
But  the  peculiarity  of  the  Revolutionary  time,  the  jealous 
feeling  of  the  mass  of  the  soldiers  that  they  must  not  be 
separated  from  the  officers,  the  necessity  of  raising  the 
prestige  of  the  officers  and  of  not  lecturing  them  before 
the  soldiers,  all  this  unhappily  led  to  the  abandonment  of 
the  private  talk  with  the  officers.  I  had  to  limit  myself 
in  giving  suitable  orders   to   the   senior  officers,   in  order 


igiy]  REORGANISATION  OF  THE  ARMY  359 

that  they,   gradually,   and   In  this  way,   could  Instruct  the 
young  officers  under  their  command. 

The  work  of  the  Staffs  showed  that  all  the  preparatory 
details  were  being  evolved  with  great  care.  All  new  meth- 
ods which  had  been  worked  out  in  the  earlier  years  of  the 
campaign  were  adopted.  At  first  attention  was  paid  to 
combined  artillery  and  aviation.  Positions  were  being  pre- 
pared for  the  placing  of  the  heavy  guns,  which  were  to 
arrive  as  late  as  possible  in  order  that  their  co-operation 
might  surprise  the  Germans.  Among  my  military  inspec- 
tions was  a  visit  to  the  ist  Siberian  Corps,  which  was  com- 
manded by  General  Plieszkoff,  who  brought  It  from  Siberia, 
and  which  distinguished  itself  in  a  satisfactory  manner.  At 
one  time  It  was  proposed  to  him  to  take  the  command  of 
an  Army,  but  he  refused,  intending  to  remain  to  the  finish 
of  the  war  with  his  own  Siberians.  Up  to  that  time  the 
Siberian  Corps  was  only  such  In  name,  as  the  greater  num- 
ber who  entered  this  corps  were  from  different  parts  of 
Russia,  and  the  percentage  of  Siberians  was  quite  insignifi- 
cant. But  the  spirit  and  traditions  of  this  corps,  by  right 
of  succession,  passed  on  to  the  new  contingents.  My  visit 
to  the  corps  occurred  at  the  same  time  as  the  Conference  of 
the  Delegate  Committee  of  the  corps.  Having  arrived  to- 
wards night,  I  met  the  Committee  In  the  little  square  before 
the  house  of  the  commander.  The  work  of  the  Committee 
was  stopped,  and  first  the  President,  and  afterwards  one  of 
the  soldiers,  who  took  part  In  the  meeting,  greeted  my  ar- 
rival and  that  of  the  commander  of  the  corps  with  a  warm, 
patriotic  speech.  In  his  address  to  me  he  called  me  their 
father,  and  finishing  his  speech  he  unexpectedly  took  my 
hand  and  kissed  it.  This  took  me  by  surprise,  but  If  one 
takes  Into  consideration  the  spirit  of  that  time,  and  the 
relation  of  the  troops  to  the  Chiefs,  this  act  was  not  to  be 


36o  REORGANISATION  OF  THE  ARMY     [ch.  xxvii 

regarded  as  an  act  of  servility,  but  as  one  of  civil  courage; 
nevertheless,  it  was  received  by  all  with  extreme  approba- 
tion. Unusually  warm  and  sincere  was  the  relation  be- 
tween the  men  and  the  beloved  commander  of  the  corps. 
It  seemed  that  one  could  rely  in  every  respect  upon  such  a 
corps.  But  the  publication  by  the  Provisional  Government 
in  the  end  of  May  of  the  so-called  rights  of  those  in  the 
service  was  sufficient  to  disorganise  even  such  detachments. 
At  the  beginning  of  July  the  same  Committee  of  the  corps 
expressed  distrust  of  General  Plieszkoff,  who  was  accused 
of  ambition  and  self-interest.  Consequently  General 
Plieszkoff  had  to  give  up  his  command. 

The  soldiers  held  very  jealously  to  the  right  of  wearing 
emblems  of  a  red  colour,  and  to  the  display  on  solemn 
occasions  of  red  banners  and  posters  with  different  inscrip- 
tions, though  understanding  that  bearing  them  in  the  ranks 
was  not  in  keeping  with  military  regulations.  I  do  not 
know  why,  but  in  no  case  when  troops  came  for  my  re- 
views did  they  bring  out  any  red  rags,  though  I  never  gave 
any  formal  order  about  it.  The  only  exception  to  this  was 
the  review  of  one  of  the  regiments  of  the  51st  Division, 
which  belonged  to  the  second  Caucasian  Corps.  When  I 
arrived  in  front  of  the  regiment  I  noticed  a  number  of 
banners  and  posters  with  inscriptions.  Among  them  were 
also  patriotic  inscriptions,  but  in  the  middle  of  the  band 
was  a  large  red  banner  with  the  white  inscription  "  Long 
life  to  the  Democratic  Republic."  This  banner  was  carried 
by  a  bandsman  of  a  Jewish  type.  Under  the  Russian  in- 
scription was  one  in  the  Jewish  language,  probably  mean- 
ing the  same  thing.  It  must  be  explained  by  the  fact  that 
the  Jews,  being  a  musical  nation,  usually  composed  the 
greater  percentage  of  the  military  bands.  Having  finished 
inspecting  all  the  companies  of  the  regiment,  I  returned  to 


I9I7]  REORGANISATION  OF  THE  ARMY  361 

the  right  flank,  and  turning  to  the  bandsman  who  held 
the  banner,  I  asked  him  if  he  could  explain  to  me  what 
"  Democratic  Republic  "  meant.  He  could  not  give  me 
any  answer.  Then  I  turned  to  the  whole  band,  and  asked 
who  among  them  could  tell  me  the  meaning  of  these  words. 
Still  getting  no  answer,  I  turned  to  the  men  of  the  Scout 
command,  who  stood  near,  with  the  same  question.  From 
one  of  the  rear  ranks,  a  non-commissioned  officer  of  a 
brave  and  rather  intelligent  aspect,  offered  to  answer  me. 
He  gave  an  explanation  in  the  following  words:  "It  is 
that  which  gave  us  the  Revolution  and  all  liberties."  I 
turned  to  those  around  and  asked  if  they  had  anything  to 
object  to  that  explanation,  but  I  did  not  get  any  answer. 
It  appeared  they  were  satisfied  with  this.  Really  the  truth 
was  that  not  one  of  them  had  an  idea,  not  only  of  what 
"  Democratic  Republic  "  meant,  but  even  what  "  Repub- 
lic "  itself  was. 

In  the  month  of  May,  at  Minsk,  a  party  of  Socialist 
delegates,  who  had  arrived  from  France  and  England,  came 
to  me;  members  of  the  French  Parliament,  and  representa- 
tives of  the  English  Trade  Unions.  They  were  accompan- 
ied by  an  officer  from  the  Ministry  of  War,  who  explained 
to  me  that  they  were  very  depressed,  considering  that  how 
things  were  established  the  Army  was  losing  its  fighting 
capability.  Considering  that  it  was  in  our  interest  to  give 
these  people  the  most  exact  impression  of  our  efficiency  — 
which  at  this  time,  thanks  to  the  influence  of  the  Chiefs, 
had  gradually  increased  —  I  decided  first  to  give  them  an 
opportunity  of  visiting  the  troops  in  the  positions  and  in 
reserve,  after  which  I  invited  them  to  come  again  to  me, 
and  to  exchange  opinions.  I  wanted  them  to  see  the  Army 
as  it  really  was.  After  two  days'  tour  of  the  troops  in 
positions   and  in   reserve,   they   returned   to   me.     To   my 


362  REORGANISATION  OF  THE  ARMY     [ch.  xxvii 

astonishment  their  views  had  quite  changed.  They  were 
full  of  hope;  especially  were  they  impressed  by  their  visit 
to  the  Siberian  Corps.  But  in  the  other  units  also  they 
found  plenty  of  martial  spirit  and  patriotic  feeling.  In 
order  to  give  them  a  clearer  view,  I  had  to  say  the  con- 
trary of  what  I  had  said  before;  I  told  them  not  to  rely 
too  implicitly  upon  what  they  had  already  seen,  not  to  be 
too  quick  in  forming  first  impressions.  All  the  same  they 
went  away  with  raised  spirits.  But  their  next  visit  was  to 
the  5  th  Army. 

At  this  time  this  Army  was  going  through  a  severe  crisis 
of  the  Revolutionary  upheaval.  The  effect  of  this  up- 
heaval could  not  but  have  been  apparent  to  the  eyes  of 
our  Allies.  The  result  of  it  was  that  they  went  to  Petro- 
grad  quite  depressed.  But  imagine  our  astonishment  when 
we  learnt  in  the  course  of  time  from  the  foreign  papers 
that  they  were  telling  the  reporters  of  papers  in  neutral 
countries  of  the  change  which  had  come  over  the  scene, 
and  that  they  were  referring  to  Russian  troops  as  troops 
full  of  fighting  capability,  martial  spirit  and  revolutionary 
patriotism,  which  gave  them  the  best  hope  for  the  future. 
It  may  be  that  this  attitude  was  adopted  to  deceive  our 
enemies,  but  they,  we  had  good  reason  to  know,  were  better 
informed  than  these  gentlemen.  If  any  were  deceived  it 
was  only  our  Allies,  and  not  our  enemies.  All  that  I  can 
say  is,  if  they  were  sincere,  it  means  that  these  people,  like 
so  many  foreigners  and  travellers,  were  too  impressionable, 
and  jumped  to  conclusions  too  readily. 

The  heads  of  the  Allied  Missions  did  not  come  to  Minsk. 
Their  stay  in  Petrograd  happened  to  be  during  the  period 
of  the  most  intense  struggle  between  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment and  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Soviets,  for 
power  and   influence   over  the   crowd  and  country.     This 


19 1 7]  REORGANISATION  OF  THE  ARMY  363 

struggle  was  so  silently  carried  on  that  for  some  time  It 
passed  unnoticed  by  the  Army.  We  heard  nothing  of 
it  until  later.  Nominally  the  whole  power  was  In  the  hands 
of  the  Provisional  Government  and  all  Instructions  came 
in  its  name.  But  actually  no  single  Instruction  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government  could  be  published  before  it  was  con- 
sidered by  the  Executive  Committee,  of  the  Workmen's 
and  Soldiers'  Soviets  which  were  not  held  in  public  and 
in  which  only  one  member  of  the  Provisional  Government 
took  part,  the  Minister  of  Justice,  Kerensky.  This  con- 
test was,  of  course,  known  in  Petrograd.  Public  opinion, 
and  especially  that  influenced  by  the  crowd,  was  paying  much 
attention  to  what  the  leading  European  nations,  our  Allies, 
thought  about  our  Soviets.  The  special  attention  which 
was  shown  to  the  Soviets  by  the  Allied  Delegates  had  the 
effect  of  raising  them  In  their  own  estimation,  and  especially 
in  the  eyes  of  the  Petrograd  workman  and  soldier,  who 
without  reading  the  newspapers  knew  about  the  rivalries 
between  the  Provisional  Government  and  the  Soviets  at 
this  time. 

In  the  Ministry  of  War,  under  the  aegis  of  these  Soviets, 
with  participation  of  the  Soviets  delegates,  took  place  a 
Commission,  presided  over  by  the  former  Minister  of  War, 
General  Pollvanoff.  To  this  Commission  was  assigned  the 
framing  of  the  rules  governing  the  rights  of  men  in  military 
service.  To  the  Committee  were  called,  on  the  choice  of 
the  Ministry  of  War,  some  military  chiefs,  but  not  of 
higher  rank  than  commanders  of  brigades.  But  it  was 
mostly  composed  of  the  delegates  of  Workmen's  and  Sol- 
diers' Soviets.  In  the  beginning  of  May  I  received  a  tele- 
gram from  the  Minister  of  War,  Goutchkoff,  containing 
the  projected  rules  for  service,  with  the  request  that  I  would 
give  my  opinion  on  them.     I  asked  the  commanders  of  the 


364  REORGANISATION  OF  THE  ARMY     [ch.  xxvii 

armies  for  their  views,  but  before  I  received  an  answer 
from  them,  I  replied  by  telegram  to  Goutchkoff  that  the 
rules  were  so  unsuited  to  army  life  and  discipline  that  they 
would  lead  to  the  complete  disorganisation  of  an  army  which 
was  gradually  giving  signs  of  regeneration,  and  that  the 
Provisional  Government  ought  rather  to  resign  its  authority 
and  hand  it  over  to  those  who,  though  willing  to  express 
their  views,  yet  would  not  take  the  responsibility  for  their 
practical  application,  rather  than  confirm  them. 

My  Chief  of  Staff,  Major-General  Alexeieff,  tried  to 
dissuade  me  from  sending  my  reply  in  such  concise  and  sharp 
terms,  but  I  considered  the  position  and  the  subject  were 
far  too  serious  for  me  to  avoid  a  frank  expression  of  my 
conduct.  Following  this  General  Alexeieff  summoned  all 
commanders  to  Mohileff  for  a  Conference,  which  I  under- 
stood was  to  discuss  these  rights  of  military  men.  The 
Conference  was  held  in  May.  Four  Commanders-in-Chief 
met  at  General  Alexeieff's  Headquarters;  among  them  was 
General  Dragomiroff,  who  had  just  replaced  General 
Russky.  General  Dragomiroff  brought  with  him  the  Chief 
of  Staff  from  the  northern  front,  General  Daniloff.  With 
General  Brussiloff  came  his  Quartermaster-General,  Douk- 
honin,  the  future  Commander-in-Chief,  who  replaced  Kor- 
niloff,  and  who  was  afterwards  murdered  in  Mohileff  by 
the  Bolsheviks.  Doukhonin,  as  usual,  did  not  express  his 
opinion.  All  the  assistants  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
adoption  of  these  new  rules  would  result  in  more  numerous 
breaches  of  military  laws  and  above  all  an  even  greater 
decline  of  discipline.  The  Revolutionary  movement,  now 
decreasing  in  some  places,  would  have  a  reaction,  and,  as 
every  relapse,  would  be  more  severe  than  the  illness  it- 
self. 

After  an  exchange  of  opinions,   I  suggested  that  I  did 


I9I7]  REORGANISATION  OF  THE  ARMY  365 

not  exclude  the  possibility  of  all  superior  chiefs  declaring 
to  the  Provisional  Government  that  the  adoption  of  the 
rights  of  military  men  would  compel  us  to  resign.  I  ad- 
mitted that  this  was  an  extreme  measure,  but  I  argued  that 
such  a  unanimous  act  would  produce  such  an  impression 
upon  those  who  had  framed  them  that  they  would  be  com- 
pelled to  consider  how  the  decision  of  such  a  unanimous 
act  on  the  part  of  the  superior  Military  Chiefs  would  in- 
fluence public  opinion. 

Something  which  happened  not  long  after  proved  to  me 
that  I  was  right.  The  ukazes  for  the  dismissal  of  General 
Alexeieff  and  myself  were  confirmed  by  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment on  one  and  the  same  day,  but  one  was  published 
some  days  after  the  other.  It  is  obvious  that  this  delay 
was  dictated  by  the  desire  to  diminish  the  impression  which 
they  would  produce  on  the  public  if  they  were  announced 
simultaneously. 

My  suggestion  met  with  no  objection  on  the  part  of  the 
commanders,  except  that  General  Daniloff  proposed,  before 
taking  such  an  extreme  decision,  that  we  should  all  go  to 
Petrograd  and  frankly  lay  the  case  before  the  Provisional 
Government  and  above  all  before  the  members  of  the  Coun- 
cil of  the  Petrograd  Soviet.  This  met  with  favour,  and 
it  was  decided  that  we  should  go  to  Petrograd  on  the  next 
day,  having  previously  informed  Prince  Lvoff  of  our  Inten- 
tion. It  was  well  known  that  the  Provisional  Government, 
under  the  influence  of  the  Soviets,  wished  to  publish  rights 
of  military  men  without  waiting  for  the  opinion  of  the 
Chiefs.  This  the  Minister  of  War,  Goutchkoff,  opposed, 
declaring  that  he  would  not  put  his  signature  to  an  Order 
that  would  bring  the  entire  disorganisation  of  the  Army, 
and  gave  his  resignation  from  the  Provisional  Government. 

For  quite  different  —  but  well-known  —  reasons  the  MIn- 


366  REORGANISATION  OF  THE  ARMY     [ch.  xxvii 

ister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Milioukoff,  left  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment at  the  same  time. 

On  May  i6th  we  went  to  Petrograd  and  drove  straight 
from  the  train  to  the  house  of  Prince  Lvoff,  where  were 
gathered  all  the  members  of  the  Provisional  Government. 
It  had  been  decided  by  the  Provisional  Government  to  re- 
place Goutchkoff  by  Kerensky.  They  thought  by  such  an 
appointment  to  satisfy  the  democratic  wishes  of  the  Com- 
mittees of  the  Army.  Milioukoff  was  replaced  by  Teresht- 
chenko,  probably  only  because  he  was  the  only  member  of 
the  Government  who  could  speak  several  languages  fluently. 
His  earlier  training  and  service  did  not  at  all  fit  him  for 
the  post  of  director  of  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  country,  es- 
pecially in  so  difficult  a  time.  No  order  had  been  issued 
authorising  the  changes  of  Ministers,  as  disputes  had  al- 
ready arisen  as  to  whose  signature  such  an  appointment 
should  bear  —  whether  that  of  the  President  of  the  Duma, 
in  the  capacity  of  President  of  the  Provisional  Committee 
of  the  Duma,  or  that  of  Prince  Lvoff,  or  finally,  ought  it 
to  carry  both  signatures?  On  the  first  appointment  of  the 
members  of  the  Provisional  Government  in  the  early  days 
of  March,  the  question  was  not  settled  as  to  who  should 
confirm  the  appointment  of  the  new  members  of  the  Gov- 
ernment in  the  event  of  the  resignation  of  one  or  several 
members,  and  further  if  all  the  Ministers  of  the  Provisional 
Government  should  resign  at  once.  Evidently  they  hoped 
that  the  first  committee  of  the  Provisional  Government 
would  be  able  to  lead  the  country  till  the  Constitutional 
Assembly,  according  to  the  Tsar's  Manifesto  of  Abdica- 
tion. 

Common  sense  would  have  suggested  that  the  confirma- 
tion of  the  new  Ministers,  and  especially  the  election  of 
people  for  the  composition  of  a  new  Government,   ought 


1917]  REORGANISATION  OF  THE  ARMY  367 

to  have  been  done  by  some  person  or  persons  who  stood 
outside  the  Government  Staff.  But  all  the  plans  of  the 
Provisional  Government  had  for  their  object  the  retention 
of  all  power  in  their  own  hands.  On  this  occasion  the  or- 
ders were  signed  by  Rodzianko  and  Lvoff,  but  the  next  time 
the  Provisional  Government  did  not  take  into  account  the 
Executive  Committee  of  the  Imperial  Duma,  and  the  signa- 
ture of  Rodzianko  had  disappeared. 

This  was  the  first  time  I  had  had  occasion  to  meet 
Kerensky.  Rarely  attending  meetings  of  the  Imperial 
Duma,  I  never  had  an  opportunity  of  seeing  him  in  the 
chair.  Having  told  the  Provisional  Government  what  had 
brought  us  to  the  capital,  we  expressed  a  wish  to  state  our 
opinions,  not  only  to  the  members  of  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment, but  before  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Duma, 
and  especially  before  the  leaders  and  directors  of  the  Petro- 
grad  Soviets.  I  proposed  to  invite  the  Executive  Committee 
which  numbered  sixty  men,  but  Prince  Lvoff  wished  to  invite 
only  the  Council  of  this  Committee,  which  was  composed  of 
nine  or  ten  men,  affirming  that  the  most  influential  members 
were  in  this  Council,  and  that  the  assembly  of  the  whole 
Committee  would  be  too  large  and  would  only  cause  some 
undesirable  incidents. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

KERENSKY,  MINISTER  OF  WAR THE  CONFERENCE  OF  THE 

COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF      IN      PETROGRAD MY      CON- 
FLICT WITH  THE  GOVERNMENT 

The  Commanders-in-Chief,  when  they  met  with  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Government,  explained  first  of  all  that  the  ob- 
ject of  their  visit  was  to  impress  upon  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment the  necessity  of  taking  serious  measures  for  the 
restoration  of  discipline  in  the  Army,  without  which  we 
could  not  count  upon  Its  fighting  value.  Until  then  every- 
body spoke  to  the  soldiers  about  their  rights;  it  was  quite 
time  to  tell  them  as  well  what  their  duties  were. 

During  the  exchange  of  opinions  I  pointed  out  that  It 
was  a  moral  obligation  on  us  not  to  hide  anything  from  those 
who,  responsibly  or  Irresponsibly,  governed  the  political 
life  of  the  country;  that  our  policy  was  to  tell  them  the 
truth,  only  the  truth,  and  all  the  truth.  At  that,  Keren- 
sky,  who  had  already,  unofiicially,  taken  the  post  of  Min- 
ister of  War,  without  resigning  that  of  Minister  of  Justice, 
remarked  that  he  was  of  the  same  opinion,  that  It  was  of 
prime  necessity  to  speak  the  truth,  only  the  truth  —  but 
not  the  whole  truth,  as  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  tactical 
situation  that  would  place  a  weapon  in  the  hands  of  the 
leaders  of  the  Soviet.  I  did  not  agree,  and  in  consequence 
considered  I  had  the  right  to  act  according  to  my  conscience. 
We  all  dined  that  day  at  Prince  Lvoff's  but  during  dinner 
the  members  of  the  Provisional  Government,  one  after  an- 

:i6& 


1917]  CONFERENCE  OF  COMMANDERS  369 

other,  retired  to  the  next  room.  There  the  Ministerial 
portfohos  were  distributed,  and  the  representatives  of  the 
Soviet  negotiated  as  to  which  of  the  members  of  the  Soviet 
should  receive  them. 

The  Session  of  the  Provisional  Government  of  the  Acting 
Committee  of  the  Imperial  Duma,  and  the  Council  of  the 
Acting  Commission  of  the  Soviet  of  Workmen's  and  Sol- 
diers' Delegates  was  appointed  for  the  next  day,  May  17th, 
at  four  o'clock.  The  sitting  was  to  be  held  in  the  great 
hall  of  the  Imperial  Council  in  the  Mary's  Palace.  At  the 
time  fixed  I  arrived  at  the  Mary's  Palace;  one  by  one  the 
Commanders-in-Chief  appeared,  but  of  the  other  members 
of  the  Council  there  was  no  sign.  One  by  one  the  members 
of  the  Provisional  Government  appeared.  As  to  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Soviet,  they  evidently  thought  that  in  order  to 
raise  their  "  prestige  "  they  ought  to  keep  others  waiting. 
But  after  all  they  were  not  kings,  and  the  French  proverb 
says  that  "  punctuality  is  the  politeness  of  kings."  On  in- 
quiring by  telephone  we  learned  that  the  members  of  the 
Soviet  had  left  for  the  Mary's  Palace  in  motor-cars. 

Among  them  only  three  names  were  known  —  Tzeretelli, 
Skobeleff,  and  Tchernoff,  a  future  Minister  of  Agriculture; 
the  others  were  soldiers  or  workmen  whose  names  or  per- 
sonalities conveyed  nothing.  Before  leaving  Mohileff  the 
commanders  had  settled  among  themselves,  on  general  lines, 
the  subject  on  which  each  would  speak  during  the  Confer- 
ence. As  a  result  of  this  Alexeieff,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
sitting,  had  to  explain  the  cause  of  our  coming  to  Petrograd, 
and  the  summoning  of  the  present  Conference.  After  him 
the  Commanders-in-Chief  were  to  speak  in  the  following 
order:  General  Brussiloff,  General  Dragomiroff,  General 
Tcherbatcheff,  and  lastly  myself.  They  all  had  concrete 
examples  showing  the  disciplinary  condition  of  the  Army  on 


370  CONFERENCE  OF  COMMANDERS     [ch.  xxviii 

their  various  fronts.  I  had  to  Illustrate  the  international 
position  of  Russia,  her  duties  in  regard  to  the  Allies,  and 
the  consequence  which  would  result  If  these  obligations  were 
not  observed.  In  his  concluding  words  Alexeleff  was  to 
lay  down  the  minimum  requirements  which  would  enable 
us  to  carry  out  the  work  which  we  had  undertaken  to  ac- 
complish. 

Prince  Lvoff  presided  over  the  Conference;  on  his  left 
sat  Alexeleff,  with  Brussiloff  and  Dragomlroff.  On  the 
right  of  Lvoff  I  sat;  on  my  right  was  Tcherbatcheff  and 
close  to  him  Kerensky.  General  Alexeleff  first  of  all  spoke 
about  the  proposals  sent  to  us  of  the  rights  of  a  military  man. 
He  said,  that  though  the  Chiefs  did  not  exclude  the  possi- 
bility of  making  regulations  as  to  the  rights  of  military  men, 
but  that  those  rights  must  also  define  the  duties  of  every 
man  in  the  service,  and  the  rights  of  the  Chief.  Though 
the  Provisional  Government  had  not  given  instructions  that 
the  existing  military  rules  and  statutes,  including  disciplinary 
laws,  should  be  altered,  it  had  not  given  instructions  for 
their  continued  proper  observance.  Because  of  that  agi- 
tators constantly  told  the  troops  that  the  Revolution  which 
gave  freedom  to  the  people  had  also  abolished  all  military 
obligations,  as  rules  that  restricted  freedom. 

Three  Commanders-in-Chief,  as  we  had  agreed,  in  glow- 
ing colours  and  with  striking  examples,  showed  how  there 
had  penetrated  into  the  Army  new  "  defeatist  "  ideas,  the 
propaganda  having  spread  with  the  appeal  made  to  the 
lower  animal  senses  of  the  men  and  the  crowd.  When  my 
turn  came  I  also  disclosed  some  facts.  I  read  a  telegram  I 
received  from  my  Chief  of  the  Staff,  Major-General 
Alexeleff,  in  which  he  informed  me  that  an  agitator  had 
arrived  with  authority  from  the  Committee  of  the  Soviet, 
and  that  for  two  days  a  division  which  should  have  taken 


1917]  CONFERENCE  OF  COMMANDERS  371 

part  in  preparations  for  an  offensive,  under  the  influence  of 
this  man's  defeatist  propaganda  had  quite  got  out  of  the 
control  of  the  Chief;  and  that  this  agitator  preached  a  doc- 
trine even  different  from  the  last  decisions  of  the  Soviet.  I 
explained  that  I  had  ordered  by  telegraph  the  arrest  of  this 
person,  assuming  him  to  be  an  impostor,  although  I  was 
not  certain  that  the  Chiefs  would  find  it  possible  to  carry 
out  the  order.  Afterwards  it  was  made  clear  that  this 
agitator  really  had  permission  to  visit  the  front  from  the 
Committee  mentioned.  Having  expounded  to  the  assembly 
the  international  position  of  Russia,  present  and  future, 
I  passed  to  her  present  internal  state.  I  said  that  the  gen- 
eral watchword  remained  "  The  Revolution  continues." 
My  advice  was  not  to  do  two  things  at  the  same  time. 
Either  the  Revolution  must  be  stopped,  or  at  least  discon- 
tinued until  the  end  of  the  war,  or  else  there  was  the  grave 
risk  of  throwing  Russia  herself  into  an  abyss  and,  together 
with  her,  the  Revolution  itself  and  all  its  conquests.  Un- 
less the  leaders  of  political  life  in  Russia  changed  their 
tactics,  they  would  find  that  in  the  near  future  the  same 
democracy  for  which  they  now  fought  would  curse  their 
names  and  their  memory.  They  ought  not  to  forget  that 
the  man  who  cannot  satisfy  his  elementary  material  necessi- 
ties does  not  require  liberty.  The  economic  disorder  of  the 
country  which  was  spreading  would,  above  all,  reflect  on 
the  democracy.  At  that  moment  the  workmen  and  soldiers, 
the  latter  being  peasants,  controlled  the  government  of  the 
country  in  union,  but  the  time  would  come  when  both  these 
classes  would  understand  that  they  were  mistaken,  and  that 
their  interests  were  often  different.  These  very  democratic 
elements  would  in  time  go  fighting  with  each  other, 

I  reminded  them  that  there  had  been  a  time  when  the 
Tsar,  who  was  abdicating,  was  accused  of  playing  the  game 


372  CONFERENCE  OF  COMMANDERS     [ch.  xxviii 

of  the  Germans,  in  regard  to  Internal  politics.  So  a  time 
would  come  when  those  who  sat  there  would  be  accused  of 
just  the  same  things  and  with  much  more  foundation  should 
they  not  change  their  own  political  views.  I  also  declared 
that,  if  the  proposals  of  Army  changes  were  carried  out  as 
they  were  projected,  I  saw  no  possibility  of  fulfilling  the 
duties  which  the  Provisional  Government  had  entrusted  to 
me.  They  would  bring  about  such  disorganisation  in  the 
Army,  which,  httle  by  little,  was  becoming  restored,  that  it 
would  become  an  easy  prey  for  the  enemy,  and  the  eventual 
result  would  be  much  bloodshed,  especially  of  the  democracy 
itself.  If  the  Conference  cared  to  take  upon  themselves  the 
responsibility  of  this  blood,  that  was  for  their  own  con- 
science, but  I  for  one  would  not  take  the  responsibility  of 
it  upon  myself.  I  had  never,  in  military  plans,  been  de- 
terred from  making  a  decision  because  it  would  cause  blood- 
shed, but  I  had  never  called  for  actions  when  I  knew 
blood  would  flow  without  result.  I  finished  my  address  by 
saying  that  from  all  the  tribunes  in  the  land  alarming  voices 
resounded  the  note  saying  the  country  was  in  danger,  but  I 
would  go  farther  and  say  that  the  country  was  on  the  verge 
of  ruin,  and  that  they  were  pushing  her  to  it. 

Alexeieff  followed  me,  and  in  a  very  plain  manner  de- 
manded from  the  representatives  of  the  Soviet  that  they 
should  stop  their  work  of  destruction.  He  told  them  that 
they  had  disorganised  the  Army,  and  that  they  must  go 
among  the  troops  In  the  trenches  and  restore  that  which 
they  had  destroyed.  It  was  foolish,  he  said,  to  give  rights 
to  the  people  without  also  laying  duties  upon  them.  He 
called  upon  the  patriotic  feeling  of  the  Soviet,  asked  from 
them  real  help  for  the  restoration  of  the  fighting  capabilities 
of  the  Army,  without  which  all  the  efforts  of  the  Chiefs 
would  be  in  vain;  told  them  that  their  duty  was  to  uphold 


1917]  CONFERENCE  OF  COMMANDERS  373 

the  authority  of  the  Military  Chief  and  not  overthrow  it; 
and  that  Russia  would  have  to  pay  too  big  a  price  for  all  that 
was  being  done. 

After  Alexeieff  had  finished  a  member  of  the  Council 
of  the  Soviet,  Tzeretelli,  asked  to  be  allowed  to  speak.  He 
tried  rather  weakly  to  justify  the  prolongation  of  the  Revolu- 
tion. He  said  that  it  is  easier  to  begin  a  Revolution  than 
to  stop  it;  that  they,  on  their  side,  did  all  that  was  possible, 
but  that  it  was  difficult  for  them  to  steer  against  the  cur- 
rent. He  protested  against  the  sharp  manner  in  which  they 
had  been  accused.  General  Alexeieff  answered  Tzeretelli. 
Then  Kerensky  asked  to  be  heard,  and  made  a  short  speech, 
the  aim  of  which  was  to  smooth  off  any  rough  edges  that  had 
been  created  in  the  discussion. 

Afterwards  another  member  of  the  Council,  Skobeleff, 
asked  for  a  word.  His  speech  was  rather  colourless,  and 
did  not  remain  in  my  memory.  Then  I  rose  once  more  to 
reply  to  some  of  the  points  of  Tzeretelli  and  Skobeleff. 
After  this  Prince  Lvoff  declared  that  the  subject  had  been 
exhausted,  and  he  closed  the  Conference.  When  the  mem- 
bers left  they  were  surrounded  by  a  crowd  of  newspaper  re- 
porters, most  of  whom  threw  themselves  upon  the  new 
Minister  of  War,  Kerensky.  But  he  rather  sharply  snapped 
at  them. 

I  had  to  listen  to  an  original  suggestion  from  a  land- 
owner known  to  me,  from  the  provinces  of  Ukraine,  though 
it  was  expressed  ironically.  He  said  that  in  a  few  days  a 
Conference  of  the  Ukrainian  Council  would  be  assembled 
at  Kieff,  and  probably  intended  to  declare  its  separation 
from  Russia.  He  said  that  he  intended  to  make  a  pro- 
posal which  would  probably  meet  with  general  approval, 
that  the  new  State  should  begin  its  political  life  clear  of  all 
debts,  and  that  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence  there 


374  CONFERENCE  OF  COMMANDERS     [ch.  xxviii 

should  be  a  declaration  that  Ukraine  did  not  impose  upon 
herself  any  debts  contracted  by  the  Russian  Government. 
To  this,  also  in  a  joking  way,  I  replied  that  his  idea  would 
meet  with  approval  so  long  as  they  did  not  mistake  him  for 
an  agitator,  and  turn  him  out  of  the  Conference. 

That  same  evening  we  were  going  back  to  our  respective 
stations.  Before  leaving  Petrograd  I  had  time  to  visit  the 
British  Ambassador,  Sir  George  Buchanan,  having  first 
informed  him  of  my  Intended  visit.  I  wanted  to  talk  with 
him  about  the  mutual  relations  of  Russia  and  the  Allies. 
Though  I  agreed  that  the  specific  weight  of  Russia  In  the 
Alliance  had  become  noticeably  less,  nevertheless  I  wanted 
to  emphasise  to  him  that  it  was  In  the  interest  of  the  Allies 
to  remain  loyal  to  Russia;  that  to  leave  Russia  to  the  free 
will  of  fate  would  mean  giving  her  over  to  the  influence  of 
Germany;  and  this  would  mean  that,  In  time,  Germany, 
having  become  strong  by  the  untouched  and  inexhaustible 
resources  of  Russia,  would  turn  her  forces  against  Western 
Europe  In  an  overwhelming  struggle.  When  I  got  back  to 
Minsk,  hoping  that  the  leaders  in  Petrograd  would  become 
more  reasonable  and  take  measures  to  reconstruct  the  Army, 
I  actively  busied  myself  with  the  last  instructions  for  the 
preparation  of  the  advance  operations  fixed  for  the  middle 
of  June.  During  the  first  months  of  the  Revolution  the 
supplies  not  only  became  worse,  but  failed  altogether.  But 
in  the  month  of  May  19 17  the  supply  of  provisions  became 
much  better.  The  Provisional  Government  lost  no  time  in 
letting,  not  only  Russia,  but  the  whole  world,  know  that 
our  conditions  had  Improved.  They  attributed  It,  however, 
to  their  own  wise  management.  But  In  reality  it  was  due 
not  so  much  to  the  Provisional  Government,  but  to  the  work 
of  the   agents  of  the   abdicated   Government.     Thanks  tg 


I9I7]  CONFERENCE  OF  COMMANDERS  375 

the  instructions  of  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  in  the  months 
of  November  and  December,  a  continuous  supply  of  corn 
and,  partly,  of  flour,  was  transported  to  the  wharves  on  the 
river  from  the  provinces  of  the  Volga,  the  true  granary  of 
Russia.  But  only  with  the  opening  of  navigation  was  it 
possible  for  these  stores,  which  comprised  more  than  a 
million  tons,  to  be  sent  by  water  into  the  centre  of  Russia 
and  to  the  railways  which  supplied  the  Army. 

In  the  active  preparation  for  advance  the  new  Minister, 
Kerensky,  also  took  part.  His  activity  was  of  a  quite 
special  character.  He  made  a  tour  of  all  the  armies,  espe- 
cially of  those  where  the  advance  was  intended,  and  ad- 
dressed the  troops.  With  exciting  speeches  he  provoked 
the  sincere  enthusiasm  of  the  crowd,  which  he  probably 
regarded  as  deep-seated  and  lasting.  I  counted  on  his 
visit  to  Minsk,  and  hoped  to  have  a  serious  conversation 
with  him,  showing  him  the  instability  of  the  Army  on  a 
dangerous  incline  towards  disorganisation,  and  the  need 
of  steadying.  I  awaited  his  arrival  at  Minsk,  but  in  vain. 
I  realised,  after  my  stay  in  Petrograd,  that  the  principal 
leaders  of  the  Soviet,  those  who  were  directing  the  life  of 
the  country,  and,  as  they  expressed  it,  were  "  deepening  the 
Revolution,"  were  not  sincere  when  they  afl^rmed  that  they 
would  undertake  all  measures  for  the  reconstruction  of  the 
Army.  I  saw  that  they  recognised  that  their  position  might 
be  compared  to  swimming  between  Scylla  and  Charybdis, 
that  they  understood  what  the  disorganisation  of  the  Army 
meant  —  the  victory  of  Germany  and  the  end  of  the  pres- 
ent free  position  of  the  country.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
rebuilding  of  the  Army,  they  knew,  meant  giving  Russia 
again  into  the  hands  of  the  Military  Chiefs  and  yet  they 
yvere  more  afraid  of  this  than  qf  the  German  invasion,  for 


376  CONFERENCE  OF  COMMANDERS     [ch.  xxviii 

It  meant  the  certain  elimination  of  these  demagogues  from 
power.  And  the  preservation  of  power  was  to  them  the 
dearest  thing  on  earth.  They  did  not  care  what  price  the 
people  paid  for  that. 

In  all  his  visits  Kerensky  did  not  meet  with  enthusiasm. 
There  were  cases  where  the  contrary  happened.  In  the 
1 2th  Army,  near  Riga,  a  soldier  in  the  trenches  entered 
into  a  dispute  with  him.  Then  the  democratic  Minister  of 
War  shouted  at  him,  "  Hold  your  tongue  when  the  Min- 
ister of  War  is  speaking  to  you."  Only  just  before  this  he 
had  told  the  soldier  not  to  call  him  Minister  of  War,  but 
simply  "  comrade."  In  Riga  his  patriotic  speeches  were 
met  with  mockery,  and  there  he  stopped  making  speeches. 
In  one  of  the  southern  armies  he  ordered  two  regiments  to 
gather  to  meet  him;  the  regiments  collected  in  their  head- 
quarters, but  one  of  them  did  not  want  to  come  to  the 
meeting-place.  The  adjutant  sent  by  Kerensky  was  re- 
ceived with  insults,  addressed  not  to  him  actually,  but  to 
the  Minister  of  War.  Kerensky  decided  not  to  appear  be- 
fore this  regiment. 

The  first  order  of  Kerensky  after  taking  the  post  of 
Minister  was  the  declaration  that  the  senior  Military  Chiefs 
under  no  conditions  had  a  right  to  leave  their  posts,  to 
ask  for  their  dismissal,  or  to  resign.  It  was  clear  to  me 
that  this  was  directed  against  me,  or  perhaps  he  had  been 
informed  by  his  brother-in-law,  the  Colonel  of  the  General 
Staff,  who  served  in  the  "  Stafka,"  that  during  the  Confer- 
ence of  May  14th,  at  which  this  Colonel  assisted,  the  com- 
manders of  the  armies  foresaw  the  necessity  of  leaving  their 
posts  in  case  of  the  realisation  of  the  projected  rights  of  the 
military  men.  In  time  that  brother-in-law  of  Kerensky's 
was  appointed  chief  of  his  military  cabinet  —  a  most  demo- 
cratic proceeding.     In  the  middle  of  May  the  Minister  of 


igiy]  CONFERENCE  OF  COMMANDERS  377 

War  published  these  rights  as  they  were  framed  by  General 
Polivanoff's  Commission.  I  at  once  wrote  a  report  in  the 
name  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Alexeieff,  in  which  I 
stated  that  the  ukaze  of  the  Minister  of  War  deprived  me  of 
my  right  to  ask  for  my  dismissal  from  my  post,  and  that  was 
why  I  left  the  Provisional  Government  to  judge  for  itself 
whether  I  could  remain  under  these  conditions,  without  the 
means  of  carrying  on  the  task  entrusted  to  me.  I  also  de- 
clared that  I  discarded  the  moral  responsibility,  the  responsi- 
bility of  my  conscience,  for  all  that  might  happen  in  the 
future  in  directing  the  troops  at  the  front.  A  copy  of  this 
report,  with  a  letter,  I  sent  to  Prince  Lvoff,  as  the  head  of  the 
Provisional  Government.  I  had  to  wait  rather  a  long  time 
for  the  answer.  In  reality  the  Provisional  Government 
signed  the  order  for  my  dismissal  on  June  5th,  at  the  same 
time  as  that  of  General  Alexeiff.  The  latter  was  signed  at 
the  request  of  the  Soviet.  The  Government  did  not  de- 
cide to  publish  the  order  for  my  dismissal  in  conjunction 
with  the  dismissal  of  General  Alexeieff,  and  I  learnt  about 
it  on  June  9th.  In  an  indirect  way  I  was  told  that  the 
Provisional  Government  after  my  report  wanted  me  to  com- 
mand a  regiment,  but,  having  consulted  wiser  leaders,  they 
declared  that  I  should  receive  the  command  of  a  division, 
a  position  in  which  I  began  the  war.  At  first  I  thought  I 
would  answer  the  Generalissimo  in  a  rather  sharp  manner, 
asking  him  to  explain  to  the  Provisional  Government  how 
the  latter  contradicted  itself  in  making  such  a  decision,  as  it 
was  entirely  opposed  to  the  newly  declared  rights  of  the 
military  men,  one  of  which  provided  that  no  one  can  be  re- 
moved from  his  post,  or  submitted  to  disciplinary  punish- 
ment, without  a  court  martial,  and  that  was  why  I  asked 
that  those  rights  should  be  applied  to  me.  But  my  Chief  of 
Staff,  Major-General  Alexeieff,  persuaded  me  to  take  up  a 


378  CONFERENCE  OF  COMMANDERS     [ch.  xxviii 

different  position,  namely,  that  I  was  acting  quite  lawfully 
within  the  existing  and  unchanged  laws,  as  I  was  largely 
bound  to  do,  in  letting  my  Chief  know  that  I  did  not  see 
the  possibility  of  executing  the  task  which  was  put  on  me; 
and  further  to  ask  why,  in  regard  to  me,  they  did  not  apply 
the  right  of  a  military  man,  proclaimed  by  the  Provisional 
Government.  This  telegram  I  sent  to  General  Brussiloff, 
who  took  the  post  of  Generalissimo.  About  June  i6th  I 
received  information  that  General  Brussiloff  was  coming  to 
Minsk.  A  guard  of  honour  was  sent  to  meet  him.  By 
chance  the  train  of  the  Generalissimo  arrived  at  the  sta- 
tion of  Minsk  twenty  minutes  earlier  than  the  appointed 
time,  and  that  is  why  I  was  not  at  the  station. 

Having  arrived  at  the  station,  I  learnt  from  Brussiloff  that 
the  Provisional  Government  had  changed  its  decision,  and 
had  given  an  order  for  me  to  be  attached  to  the  Generalis- 
simo. Then  we  went  with  Brussiloff  to  the  sector  of  the 
Army  where  the  last  preparations  were  being  made  for  the 
offensive,  which  was  fixed  for  the  middle  of  July.  General 
Brussiloff  afterwards  went  to  visit  other  troops,  but  I  did 
not  accompany  him,  because  I  could  not  have  avoided  re- 
ferring to  the  causes  of  my  resignation  except  at  the  price  of 
severely  criticising  the  Provisional  Government.  This  I 
did  not  wish  to  do  before  the  troops,  because  I  did  not  wish 
to  lessen  the  authority  of  this  Government,  which  was  al- 
ready not  very  great.  Before  leaving  I  asked  Brussiloff  to 
send  my  successor  to  Minsk  as  soon  as  possible. 

It  seemed  to  me  incomprehensible  that  the  Provisional 
Government,  which  considered  me  unsuitable  to  take  the 
post  of  General-in-Chief,  did  not  give  me  at  once  instruc- 
tions to  vacate  my  post,  in  favour  of  one  of  the  senior  com- 
manders, as  always  happens  in  similar  cases.  Before  leav- 
ing, I  told  Brussiloff  that  after  leaving  my  post  I  would  not 


I9I7]  CONFERENCE  OF  COMMANDERS  379 

come  to  Mohileff,  but  would  go  to  a  Caucasian  watering- 
place  for  leave. 

At  last,  on  June  21st,  General  Denikin,  who  had  before 
occupied  the  post  of  Chief  of  Staff  at  the  "  Stafka,"  arrived 
at  Minsk.  In  giving  over  the  post  to  Denikin,  I  could  make 
my  farewell  order  to  the  troops  of  the  western  front  (see 
Appendix  III).  Some  days  before,  wanting  to  say  good- 
bye to  my  subordinates,  I  proposed  to  those  willing,  to  meet 
at  the  appointed  hour  in  the  building  of  the  staff  officers' 
mess.  Knowing  that  my  leaving  had  aroused  varying  com- 
ments I  wanted  to  explain  why  I  considered  it  morally  wrong 
for  me  to  continue  to  occupy  such  a  responsible  post.  Be- 
sides the  reasons  which  I  mentioned  during  the  conference 
in  the  Mary's  Palace,  I  had  the  other  hope  that  my  volun- 
tary leaving  would  bring  the  Petrograd  leaders  to  their 
senses,  and  make  them  understand  that  probably  something 
really  serious  was  happening,  when  the  man  who  had  given 
all  his  strength  to  the  beloved  work,  and  who  had  reached 
a  position  which  rarely  falls  to  the  lot  of  a  military  man, 
cast  it  all  aside. 

I  may  confess  that  I  gave  myself  the  satisfaction  of  saying 
some  pleasant  words  on  the  address  of  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment. I  said  that  I  was  accused  of  the  sharp  manner 
in  which  I  expressed  my  opinion  to  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment; when  I  wanted  to  resign,  I  drew  attention  to  the  fact 
that  I  never  had  two  languages,  one  for  my  subordinates 
and  another  for  my  Chiefs,  as  also  I  did  not  have  two  lan- 
guages, one  for  gentlemen  and  —  I  pointed  to  those  present 
—  and  the  other  for  lackeys  —  pointing  afar.  I  did  not,  I 
said,  belong  to  the  class  of  invertebrate  beings;  that  I  never 
bent  my  back  before  Tsars,  so,  naturally,  I  would  not  bend 
before  those  new  autocrats.  Never  before  had  I  addressed 
such  an  attentive  audience,  or  one  which  so  eagerly  listened 


38o  CONFERENCE  OF  COMMANDERS     [ch.  xxviii 

to  ev^ery  word.  A  great  effort  of  will  was  required  to  con- 
tinue my  speech  calmly  to  the  end.  It  was  the  cry  of  the 
troubled  soul,  into  it  penetrated  the  whole  bitterness  of  what 
was  passing  in  the  land,  in  it  one  could  hear  the  anxiety  for 
the  near  future. 

My  nearest  colleagues  and  assistants  turned  to  me  with 
a  farewell  address.  First  of  all  spoke  the  priest  of  the 
Staff,  and,  according  to  the  Russian  custom,  he,  in  the  name 
of  all  the  people  present,  blessed  me  with  the  image  of  Saint 
Vasili  the  Great,  my  patron.  Such  moments  naturally  leave 
an  indelible  impression.  It  was  not  the  usual  farewell  be- 
fore taking  a  new  post,  which  had  happened  to  me  more  than 
once,  but  it  was  a  farewell  to  all  the  past,  to  all  that  was 
dear  to  me,  to  all  to  which  I  had  given  over  thirty  years  of 
my  life  and  service.  It  was  a  farewell  with  the  possibility, 
at  least  in  the  near  future,  of  giving  active  help  to  my  country 
in  the  moment  when  she  needed  every  conscientious  worker. 
The  decision  taken  by  me  was  taken  after  a  long  struggle.  I 
admitted  that,  remaining,  I  could  serve  those  elements  of  the 
military  power  of  Russia,  a  power  which  she  needed  the 
most.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  I  could  not  admit  that,  in  ex- 
ecuting the  instructions  of  the  Provisional  Government, 
which  in  its  turn  was  the  blind  exeaitor  of  the  irresponsible 
"  Soviets,"  I  should  put  my  energy  and  knowledge  to  pre- 
pare what  would  reveal  the  helpless  state  of  the  Russian 
Army  during  the  expected  offensive.  I  could  not  take  upon 
my  conscience  the  flow  of  innocent  blood  in  the  coming  ad- 
vance, an  advance  which  would  only  end  in  the  defeat  of 
those  few  regiments  which  still  retained  fighting  capability 
and  leaving  behind  the  mass  of  the  Army  which  would  be  un- 
able to  push  back  the  weakest  counter-attack  of  our  enemies. 
Unfortunately,  what  happened  in  the  future  confirmed  my 
fears,  even  exceeded  them. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

THE     ELECTION    OF    THE     COSSACKS'    ATAMAN GENERAL 

KALEDIN MY    ARREST    AND    CONFINEMENT    IN    THE 

FORTRESS     OF     PETER     AND     PAUL DEPARTURE     TO 

ENGLAND 

On  July  20th  General  Denikin  arrived  at  Minsk  with  Gen- 
eral Markoff,  whom  he  destined  for  the  post  of  Chief  of 
his  Staff,  and  two  days  after  I  left  the  Front,  having  ac- 
quainted General  Denikin  with  all  possible  details  of  the 
future  active  operations,  as  well  as  with  the  political  spirit 
of  the  Army. 

A  Commissary  of  the  Provisional  Government  had  al- 
ready been  appointed  to  the  front.  He  arrived  at  Minsk 
about  the  middle  of  May,  and  came  to  see  me,  but  he  could 
not  explain  what  were  his  functions,  rights,  and  duties.  I 
telegraphed  to  Prince  Lvoff  asking  him  to  let  me  know  by 
whose  instructions  the  newly  arrived  commissary,  Vyrouboff, 
would  be  directed  in  his  activity  at  the  front,  wishing  to  give 
my  opinion  when  I  should  be  acquainted  with  the  reason  of 
instituting  such  an  appointment.  1  received  the  reply  that 
the  instructions  were  being  considered.  When  Vyrouboff 
again  came  to  me  I  showed  him  the  telegram,  and  told  him 
that  before  the  instructions  were  received  I  did  not  see  any- 
thing in  which  he  could  engage.  Besides,  I  understood  his 
work  to  be  that  of  an  agent  of  the  Government,  who  would 
help  the  General-in-Chief  in  his  relations  with  the  popula- 
tion of  the  place,  and  with  the  different  electoral  institutions 
which  had  arisen  in  the  country  instead  of  the  abolished  ad- 

381 


382  MY  ARREST  AND  CONFINEMENT     [ch.  xxix 

ministration.  Until  my  actual  departure  I  did  not  receive 
any  instructions  from  the  Provisional  Government,  nor  did 
I  hear  anything  about  Vyrouboff;  he  did  not  come  to  see  me, 
and  did  not  show  any  activity.  In  such  conditions  his  pres- 
ence did  not  disturb  me  in  the  least. 

As  I  have  already  said,  I  had  intended  going  to  Kislo- 
vodsk in  the  Caucasus,  to  the  mineral  waters.  My  way  lay 
by  Novotcherkask,  the  principal  town  of  the  province  of 
the  "  Troops  of  the  Don."  In  Novotcherkask  was  assem- 
bled for  a  conference  the  military  circle  of  Cossacks,  an  elec- 
toral institution  comprising  about  400  people.  This  elec- 
toral institution  of  the  Cossacks  was  in  existence  from  long 
ago  until  the  reign  of  Peter  the  Great.  Its  functions  at  that 
time  appertained  to  economic  questions,  the  election  of  the 
"  Ataman  "  and  the  election  of  the  Council  of  the  latter, 
which  was  termed  the  "  Government  of  the  Troops  of  the 
Don."  With  the  evolution  of  March,  this  institution  was 
re-established. 

For  the  last  two  centuries  the  Cossack  assembly  had  been 
preserved  as  a  tradition  and  ceremony,  when  a  new  ataman 
received  the  emblems  of  his  office.  But  since  the  time  of 
Peter  the  Great,  the  Cossack  atamans  had  not  been  elected 
by  the  Cossacks,  but  had  been  chosen  by  the  Emperors. 
This  change  had  arisen  owing  to  the  treachery  of  the  "  Het- 
man  "  (Ataman)  of  Little  Russia,  Mazeppa,  who  passed 
with  his  troops  to  the  side  of  the  King  Charles  XII  of 
Sweden  before  the  battle  of  Poltava  in  1709. 

On  my  way  to  the  Caucasus  I  decided  to  stop  at  Novot- 
cherkask. I  was  interested  in  the  procedure  of  the  Cossack 
assembly  and  the  ceremony  of  electing  the  Ataman,  and  I 
wished  also  to  see  what  spirit  prevailed  among  the  Cossacks 
of  the  Don.  From  the  newspapers  I  had  concluded  that  this 
meeting,  with  all  its  democratic  pretensions,  was  quite  differ- 


I9I7]  MY  ARREST  AND  CONFINEMENT  383 

ently  disposed  than  the  Soviets  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers' 
deputies.  The  Cossack  Assembly  was  elected  by  the  entire 
population  of  the  Province  of  the  Don,  on  the  system  of  the 
universal  vote.  Among  the  number  of  the  elected  was  a 
woman. 

I  arrived  at  Novotcherkask  on  June  (25th),  at  three 
o'clock  in  the  morning.  I  could  find  no  accommodation  in 
the  hotels  and  had  to  take  advantage  of  an  invitation  from 
one  of  my  comrades  Zerebkoff,  whose  old  parents  lived  in 
Novotcherkask.  The  old  Zerebkoff,  more  than  eighty  years 
of  age,  was  at  that  time  the  only  Cossack  Adjutant-General 
of  Nicolai  II,  and  enjoyed  great  respect  among  Cossacks. 
In  his  house  I  found  hospitality,  learned  what  was  happening 
in  the  Cossack  circles,  and  further  I  found  that  General  Kale- 
din  lived  on  the  first  floor  in  the  same  house.  Not  long  since 
General  Kaledin  had  commanded  the  8th  Army  on  the  south- 
western front,  but  he  did  not  get  on  well  with  General  Brus- 
siloff,  under  the  conditions  of  the  Revolution.  Early  in  the 
morning,  General  Zerebkoff  and  I  went  to  the  Summer  The- 
atre, where  the  Cossack  Assembly  was  to  meet,  and  entered 
the  box  of  the  ataman  where  Kaledin  was  already  sitting 
with  his  wife.  General  Kaledin  was  married  to  a  French- 
woman. 

Scarcely  had  I  entered  the  box,  before  some  of  my  former 
subordinates  recognised  me,  and  one  of  them  went  on  the 
stage  and  spoke  something  in  the  ear  of  the  President  of 
the  Assembly,  Bogaevsky.  When  a  member  who  was 
speaking  had  finished,  Bogaevsky  turned  to  the  assembly  and 
informed  them  that  they  were  honoured  by  the  presence 
of  the  former  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  western  front. 
All  the  members  rose  from  their  seats  and  greeted  me  with 
applause.  Some  asked  that  I  would  take  the  chair.  I  was 
greatly  pleased  to  have  the  opportunity  of  meeting  the  Cos- 


384  MY  ARREST  AND  CONFINEMENT     [ch.  xxix 

sacks  of  the  Don,  and  of  expressing  to  them  my  views  on  the 
present  position  of  things,  and  about  the  role  which  the  Cos- 
sacks might  play  in  these  difficult  hours  in  which  Russia  lived. 
On  taking  the  chair  I  told  them  how  comforting  it  was  to 
know  that  the  revolutionary  intoxication  which  had  seized 
the  whole  of  Russia  had  not  turned  their  heads,  as  the  words 
"  freedom  "  and  "  liberty  "  were  no  new  phrases  to  the  Cos- 
sacks. The  love  of  freedom  had  created  the  Cossacks;  it 
directed  them  in  social  life;  and  their  special  liberties  had 
always  been  confirmed  by  a  special  decree  of  Emperors 
when  they  ascended  the  throne.  But,  understanding 
what  it  meant  themselves,  the  Cossacks  would  realise  that 
freedom  could  be  combined  with  military  discipline,  the  main- 
tenance of  which  had  made  the  Cossacks  a  splendid  army 
which  was  always  at  the  disposal  of  the  Military  Chiefs  as  a 
reliable  weapon.  Russian  life  was  so  complicated  that,  once 
I  had  entered  upon  it,  my  speech  became  long,  in  spite  of  my- 
self. I  had  talked  for  more  than  an  hour  before  I  noticed 
it;  and  knowing  that  the  Assembly  had  its  own  business  to 
transact  I  wanted  to  leave  the  chair,  but  the  members  of  the 
Assembly  persistently  demanded  that  I  should  continue,  and 
finish  all  that  I  had  to  say.  From  the  spirit  of  the  Council, 
from  the  attention  with  which  I  had  been  listened  to  I  could 
see  that  they  had  nothing  in  common  with  the  spirit  of  the 
Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Soviets. 

My  further  attendances  at  the  Conference  convinced  me 
more  than  ever.  It  was  quite  apparent  that  the  people  had 
assembled,  not  for  the  discussion  of  "  abstract  "  questions  of 
politics  or  rights,  but  for  the  arrangement  of  their  own  af- 
fairs, and  the  establishment  of  orderly  administration  in 
their  own  province. 

In  the  intervals  I  conversed  with  the  members,  with  soldier 
Cossacks  as  well  as  officers.      I  gathered  the  same  impres- 


191 7]  MY  ARREST  AND  CONFINEMENT  385 

sion  from  all  these  little  talks.  They  discussed  names  of 
candidates  for  the  post  of  the  Ataman.  The  majority  were 
for  General  Kaledin.  Of  all  the  Cossacks  he  was  the  one 
who  had  most  distinguished  himself  during  the  war.  But  at 
first  Kaledin  obstinately  refused  his  candidature,  and  only 
yielded  at  the  persistent  exhortation  of  the  Cossacks.  On 
the  evening  of  the  last  conference,  the  election  of  the  Ata- 
man was  to  be  determined  and  the  ceremony  observed  of 
presenting  to  the  Ataman  the  so-called  herdish,  a  long  scep- 
tre not  less  than  two  metres  long,  with  silver  top  and  an 
Inscription  which  Identified  it  as  an  historic  emblem  dating 
back  to  before  the  time  of  Peter  the  Great. 

This  presentation  Is  made  by  the  President  of  the  Assem- 
bly in  historic  words  always  uttered  on  this  occasion.  The 
Ataman  replies,  promising  to  serve  faithfully  the  interests 
of  the  Cossacks  and  the  Don  birthright.  On  the  next 
day  the  Ataman,  bearing  the  sceptre  accompanied  by 
the  members  of  the  Assembly  and  the  standards  of  the 
Cossacks,  proceeds  from  the  Military  Administration  to  the 
Cathedral  where  a  solemn  service  takes  place.  At  Its  con- 
clusion, the  Ataman  goes  to  the  square  on  which  are  paraded 
the  Cossack  troops  of  all  the  garrison,  and  standing  on  a 
high  platform,  he  receives  from  the  hand  of  the  President  of 
the  Assembly  the  second  emblem  of  his  power,  the  gold  mace 
which  is  very  like  a  long  marshal's  baton  with  a  crown  and 
cross  at  the  end.  Prayers  are  said  by  the  clergy,  and  the 
Ataman,  with  the  baton  in  his  hand,  swears  faithfulness  to 
the  Cossacks.  When  the  clergy  have  retired  from  the 
Cathedral  the  Ataman,  bearing  his  mace,  inspects  the  troops, 
who  then  file  off  before  him. 

There  was  a  rather  large  garrison  in  Novotcherkask  made 
up  of  reserve  units  of  soldiers  preparing  to  reinforce  the 
Army.      Directly  after  the  Revolution  this  garrison,  in  com- 


386         .    MY  ARREST  AND  CONFINEMENT     [ch.  xxix 

mon  with  others,  had  chosen  a  Soviet  of  deputies,  but  from 
the  start  of  the  Assembly  the  relations  between  it  and  the 
Soviet  were  hostile.  During  the  Cossack  Assembly  the 
question  had  been  raised  of  dissolving  the  Soviet.  But  it 
was  finally  referred  to  the  Ataman  and  to  the  Government 
of  the  Don.  Not  one  detachment  of  the  garrison,  nor  the 
Soviet,  took  part  in  the  ceremony  when  the  Ataman  was 
invested.  The  Soviet  even  decided  to  arrest  him.  But, 
fortunately,  this  decision  was  not  acted  upon,  because  a  col- 
lision of  arms  and  shedding  of  blood  would  have  been  in- 
evitable. 

The  Circle  of  the  Don,  in  its  strife  with  the  Workmen's 
and  Soldiers'  Committees,  which  were  hostile  to  the  Cos- 
sacks, could  lean  on  two  Cossack  divisions,  which  waited  on 
the  Don  to  be  dispatched  to  the  Caucasus  with  the  one  object 
of  giving  help  to  the  English  Mesopotamian  Army  (see 
Chapter  XXI). 

That  same  evening  I  said  good-bye  to  my  hospitable  hosts 
at  whose  house  I  had  lived  for  about  a  week,  and  went  to 
Kislovodsk,  to  the  mineral  springs  where  my  wife  had  pre- 
ceded me.  In  Kislovodsk  I  met  several  military  men  who, 
like  myself,  had  left  the  Army  because  the  new  conditions 
made  it  impossible  for  them  to  remain  at  the  head  of  the 
troops.  Among  them  was  General  Russky,  who  had  not 
long  left  the  post  of  Commander-in-Chief  on  the  northern 
front  at  the  request  of  the  Government.  Three  weeks  after 
my  arrival  in  the  Caucasus  I  learned  from  the  newspapers 
of  the  defeats  which  our  troops  had  suffered  in  Galicia. 
Though  the  first  actions  seemed  to  be  successful,  they  led  to 
the  capture  of  the  former  capital  of  Red  Russia,  Galitch.  In 
the  telegrams  hurriedly  sent  out  to  local  papers  appeared  the 
messages  of  the  Committee  of  the  south-western  front,  sent 
to  the  Generalissimo   and  the   Minister  of  War.     These 


GENERAL   tlolKKO  GEXKKAI.   KISSKV 

At    Kisli)\(i(lsk 


I9I7]  MY  ARREST  AND  CONFINEMENT  387 

messages  indicated  not  only  the  complete  disorganisation 
of  our  Army  and  its  reserves,  but  in  what  degree  those  who 
wrote  the  telegrams  had  lost  their  heads.  I  at  once  sent  a 
telegram  to  the  Minister  of  War,  Kerensky,  with  a  copy  to 
Brussiloff.  In  it  I  protested  that  it  was  unpardonable  that 
the  military  censorship  should  permit  the  publication  of  such 
a  telegram.  It  not  only  informed  the  enemy  of  the  dis- 
order which  had  occurred  on  the  attacking  front,  but,  besides, 
it  clearly  demonstrated  the  perplexity  and  helplessness  of  the 
military  committees,  the  influence  of  which  on  the  troops  was 
no  secret  to  the  Germans.  Information  of  that  sort  gave 
gratuitously  into  our  adversaries'  hands  a  new  weapon  to 
inspire  them  to  continue  the  energetic  advance,  and  to  raise 
the  moral  of  their  own  troops.  I  further  pointed  out  that 
to  continue  the  offensive  by  drawing  the  best  elements  from 
the  Army  for  the  formation  of  the  so-called  "  storming  " 
battalions,  meant  to  lose  from  the  beginning  of  a  battle  the 
only  combative  elements  of  our  troops,  and  would  leave  the 
remainder  to  become  the  easy  prey  of  the  enemy.  To  pur- 
sue offensive  operations  under  such  conditions,  I  added,  was 
sacrificing  unnecessarily  rivers  of  blood,  and  was  not  only 
losing  without  any  profit,  but  was  extremely  dangerous,  If  not 
criminal. 

I  received  no  reply  to  this  telegram  to  the  War  Minister, 
but  two  days  later  during  the  night  a  message  was  brought 
to  me  signed  by  General  Brusslloff,  asking  General  Russky 
and  myself  to  proceed  without  any  delay  to  General  Head- 
quarters for  a  conference  with  the  Provisional  Government. 
An  express  train  was  placed  at  our  disposal,  and  the  Confer- 
ence Itself  waited  for  our  arrival.  General  Russky  and  I 
left  the  same  evening,  hoping  to  reach  Mohileff  on  the  third 
day.  But  the  following  night  I  received  a  telegram  signed 
by  General  Loukomsky,  who  succeeded  General  Denikin  as 


388  MY  ARREST  AND  CONFINEMENT     [ch.  xxix 

Chief  of  the  General  Staff.  In  it,  on  behalf  of  Brussiloff, 
he  asked  me  not  to  come  to  Mohileff,  as  the  circumstances 
were  changed.  Had  I  received  this  intimation  before  leav- 
ing Kislovodsk,  I  should  probably  not  have  started,  but  now 
that  I  was  on  the  way  I  decided  to  continue  my  journey.  On 
the  next  morning,  at  Rostoff,  I  had  a  second  telegram,  in 
which,  excusing  himself  for  the  trouble  caused  to  me,  General 
Brussiloff  again  asked  me  not  to  come  to  the  General  Head- 
quarters. Only  on  arrival  at  Mohileff  did  I  learn  the  rea- 
sons for  this  invitation  and  counter-invitation.  The  catas- 
trophe to  the  Army  of  General  Korniloff  had  troubled,  not 
only  the  High  Command,  but  the  Provisional  Government. 
They  were  now  convinced  how  low  the  combative  spirit  of 
the  Army  had  fallen.  The  success  of  the  so-called  Revolu- 
tionary regiments  on  their  first  appearance  on  July  ist  was 
at  once  wiped  out  by  the  enemy.  The  heroic  "  Revolution- 
ary Regiments  "  received  for  the  immortal  glory  of  their 
deeds,  red  flags !  and  on  the  next  day  they  were  driven  from 
their  positions  and  compelled  to  retreat  to  their  starting- 
point.  If  the  success  of  the  enemy  was  not  developed  it  was 
only  because  they  were  Austrian  troops.  The  newspapers 
were  ordered  to  keep  silent,  under  the  pretext  of  keeping 
things  secret,  as  if  the  circumstances  which  brought  to  an  end 
the  first  advance  of  the  Revolutionary  Army  was  not  as  well 
known  to  him  as  to  us. 

The  presence  of  Kerensky,  who  visited  the  reserve  di- 
visions and  made  encouraging  speeches,  did  not  help  to  raise 
the  spirits  of  the  men.  Someone  said  of  him  that  during 
this  period  he  played  the  role  of  a  "  petite  Jeanne  d'Arc," 
while  searching  for  an  outlet  from  the  perilous  position. 
Then  the  Government  called  the  Conference  at  the  General 
Headquarters,  asking  General  Brussiloff  to  invite  the  Com- 
manders-in-Chief General  Alexeieff  and  Russky,  and  others 


I9I7]  MY  ARREST  AND  CONFINEMENT  389 

whom  Brussiloff  considered  desirable.  It  was  in  accordance 
with  this  that  General  Brussiloff  sent  me  an  invitation,  but 
when  the  Provisional  Government  heard  of  it  they  let  Gen- 
eral Headquarters  know  that  if  I  took  part  in  the  Confer- 
ence their  members  would  not  come.  At  the  same  time  as 
Russky  and  myself  came  General  Alexeieff  to  General  Head- 
quarters, but  because  of  the  anxiety  on  his  sector  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  south-western  front  could  not  leave. 
Next  morning  Denikin  was  expected  from  Minsk,  On  his 
Front  the  offensive  was  at  first  postponed  and  then  quite 
countermanded.  Members  of  the  Provisional  Government 
were  expected  in  the  afternoon  of  the  next  day.  The  mil- 
itary members  had  gathered  at  Brussiloff's,  and  were  engaged 
in  a  consideration  of  the  existing  position,  before  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Provisional  Government  arrived  at  Mohileff,  in 
which  the  advantages  of  my  presence  at  Headquarters  was 
realised.  But  in  order  that  neither  Brussiloff  nor  the  Pro- 
visional Government  should  be  embarrassed,  I  announced  to 
Brussiloff  that  before  the  Conference  began  I  would  leave 
for  Petrograd,  where  I  had  private  business  which,  after 
my  three  years'  absence,  required  my  presence,  as  my  visits 
to  Petrograd  on  duty  had  not  given  me  any  time  to  attend  to 
my  personal  affairs. 

On  account  of  the  delay  of  the  Kieff  train,  which  passed  by 
Mohileff  to  Petrograd,  the  members  of  the  Provisional 
Government,  Kerensky,  and  the  Minister  of  the  Exterior, 
Tereshtchenko,  came  to  Mohileff  while  I  was  still  waiting 
for  the  coupling  of  my  waggon  to  the  Petrograd  train. 
Kerensky  and  Tereshtchenko  came  in  the  most  luxurious 
Imperial  train.  The  two  men  were  brought  by  a  train 
which  was  on  forty-four  axles,  and  at  a  time  when,  from  the 
insufficiency  of  the  coal,  traffic  was  stopping  on  the  railways. 
It  is  difficult  to  say  if  it  was  the  boastfulness  peculiar  to  all 


390  MY  ARREST  AND  CONFINEMENT     [ch.  xxix 

upstarts,  or  if  it  was  a  case  of  carelessness,  or  the  con- 
scientious thought  that  the  men  who  are  in  power  ought  to 
impress  the  crowd  by  sumptuousness.  If  such  was  the  idea 
which  directed  the  Government  at  this  time,  it  would  have 
been  sufficient  for  them  to  mix  with  the  crowd  and  to  Hsten 
to  expressed  opinions.  That  which  is  seldom  or  not  always 
forgiven  with  regard  to  the  head  of  a  State,  who  is  in  power 
by  right  of  birth  and,  in  the  mind  of  the  Russian  nation,  by 
the  Will  of  God,  is  not  forgiven  in  men  who  grasp  the 
power,  and  are  sprung  from  the  people. 

On  the  arrival  of  Kerensky,  the  following  characteristic 
episode  occurred.  The  Conference  of  the  Committee  was 
appointed  at  three  o'clock  p.  m.  General  Brussiloff  passed 
the  whole  morning  in  conversation  with  us  who  had  come  to 
Mohileff  and  then  until  lunch  received  the  reports.  That  is 
why  he  did  not  go  to  the  station  to  meet  Kerensky.  On  this 
day  I  had  refused  to  lunch  at  Brussiloff's,  wishing  to  see  in 
the  officers'  mess  my  former  subordinates  during  the  time  of 
my  winter  residence  in  the  General  Headquarters.  During 
lunch  time  the  Quartermaster-General,  Romanovsky,  was 
called  to  the  telephone.  From  the  carriage  of  Kerensky  his 
brother-in-law  and  chief  of  his  Cabinet  asked  if  the  Gen- 
eralissimo would  come  to  the  train  of  the  Minister  of  War. 
By  the  order  of  General  Loukomsky,  Romanovsky  an- 
swered that  General  Brussiloff  had  been  busy  all  the  morning 
and  was  now  sitting  down  to  lunch,  and  asked  the  members 
of  the  Provisional  Government  to  come  at  four  o'clock  to  the 
Conference  at  the  house  of  the  Governor.  At  the  station, 
waiting  for  the  departure  of  my  train,  I  learnt  from  the 
officers  of  the  Staff  who  came  to  wish  me  farewell  that  Keren- 
sky, on  receiving  this  answer,  ordered  General  Brussiloff 
with  the  Chief  of  Staff,  Loukomsky,  to  come  to  him  to  the 
train  with  reports.     If  one  could  not  doubt  the  motives 


I9I7]  MY  ARREST  AND  CONFINEMENT  391 

which  directed  Kerensky  in  the  desire  of  travelling  in  the 
Imperial  trains,  here  one  could  not  be  mistaken  in  the  motive 
that  guided  him  in  ordering  the  Generalissimo  to  meet  the 
train  before  he  would  come  to  the  Conference.  Three  days 
afterwards  the  replacing  of  Brussiloff  in  the  post  of  Com- 
mander-in-Chief by  General  Korniloff  occurred.  Naturally 
the  whole  General  Staff  was  talking  about  this  as  the  result 
of  Brussiloff  not  going  to  meet  Mr.  Kerensky  at  the  station. 

The  next  day  I  was  in  Petrograd,  which  in  its  general 
aspect  had  little  changed.  The  only  thing  that  struck  was 
that  at  the  corners  of  streets  militiamen  with  white  armlets 
and  rifles  on  their  left  shoulder  replaced  the  less  warlike  but 
more  active  policemen  of  former  times.  The  military  au- 
thorities were  still  so  amiable  that  they  gave  for  my  use  a 
military  motor-car,  as  the  means  of  travelling  In  the  capital 
were  rather  difficult.  I  stopped  at  my  private  house,  and 
expected  to  stay  less  than  a  week  and  then  to  go  to  Moscow. 
At  this  time,  at  Moscow,  It  was  intended,  at  the  initiative  of 
the  Provisional  Government,  to  call  a  special  Conference 
attended  not  only  by  the  democracy,  but  by  the  other  classes 
of  society,  social  institutions,  and  corporations.  I  had  not 
lost  hope  of  receiving  a  mandate  from  some  society  to  assist 
at  the  Conference,  and  take  part  in  It.  These  steps  I  meant 
to  take  in  Moscow  itself.  But  events  which  occurred  made 
it  impossible  for  me  to  go. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  August  4th  in  the  private  house  In 
which  I  stopped,  one  could  hear  continued  bell-ringing. 
When  the  servant  opened  the  door  of  the  house  there  did 
not  come  In,  but  rushed  In,  not  less  than  ten  armed  soldiers 
with  an  officer  at  the  head  and  began  to  spread  themselves 
all  over  the  house.  The  officer  first  met  my  wife,  whom  he 
asked  if  I  were  there  and  requested  her  to  show  him  the 
room  I  occupied.      I  saw  the  officer  entering,  but  did  not 


392  MY  ARREST  AND  CONFINEMENT     [ch.  xxix 

notice  the  armed  men  who  followed  him.  I  met  him  with 
a  sharp  remark  about  the  unwarranted  intrusion  into  a  pri- 
vate house  at  such  an  early  hour,  however  important  might 
be  the  errand,  but  the  officer  at  once  answered  me  that  he 
had  an  order  to  arrest  me.  During  this  time  the  room  was 
filled  with  a  crowd  of  armed  soldiers.  At  my  request  to 
show  me  any  papers  they  might  have,  they  showed  me  a 
letter  of  small  size,  I  should  say  of  ladies'  note-paper,  in 
the  personal  hand-writing  of  Kerensky  giving  orders  to  Lieu- 
tenant Kouzmin,  "  On  receiving  this  I  order  you  to  arrest 
General  Gourko,"  and  signed  "  A.  Kerensky."  I  was  struck 
by  the  pin-point,  quite  unmanly  writing.  At  the  same  time 
Lieutenant  Kouzmin  declared  that  he  was  obliged  to  make  a 
search,  but  for  this  he  was  awaiting  the  judicial  authorities. 
He  proposed  to  me  to  follow  him  without  waiting  for  the 
search.  I  refused  this,  declaring  that  it  was  not  guaranteed 
to  me  that  they  were  Incapable  of  putting  among  my  papers 
those  that  did  not  belong  to  me.  To  such  a  declaration 
Lieutenant  Kouzmin  agreed,  and  we  began  to  wait  for  the 
arrival  of  the  judicial  authorities. 

Lieutenant  Kouzmin  was  the  assistant  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Petrograd  Military  District.  This  post,  di- 
rectly after  the  Revolution,  was  occupied  by  General  Kor- 
nlloff,  who  was  chosen  by  the  Provisional  Government,  and 
was  now  replaced  by  General  Vasllkovsky,  who  served  In 
the  Cossack  troops,  but  who  did  not  belong  to  the  Cossack 
element.  Vasllkovsky  was  friendly  with  such  people  as 
Tchernoff,  the  future  Minister  of  Agriculture  who  led  the 
socialistic  agricultural  reforms,  and,  at  the  same  time,  dur- 
ing the  days  before  the  Revolution  was  seeking  influence  for 
more  rapid  promotion  from  Grand  Dukes  and  Duchesses, 
the  common  type  of  person  who  after  the  Revolution  entered 
into  power. 


I9I7]  MY  ARREST  AND  CONFINEMENT  393 

From  conversation  which  arose  by  telephone  I  under- 
stood that  the  judicial  authorities  would  not  come.  After- 
wards it  was  explained  that  the  Minister  of  Justice  refused 
to  sanction  the  decision  of  the  Provisional  Government  to 
call  me  before  the  Court,  as  he  did  not  see  any  crime  In  my 
actions.  The  letter  of  March  20th,  which  I  wrote  three 
days  after  the  Revolution  to  the  Emperor  NIcolal  II,  could 
not  even  serve  them  as  an  excuse  which  they  could  present. 
They  did  not  find  its  contents  criminal,  and  besides  this,  the 
amnesty  granted  by  the  Provisional  Government  a  week 
after  the  Revolution  pardoned  any  such  action  on  my  part. 
For  the  search  two  young  officers  who  served  In  the  Inquiry 
Department  were  brought  in;  they  had,  of  course,  to  obey, 
especially  as  under  the  exceptional  conditions  during  the 
time  of  the  war  there  were  no  specified  formalities  for  carry- 
ing out  a  search.  It  was  already  11  A.  M.  when  I  got  Into 
the  motor  with  Lieutenant  KouzmIn  and  two  soldiers  armed 
with  rifles;  two  dragoons  followed  us  on  horseback.  In  this 
way  the  cortege  traversed  the  principal  streets  of  the  capital, 
awakening  the  astonishment  of  the  crowd.  The  Minister 
of  Justice  declined  giving  instructions  about  my  confinement 
in  Peter  and  Paul  fortress,  and  that  is  why  I  was  sent  to  the 
Staff  of  the  military  District  Headquarters  to  be  put  into  a 
room  guarded  by  two  sentinels.  On  the  second  day  of  my 
stay  a  circumstance  occurred  which  obliged  the  Provisional 
Government  to  send  me  to  the  fortress  of  Peter  and  Paul. 
To  the  chief  of  the  guard,  and  then  to  General  Vasilkovsky, 
came  an  officer  from  one  of  the  Guards  infantry  regiments, 
to  ascertain  If  the  report  about  my  arrest  were  true  which 
had  appeared  in  the  newspapers.  The  conversation  took 
rather  a  sharp  turn,  though  it  occurred  In  the  presence  of 
subordinates.  After  this  the  officer  departed,  but  during  the 
night  I  was  awakened  by  Lieutenant  KouzmIn,  who  stated 


394  MY  ARREST  AND  CONFINEMENT     [ch.  xxix 

that  they  were  sending  me  to  the  fortress  of  Peter  and 
Paul. 

After  my  arrival  at  this  place  they  read  to  me  the  rules 
which  were  to  be  observed  with  respect  to  all  who  were  con- 
fined in  the  bastion  of  Troubetzkoy.  This  is  one  of  the  old- 
est buildings  in  the  fortress,  where,  in  former  times,  con- 
demned political  criminals  were  kept.  Rules  had  been  made 
by  Kerensky  and  confirmed  by  him  in  the  capacity  of  Minister 
of  Justice.  The  first  paragraph  said  that  in  the  bastion  of 
Troubetzkoy  of  the  fortress  of  Peter  and  Paul  persons  could 
be  confined  only  by  exclusive  orders  of  the  Minister  of  Jus- 
tice, which  at  this  time  Kerensky  was  not.  To  my  question 
to  the  commandant  why  this  rule  was  not  observed  with 
regard  to  me,  he  answered  very  confusedly  that,  in  spite  of 
himself,  he  was  obliged  to  obey  the  formal  order  received 
from  the  Provisional  Government.  The  regime  to  which 
those  confined  in  the  bastion  were  subject,  I  must  say,  if 
applied  in  regard  to  those  who  were  condemned  by  the 
Court,  was  not  especially  severe,  but  if  applied  to  those  in- 
carcerated only  by  the  instructions  of  the  Minister  of  Justice 
and,  moreover,  against  his  opinion,  cannot  be  said  to  have 
been  an  improvement  on  the  behaviour  of  the  former  Gov- 
ernment during  the  time  of  the  Monarchy. 

Five  days  after  my  stay  at  the  bastion  I  was  told  that  the 
regime  would  be  in  a  great  measure  changed  for  the  better. 
I  afterwards  learnt  that  the  reason  for  it  was  the  confine- 
ment in  the  bastion  of  some  Bolsheviks.  After  their  confine- 
ment they  immediately  requested  the  Government  to  be  al- 
lowed to  wear  their  own  clothes  and  not  those  of  the  prison, 
and  to  receive  food  from  their  houses  or  restaurants,  and 
that  the  time  of  their  daily  walk  should  be  longer.  At  this 
time  the  Provisional  Government,  unable  to  find  a  reason 
for  my  accusation,  but  obliged  to  conform  to  the  general 


191 7]  DEPARTURE  TO  ENGLAND  395 

opinion  and  to  the  voice  of  the  Press,  was  looking  for  a 
loophole  to  justify  my  arrest.  Almost  every  three  days  they 
made  new  decisions.  One  day  it  was  decided  to  give  me  my 
freedom;  then  this  decision  was  changed  before  my  libera- 
tion. I  should  have  to  be  dismissed  from  military  service. 
At  last  they  decided  to  edict  a  law  by  which  the  Minister 
of  the  Interior  and  Minister  of  War  by  mutual  agreement 
could  give  instructions  to  send  any  person  beyond  the  fron- 
tier of  the  country  if  they  thought  him  dangerous  to  the  new 
form  of  Government,  and  to  the  preservation  of  the  "  lib- 
erty "  attained  by  the  Revolution.  In  this  way  the  liberty  of 
every  separate  person  on  the  grounds  of  this  law  depended 
upon  the  opinion  of  two  persons  who  were  not  obliged  to 
give  an  account  to  anybody  of  their  doings.  But  much 
earlier  than  this  the  commandant  of  the  fortress  had  re- 
ceived an  order  to  give  me  other  quarters  in  the  fortress,  and 
to  change  the  regime  which  was  observed  in  regard  to  me. 
It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  under  new  conditions  everyone 
could  call  upon  me  by  permission  of  the  commander,  who,  I 
must  say,  did  not  refuse  it  to  anybody.  My  wife  was  al- 
lowed to  live  with  me  and  she  could  freely  leave  the  fortress 
or  return  to  it  at  any  hour.  Questions  to  the  persons  belong- 
ing to  the  Provisional  Government  about  the  reason  for  my 
arrest  and  the  time  of  my  release  produced  promises,  which 
were  not  carried  out  at  the  end,  the  Provisional  Government 
declaring  that  they  were  obliged  to  send  me  abroad  as  a 
person  "  dangerous  to  the  Republic."  This  was  at  the  time 
when  the  Republic  was  not  yet  declared  by  the  decree  of  the 
Government. 

When  the  Government  decided  on  my  departure  abroad, 
the  difficulty  arose  that  I  was  on  active  service.  It  was 
necessary  to  find  a  reason  for  my  release  from  the  service. 
To  my  wife  came  General  Adrianoff,  sent  by  the  Provisional 


396  DEPARTURE  TO  ENGLAND  [ch.  xxix 

Gov^ernment  asking  her  to  persuade  me  to  apply  for  my 
resignation.  My  wife  refused  to  give  me  such  a  message. 
At  last,  on  September  8th,  at  night,  two  commissaries 
came  from  the  Provisional  Government  and  told  me  the 
proposal  of  the  Government  that  I  should  go  abroad 
in  the  shortest  time  possible.  I  agreed  to  this  only  on  con- 
dition that  I  should  have  three  days  for  arranging  my  private 
affairs.  At  the  same  time  they  declared  that  in  the  case  of 
my  refusing  to  carry  out  the  decision  of  the  Provisional 
Government  I  should  be  sent,  accompanied  by  a  convoy,  to 
distant  Siberia.  One  may  ask,  was  there  a  difference  be- 
tween the  instructions  of  the  Provisional  Government  and 
those  which  were  abolished  by  them?  Perhaps  the  dif- 
ference was  that  in  former  times  a  person  who  was  in  the 
service  would  not  be  subjected  to  such  treatment  before  he 
was  dismissed.  With  regard  to  me  they  hesitated  to  give 
the  order  for  my  dismissal.  In  the  end  they  decided  it  in  a 
most  simple  way:  an  order  was  issued  announcing,  without 
any  reason,  my  dismissal. 

It  ought  to  be  said  that  during  my  month's  stay  in  the 
fortress,  except  the  commander,  I  had  not  seen  any  agent 
of  the  Government  and  still  less  of  the  Judicial  Depart- 
ment. The  Provisional  Government  intended  to  send  me 
abroad  via  Sweden,  but  it  was  not  in  their  power,  as  the 
Bolsheviks  who  ruled  in  Helsingfors  did  not  observe  any 
instruction  of  the  Provisional  Government,  and  decided  not 
to  pass  through  Finland  persons  who  were  sent  abroad  by 
the  instructions  of  the  Provisional  Government.  During 
the  three  days  in  which  I  was  free  in  Petrograd,  the  attempt 
of  General  Korniloff  to  inaugurate  a  thorough  reform  in 
the  replacing  of  several  persons  in  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment took  place.  Without  going  into  the  details  of  this 
affair,  it  is  enough  to  say  that  the  previous  instructions  for 


I9I7]  DEPARTURE  TO  ENGLAND  397 

occupying  Petrograd  by  the  troops  faithful  to  the  Provi- 
sional Government  were  made,  not  only  with  the  knowledge 
of  Kerensky,  but  according  to  his  instructions.  But  these 
instructions  were  no  secret  to  the  Petrograd  Soviets.  Ker- 
ensky, questioned  by  the  Soviets,  at  once  denied  his  loyalty 
to  Korniloff,  and  not  only  gave  instructions  about  the  send- 
ing away  of  the  troops  from  the  capital,  but  even  dismissed 
Korniloff  from  his  post.  For  the  latter,  however,  the  lot 
was  already  cast.  He  had  nothing  else  to  do  but  to  try 
and  carry  out  the  plan  agreed  upon.  In  the  case  of  his 
success  the  entire  difference  of  the  affair  would  be  that 
Kerensky  would  not  be  of  the  future  Government  as  was  the 
intention.  The  fact  that  the  authorities  in  Petrograd,  who 
should  have  been  loyal  to  Korniloff,  became  hostile  brought 
the  plan  to  complete  failure.  Korniloff's  "  Coup  d'Etat  " 
did  not  even  come  to  an  armed  collision. 

When  it  was  clear  that  it  was  impossible  for  the  Govern- 
ment to  send  me  by  Finland,  it  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
it  was  necessary  to  arrest  me  again.  When  I  was  informed 
of  this  I  demanded  to  be  given  time  for  arranging  my  own 
affairs,  after  which  I  proposed  to  return  by  myself  to  the 
fortress,  seeing  no  sense  in  repeating  the  comedy  of  my 
arrest.  On  the  fourth  night  after  my  release  from  the 
fortress  I  voluntarily  returned  there.  Nevertheless  some 
newspapers  alleged  that  I  was  trying  to  avoid  arrest,  but 
was  caught  and  was  accompanied  to  the  fortress  by  a  strong 
escort.  If  it  entered  my  plans  I  would  not  have  considered 
it  a  crime  nor  a  breach  of  the  law,  because  I  considered 
my  arrest  unlawful.  But,  in  order  to  tell  the  truth,  I 
wanted  to  publish  in  the  papers  a  contradiction  of  this  news 
and  an  explanation  of  how  events  had  happened.  How- 
ever, the  censor  did  not  allow  the  newspapers  to  publish 
such  an  explanation.     It  was  only  a  small  incident  confirm- 


398  DEPARTURE  TO  ENGLAND  [ch.  xxix 

ing  how  by  this  time  the  shadow  of  the  freedom  of  the 
Press  had  disappeared.  It  was  just  then,  when  all  the 
numerous  Soviets  which  had  spread  over  the  whole  of 
Russia,  and  the  Provisional  Government  with  them,  an- 
nounced the  coming  counter-Revolution.  But  when  the 
newspapers  wanted  to  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
counter-Revolution  had  already  happened,  thanks  to  the 
fact  that  not  one  of  the  liberties  which  were  proclaimed  by 
the  Revolution  could  be  realised,  the  Press  was  not  allowed 
to  publish  it. 

After  a  week  of  my  second  confinement  in  the  fortress  the 
Provisional  Government  decided  to  give  me  permission  to 
leave  the  country  by  Archangel.  The  Provisional  Govern- 
ment was  apparently  so  interested  at  my  departure  that 
it  personally  asked  the  British  authorities  in  Archangel 
through  the  British  Embassy  to  help  me  to  pass  through 
organisations  of  the  Soviets  at  that  place,  as  they  might 
not  consider  the  instructions  of  the  Provisional  Government. 
The  kindness  of  the  British  authorities  in  Archangel  was 
shown  to  me  in  full.  On  September  19th  I  left  Petrograd, 
and  on  the  21st,  before  evening,  Admiral  Kemp,  who  com- 
manded the  British  naval  forces  in  Archangel,  offered  me 
and  my  wife  the  use  of  his  yacht,  on  which  he  displayed  his 
flag,  while  awaiting  the  day  of  the  departure  of  the  English 
passenger  ship,  the  Umthali. 

In  such  a  way,  two  days  after  my  departure  from  Petro- 
grad, thanks  to  the  help  of  the  Provisional  Government  and 
the  kindness  of  the  British  authorities,  I  found  myself  on 
English  territory.  But  I  only  arrived  on  English  soil  on 
October  15th,  19 17.  Our  voyage  on  board  the  Umthali 
and  the  stops  which  we  were  obliged  to  make  on  the  way, 
lasted  about  three  weeks. 


r. 


O 
'3 


^i  o  >:• 

■^   J  ^ 


.9  Si 

■^    o 


X 


APPENDIX  I 

THE  TSAR'S  ORDER  OF  THE  DAY 

ORDER  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY 

December  25TH,  1916 

It  is  now  more  than  two  years  since  Germany,  in  the  midst  of  peace 
and  after  secretly  preparing  over  a  long  period  to  enslave  all  the 
nations  of  Europe,  suddenly  attacked  Russia  and  her  faithful  Ally, 
France.  This  attack  compelled  England  to  join  us  and  take  part 
in  our  struggle. 

The  complete  disdain  which  Germany  showed  to  principles  of  in- 
ternational law  as  demonstrated  by  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium,  and  her  pitiless  cruelty  towards  the  peaceful  inhabitants  in 
the  occupied  provinces,  little  by  little  united  the  Great  Powers  of 
Europe  against  Germany  and  her  ally,  Austria. 

Under  the  pressure  of  the  German  troops,  which  were  well  pro- 
vided with  the  technical  aids  to  warfare,  Russia  as  well  as  France 
were  compelled  in  the  first  year  of  the  war  to  give  up  a  portion  of 
their  territory,  but  this  temporary  reverse  did  not  break  the  spirit 
of  our  faithful  Allies,  nor  of  you,  my  gallant  troops.  In  time,  by 
the  concentrated  efforts  of  the  Government,  the  inequalities  between 
our  own  and  the  German  technical  resources  were  gradually  reduced. 
But  long  before  this  time,  from  the  autumn  of  1915,  our  enemy  was 
unable  to  occupy  the  smallest  portion  of  Russian  soil,  and  in  the 
spring  and  summer  of  the  current  year  suffered  a  number  of  severe 
defeats  and  assumed  the  defensive  along  the  whole  front. 

His  strength  is  apparently  waning,  but  the  strength  of  Russia  and 
her  gallant  Allies  continues  to  grow  without  failing.  Germany  is 
feeling  that  the  hour  of  her  complete  defeat  is  near,  and  near  also 
the  hour  of  retribution  for  all  her  wrongdoings  and  for  the  violation 
of  moral  laws.  Similarly,  as  in  the  time  when  her  war  strength  was 
superior  to  the  strength  of  her  neighbours,   Germany  suddenly  de- 

399 


400  THE  TSAR'S  ORDER  OF  THE  DAY         [app.  i 

dared  war  upon  them,  so  now,  feeling  her  weakness,  she  suddenly 
offers  to  enter  into  peace  negotiations  with  her  enemies  indissolubly 
united  against  her. 

Particularly  she  desires  to  begin  these  negotiations  and  to  complete 
them  before  the  entire  elucidation  of  the  degree  of  her  weakness  and 
before  the  definite  loss  of  her  military  power.  At  the  same  time  she 
is  creating  a  false  impression  about  the  strength  of  her  Army  by 
making  use  of  her  temporary  success  over  the  Roumanians,  who  had 
not  succeeded  in  gaining  experience  in  the  conduct  of  modern  warfare. 

But  if,  originally,  Germany  was  in  the  position  to  declare  war  and 
fall  upon  Russia  and  her  ally,  France,  in  her  most  favourable  time, 
having  strengthened  in  war-time  the  Alliance,  among  which  is  to  be 
found  mighty  England  and  noble  Italy,  this  Alliance  in  its  turn  has 
also  the  possibility  of  entering  into  peace  negotiations  at  such  a  time 
as  it  considers  favourable  for  itself. 

This  time  has  not  yet  arrived.  The  enemy  has  not  yet  been  driven 
out  of  the  provinces  occupied  by  her.  The  attainment  by  Russia  of 
the  tasks  created  by  the  war  —  the  possession  of  Constantinople  and 
the  Dardanelles,  as  well  as  the  creation  of  a  free  Poland  from  all 
three  of  her  until  now  separated  provinces  —  has  not  yet  been 
guaranteed. 

To  conclude  peace  at  this  moment  would  mean  the  failure  to  utilise 
the  fruits  of  the  untold  trials  of  you,  heroic  Russian  troops  and  Fleet. 

These  trials,  and  still  more  the  sacred  memory  of  those  noble  sons 
of  Russia  who  have  fallen  on  the  field  of  battle,  do  not  permit  the 
thought  of  peace  until  the  final  victory  over  our  enemies.  Who  dares 
to  think  that  he  who  brought  about  the  beginning  of  the  war  shall 
have  it  in  his  power  to  conclude  the  war  at  any  time  he  likes? 

I  do  not  doubt  that  every  faithful  son  of  Holy  Russia,  those  who 
under  arms  are  fighting  in  the  firing  lines,  as  well  as  those  peacefully 
working  in  the  interior  for  the  increase  of  her  war  strength  or  the 
creation  of  her  industry,  will  be  convinced  that  peace  can  only  be 
given  to  the  enemy  after  he  has  been  driven  from  our  borders;  and 
then  only  when,  finally  broken,  he  shall  give  up  to  us  and  our  faithful 
Allies  reliable  proof  of  the  impossibility  of  a  repetition  of  the  treacher- 
ous attack  and  a  firm  assurance  that  he  will  keep  to  these  promises. 
By  the  strength  of  these  guarantees  he  will  be  bound  to  the  fulfil- 
ment in  times  of  peace  of  the  engagements  which  he  will  undertake. 

Let  us  be  firm  in  the  certainty  of  our  victory  and  the  All  Highest 


I9i6]  THE  TSAR'S  ORDER  OF  THE  DAY  401 

will  bless  our  standards  and  will  cover  them  afresh  with  glory,  and 
will  give  to  us  a  peace  worthy  of  your  heroic  deeds,  my  glorious 
troops  —  a  peace  for  which  the  future  generation  will  bless  your 
memory,  which  will  be  sacred  to  them. 

NiCOLAI. 


APPENDIX  II 

GENERAL  GOURKO'S  LETTER  TO  THE  TSAR, 
WRITTEN  FOUR  DAYS  AFTER  HIS  ABDI- 
CATION 

In  these  grievous  days  that  all  Russia  is  living  through,  and  which 
cannot  fail  to  affect  you  most  painfully  of  all,  allow  me,  Sire,  out  of 
heart-felt  affection,  to  send  you  the  following  lines,  in  the  conviction 
that  you  will  see  in  this  merely  the  need  I  feel  of  telling  you  with 
what  pain  I  and  millions  of  other  faithful  sons  of  Russia  have  learnt 
of  the  magnanimous  act  of  your  Majesty. 

Actuated  by  your  wishes  for  the  welfare  and  happiness  of  Russia, 
you  preferred  to  take  upon  yourself  all  the  consequences  and  the 
burden  of  what  had  occurred  rather  than  to  subject  the  country  to 
all  the  horrors  of  a  long  internecine  struggle,  or  —  what  would  have 
been  still  worse  —  to  expose  it  to  the  triumph  of  the  enemy's  arms. 
Your  conduct  will  receive  its  due  reward  from  history,  and  the  grate- 
ful memory  of  the  people.  The  knowledge  that  in  this  grievous 
moment  you  decided  without  hesitation  on  an  act  of  the  greatest  self- 
sacrifice  for  the  sake  of  the  integrity  and  the  welfare  of  our  country, 
to  which,  following  the  example  of  your  crowned  ancestors,  you  were 
always  loyal,  indeed  the  most  loyal  servant  and  well-wisher,  will 
serve  you  as  a  worthy  reward  for  the  unexampled  sacrifice  you  have 
made  on  the  altar  of  your  country. 

I  do  not  find  words  to  express  my  respect  for  the  greatness  of  the 
sacrifice  you  have  made,  both  in  your  own  case  and  in  the  case  of 
your  heir.  I  fully  understand  that  you  could  not  decide  to  give  up 
to  the  service  of  the  State  your  only  son,  who  within  four  years 
would  have  to  take  within  his  hands,  before  they  were  strong  enough, 
the  reins  of  government.  Moreover,  there  is  little  hope  that  by  that 
time  Russian  life  will  have  returned  to  its  ordinary  tranquil  course. 
But  the  ways  of  the  All  Highest  are  inscrutable,  and  it  may  be  it 
was  He  who  guided  you.     It  may  be  that  you  are  keeping  for  your 

402 


I9I7]         GOURKO'S  LETTER  TO  THE  TSAR  403 

son  the  possibility  of  a  more  regular  and  gradual  education  until  he 
is  mature,  that  he  may  make  a  wide  study  of  political  science  and 
become  acquainted  with  people  and  life,  so  that  in  due  time,  after  a 
stormy  period  of  life  in  the  service  of  the  State,  the  eyes  of  those 
that  wish  well  to  Russia  will  turn  to  him  as  the  hope  of  Russia. 
Fully  equipped  with  living  experience  and  the  knowledge  that  he  has 
gained,  he  will  then  be  able  to  take  over  his  lawful  heritage  for  the 
welfare  and  happiness  of  Russia. 

But,  apart  from  the  comparatively  distant  future,  it  is  impossible 
not  to  foresee  the  possibility  that,  after  painful  experience  of  internal 
troubles,  after  the  reconstruction  of  the  State  and  a  form  of  govern- 
ment for  which,  historically  and  socially,  the  Russian  people  is  far 
from  being  ready,  have  been  tested,  the  country  will  again  turn  to  its 
lawful  Emperor  and  Anointed  of  God.  The  past  history  of  peoples 
teaches  us  that  in  this  there  is  nothing  improbable,  and  the  exceptional 
nature  of  the  conditions  under  which  the  change  of  government  has 
taken  place  in  Petrograd,  and  the  fact  that  to  the  majority  of  people 
this  change  was  just  as  unexpected  to  us  as  it  was  to  your  Army, 
gives  ground  to  suppose  that  this  is  extremely  probable. 

The  possibility  of  this,  however,  involuntarily  compels  me  to  think 
of  those  events  w^hich  now  are  taking  place  in  Petrograd.  The  Pro- 
visional Government  has  now  proclaimed  and  is  carrying  out  a  full 
amnesty  of  all  those  people  who  suffer  punishment  for  political  crimes, 
whether  judicial  or  administrative.  At  the  same  time  it  is  imprison- 
ing your  former  faithful  servants,  who,  if  they  offended  in  anything, 
acted  at  any  rate  within  the  bounds  of  the  laws  existing  at  that  time. 
Such  conduct  with  regard  to  them  appears  to  infringe  that  very 
freedom  which  the  people  who  have  seized  power  proclaim  on  their 
banners. 

But  there  is  another  side  to  this.  If  one  can  foresee  the  possibility 
that  the  country  may  wish  to  return  to  a  state  of  law  and  order, 
then  it  is  necessary  that  those  w^ho  form  a  centre  able  to  unite 
around  themselves  all  who  care,  not  for  temporary  power,  but  for 
regular  development  and  for  gradual  evolution  of  the  Russian  people, 
must  not  be  stopped  by  the  memory  that,  in  a  time  when  their  ideals 
were  temporarily  defeated,  has  not  been  obtained  even,  if  necessary, 
by  exceptional  efforts  the  security  and  personal  liberation,  perhaps 
also  the  life  of  those  the  majority  of  whom  in  their  time  faithfully 


404  GOURKO'S  LETTER  TO  THE  TSAR       [app.  ii 

and  truly  served  their  country,  though  guided  perhaps  by  laws  which 
were  out  of  date,  but  nevertheless  legally  in  force. 

Allow  me.  Sire,  to  direct  your  attention  to  this  fact  merely  because, 
in  view  of  the  tremendous  events  which  are  so  quickly  advancing 
upon  you,  you  may  not  be  able  to  realise  all  the  importance  of  that 
step  which  in  the  future  may  have  incalculable  consequences,  both 
for  your  dj^nasty  and  for  the  fate  of  Russia.  Remembering  your 
unfailing  graciousness  towards  me  during  the  few  months  when  by 
your  will  I  was  called  upon  to  be  your  closest  assistant  in  the  High 
Command,  I  flatter  myself  with  the  hope  that  you  will  accept  with 
the  same  graciousness  the  out-pourings  of  my  heart,  which  suffers 
anguish  because  of  these  days  which  threaten  the  life  of  Russia,  and 
that  you  will  believe  that  I  have  been  guided  merely  by  the  feeling 
of  devotion  to  the  Russian  Monarch  which  I  have  inherited  from  my 
ancestors,'  who  always  had  the  courage  and  the  honesty  in  moments  of 
danger  to  the  Russian  State  to  express  to  their  Emperors  their  out- 
spoken opinion  and  the  whole  truth. 

Accept,  Sire,  my  sincere  wishes  to  see  brighter  days,  which  at  the 
same  time  must  herald  the  dawn  of  Russia  renewed  after  her  period 
of  trial,  and  accept  my  feelings  of  unbounded  devotion. 

Lutsk, 
March  /\.th  {old  style),  191 7. 


APPENDIX  III 

ORDER  OF  THE  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  OF 
THE  WESTERN  FRONT,  June  8th,  1917 

No  1832 


31 

Troops  of  the  Western  Front, 

As  you  have  learned  from  the  Ukaze  of  June  5th,  issued  by  the 
Provisional  Government,  I  have  been  retired  from  the  Chief  Com- 
mand. Duty  as  I  conceived  it  obliged  me  to  declare  to  the  Pro- 
visional Government  that  I  did  not  see  my  way  to  justify  the  con- 
fidence that  had  been  reposed  in  me  in  appointing  me  to  the  Chief 
Command  of  the  Western  Front. 

At  the  same  time  the  Government  offered  me  the  position  of  a 
General  of  Division ;  probably  it  would  have  been  in  the  cavalry,  as 
it  was  at  the  head  of  a  cavalry  division  that  I  participated  in  the 
fighting  during  the  opening  months  of  the  war.  In  principle  I  have 
no  objection  at  all  to  this  appointment,  for  there  was  nothing  in  the 
existing  circumstances  that  could  prevent  me  from  doing  my  duty 
at  the  head  of  a  division.  Owing  to  its  relative  smallness  I  should 
have  been  able  to  enter  into  personal  relations  with  this  force  and 
thus  to  exert  a  direct  influence  over  it.  Above  all,  I  should  have 
been  able  to  exercise  a  most  potent  means  of  influence  in  case  of 
emergency,  in  the  course  of  the  fighting,  that  is  to  say,  the  influence 
of  personal  example.  Not  only  Commanders-in-Chief,  but  also  the 
Commanders  of  Corps,  who  in  the  midst  of  a  battle  can  abandon 
neither  their  Headquarter  Staffs  nor  their  posts  of  observation,  are 
deprived  of  this  influence. 

While  rigorously  obeying  that  military  discipline  to  safeguard 
which  I  have  fought,  I  do  not  consider  that  I  have  the  right  to  enter 

405 


4o6  ORDER  OF  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF     [app.  hi 

into  fuller  details  on  this  question.  On  taking  my  departure  I  turn 
to  you,  my  dear  colleagues  and  comrades  in  arms,  and  I  declare  my 
conviction  that  if  the  Russian  troops  be  reassembled  under  the  colours, 
solely  to  remain  in  the  trenches,  my  presence  among  you  is  useless. 
But  if  you  are  really  ready  to  strike  a  formidable  blow  at  the  enemy, 
this  is  possible  only  on  one  condition  —  the  re-establishment  of  mili- 
tary discipline,  not  cruel,  but  sound  and  firm.  Such  discipline  must 
be  founded  on  the  sense  of  duty  which  prevails  among  those  who 
understand  the  meaning  of  that  word.  Such  men  are  the  faithful 
sons  of  our  country,  who  need  have  no  fear  of  the  rigours  of  justice 
or  of  disciplinary  measures,  for  these  are  not  intended  for  them. 
The  discipline  which  has  its  foundation  in  the  possibility  of  retribu- 
tion or  punishment  is  necessary  in  the  case  of  those  who  forget  their 
duties  towards  their  country.  These  always  have  formed,  and  al- 
ways will,  I  am  sure,  form  but  an  insignificant  proportion  of  the 
Army.  Nevertheless,  a  bad  example  is  contagious.  The  result  of 
this  military  discipline  can  only  be  advantageous  to  the  army,  for  at 
all  times  it  is  only  through  discipline  that  troops  have  been  enabled 
to  prove  themselves  a  faithful  weapon  and  a  sure  instrument  of  vic- 
tory. Never  can  an  army  suffer  so  much,  never  can  so  many  lives 
be  lost  in  vain  as  when  troops  losing  their  discipline  escape  from  the 
control  of  their  chiefs,  thus  turning  the  Army  into  an  easy  target 
for  the  enemy. 

If  the  Russian  Army  wants  to  fight;  if  it  has  taken  this  decision 
as  a  result  of  the  inflexible  and  free  will  of  the  people,  the  Army 
must  place  itself  voluntarily  under  the  sway  of  sound  military  disci- 
pline. Without  that  can  there  be  no  victory,  no  salvation  of  the 
country.  If  we  in  reality  wish  to  be  free  sons  of  our  country  and 
worthy  of  the  rights  conquered  for  us  by  the  Army  and  by  the  people, 
we  must  by  our  own  free  will  impose  on  ourselves  real  duties.  Of 
these  the  primary  one  for  every  soldier  is  that  of  submission  to  his 
Chief,  and  it  is  discipline  that  is  the  motive  power  of  this  submission. 
Another  most  important  point  in  the  life  of  a  soldier  is  that  he  should 
have  confidence  in  his  Chiefs  and  in  their  long  experience.  If  from 
the  generals  down  to  the  youngest  officers  we  demand  that  they  meet 
the  needs  and  wishes  of  the  soldiers,  then  on  his  part  the  soldier  must 
boldly  and  openly  meet  his  officer  and  his  Chief.  Both  must  re- 
ciprocally recognise  that  they  are,  in  the  first  place,  men,  and  then 
the  subordinate  must  be  regarded  by  his  superior  as  a  man  who  wants 


I9I7]         ORDER  OF  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  407 

care  and  solicitude  —  and  the  superior  must  be  regarded  by  his  sub- 
ordinate as  being  worthy  of  all  confidence  and  respect. 

This  is  my  farewell  to  you. 

After  a  period  of  service  together,  which,  though  brief,  was  spent 
in  days  that  were  exceptionally  trying  and  painful,  I  offer  you  my 
cordial  farewell  greetings  and  also  the  expression  of  my  profound 
gratitude  for  your  service.  If  some  among  you  have  incorrectly  and 
often  in  quite  a  contrary  sense  interpreted  their  rights  and  their  obli- 
gations, and  have  thereby  caused  much  mortification  to  myself,  as 
well  as  to  your  more  direct  chiefs,  others,  on  the  other  hand,  have 
during  the  trying  times  through  which  we  are  passing  set  an  example 
of  loyal  execution  of  duty  and  of  fidelity  to  your  sworn  oath.  Above 
all  do  I  turn  to  you  young  officers  and  in  particular  to  those  among 
you  who  have  grasped  the  nature  of  the  changes  that  have  been  ac- 
complished in  Russia  and  in  the  Army,  and  have  contrived  to  master 
the  mind  and  the  heart  of  your  younger  brothers-in-arms  in  order 
to  lead  them  through  these  troublous  days  of  liberty,  acquired,  but 
not  always  understood,  towards  the  road  of  duty  and  justice.  I  am 
aware  to  what  extent  your  path  has  been  strewn  with  obstacles,  but 
this  has  not  checked  you,  and  you  have  emerged  from  the  trial  with 
honour.  You  now  gather  the  fruits  of  the  troubles  you  have  en- 
dured, and  of  which  you  were  at  times  the  victims,  for  as  a  recom- 
pense you  have  obtained  the  confidence  and  affection  of  your  sub- 
ordinates. 

But  a  still  greater  reward  awaits  you  in  the  stormy  hour  of  war- 
like trial.  I  know  that  all  of  you  have  not  arrived  at  this  result, 
but  in  the  case  of  the  majority  of  you  it  was  not  lack  of  good  will, 
but  the  unhappy  circumstances  that  were  the  cause  of  that  failure. 
Be  not  discouraged ;  work,  strive  to  ameliorate  your  environment,  and 
success  will  be  yours.  The  greater  the  effort  to  attain  this  object, 
the  greater  will  be  the  moral  reward  that  success  will  bring  you. 

My  thanks  to  you,  my  assistants,  all  Chiefs,  superior  and  inferior. 
Do  not  think  that  I  have  not  realised  the  difficulties  of  the  onerous 
task  you  have  accomplished.  If  some  of  you  have  had  to  retire  from 
active  service,  the  greater  has  been  the  merit  of  those  who  remained 
at  their  post  to  work  in  the  reconstruction  of  the  Army  on  new 
principles.  Work  without  losing  hope,  for  the  hour  is  not  far  re- 
mote when  at  the  price  of  your  indefatigable  labours  and  according 
to  the  measures  of  the  central  authorities  the  Army  will  be  again  a 


4o8  ORDER  OF  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF     [app.  hi 

redoubtable  weapon  directed  against  the  enemy,  against  the  adversary 
who  already  dreams  of  us  as  of  a  negligible  force,  a  force  that  no 
longer  bars  his  access  to  his  object,  which  is  the  enslavement  of  the 
peoples,  and  the  achievement  of  his  greedy  designs  by  treading  under 
foot  the  rights  of  the  whole  of  humanity. 

My  thanks  to  you,  soldiers,  my  thanks  to  those  who  in  these  days 
of  trouble  have  not  allowed  themselves  to  be  carried  away  by  the 
appeal  incessantly  repeated  to  destroy  every  scrap  of  order  that  regu- 
lates our  lives,  which  could  but  lead  to  the  triumph  of  the  enemy  in 
his  struggle  with  an  Army  deprived  of  all  power  of  resistance  through 
decay.  My  thanks  to  those  who  have  not  allowed  themselves  to  be 
overcome  by  the  flattering  counsel  of  the  perfidious  enemy  and  did 
not  go  to  meet  him,  who  was  ready  to  give  you  the  kiss  of  a  Judas. 
In  particular  I  express  my  thanks  to  those  who,  with  all  the  strength 
of  their  moral  influence,  have  constrained  their  shaken  comrades  to 
execute  our  sacred  duty  to  the  country  and  who  by  every  means  have 
revived  the  fighting  spirit  of  our  valiant  regiments,  in  the  profound 
consciousness  of  the  justice  of  our  cause  and  in  the  unshakable  faith 
in  the  success  of  our  arms,  which  we  have  raised  in  the  defence  of 
the  peoples  against  enslavement  by  Germany  and  for  establishing  the 
right  of  the  people  to  obtain  a  life  of  freedom  and  welfare  for  the 
whole  of  Russian  life. 

My  thanks  to  you,  disinterested  workers  of  the  Military  Com- 
mittees. It  is  on  you  that  the  whole  burden  rests  of  the  restoration 
of  order  among  the  troops  until  the  complete  re-establishment  of  the 
authority  of  the  Chiefs,  wherever  the  authority  has  been  shattered 
by  the  senseless  and  often  involuntary  acts  of  badly-balanced  hot- 
heads. In  the  consciousness  of  the  responsibility  which  lies  upon 
you,  you  are  directing  and  pacifying  the  passions  that  have  been  un- 
chained. But  if  much  has  been  entrusted  to  you,  much  will  be  de- 
manded. Work  then  to  justify  the  confidence  that  has  been  reposed 
in  you,  and  in  full  consciousness  of  the  responsibility  that  rests  on 
you,  in  the  firm  certainty  that  your  labour  is  not  in  vain,  that  its 
final  result  must  bring  calm  to  the  troubled  spirits  as  well  as  the 
moral  strengthening  of  the  people  and,  as  a  final  result,  the  victory. 
Work  for  the  strengthening  of  the  influence  of  the  Chiefs,  without 
whose  support  no  warlike  effort  can  lead  to  the  success  desired,  and, 
as  a  consequence  of  the  success,  to  universal  peace. 

May  God's  aid  be  with  you  all,  from  the  humblest  to  the  highest, 


191 7]         ORDER  OF  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  409 

in  your  difficult  and  responsible  though  glorious  task.     As  for  my- 
self, bear  me  no  ill-will. 

This  Order  to  be  read  in  all  companies,  squadrons,  batteries,  and 
commands. 

(Signed)    Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Armies, 

General  of  Cavalry 

GOURKO. 


INDEX 


Aa  river,  286. 

Adrianoff,   General,   395. 

Aeroplanes,  German,  34,  172;  Rus- 
sian, 172. 

Alexander  Michailovitch,  Grand 
Duke,  214. 

Alexandra,  Empress  of  Russia,  char- 
acter, 184;  at  Mohileff,  218;  ru- 
mours of  her  sympathies  with  Ger- 
many, 287-289;  interview  with 
General  Gourko,  289 ;  reception  of 
the  members  of  the  Inter-Ally  Con- 
ference, 302. 

Alexeiefl,  General,  Chief  of  the  Im- 
perial General  staff,  9,  184;  career, 
10;  character,  10;  method  of  work- 
ing, II,  214;  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  north-west  front,  126,  135; 
illness,  204,  208,  210;  interview 
with  General  Gourko,  218;  recov- 
ery, 313,  322;  member  of  the  State 
Defence  Commission,  317;  recep- 
tion at  Mohileff,  322;  friendly  re- 
lations with  General  Gourko,  323; 
Conference  on  military  service 
rules,  364;  at  the  Conference  of 
Commanders-in-Chief,  at  Petro- 
grad,   369,   372;   dismissal,   377. 

Alexeieff,  Major-General,  Chief  of 
Staff,  163,  180,  190;  characteristics, 
164;    Quartermaster-General,    346. 

Allenstein,  attack  on,   53,   59-65- 

Allied  Armies,  Conference  of  repre- 
sentatives, at  Paris,  243;  the  prin- 
ciple of  unity  of  command,  291, 
299;  comparison  of  forces  and 
means  on  the  various  fronts,  294; 
Mission,  at  Petrograd,  292. 
Allies,  want!  of  co-ordination,  114; 
relations  with  Russia,  374. 


Andreieff,   General,    in. 

Angerburg,  43. 

Arapoff,  Captain,  208. 

Archangel,  398. 

Army,  Russian,  mobilisation,  1-8 ; 
system  of  "  hidden  reserves,"  6 ; 
forming  the  new  staffs,  6 ;  strate- 
gical development,  17;  attack  on 
Austria,  17;  impressions  of  aero- 
planes, 34;  work  of  the  cavalry, 
47,  50;  defeated  at  Tannenberg, 
73-76;  retreats,  82,  130,  134,  140, 
144-148,  240;  defeat  the  Austrians, 
86;  invasion  of  Galicia,  86,  114; 
capture  Lemberg,  86;  invasion  of 
Eastern  Silesia,  lor ;  trench  war- 
fare, 105 ;  shortage  of  munitions, 
117,  119-127,  158;  methods  of 
avoiding  retreat,  130;  supply  of  of- 
ficers, 131-133;  evacuate  Lemberg, 
140;  care  of  the  wounded,  152- 
157,  206;  food  supply,  156,  160, 
161,  230,  252,  255-258,  374;  mili- 
tary operations  in  Roumania,  238- 
240;  Conference  of  the  Command- 
ers-in-Chief, 251 ;  reorganisation, 
264-268;  formation  of  "position 
batteries,"  267;  reinforcements,  270; 
number  of  deserters,  271  ;  reception 
of  the  news  of  the  Tsar's  abdica- 
tion, 326;  Oath  of  Allegiance,  326; 
disorganisation,  341,  372,  387;  for- 
mation of  "storming"  battalions, 
356,  387;  duties  of  officers,  358; 
defeated  in  Galicia,  386;  farewell 
order  of  General  Gourko  to  the 
troops,  393-409. 
Arngold,  Captain,  163,  208. 
Augustoff  Canal,  51,  85,  90,  96; 
Woods,  victory  at,   112. 

411 


412 


INDEX 


Austria,  mobilisation  of  the  army, 
3 ;  military  operations  against  Rus- 
sia, i8,  86;  retreat,  86,  loi ;  ad- 
vance in  Italy,  174;  checked,  175; 
military  operations  in  Roumania, 
94. 

Babith,  Lake,  284. 

Bakeries,  use  of  movable,  in  war,  87. 

Baloueff,  General,  204;  in  command 
of  the  "  Special  Army,"  204. 

Baranowitchi,   148,  176. 

Baratoff,  General,  in  Persia,  264. 

Barbed  wire,  supply  of,  105,  129,  158. 

Bark,  N.  N.,  at  the  Inter-Ally  Con- 
ference, 297. 

Belaieff,  General,  at  the  Conference 
of  the  Commanders-in-Chier,  262; 
appointed  Minister  for  War,  275- 
278;  at  the  Inter-Ally  Conference, 
297;  on  the  Polish  question,  312. 

Benckendorff,  Count,  Ambassador  to 
Great  Britain,  250;  Chief  Marshal 
of  the  Court,   302;   death,   311. 

Beniksen,  Count,  at  the  Red  Cross 
Congress,   354. 

Berditcheff,  208. 

Berthelot,  General,  instructor  to  the 
Roumanian   army,  234. 

BezobrazofF,  General,  190. 

Bjorko,   agreement  signed  at,  2. 

"Bloc,"  meaning  of  the  term,   314. 

Bobrinsky,  Count,  Minister  of  Agri- 
culture, 225,  229;   duties,  229. 

Bogaevsky,  President  of  the  Confer- 
ence of  Cossacks,  383. 

Bolderoff,  Cornet,  gallant  exploit,  50. 

Bologoi,  332. 

Boris  Vladimirovitch,  Grand  Duke, 
214. 

Borjimovsky  Wood,  107. 

Bratiano,  M.,  at  Mohileff,  294;  at 
a  meeting  of  the  Inter-Ally  Con- 
ference, 290;  at  Petrograd,  308. 

Brest-Litovsk   fortress,   145,    147. 

Brussiloff,  General,  military  career, 
13;  opportunism,  14;  attacking  op- 
erations,   174-177,    192;    at   Berdit- 


cheff,  205,  208 ;  invasion  of  Aus- 
tria, 291 ;  on  the  Tsar's  abdication, 
333;  at  the  Conference  on  military 
service  rules,  364;  of  Commanders- 
in-Chief,  369,  370;  Generalissimo, 
378;  at  Minsk,  378;  ordered  to 
meet  Kerensky,  390;  dismissed,  391. 

Brzezany,  137. 

Buchanan,  Sir  George,  British  Am- 
bassador at  Petrograd,  at  the  Inter- 
Ally  Conference,  298 ;  interview 
with  General  Gourko,  374. 

Bug  river,   16. 

Bukarest,  defence  of,  235;  evacuated, 
238. 

Bukovina,   194. 

Bzura  river,  92,  105,  135,  142,  144. 

Carlotti,    Marquis,    at   the    Inter-Ally 

Conference,  298. 
Carpathian  mountains,  101,   114,  134. 
Cartridges,  supply  of,  123. 
Castelnau,  General,  at  the  Inter-Ally 

Conference,     298 ;     Order     of     St. 

George,  conferred,  304. 
Chantilly,   Conference  at,  263,  293. 
Coal,  supply  of,  159,  257. 
Coal-mines,   result   of  withdrawal   of 

men,  159. 
Commanders-in-Chief,    Conference   at 

Mohileff,    251,    262-273;    at   Petro- 
grad, 368-373. 
Conference  of  the  Front,  348-352. 
Constantine,   King   of   Greece,    eflForti 

to  maintain  neutrality,  310. 
Corn,  supply  of,  255. 
Cossacks,   character,   149;    Conference 

at   Novotcherkask,   383 ;    election   of 

the  "Ataman,"  382-386. 
Czech  question,  279,  304,  305. 

Daniloff,  General,  Quartermaster- 
General  of  the  General  Staff,  9; 
Chief  of  Staff,  179;  at  Pskoff,  179; 
at  the  Conference  on  military  serv- 
ice rules,  364,  365. 

Danube,  the,  240. 

Defence,  State,  Commission  of,  315. 


INDEX 


413 


Denikin,  General,  in  command  of  an 
army  corps,  236;  at  Minsk,  379, 
381. 

Dnieper,  the,  182 

Dniester,  river,  136,   138. 

Dobroudja,  evacuated,  240. 

Dolgorouky,     Major-General    Prince, 

185. 

Doukhonin,  Quartermaster-General  at 
the  Conference  on  military  service 
rules,  364. 

Doumergue,  Gaston,  at  the  Inter-Ally 
Conference,  298. 

Dragomiroff,  General,  at  the  Confer- 
ence on  military  service  rules,  364; 
the  Commanders-in-Chief,  369,  370. 

Druskeniki,  51;  attack  on,  90. 

Duma,  the  Imperial,  opened,  274; 
wishes  of  the  members,  314;  rela- 
tions with  the  Government,  318; 
Committee  of  Execution,  335. 

Durich,  the  Czech,  306. 

Dvina,  the,  348. 

Dvinsk,  148,  164,  173. 

Egorievsky,   General,   252. 

European  War,  19. 

Evert,    General,    135,    176;    on    the 

Tsar's    abdication,    333;    dismissed, 

339- 

Ferdinand,  King  of  Roumania,  239; 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army, 
239;   plot  against,   308. 

France,  military  operations  against 
Germany,  18;  treatment  of  the 
wounded,  153;  Revolution  com- 
pared with  the  Russian,   335. 

Frederiks,  Count,  Minister  of  the 
Court,  185,  288;  warning  to  Gen- 
eral  Gourko,   314. 

Frost-bite,  cases  of,  168. 

Galicia,  invasion  of,  86,  114;  Russian 

army  defeated,  386. 
Galitch,   capture   of,   386. 
Gases,  asphyxiating,  use  of,  106,  201- 

203. 


Gerard,  J.  W.,  American  Ambassa- 
dor to  Berlin,  2. 

German  army,  use  of  smoke  columns, 
26;  evacuate  Marggrabowa,  33; 
aeroplanes,  34,  172;  methods  of 
obtaining  information,  36;  observa- 
tion garrets,  36;  superiority  in 
guns,  40;  victory  of  Tannenberg, 
73-76;  plan  of  operations,  80;  at- 
tack on  Rennenkampf's  army,  81 ; 
superiority  of  the  troops,  84;  attack 
on  Warsaw,  88-92,  100;  treatment 
of  the  Poles,  88;  cruelties,  88, 
149;  defeated  by  Siberian  riflemen, 
91;  relations  with  the  Russian 
troops,  97 ;  retreat,  loi ;  use  of 
poison  gases,  106,  201-203 ;  inva- 
sion of  Roumania,  234;  advance 
stopped,  241 ;  military  operations  in 
winter,  310. 

Germany,  declares  war  against  Rus- 
sia, 2;  railways,  5,  72,  112;  mili- 
tary operations  against  France,  18; 
looting  in,  98 ;  supply  of  munitions, 
ii8;  declares  independence  of  Po- 
land, 246. 

Gilinsky,  General,  Commander-in- 
Chief  on  the  north-western  front, 
11;  career,   11;   at  Mohileff,  210. 

Golitzin,  Prince,  President  of  the 
Council  of  Ministers,  274;  quali- 
ties, 27s ;  entertains  members  of  the 
Inter-Aliy  Conference,  301 ;  Presi- 
dent of  the  Polish  Commission,  310. 

Golitzin,   Princess,   marriage,   226. 

Goremykin,  J.  L.,  on  autonomy  to 
Poland,  246;  murdered,  305. 

Goundsadze,  General,  in. 

Gourko,  General  Basil,  in  command 
of  the  ist  Army  Cavalry  Division 
in  Moscow,  19;  at  Suwalki,  20; 
temporary  Governor-General,  20; 
on  the  duties  of  a  Chief,  22,  31; 
treatment  of  his  subordinates,  22- 
24;  advance  on  Marggrabowa, 
25-33 ;  crosses  the  Prussian  fron- 
tier, 26,  97;  at  Angerburg,  43; 
operations  at  Widraennen,  54;   in- 


414 


INDEX 


structions  from  General  Rennen- 
kampf,  59;  dash  through  the  Ger- 
man lines  to  Allenstein,  59-70;  in 
command  of  the  ist,  2nd,  and  3rd 
Cavalry  Divisions,  73 ;  of  the  6th 
Field  Army  Corps,  103 ;  defence 
of  Lovvicz,  103 ;  in  charge  of 
eleven  divisions,  no;  sent  to  Gali- 
cia,  135;  at  Lemberg,  137;  on 
leave,  162;  in  command  of  the 
Sth  Army,  162,  167;  at  Dvinsk, 
164,  179;  inspection  of  the  work 
of  the  Staffs,  164;  issues  editions 
of  regulations  for  troops  in  posi- 
tion warfare,  170;  in  temporary 
command  of  the  northern  front, 
179;  report  on  Riga,  179;  in 
command  of  the  "  Special  Army," 
181,  195;  at  Mohileff,  181,  210, 
284,  322;  interviews  with  the  Tsar, 
188,  189,  210,  219,  249,  283,  317; 
at  Lutsk,  190,  324,  336;  inspection 
of  troops,  191,  203,  356-362;  tem- 
porary Chief  of  the  General  Staff, 
204;  his  wife's  work  as  a  Sister  of 
Charity,  205 ;  journey  to  Mohileff, 
207-210;  meeting  with  the  Grand 
Duke  Nicolai,  208;  duties,  211- 
217,  220;  interview  with  General 
Alexeieff,  218;  on  the  Polish  ques- 
tion, 245,  247,  311;  at  the  Con- 
ference of  the  Commanders-in- 
Chief,  262-273,  368-373  ;  at  Petro- 
grad,  278,  291,  365,  391;  inter- 
views with  Pokrovsky,  278;  with 
ministers,  279,  306;  with  Protopo- 
poff,  280-283 ;  with  the  Empress, 
289;  with  M.  Bratiano,  294;  at  the 
Inter-Ally  Conference,  296-304; 
the  Polish  Commission,  310;  rela- 
tions with  Goutchkoff,  314-317; 
member  of  the  State  Defence  Com- 
mission, 315;  friendly  relations 
with  General  Alexeieff,  323; 
lunches  with  the  Dowager-Empress, 
324;  instructions  to  Commanders  in 
the  abdication  of  the  Tsar,  326;  at 
Minsk,  329,  340,  374;  meeting  with 


his  wife  at  Lutsk,  336;  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  western 
front,  339;  on  the  disorganisation 
of  the  army,  340-343,  387;  at  the 
Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Commit- 
tee meeting,  346 ;  at  the  Conference 
of  the  Front,  349,  352;  the  Con- 
gress of  the  Red  Cross,  354;  criti- 
cism of  the  military  service  rules, 
364;  interview  with  Sir  G.  Bu- 
chanan, 374;  resignation,  376-380; 
farewell  order  to  the  troops,  379, 
405-409;  at  the  Conference  of  Cos- 
sacks at  Novotcherkask,  383,  385; 
speech  to  the  Cossacks,  384;  at  Kis- 
lovodsk, 386;  summoned  to  Head- 
quarters, 387;  arrested,  392;  letter 
to  the  Tsar,  393,  402-404;  confined 
in  the  Fortress  of  Peter  and  Paul, 
393-396,  397;  released,  396;  at 
Archangel,  398;  voyage  in  the  Urn- 
thali,  398. 

Goutchkoff,  A.  J.,  President  of  the 
War  Trade  Committee,  125;  po- 
litical views,  314;  relations  with 
General  Gourko,  314-317;  Presi- 
dent of  ihe  State  Defence  Commis- 
sion, 316;  Chief  of  the  Red  Cross, 
317;  Minister  of  War,  328;  at 
Pskoff,  332;  Minsk,  343;  reform  of 
the  Army,  343-346;  at  a  meeting 
of  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers' 
Committee,  346;  resignation,  365. 

Grabbe,  General  Count,  186. 

Graevo,   53,   54. 

Griffiths,  Sir  John  Norton,  mission  to 
Roumania,  300. 

Grodisko,  202. 

Grodno  fortress,  90,  145. 

Grotten,  Colonel,  69. 

Gumbinnen,  97,  103 ;  bombardment 
of,  82. 


Habaloff,    General,    commandant    of 

the  Petrograd   district  troops,  320. 
Hand  grenades,  use  of,  106. 
Henderson,  Arthur,  at  Petrograd,  330. 


INDEX 


415 


Hospital  trains,  in  Russia,  155. 
Hvostoflf,  M.,  225. 


Ignatieff,  Count,  Chief  of  Staff  of 
the  Guards,  190. 

Ignatieff,  Count,  Minister  of  Public 
Education,  227. 

Insterburg,  advance  on,  40. 

Inter-Ally  Conference  at  Petrograd, 
278,  291,  296-304. 

Italy,  advance  of  the  Austrians,   174. 

Ivangorod  fortress,  93,  94. 

Ivanoff,  Cornet,  brilliant  exploit,  51. 

Ivanoff,  General,  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  south-western  front,  9 ; 
characteristics,  9 ;  interview  with 
General  Gourko,  136;  at  the  Con- 
ference of  the  Commanders-in- 
Chief,  262. 

Jacobstadt,  167. 

Janin,   General,   head   of  the   French 

Mission  at  Mohileff,  250. 
Japanese  War,  87,  94,  119. 

Kaledin,  General,  capture  of  Lutsk, 
181,  190;  meeting  with  General 
Gourko,  191;  at  Tchernovitz,  195; 
at  the  Conference  of  Cossacks  at 
Novotcherkask,  383;  elected  Ata- 
man, 385. 

Kalisz,  loi ;  taken  by  the  Germans, 
88. 

Karepoff,   General,   iii. 

Kazan,  2. 

Kemp,  Admiral,  in  command  of  the 
British  naval  forces  in  Archangel, 
398. 

Kerensky,  A.,  Minister  of  War,  366, 
368 ;  at  the  Conference  of  Com- 
manders-in-Chief, 373  ;  tour  of  the 
armies,  375;  publishes  the  military 
service  rules,  376;  at  the  Confer- 
ence at  Mohileff,  390;  treatment  of 
General  Brussiloff,  390;  orders  the 
arrest  of  General  Gourko,  392. 

Kieff,  I,  208,  324. 


Kisliakoff,  Major-General,  appointed 
Assistant  Minister  of  Ways  and 
Communications,  259. 

Kislovodsk,  162,  382,  386. 

Kitchener,  Lord,  disaster  to,  293. 

Klembovsky,  General,  Assistant  to 
the  Chief  of  the  General  Head- 
quarters, 254;  at  the  Conference  of 
the   Commanders-in-Chief,   262. 

Koanda,  General,  conversations  with 
the  Tsar,  235;  appeal  for  help,  235. 

Kondratenko,  General,  defence  of 
Port  Arthur  fortress,  93. 

Konigsberg,  fortress  of,  47. 

Korniloff,  General,  197;  taken  pris- 
oner, 198;  escape,  198;  in  command 
of  the  25th  Army  Corps,  199;  char- 
acteristics, 199;  appearance,  200; 
appointed  Commander  -  in  -  Chief, 
391;  dismissal,  397;  failure  of  his 
"  Coup  d'Etat,"  397. 

Korschen,  capture  of,  52. 

Kourloff,  General,  at  Mohileff,  221. 

Koutouzoff,  Princess,  324. 

Kouzmin,  Lieutenant,  ordered  to  ar- 
rest  General   Gourko,   392. 

Kouzmin-Karavaieff,   General,   iii. 

Kovno  fortress,  83,  90,  145. 

Krakau,  loi. 

Kreutsburg,   148. 

Krivosheyn,  A.  W.,  Minister  of  Agri- 
culture, 229. 

Kruglanken,  Lake  of,  54. 

Kuropatkin,  General,  introduction  of 
movable  bakeries  in  the  Japanese 
War,  87;  Commander-in-Chief  on 
the  northern  front,  166;  character- 
istics, i66;  tour  of  inspection,  166; 
Governor-General  of  Turkestan, 
ij8.  _ 

Kvietzinsky,  General,  345. 

Lechitzky,   General,   195. 

Lemberg    (Lvoff),    136;    capture    of, 

86,  100;  evacuated,  141. 
Leoff,   General,   67 ;   thrown  from  hii 

horse,  67. 
Litvinoff,  General,  105. 


4i6 


INDEX 


Lobanoff,  Prince,  member  of  the 
Legislative  Delegation,  319. 

Lodz,  loi. 

Lombardy,  threatened  invasion  of,  94. 

Lomja,  38,  144. 

Looting,  cases  of,  98. 

Lotzen,  fortress  of,  24,  81. 

Loukomsky,  General  Quartermaster- 
General,  255;  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  387,  388. 

Lowicz,  103 ;  defence  of,  103. 

Lutsk,  207,  324;  capture  of,  i8i,  190; 
meetings  at,  328. 

Lvoff,  Prince,  President  of  the  Coun- 
cil of  Ministers,  338;  of  the  Confer- 
ence of  Commanders-in-Chief,  370. 

Lyck,  81. 

Machine  guns,  supply  of,  124. 
Mackensen,   General,  in  command  of 

army  corps  in  Austria,  116. 
Makaroff,  M.,  Minister  of  Justice,  at 

Mohileff,  220. 
Makedonsky,   Captain,  30;   killed,   52. 
Maklakoff,       M.,       Ambassador       to 

France,   319;   at  the   Conference  of 

the  Front,  348,  349. 
Malevanoff,  Captain,  59. 
Manchuria  campaign,  10,  15. 
Mannerheim,   General,   241 ;   in   com- 
mand of  the  White  Guards  of  Fin- 
land, 241. 
Marggrabowa,    advance    on,    25-33; 

evacuated,  33,  34;  destruction,  58. 
Maria  Feodorovna,  Dowager-Empress 

of  Russia,  entertains  General  Gour- 

ko,  324;  at  Mohileff,  334. 
Markoff,  General,  Chief  of  the  Staff, 

at  Minsk,   381. 
Marne,  battle  of  the,  72. 
Martson,   General,  75,  76. 
Maslennikoff,   M.,   at  the   Conference 

of  the   Front,   348,   349. 
Masurian  Lakes,   39,   53,   54. 
Maximovitch,        General        Aide-de- 

Camp,   211,   212. 
Meat,   supply  of,   for  the   army,    160, 

256. 


Meeshtchenko,  General,  In  com- 
mand of  the  2nd  Caucasian  Army 
Corps,  104. 

Mesopotamia,  military  operations  in, 
267,  386. 

Miassoiedoff,  Colonel,  Chief  of  the 
Gendarmerie  Administration,  20. 

Michael,  Grand  Duke,  refuses  to  be 
Emperor,  326,   327. 

Miliant,  General,  no. 

Milioukoff,  M.,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,   resignation,   366. 

Military  Administrative  Conference, 
251,  260. 

Military  service  rules  Conference  at 
Mohileff,  364;  at  Petrograd,  369; 
publication,  376. 

Miller,  Major-General,  Chief  of 
Staff,  171,  180. 

Milner,  Lord,  at  the  Inter-Ally  Con- 
ference, 298. 

Minsk,  329,  374;  Council  of  Work- 
men, 340;  meetings,  346;  Socialist 
delegates  at,  361. 

Mitau,  286. 

Mohileff,  10;  Headquarters  Staff  at, 
162,   181,   183,  210. 

Moscow,  19,  391. 

Mukden,  battle  of,  10. 

Murman   Railway,  258,  287. 

Narew,  river,   16,  85,  90,  95,  144. 

Neratoff,  M.,  at  the  Inter-Ally  Con- 
ference, 298. 

Nesteroff  Lieutenant,  "  loops  the 
loop,"  35. 

Nicolas  II,  Emperor  of  Russia,  agree- 
ment signed  at  Bjorko,  2;  at 
Dvinsk,  165;  Commander-in-Chief, 
183;  at  Mohileff,  184,  248,  323, 
334;  members  of  his  suite,  184,  212; 
military  duties,  186-188;  intervievys 
with  General  Gourko,  188,  189,  210, 
219,  249,  283,  317;  receives  M.  Tre- 
poff,  218;  at  Tsarskoe  Selo,  245, 
274;  signs  Ukaze,  249;  at  the  Con- 
ference, of  the  Commanders-in- 
Chief,    262-269;    leaves    Mohileff, 


INDEX 


417 


268 ;  entertains  members  of  the 
Inter-Ally  Conference,  301 ;  treat- 
ment of  M.  Rodzianko,  313;  abdi- 
cation, 326;  at  Pskoff,  332;  mani- 
festo, 333 ;  calm  and  self-control, 
334;  letter  from  General  Gourko. 
393  ;  Order  of  the  Day,  399. 

Nicolai  Nicolaievitch,  Grand  Duke, 
appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  Army,  7,  338;  resignation, 
i8i,  183,  338;  meeting  with  Gen- 
eral Gourko,  208;  appeal  to  the 
Polish  nation,  246 ;  on  the  Tsar's 
abdication,  333;  in  the  Crimea,  339. 

Nicolaieff,  137. 

Nicolaieffsky  Military  Academy,  8, 
10,  134. 

Nieman  River,  51,  85,  90. 

Niloff,   General,  65. 

Nostitz,  General  Count,  meets  the 
members  of  the  Inter-Ally  Confer- 
ence, 292. 

Novikoff,  Captain,  67. 

Novo-Alexandria,  136. 

Novogeorgievsk  fortress,  16;  capture 
of,  145. 

Novotcherkask,  Conference  of  Cos- 
sacks at,   382. 

Odessa,  i. 

Officers,  supply  of,  in  the  Russian 
Army,  130-133. 

Oldenburg,  Prince  Alexander,  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  Medical 
Departments,  243;   irascibility,  243. 

Oletzko,  Lake,  31. 

Olsoufieff,  P.  A.,  224. 

Osovetz  fortress,  95,   144,  145. 

Ouroussof,   Prince,   killed,    56. 

Paleologue,  M.,  at  the  Inter-Ally 
Conference,  298. 

Palitzin,  General,  Chief  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  316. 

Paris,  Conference  of  representatives 
of  the  Allied  Armies,  243. 

Paul  Alexandrovitch,  Grand  Duke, 
X90. 


Peter  and  Paul  fortress,  rules,  394. 

Petrograd,  i,  147,  391;  number  of 
the  garrison,  320;  Revolution,  328; 
causes  of,  331. 

Pflug,  General,  53 ;  in  command  of 
the  loth  Army,  58. 

Pleve,  General,  temporary  Com- 
mander-in-Chief on  the  northern 
front,   162,   165. 

Plieszkoff,  General,  in  command  of 
the  ist  Siberian  Corps,  359;  resig- 
nation, 360. 

Podolia,  18. 

Pokrovsky,  N.  N.,  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs,  278;  meeting  with 
General  Gourko,  278 ;  at  the  Inter- 
Ally  Conference,  296. 

Poland,  position,  15;  invasion  of,  88- 
91 ;  question  of  autonomy,  246,  304, 
310,  313  ;  promise  of  independence 
from  Russia,  246,  249 ;  Germany, 
246;  meeting  of  delegates,  355. 

Poles,  cruelty  of  the  Germans,  88. 

Polivanoff,  General,  Minister  of  War, 
319;  resignation,  319;  military 
service  rules,  363. 

Port  Arthur  fortress,  93. 

Posner,  presides  over  the  Council  of 
Workmen,  at  Minsk,  340,  346; 
President  of  the  Conference  of  the 
Front,  349. 

Postovski,  General,  77. 

Poustovoitenko,  Quartermaster-Gen- 
eral, 212. 

Presano,  General,  239. 

Protopopoff,  M.,  question  of  his  dis- 
missal 218-221;  at  Mohileff,  221; 
career,  222;  character,  223;  elected 
Vice-President  of  the  Imperial  Du- 
ma, 223;  delegate  to  Allied  coun- 
tries, 223;  in  London,  224;  Minis- 
ter of  the  Interior,  225 ;  interview 
with  General  Gourko,  280-283  i  Po- 
litical  programme,  282. 

Provisional  Government,  339;  au- 
thority, 340;  relations  with  the  So- 
viets, 331,  363;  reorganisation  of 
the    army,    340,    343-346;    appoint- 


4i8 


INDEX 


ment  of  new  members,  366;  Con- 
ference with  Commanders-in- 
Chief,  368-373;  at  MohileflF,  389. 

Prussia,  East,  campaign,  27,  38; 
reserves  of  food,  41,  98;  farms,  42; 
flight  of  the  inhabitants,  42;  inva- 
sion  of,  72. 

Przemysl  fortress,  siege  of,  loi,  105; 
surrender,  115;  retaken,  139. 

Psheloutsky,   General,   iii. 

Pskoff,   166,  178,  332. 


Railways,  influence  on  strategical 
operations,  48;  German,  112;  Rus- 
sian, 4,  72,  152,  242,  258,  320. 

Rasputin,  murder  of,  269,  272. 

Ratkevitch,  General,  in  temporary 
command  of  the   loth   Army,   53. 

Ratko-Dmitrieff,  General,  176;  in 
command  of  the  12th  Army,  284; 
result  of  his  local  advance,  284-287. 

Rava  river,  92,  105,  135,  142,  144. 

Red   Cross,   Congress,   meeting,   354. 

Rediger,  General,  Minister  of  War, 
316. 

Rennenkampf,  General,  reputation, 
12;  German  descent,  13;  charac- 
teristics, 13;  in  command  of  the  1st 
Army,  20;  operations  in  East 
Prussia,  38,  71,  81;  advance  on 
Insterburg,  40;  retreat,  53,  83;  in- 
structions to  General  Gourko,  59; 
pressure  of  the  German  troops,  81 ; 
tactical   errors,   102. 

Reval,  78. 

Revelstoke,  Lord,  at  the  Inter-Ally 
Conference,   297. 

Rifle,  the  five-clip  magazine,  120. 

Riga,  148,  178. 

Rikkel,  Count,  head  of  the  Belgian 
mission,  at  Mohileff,  182,  211. 

Rittich,  M.,  Minister  of  Agriculture, 
278;  interviews  with  General 
Gourko,    279,    307. 

Roditchefl,  M.,  at  the  Conference  of 
the  Front,  348,  349. 

Rodzianko,    M.    V.,    President   of   the 


Duma,  224,  226;  at  Mohileff,  225; 
marriage,  226;  oratorical  talent, 
226 ;  at  the  Polish  Commission, 
310;  interview  with  the  Tsar,  313; 
at    the    Conference    of    the    Front, 

349.   350- 

Rojitche,  190. 

Romanovsky,    Port,    292. 

Rominten    Forests,   20,   39,   96. 

Ronjin,  General,  Chief  of  the  Mili- 
tary Communications,   259. 

Root,   Senator,  at  Petrograd,  330. 

RostofiF,  388. 

Rostovtseff,  Count,  private  secretary 
to  the  Empress,  287. 

Roumania  joins  the  Allies,  193; 
military  operations,  193,  232,  234; 
agreement  with  Russia,  193;  assist- 
ance from,  232,  234;  character  of 
the  army,  234;  invasion  of,  234; 
condition  of  the  railways,  237,  242; 
the  roads,  238;  difficulties  of  ad- 
ministration, 294 ;  result  of  the  de- 
feat, 296;  destruction  of  oil-wells, 
300;    result  of   entry  into  the  war, 

309- 

Roussin,  Admiral,  Chief  of  the  Naval 
Staffs,  at  the  Conference  of  Com- 
manders-in-Chief,   262. 

Rudgieri,  Count,  at  the  Inter-Ally 
Conference,  298 ;  Russian  Order 
conferred,   304. 

Russia,  mobilisation  of  the  army,  i- 
8 ;  war  declared  against  Germany, 
2;  railways,  4,  72,  153,  242,  257, 
319;  military  operations  against 
Austria,  17;  character  of  the  for- 
tress, 94;  stock  of  munitions,  118; 
shortage,  119-128;  flight  of  the  in- 
habitants, 148-152;  epidemic  of 
scurvy,  156;  air-service,  172  ;  agree- 
ment with  Roumania,  194;  assist- 
ance to  her,  232,  235;  promises  au- 
tonomy to  Poland,  246,  249;  Revo- 
lution, 325,  330;  the  watchword, 
335,  371;  compared  with  the  French 
Revolution,  335;  relations  with  the 
Allies,  374. 


INDEX 


419 


Russia,  Tsarevitch  of,  at  Mohileff, 
185,  216;  illness,  283. 

Russky,  General,  in  command  of  the 
north-western  army,  109 ;  illness, 
162;  at  Pskoff,  179,  332;  authorises 
local  advance,  284;  on  the  Tsar's 
abdication,  333;  resignation,  386; 
at  Kislovodsk,  386;  summoned  to 
Mohileff,  387. 


Saharoff,  General,  162;  in  command 
of  the  Separate  Danube  Army,  233, 
240;  on  the  Tsar's  abdication,  333. 

Samsonoff,  General,  character,  13;  in 
command  of  the  2nd  Army,  at 
Lomja,  38;  at  Graevo,  53;  concen- 
tration on  the  East  Prussian  fron- 
tier, 71 ;  defeated  at  the  battle  of 
Tannenberg,  73-77;  death,  78. 

San  river,  86. 

Sarts,  disorders  in,  178. 

Sazonoff,  M.,  at  the  Inter-Ally  Con- 
ference, 298 ;  scheme  for  the  au- 
tonomy of  Poland,  304,  311,  312; 
Ambassador  to  Great  Britain,   311. 

Schwartz,  General,  commandant  of 
Ivangorod  fortress,  93. 

Scurvy,   epidemic   of,   in   Russia,    156. 

Selivanoff,    General,    115. 

Seliverstoff,    General,    222. 

Seret  river,  240,  241. 

Serge  Michailovitch,  Grand  Duke, 
Inspector  of  the  Artillery,  213;  at 
the  Conference  of  the  Commanders- 
in-Chief,  262;  at  the  Inter-Ally 
Conference,  299. 

Shahovskoy,  Prince,  Minister  of  the 
Board  of  Trade,  231;  interview 
with  General  Gourko,  307. 

Shaloya,  M.,  at  the  Inter-Ally  Con- 
ference, 298. 

Shataloff,  Lieutenant,   32. 

Sheideman,  Major-General,  172;  in 
command  of  the  48th  Army  Corps, 
272. 

Shells,  charged  with  asphyxiating 
gases,  io6. 


Shervashidzy,  Prince,   324. 
Shevtsoff,  Captain,  killed,  67. 
Shidlovska,     Volga,     spirit     distillery, 

attack  on,  io8-n2. 
Shingareff,  M.,  murder  of,  319. 
Shishkievitch,  General,  Chief  of  Staff, 

137.  234,  240. 

Shoulgin,  member  of  the  Duma,  319; 
at  Pskoff,   332. 

Shouvaeff,  General,  Minister  of  War, 
228 ;   character,  228. 

Shouvaeff,  M.,  at  the  Conference  of 
the   Commanders-in-Chief,  262. 

Shtakelberg,  General  Baron,   182. 

Siberian  Corps,  the  ist,  359;  regi- 
ments, transported  to  Warsaw,  91 ; 
defeat  the  Germans,  92. 

Silesia,   Eastern,    loi. 

Sivers,   General,   58. 

Skobeleff,  M.,  at  the  Conference  of 
the  Front,  248,  249 ;  of  the  Com- 
manders-in-Chief,  369,   372. 

Slavonic  question,  279. 

Sluysarenko,  General,  in  command  of 
the  5th  Army,  181. 

Smirnoff,  General,   iii. 

Smoke  columns,  use  of,  26. 

Socialist  delegates  at  Minsk,  361. 

Sochatoff,  104. 

Sokovnin,    General,    11 1. 

Soukhomlinoff,  General,  11,  94;  Min- 
ister of  War,   II,   16. 

Soviets  (Workmen's  and  Soldiers' 
Deputies)  Ukaze  No.  i,  328,  341; 
relations  with  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment, 330,  362;  at  the  Confer- 
ence of  Commanders-in-Chief,  369; 
disorganisation    of    the    army,    370, 

371,  372- 
Stalloupenen,  38,  96,  102. 

Stefanic,  M.  B.,  member  of  the  Czech 

National  Council,  279. 
Stohod  river,  344. 
Stremouchoff,   General,    iii. 
Stroudza,    General,    241;     plot,    308; 

flight,  309. 
Strounnikoff,    Dr.,    207. 
Stryj,   139. 


420 


INDEX 


Stuermer,  M.,  President  of  the  Coun- 
cil of  Ministers,   dismissed,  218. 

Suchomlin,   General,   325. 

Sugar,  supply  of,  for  the  Russian 
army,   161. 

Sulwalki,  19,  20. 

Tannenberg  Wood,   53,  73. 

Taranovsky,   Colonel,  26. 

Tatiana,   Grand  Duchess,   Committee, 

275- 

Taube,  General,   in. 

Tcherbatcheff,  General,  136;  at  the 
Conference  of  Commanders-in- 
Chief,  369,  370. 

Tchernoff,  M.,  at  the  Conference  of 
Commanders-in-Chief,  369. 

Tchernovitz,  194. 

Tchheidze,  M.,  at  the  Conference  of 
the  Front,  348,  351. 

Tereshtchenko,  M.,  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs,  366;  at  the  Confer- 
ence at  Mohilefl,  384. 

Thomas,  Albert,  at  Petrograd,  330. 

Thorn  fortress,   lor. 

Transylvania,  Russian  troops  in,  193, 
197. 

Tregouboff,   General,   no. 

Trench  feet,  cases  of,  168;  warfare, 
105. 

Trepoff,  Alexander  F.,  President  of 
the  Council  of  Ministers,  218;  in- 
terview with,  the  Tsar,  218;  wish 
to  have  M.  Protopopoff  dismissed, 
218-221;   resignation,  274. 

Trotzky,  M.,  248. 

Tsheglovitoif,  M.,  President  of  the 
Imperial   Council,   304,   311. 

Tutcheff,   Cornet,   69. 

Tzeretelli,  M.,  at  the  Conference  of 
the  Front,  348,  351;  the  Command- 
ers-in-Chief, 369,  373. 

Umthal'i,  the,  398. 

Vandervelde,  M.,  at  Petrograd,  330. 


Vasilieff,   General,   in. 

Vasilkovsky,  General,  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Petrograd  Military 
District,    392. 

Vistula  river,  15,  18,  89,  90,  96,  loi, 
102,    141. 

Voeikoff,  General,  185,  269. 

Voinovsky-Krigier,  M.,  Minister  of 
Ways  and  Communications,  259, 
278;  interview  with  General  Gour- 
ko,  279,  307. 

Volhynia,  18,  141. 

Volynsky  Regiment,  331. 

Vyrouboff,  Commissary  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government  at  Minsk,  381. 

War,  European,   19. 

War  Trade  Committee,  125. 

Warsaw,  15-18,  100;  attack  on,  88- 
93  ;  surrender,  147. 

Waters,  General,  182. 

Widmennen,  54. 

William  II,  Emperor  of  Germany, 
agreement  signed  at  Bjorko,  2;  pro- 
posals for  peace,  248. 

Williams,  General  Sir  John  Hanbury, 
182,  210. 

Wilson,  General  Sir  Henry,  at  the 
Inter-Ally  Conference,  298;  Rus- 
sian Order  conferred,  304. 

Wounded,  care  of  the,  in  Russia,  152- 
157,  206. 


Yanushkevitch,     General,     appointed 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  8. 


Zaharoff,   General,   no. 

Zamjitsky,   Lieutenant-Colonel,   171. 

Zbaraz,   141,   163. 

Zegrie  fortress,  destruction,  16-18. 

Zerebkoff,  General,  at  Novotcherkask, 

383. 
Zviagintseff,    A.    J.,    member    of    the 

State  Defence  Commission,  315. 


PRINTED    IK    THE    UNITED    STATES    OF    AMEEIOA 


'T'HE  following  pages  contain  advertisements  of  a 
few  of  the  Macmillan  books  on  kindred  subjects. 


A  NEW  BOOK  BY  ERNEST  POOLE 

The  Village:  Russian  Impressions 

By  ERNEST  POOLE, 

Author  of  "  The  Dark  People,"  "  His  Second  Wife," 
•'  The  Harbor,"  etc. 

Illustrated,  $1.50 

With  the  advent  of  Allied  intervention  in  Russia,  Mr.  Poole's 
new  book  has  an  immediate  and  inescapable  importance.  During 
the  early  days  of  revolution,  he  met  an  old  friend  who  invited 
him  to  his  small  estate  in  the  north  of  Russia.  With  this  Tara- 
sov,  a  delightful  character,  as  his  interpreter,  he  ranged  the  neigh- 
borhood, talking  with  peasants  in  their  huts ;  with  the  vagabonds 
camped  at  night  on  the  riverside ;  with  the  man  who  kept  the 
village  store ;  with  the  priest,  the  doctor,  the  school  teacher,  as 
well  as  with  the  saw-mill  owner.  The  personal  narrative  record- 
ing their  views  supplements  Mr.  Poole's  recent  forceful  book  on 
the  situation  at  the  time  of  the  crisis. 

"  I  am  writing  this  true  narrative  of  a  village  in  Russia  in  Aug- 
ust, 19 17,  because  it  is  there  in  the  heart  of  the  country  that  the 
great  mass  of  the  Russians  dwell.  These  are  the  people  we  must 
understand  if  we  are  to  show  ourselves  their  friends.  If  we  do 
not  help  them,  Germany  will ;  and  if  Germany  is  allowed  to  domi- 
nate Russia  now,  the  war  is  lost  for  democracy.  But  because  if 
ever  there  was  a  time  to  tell  the  truth,  it  is  in  this  world  crisis,  I 
shall  speak  for  the  truth  as  nearly  as  in  me  lies.  I  shall  not 
idealize,  I  shall  try  to  describe  these  people  exactly  as  I  found 
them." —  Foreword. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publishers     64-66  Fifth  Avenue     New  York 


MR.  POOLE'S  RECENT  BOOK  ON  RUSSIA 

The  Dark  People:  Russia's  Crisis 

By  ERNEST  POOLE, 
Author  of  "  The  Harbor,"  "  His  Family,"  "  His  Second  Wife." 

Cloth,  i2mo,  $1.50 

"  We  have  read  no  book  which  got  closer  to  the  heart,  or  to 
the  multitudinous  hearts  of  the  Russian  people  of  all  classes  and 
conditions,  and  which  more  graphically  revealed  the  contents 
thereof  to  the  reader's  vision." — New  York  Tribune. 

"  Deep  in  understanding  and  deserving  of  careful  attention 
.  .  .  the  most  important  book  about  Russia  that  has  appeared 
since  the  Revolution." — Boston  Post. 

"  A  sincere,  unpretentious  and  strikingly  successful  attempt  to 
get  at  the  mind  and  heart  of  these  people  in  the  midst  of  the 
Revolution." —  N.  Y.  Evening  Post. 

"  A  valuable  book  .  ,  .  sane  and  informative  .  .  .  shows 
close  study  by  an  impartial  mind." —  New  York  Herald. 

"  A  beautiful  work.  Ernest  Poole  has  the  leisure  and  the  pa- 
tience thoroughly  to  digest  the  material  .  .  .  one  is  sure  of  get- 
ting sober  second  thought  rather  than  hurried  first  impressions 
.  .  .  accordingly  one  of  the  possibly  permanent  literary  contri- 
butions of  the  Russian  revolution." —  Chicago  Herald. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publishers     64-66  Fifth  Avenue     New  York 


The  Recollections  of  a  Russian 

Diplomat:   The  Suicide  of  Monarchies 

By  baron  EUGENE  de  SCHELKING 

Illustrated,  $2.00 

Besides  being  an  amazing  and  stirring  story,  this  is  a  perma- 
nently important  historical  document.  It  epitomizes  the  case  of 
the  people  and  democratic  government  against  government  by 
autocracies  and  shamming  chancellories.  The  writer  has  had 
unusual  opportunities  for  personal  acquaintance  with  European 
Royalties  and  diplomats,  and  in  these  memoirs  he  gives  only  per- 
sonal experiences  and  first  hand  information.  He  escaped  from 
Russia  by  pawning  his  wife's  jewels.  He  came  to  Canada  and 
electrified  the  readers  of  American  papers  by  his  revelations  of 
court  life  in  the  Balkans.  He  foresaw  the  inevitable  end  of 
monarchy :  there  never  was  a  clearer  case  of  suicide.  His  vol- 
ume opens  with  an  account  of  the  closing  years  of  the  reign  of 
Alexander  HI ;  then  comes  the  story  of  Nicholas  and  his  minis- 
ters. The  German  Emperor  and  his  relations  with  Nicholas,  the 
leading  actors  in  the  Balkan  affairs,  the  negotiations  preceding 
Roumania's  entrance  into  the  war,  the  conditions  of  the  court 
under  the  influence  of  Rasputin,  and  the  character  of  the  chief 
ministers,  are  some  of  the  topics  taken  up  in  the  different  chap- 
ters. Finally  there  is  a  section  discussing  the  course  of  the  Rus- 
sian Revolution. 


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The  Flaming  Crucible 

By  ANDRE  FRIBOURG 
Translated  by  A.  B.  Maurice 

$1.50 
Under  the  title  Croirc,  this  autobiography  of  a  French  infan- 
tryman was  published  in  Paris  in  1917.  It  is  a  revelation  of  the 
French  spirit.  It  is  rather  a  biography  of  the  spirit,  than  an 
account  of  the  amazing  experiences  M.  Fribourg  encountered, 
from  191 1  at  Agadir,  through  the  fighting  on  the  Meuse,  and 
part  of  the  campaign  in  Flanders.  The  descriptions  are  mem- 
orable for  their  beautiful  style,  their  pathos  or  their  elevation. 
There  is  a  definite  climax  toward  the  end  where  M.  Fribourg  re- 
turns to  a  hospital  in  Paris,  broken  and  dulled,  his  faith  momen- 
tarily befogged.  Gradually  he  readapts  himself,  regains  and 
confirms  his  faith  in  the  human  spirit  that  was  so  vivid  when  he 
lived  with  his  fellow  soldiers. 

Behind  the  Battle  Line 

By  MADELEINE  Z.  DOTY 

Cloth,  $1.25 

What  are  the  women  of  the  world  planning  for  the  future? 
To  find  that  out.  Miss  Doty  made  a  trip  around  the  world.  She 
takes  you  into  the  heart  of  each  nation  she  visited  —  Japan, 
China,  Russia,  Norway,  Sweden,  England  and  France.  The  dif- 
ferences in  civilization  are  vividly  shown,  mainly  through  the 
daily  thought  and  life  of  the  women.  "  Behind  the  Battle  Line: 
Around  the  World  in  1918  "  depicts  the  great  spiritual  struggle 
that,  beside  the  physical  battle,  engulfs  the  world. 

The  War  and  the  Future 

By  JOHN  MASEFIELD 

Author  of  "  Gallipoli,"  "  The  Old  Front  Line,"  etc. 

Cloth,  $1.25 

"  It  was  well  to  reprint  these  lectures,  and  it  will  be  well  for 
the  book  to  have  the  widest  possible  reading  and  permanent  pres- 
ervation for  rereading.  .  .  .  No  man  in  the  world  today  has  a 
more  searching,  accurate,  and  divinely  just  spiritual  vision  of  the 
war  and  of  the  issues  involved  in  it.  .  .  .  If  ever  a  book  was  in- 
spired, this  was." —  A'^.  Y.  Tribune. 

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3   1205  00168  2077 


